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Abstract 
This thesis offers a reconstruction and analysis of a debate about responsibility, and 
causation initiated by Plato, and continued by the Stoics. The pivotal moment of the 
discussion is a problem I call ‘the greatest difficulty,’ found in Plato’s Parmenides. The 
debate, however, involves a complex network of arguments including subordinated or 
parallel discussions about ontology, method, ethics, and epistemology. Instead of isolating 
the main topic, I highlight the structure of the debate, and the interconnection between its 
parts, to show the complexity and sophistication of the argumentation in both Plato and the 
Stoics, and the depth of the Stoics’ engagement with Plato’s works. 
The motivation for doing this is to better understand many of the otherwise 
unexplained and odd starting points of the early Stoic philosophy. But since this requires a 
reconstruction of the dialectical background the Stoic texts assume, this means that the bulk 
of the thesis is devoted to discussing Plato. The hope is that by showing the structure of the 
debate in Plato’s dialogues, the connections in the Stoic fragments will show with more 
clarity. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first two are dedicated to Plato’s 
discussion of causality and responsibility in Phaedo 95e8-105c7, and Republic 6, 506d7-
509c4. The third chapter discusses ‘the greatest difficulty’ in Parmenides 133a11-135c4 
as an objection to the main arguments of the previous dialogues. In chapter four, I analyse 
how Plato revisits the greatest difficulty in Sophist 245e6-249d5. Finally, in chapter five, I 
examine surviving evidence from the early Stoics, to argue that they engaged with Plato’s 
ongoing debate via the Sophist, and that their views on these topics are a careful 
continuation of this debate.  
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I am going to start with a disclaimer. The title of this thesis does not make reference 
to its main topic, but to its finale. My general aim is to offer a reconstruction and discussion 
of a philosophical debate initiated and advanced by Plato’s dialogues, and continued by the 
early Stoa. This debate, as I shall show, is about responsibility, and causation,1 but it 
develops into a complex network of arguments including subordinated or parallel 
discussions about ontology, method, ethics, and epistemology. Instead of isolating the main 
topic, as is often done, my interest is to highlight the structure of the debate, and the 
interconnection between its parts, to show the complexity and sophistication of the 
argumentation in both Plato and the Stoics, and the depth of the Stoics’ engagement with 
Plato’s works. The main task of the thesis, then, is to show that there is such a debate (and 
not, for example, just people offering different theories about the same topic), and that it is 
as carefully and well articulated as I think it is.  
The motivation for doing this is to better understand many of the otherwise 
unexplained and odd starting points of early Stoic philosophy. But since this requires a 
reconstruction of the dialectical background the Stoic texts assume, this means that the bulk 
of the thesis is devoted to discussing Plato. The hope is that by showing the structure of the 
debate in Plato’s dialogues, the connections in the Stoic fragments will show with more 
clarity. 
The question that initially motivates and underlies the debate is to understand who or 
what was responsible for Socrates’ death. As I see it, its dialectical structure has three main 
parts. In the first one, Plato discusses possible accounts of responsibility and causation. Two 
passages are prominent here. One of them is found in the final section of the Phaedo (Ch. 
                                                
1 Let me be more precise about the topic of the debate. Plato and the Stoics use a wide range of locutions 
to express what I call ‘causation and responsibility.’ This includes: (1) the adjective αἴτιος, used with 
genitive, or as a noun in neuter (αἴτιον), (2) the noun αἰτία, (3) the verb αἰτιάοµαι, (4) διὰ + accusative, 
(5) causal or instrumental dative, (6) the verb ποιεῖν, (7) ἕνεκα, and (8) διὰ τί, and δι' ὅτι. The translation 
into English of some of these locutions is problematic. First, because it is almost impossible to find 
translations that work well for all the passages, and because any available word in English is loaded with 
philosophical baggage, and could give the impression that one is begging the question about how to 
understand these terms.   
The semantic field of αἰτία, for example, includes ‘responsibility,’ ‘guilt,’ ‘blame,’ ‘fault,’ ‘accusation,’ 
but also ‘cause.’ In the specific context, other suggestions include, ‘reason,’ ‘explanation,’ ‘mode of 
explanation,’ ‘causation,’ and ‘causal account.’ The adjective αἴτιος, -ον in turn, means ‘culpable,’ 
‘responsible,’ but used with the genitive means ‘responsible for,’ and accompanied by an article means 
‘the accused,’ ‘culprit,’ ‘cause,’ or ‘the thing responsible.’  See Sedley (1998, 115). From an etymological 
point of view, Beekes (2014) explains that ‘αἴτιος, αἰτία and αἰτέω were derived from *αἶτος “share’’ (see 
à αἴνυµαι, à αἰτέω).’Although these two terms are not identical, they are at times also interchangeable. 
As it can be seen, in both cases part of the semantic field implies an evaluative aspect (responsibility, 
guilt, culpable), while other parts sound more objective (cause). Notice that it also has an epistemological 
aspect (explanation, causal account). 
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1), and the other in Republic 6 (Ch. 2). In a second moment, Plato discusses an objection 
that affects the leading arguments advanced before. The objection is known as ‘the greatest 
difficulty,’ and is found in the Parmenides (Ch. 3). If successful, it not only threatens to 
demolish the progress done on understanding responsibility and causation, but also brings 
intolerable consequences in ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics.  
A final moment of the debate, then, consists in the discussion of how to respond to 
the greatest difficulty. A passage in Plato’s Sophist, known as ‘the battle between gods and 
giants,’ has been read as a careful rereading and reflection of the difficulty, which discusses 
the necessary conditions to solve it, and outlines a tentative way out of it (Ch. 4).2 It is in 
this last part that the Stoics enter into the picture. The surviving evidence from the early 
Stoics suggests, I shall argue, that they engaged with Plato’s ongoing debate about causality 
and responsibility via the Sophist, and that their views on these topics are a careful 
continuation of this debate. The oddity of some of the Stoics’ central tenets — and the 
complexity of their argumentation — is then explained by seeing it with the whole debate in 
the background (Ch. 5).   
At this point, one might be tempted to render the debate as one in which Plato 
advances an account of causality and responsibility that gets rejected by the Stoics in favour 
of their own version. This is the way Plato’s contribution to the topic, and the Stoics’ 
relationship with him is often portrayed. Moreover, most studies agree that the Stoics were 
careful readers of the Platonic corpus, but that they were, nevertheless, hostile, and 
confrontational towards Plato. To put it crassly: under this traditional view, Plato is a 
Platonist, and the Stoics are anti-Platonists. There is a good reason, however, to resist this 
portrayal of the debate and the relationship between Plato and the Stoics. In brief, the 
problem is that this picture simply assumes a doctrinal reading of Plato (where the 
dialogues are vessels of doctrines endorsed by Plato himself), both as the correct, and as the 
interpretation favoured by the Stoics. It is far from clear, however, that this reading does 
enough justice to Plato’s texts. And if it does not, but was the way the Stoics understood 
Plato, it cannot be said, then, that they were as careful readers of Plato as we thought. But 
the problem, one might think, is not the Stoics’ lack of capacity.  
                                                
2 There are, of course, other dialogues that also reflect the greatest difficulty, like the Parmenides itself, 
and that were of importance for the Stoics, like the Timaeus, and Theaetetus. I have decided, however, to 
focus on just three dialogues (Phaedo, Republic, and Sophist), with secondary reference to other works. 
The reason is twofold. There is already a fair amount of literature on these other dialogues, and their 
reception (especially the Timaeus), and, more significantly, I believe there is enough material in my 
selection of  dialogues to explain the main features of the debate. 








Some recent studies, for example, are sceptical about Plato’s direct impact on the 
Stoics, and insist on the mediation of the Old Academy—the philosophers who succeeded 
Plato in the Academy from his death to the times in which the Stoa was founded. Although 
the surviving evidence from the Old Academy is thin, it is commonly thought that they 
systematised and developed Plato’s philosophy into a philosophical system of doctrines. 
The thought is, then, that even if Plato was not a Platonist himself, the Old Academics were, 
so the Stoic anti-Platonism is more directly a reaction against them than against Plato.  
It is certain that the Old Academy must have had a tremendous impact on the Stoics. 
After all, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoa, studied in the Academy during the 
headship of Polemo, one of the last philosophers considered part of the Old Academy. My 
worry with this line of thought, however, is twofold. First, it only moves the location of the 
problem. Instead of blaming the Stoics for being lazy readers of Plato, it blames the Old 
Academy. There seems to be, however, not enough textual evidence to sustain this 
uncharitable claim. Second, this view ignores textual evidence suggesting that the early 
Stoa had direct access to Plato’s dialogues, or assumes that the Stoics could not have 
understood Plato outside the assumed doctrinal interpretation transmitted by the Old 
Academy. Both of these options, however, portray the Stoics as far from being careful and 
thoughtful philosophers.  
In this thesis I argue that we need to rethink the nature of the debate and the 
relationship between Plato and the Stoics. Through a detailed analysis of the texts, I show, 
first, that Plato’s passages do not offer a single and determinate account or conception of 
responsibility and causation. Instead, I found various tentative options, and several 
unresolved puzzles that foster further discussion and leave open various lines of argument. 
Then, I argue, and show relevant evidence that the Stoics had direct access to the Platonic 
texts, and were careful readers of them. But by this I mean that they engaged fully with 
Plato’s philosophical project, building upon some of the methods proposed, and rethinking 
and reflecting about a wide range of arguments discussed in his dialogues. In a nutshell, the 
reading I put forward considers the debate as a complex interchange where multiple 
tentative options are tested, and where the Stoics engage in a sophisticated way, agreeing, 
disagreeing, modifying, developing, drawing consequences, and following the arguments 
where they lead, trying to solve the puzzles Plato was interested in.  
I argue, moreover, that the Stoics share with Plato an organic conception of 
philosophy and try to give a holistic account of reality with responsibility and causation at 
the core of their reflection. In both, philosophy is an enterprise where its different areas are 
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interconnected, and should not be thought separately. The Stoics, of course, were 
independent and talented philosophers who did not agree with every argument or method 
tried out by Plato. But to say that they were anti-Platonists is a mistake. But then, we may 
ask, from where does all the reported hostility come? This is the puzzle I shall try to answer 
at the end of the thesis. The Stoics, if I am right, are as rightful heirs of Plato as the 
Academics or Aristotle, not because their philosophy is a derivative critical reaction, or an 
uncritical and mediated borrowing of his ideas, but because they continue Plato’s 
philosophical project. This challenges a recent trend in Stoic scholarship, which argues that 
the Stoics were not really interested in Plato’s philosophical project even if they read him 
and use him as a platform for building up their philosophical system.  
There is a general objection against the plausibility of my reconstruction, though. One 
may think—in line with the more sceptical studies—that it is just not possible to be certain 
about whether the Stoics read Plato. If this were to be true, then, to say that they engaged 
with him in a conscious philosophical debate, or even with weaker claims, such as partial 
appropriations, would be a mere exercise of wild speculation. As I mentioned, however, 
there is some textual evidence to suggest otherwise, which I shall discuss in my last chapter. 
But here I want to make clear that even in the case of a severe lack of evidence, the retreat 
to a suspension of judgement is not necessarily the best option.  
It is true that there are not enough facts to be absolutely certain about the relation 
between these philosophers, and that we cannot simply claim there is influence or 
engagement every time we see vague similarities between two texts. These facts, however, 
are not in themselves enough to conclude that we should suspend our judgment; first, 
because for the reconstruction to be plausible, we do not need absolute certainty, and 
second, because when in doubt it is better to apply the principle of charity, and here it 
would apply not only to individual philosophers but to the development of the debate as a 
whole (see Ch. 5, sec. 1.2 The scholarly debate about the Stoics’ relation with the 
Sophist). 
My starting point, then, goes the other way around. If there is some evidence to 
suggest the connections, we should assume there is a well intentioned, and conscious 
rational debate going on, unless there is explicit evidence against it, or a more economic, 
and charitable interpretation is available. This requires extreme caution. Scholars, for 
instance, have seen in the Old Academy and Hellenistic fragments clear references to 
specific passages in Plato when the evidence also fits well, even better in some cases, with 
the content of other dialogues. For this reason, the connections between the texts I would 








make here do not demand exclusivity. In fact, the texts I am going to analyse make multiple 
other references I am not going to pursue here. It is with these methodological assumptions 
that I attempt to reconstruct the debate.  
 There are some things this thesis is not. First, I am not claiming that Plato was the 
only or the most important interlocutor for the early Stoa. For the purposes of this thesis I 
focus exclusively in this relationship, but I do not do justice to all the other important 
predecessors and contemporary interlocutors of the Stoics. I try to make clear whenever the 
Stoics introduce non-Platonic elements into their philosophy, but the discussion about the 
origins of those elements is beyond the scope of this research. Second, I do not think that 
the passages I shall analyse exhaust the debate. Many other dialogues and passages come to 
mind when one thinks about the discussion regarding causality and responsibility. The only 
thing I defend is that my selection of passages is sufficient for arguing my main thesis.  
I also need to give an account of the structure and layout of the thesis. I have divided 
the thesis in five chapters of different lengths. Each of the first four chapters analyses and 
evaluates a passage from Plato’s dialogues, and the last chapter examines a selection of 
Stoic fragments. All translations from the Greek and Latin are my own. For better or for 
worse, I decided to leave most of my discussion of the secondary literature and textual 
issues to the footnotes. This, I hope, separates more clearly the different layers of discussion 
in the thesis. The downside is that some readers will found that the most interesting bits of 
analysis are found in the footnotes.   
I should warn, though, that in some chapters I defend a couple of controversial theses. 
This was the result of my incapacity to run with some of the standard interpretations I 
disagree with, even when in some cases seemed safer and advisable to stay with them from 
a rhetorical point of view. I do not think I have exhausted all the arguments and objections 
regarding these views, but I have argued for their plausibility as much as the format allowed 
me to do it. Although further discussion is required, this seemed to me the most honest 
decision. In my defence I can say that although these theses play an auxiliary role, they are 
not essential for my main argument. I hope that even if my readers disagree with particular 
interpretations of the text, they can still agree with the main premises and the general 
argument I am making. For more details, a brief abstract is found at the beginning of each 
chapter.  
I am going to end this introduction with a slightly technical note. Causality and 
responsibility are relations we could express as ‘x causes y,’ and ‘x is responsible for y.’ 
Throughout the thesis I use and make reference to some of the formal properties of binary 
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relations as understood by modern logic. This should be taken with caution, bearing in 
mind that the way Plato understands relations in general is not exactly the same.3 
Analysing the formal properties of relations, however, is a useful tool to understand the 
different models of causation and responsibility discussed in the texts. There are six 
properties that binary relations could have: reflexivity, symmetry, asymmetry, 
antisymmetry, transitivity, and intransitivity.4 But in the case of causation and 
responsibility, the main tension in the different conceptions discussed is whether the 






                                                
3 As Duncombe (2013, 53) rightly puts it, Plato lacks the idea of a dyadic or binary relation, as we 
understand them now.  
4 These properties are defined in the following way:  
§ A relation R on a set A is reflexive iff for any a in A, a is R to itself.   
§ A relation R on a set A is irreflexive iff for every a in A, a is not R to itself.  
§ A relation R on a set A is symmetric iff for any a, and any b in A, if a is R to b, then b is R to a.  
§ A relation R on a set A is antisymmetric iff for any a, and any b in A, if a is R to b, and b is R to a, 
then a=b.  
§ A relation R on a set A is asymmetric iff for any a, and any b in A, if a is R to b, then b is not R to a. 
§ A relation R on a set A is transitive iff for any a, any b, and any c in A, if a is R to b, and b is R to c, 
then a is R to c. 
It is important to note, however, that a relation could be neither reflexive nor irreflexive, or neither symmetric 
nor antisymmetric. 








CHAPTER 1. Responsibility and causation in Phaedo 
95e8-105c7 
 In this chapter I analyse and evaluate Plato’s argumentation in Phaedo 95e8-105c7. 
My aim is to show how the text discusses three groups of conceptions of responsibility and 
causation, and how it turns out that progress on this topic is closely related to the method of 
inquiry, which includes a methodological, an epistemological, and an ethical aspect. On a 
more controversial note, I argue that Plato’s Socrates never abandons the idea that causation 
and responsibility are explained by the ordering activity of nous,5 and that this is what gives 
unity to the passage.6 The chapter is divided into nine sections. In the first one I give a brief 
context to the passage. In the second one I discuss the general structure of the text, and offer 
an interpretation of its main argument. Sections 3-8 are dedicated to analysing in detail each 
subsection of the passage and how they interconnect with each other. Finally, a ninth 
section evaluates the passage, signals its contributions for causation and responsibility and 
its remaining puzzles.   
1. Socrates’ last conversation  
Socrates was famously condemned to death, refused the opportunity to escape, and 
died in 399 BC by drinking the hemlock. Who is to blame for his death? Were the 
Athenians responsible for what happened or was it a result of Socrates own actions? This 
traumatic event in the history of Athens led to a philosophical debate about responsibility 
and causation that occupied Plato for a good part of his life (the Stoics also make reference 
to this event, see Ch. 5, sec. 7). He reflected and reflected again about the event in many of 
his texts. He is commonly thought to write about responsibility and causation in various 
                                                
5 Contraction of νόος, has a semantic field that includes ‘mind, sense, intellect, reason; purpose, aim.’ See 
Beekes (2014). Translations in the Phaedo often choose ‘mind,’ but it has also been rendered as 
‘intellect.’ Gallop (1975, 174), instead, uses ‘intelligence,’ and thinks nous is used as a ‘substance term,’ 
referring to the ‘faculty of thought, or that which thinks, rather than a mental quality.’ He also points out 
that nous is cognate with νόησις (see Phaedo 83a8), used for thinking of forms, and the adjective νοητός 
(see Phaedo 80b1, 81b7, 83b4), used to describe forms as objects of thought. See also ἐννοέω in Republic 
6.507d7. In general terms, I agree with Gallop’s description, but I am not convinced that ‘intelligence’ 
renders the active, causal, and organising capacity that nous has. For that reason I have decided to leave 
this word untranslated.   
6 The standard view is that after an enthusiastic reaction, Socrates rejects this idea, and goes on to propose 
forms as the central piece in the causal process. As far as I am aware, this reading was introduced by 
Shorey (1933), and Murphy (1951, 145-148), and later popularised and defended by Vlastos (1969, 297-
298, n.15), and Gallop (1975, 176); for examples of scholars following this interpretation, see Lennox 
(1985), Fischer (2002), Mason (2013), and Ebrey (2013). For a different reading, see Bluck (1955), and 
Wiggins (1986). I shall argue my own views in more detail in this chapter’s section 5.3.  
  13 
dialogues,7 but in this chapter I only focus on a passage from the Phaedo, which is one of 
the most explicit discussions of the topic. 
In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates is about to die. The dialogue portrays Socrates’ last 
conversation with his closest friends, and ends with the description of how he drinks the 
hemlock and dies. In his last philosophical debate, Socrates argues for the immortality of 
the soul. His understanding of his life, decisions, and attitudes depended on the truth of the 
matter. But this proves to be highly controversial, and two of his friends, Simmias and 
Cebes,8 test and object to Socrates’ arguments (Phaedo 84c-86e, and 86e-88b). Socrates 
addresses each of their objections in a last tour de force (Phaedo 91c-95a, and 95a-107b).  
Cebes’ objection is the one that most worries Socrates, and it is the last one he 
answers. The problem is—Cebes complains—that Socrates’ arguments so far do not 
guarantee the immortality of the soul, but only that the soul survives the body’s death. This 
leaves open the possibility for long-lived mortal souls. Socrates, then, still needs a decisive 
argument to show that souls never die. It seems, however, that Socrates has no ready-made 
answer to this difficulty, since the conversation breaks off, and Socrates takes a long time 
considering the question in silence (Phaedo 95e8-10). After this pause, he announces ‘it is 
necessary to discuss thoroughly the αἰτία9 of generation and destruction’ (Phaedo 95e10-
96a1). What follows is the passage that concerns this chapter, where Socrates, by reporting 
his own intellectual journey, explains his own thoughts about causation and responsibility, 
to finally use them to prove that the soul can never partake in death.  
Although a tragic tone pervades the whole conversation, the reader’s access to the 
scene is mediated, and distant. Phaedo narrates by heart events that took place long ago 
(Phaedo 57b), and we are reminded that Plato himself was not a direct witness because he 
                                                
7 For instance, see Cratylus 413a1-7, Lysis 219a1-220a6, Hippias Major 296e7-297c3, Phaedo 95a-107b, 
Republic 6.506b-511e5, Philebus 26e2-27b3, Phaedrus 245c2-246a4, Timaeus 28a-b, 46c-48b, 68e-69a, 
and Laws 891e. 
8 For a detailed discussion of the characters in the Phaedo see Sedley (1995), and Nails (2002).  
9 There is no consensus about how to translate αἰτία in this passage, and whether αἴτιον is used as a 
synonym (see note 1). Compare the Phaedo, with Cratylus 413a4-5; Philebus 26e3-27a9, 30d3, and 
especially 30c4-7; Phaedo 110e2-6; Republic 379c3, 329d3, 468a8; Timaeus 18e3, 29d6, 33a6, 38d7, 
40b4, 44c7, 47b6, and 63e; Philebus 30c5-6, Phaedrus 229e5-230a6, Laws 896b1 and 967c5, Gorgias 
457a3. For a discussion of the use and translation of these words in Plato, see Vlastos (1969, 292-296), 
M. Frede (1980, 223), Silverman (1992, 99n32), Irwin (1983, 130-132), Sedley (1998, 114-115), 
Hankinson (1998, 84-85), Ledbetter (1999), Ferejohn (2006, 151), and Sharma (2009, 137n1). Although I 
am going to leave these words untranslated, my own impression is that Plato is extrapolating legal slang, 
where αἴτιον points to the ‘culprit,’ that is, an object or person qua responsible for something, and the 
αἰτία refers to the ‘charge,’ meaning the explanation that links the culprit with her deed. This explains 
why these terms are so closely connected, and yet have a different emphasis. When someone asks who 
raped Cassandra, we could answer ‘a rapist’ or ‘Ajax the Lesser.’ But if we ask why Cassandra was 
raped, the answer would be because Ajax the Lesser (a rapist) decided to do it. The potential source of 
confusion is the fact that the answer to who is the culprit could make reference to the charge, and that the 
charge mentions who is the culprit.  








was ill (Phaedo 59b10). This, however, means no simplification nor lack of detail on 
Phaedo’s part. These features are not excuses for the failures of a historical report. More 
likely, they are indications of Plato’s self-awareness of the fictional character of the 
dialogue. The text seems to recognise its distance from the real events, and stresses instead 
the prescriptive and philosophical aspect of the dialogue. This does not have to mean an 
emotional detachment; but the main theme is reflecting on how a philosophical life should 
be lived rather than how it was actually lived by Socrates.10 By including the context, 
emotions, and attitudes during the conversation, however, Plato emphasises the close 
connection between philosophical conversation and a person’s way of life.  
The dramatic setting leaves no room for an aporetic finale, and compels Socrates to 
defend his point to the best of his ability. Although Plato allows Socrates to die in peace of 
mind at the end of the dialogue, the text allows space to remain puzzled and unconvinced 
by the arguments. In particular, the discussion about the αἰτία of generation and destruction 
and the arguments about causation and responsibility are left as an outline. Consider, for 
example, how Simmias at the end of the discussion says that even if he has no grounds for 
doubt, he still has some reserve towards the conclusion. Socrates also accepts the matter is 
in need of further investigation, even if they find it convincing at the time (see Phaedo 
97b6-7, and 107a8-b10).   
2.  A complex storyline 
In order to understand the complex argumentation of the passage, the first step is to 
understand its structure as thoroughly as possible. The passage is, on the one hand, divided 
into four main sections: (i) the introduction of the topic, (ii) Socrates’ intellectual 
autobiography including his own proposal, (iii) a brief interruption of Phaedo’s narration of 
the events, and (iv) the development of Socrates’ proposal into a more subtle answer. The 
latter is then, used as the central piece of Socrates’ final argument of the immortality of the 
soul (see Phaedo 105c8-107a1).11 But the passage is also constituted by three nested 
dialogues: (a) the indirect dialogue between Plato and the reader, (b) Phaedo’s narration of 
Socrates’ last day and dialogue with Echecrates, and (c) Socrates’ narration of his 
intellectual development and dialogue with their friends (cf. Ch. 4, sec. 2. Fiction within 
fiction).  
                                                
10 On this line of thought see McCabe (2006). Scholars did not always have this opinion. For the 
discussion about the dramatic structure of the Phaedo see Dorter (1970), Sedley (1995), Madison (2002), 
and Jansen (2013). 
11 From where exactly the ‘final argument’ begins depends, on one’s own conception of an argument. See 
D. Frede (1978, 27), Rowe (1993, 249), and Denyer (2007, 87). 
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It is also worth noting that Socrates’ intellectual autobiography (ii) has a nonlinear 
narrative: Socrates starts from (1) his inquiry into nature, but then talks about (2) his 
original views, to then turn to (3) his present views and puzzles. Then, he (4) goes back to 
narrate his encounter with Anaxagoras’ philosophy. In his criticism, however, Socrates (5) 
talks again about some of his current views. The narration ends with (6) a section about the 
opinions of the many and other theories. This means that Socrates’ autobiographical 
passage contains both the story of his intellectual development, and some of his current 
views. This fact is important for two main reasons. First, because if one does not pay 
enough attention, it is possible to confuse past with present, but it is also important because 
this going back and forth is part of Socrates’ argumentative method. He is contrasting his 
former views with present ones.  
Why did Socrates make so much effort in explaining his whole intellectual journey 
instead of offering his present views straightaway? When Socrates announces the topic, he 
says that a thorough investigation is needed. But if the autobiographical passage is part of 
an argument, what is it for, and what is its conclusion? My suggestion is that the general 
argument of the passage can be construed as follows:   
1. Natural inquiry leads to puzzlements that made Socrates even unlearn his previous 
views. 
2. Socrates’ search, however, leads to a promising idea he attributes to Anaxagoras: 
that nous is responsible and orders each thing in whatever way is best. 
3. But Anaxagoras’ and similar accounts do not hold together because they offer 
necessary conditions as αἰτίαι, failing to offer real αἰτίαι to connect nous with its 
effects.   
4. The source of the problem common to all previous accounts is that their method is 
unsafe and careless.   
5. A tentative solution (to connect nous with its effects) is to use the method of 
hypothesis applied to this case.  
6. Assuming, then, the existence of intelligible12 forms and that it is because things 
partake in them that they have their properties, Socrates could offer a safe but 
simple answer.  
                                                
12 Cf. Phaedo 79a1-4. Cf. Rep. 6.507b8-9, and 6.507d7. Ιn Phaedo Socrates sometimes uses the word 
διάνοια, whereas in Republic he uses the verb νοεῖσθαι, and ἐννοεῖν, but note that all these words derive 
from νόος. See Beekes (2014). See also Phaedo 65d10-ff. 








7. If we also agree that some things other than forms always have the character of a 
specific form, we can offer safe and subtler answers.  
The aim of the argument is to deliver a general framework to offer safe and subtle 
answers to ‘why?’ questions. To do it, Socrates first explains why other models to answer 
these questions are useless, and, moreover, harmful. As a result of his first contact with 
Anaxagoras, Socrates thinks, however, that nous is responsible for each thing, and that its 
job is to order them in whatever way is best. In an attempt to make sense of what 
Anaxagoras says, and to use it to answer his own question, Socrates links nous’s practical 
reasoning with order, and order with goodness. If nous’s activity can be linked in this way 
to order and goodness, perhaps, there is a general way to explain why questions.  
Socrates is later disappointed with Anaxagoras’ incompetence in connecting nous 
with its effects, but I shall show he never abandons the thought that nous is responsible for 
each thing. The main argument here has to do with Socrates’ real αἰτία (see sec. 5.1). After 
Socrates explains that all other people fail to see the real answer due to their laziness and 
lack of care, he decides to explain again the connection between nous and its effects. Since 
Socrates, however, has no solid starting point, he resorts to the method of hypothesis. This 
consists in hypothesising whatever seems to be the strongest argument, and establishing as 
true whatever harmonises with the hypothesis. In this way, Socrates’ hypothesis is the 
existence of forms (accepted at Phaedo 77a), adding then that things have their properties 
because they partake in forms. This allows a safe answer of the type ‘X is Y because it 
partakes in the Y-itself.’ But to make this account one that really solves Anaxagoras’ 
problems, I shall show that it should be understood that it is nous that makes things partake 
in the forms (see sec. 7.2.1).  
Nous is the agent and causal link between forms and the effects in the sensible part of 
the world; forms are only nous’s instruments. In a final step, Socrates adds that there are 
some things that, although they are not forms, always have the character of a specific form, 
and when they are present, its opposite cannot be present. This allows Socrates a more 
subtle answer, which has the form ‘X is Y because it has Z, since Z always partakes in the Y-
itself and never in its opposite’ (see sec. 8.5). Let me now argue that this description of the 
passage is accurate.  
3.  Puzzlements that make you unlearn your previous views  
Socrates’ thoughts on responsibility and causation will turn out to be unconventional. 
Perhaps for this reason, instead of explaining them right away, he recounts the development 
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of his understanding of the topic, and the events that lead him to his actual views (Phaedo 
96a1-97b7). The first part of the autobiographical report13 explains how natural inquiry led 
Socrates to puzzles that made him unable to decide which of the available answers was 
right, and even to unlearn very basic things that he thought he knew before. His journey 
started from understanding little (or thinking that he understood little) to not understanding 
at all. It was a process of unlearning.  
Socrates’ engagement with natural inquiry emphasises his second-order reflections on 
his own state of mind, and on the nature of the distinctions and methods of the inquiry. 
Even after all his journey, Socrates acknowledges that at the present moment he does not 
think that he knows why things come to be, pass away, or exist; he knows, however, that he 
does not know the answers. In addition, he cannot accept the methods of natural inquiry, or 
their answers, but he has a method, which although not completely lucid, helps him to offer 
safer answers than those given by others. Although Socrates’ confidence on the answers is 
mild, thanks to the second-order reflections, he presents himself as someone with a better 
understanding of understanding, and of some claims of responsibility and causation.  
Socrates’ intellectual journey has various moments, as I mentioned above.14 At first, 
Socrates thought he knew some things that he considered were clear to everyone. He spent 
his time, then, considering the questions of natural science. This adventure had two parts. 
First, he often changed his mind back and forth, unable to decide which answer was right.15 
But by considering these questions a second time, he resolved he was the most incompetent 
person for this type of inquiry.16 For he was so blinded by it that he unlearned even the 
things he took for granted from the beginning.17 Socrates explains, then, that at the moment 
he is far from being persuaded by the naturalistic method of inquiry, or by any of the 
                                                
13 The interest around this passage has largely focused on assessing to what extent it is evidence for 
Socrates’ or Plato’s youth. See, for example, Burnet (1911, 99), Williamson (1904, 192-193), Gallop 
(1975, 169-170). Rowe (1993, 229) suggests that it may be ‘wholly invented, as a conveniently dramatic 
way of presenting a collection of problems and solutions.’ The presentation, however, has a philosophical 
significance, and is not only a dramatic or narrative interlude. In this way, Socrates emphasises two 
aspects: his second-order reflections, and the psychological impact of the inquiry which resembles the 
method of hypothesis proposed later. 
14 These stages remind us of Socrates’ interrogation of Meno’s slave-boy (Meno 82a-86c), and seem to be a 
preliminary model for the method of hypothesis later explained at Phaedo 100a3-8 (see this Chapter, sec. 7.  
A new hope. See also Meno 86c-e, and compare with the divided line in the Republic 6.509d6-511e5. 
15 Cf. Apology 19b-d, Aristophanes’ Clouds 223-ff., Birds 1280-4, 1553-6, and Frogs 1491-9; as well as 
Xenophon’s On the Management of the State 2.3, and Recollections of Socrates 4.7.1-6, and 1.6.14. 
16 Socrates describes the effect of natural inquiry in a similar way to Meno when he complains about 
Socrates’ own stingray effect (Meno 79e-81e). For an analysis of Meno passage, see Scott (2005, 69-74). 
17 This blinding effect will reappear later in the analogy of the solar eclipse. See Phaedo 99d4-100a3 (Ch. 
2, sec. 5). 








proposals it offers, but that he has made up some other confused method of his own 
(Phaedo 97b6-7).  
To understand Socrates’ most recent ideas on responsibility and causation, then, it is 
necessary to get a clearer picture of the views he cannot accept and the puzzles he found 
himself in. However, he never claims these views are false, or that he has arguments to 
definitely reject them. His arguments only show that these views led him to difficult 
puzzles, and instead of making him understand more about the topic, they had the opposite 
effect. They made him understand less. Socrates, however, uses his state of mind as 
evidence to distrust the answers of natural inquiry.18 When Socrates says he felt 
incompetent he is not being ironic. His psychological state at that moment is key to the 
development of his understanding of himself and of the topic. As many novel students in 
any area, when he was unable to understand, he blamed himself for his incompetence. But 
his incapacity to understand the explanations of natural inquiry also gave him evidence that 
something was wrong with them. The explanations were not explaining anything to him. 
Since understanding is a personal matter, Socrates, still wanting the answers to these 
questions, took the only path available to him: to improvise a method of his own.    
Let me start from the chronological beginning of Socrates’ intellectual development. 
Before engaging into natural inquiry, Socrates held his initial conception of growth in high 
esteem since he thought it was reasonable (Phaedo 96d5-6), adequate (Phaedo 96d8, cf. 
92e1), clear to everyone (Phaedo 96c8), and that he and others thought they knew it 
(Phaedo 96c4-7). The core idea—perhaps a popularisation of Anaxagoras’ insight19—is to 
reduce growth to an appropriate process of addition.20  
Initially, Socrates had an excellent disposition in his wonderings into nature. He was 
‘extraordinarily eager for that wisdom,’ since he thought it was ‘splendid’ to know about it 
(Phaedo 96a6-8). Socrates describes its subject matter as the knowledge of ‘the αἰτία of 
                                                
18 See Phaedo 96c3-8, 96e6-7, 97a7, 97b3-4. 
19 See DK59B10. Anaxagoras lived in Athens during Pericles’ time, and it is plausible to think that some 
of his ideas were popular or held as the accepted view in Socrates’ time. See DL2.7. For the discussion 
about the specifics, see Mansfeld (1979), and Woodbury (1981). 
20 Plato uses here the geometrical rather than the arithmetical notion of addition, which means that its 
opposite is division, rather than subtraction. Socrates offers four examples: (1) humans grow because of 
eating and drinking (Phaedo 96c7-9); (2) a big person standing besides a small one is bigger by a head 
(Phaedo 96d9-e1); (3) ten is more than eight because two had been added (Phaedo 96e1-3); (4) two 
cubits is longer than one because it exceeds it by half (Phaedo 96e3-4). Socrates expresses the general 
principle at work saying ‘the appropriate (οἰκεῖα) thing is added (προσγένηται) to each of the other parts, so the 
small bulk comes to be large’ (Phaedo 96d2-4). The two key terms of the principle—addition and 
appropriateness—have a broad sense. Addition includes ingestion, adhesion, and juxtaposition (Cf. the dice 
paradox at Theaetetus154a9–155c6). An appropriate part is that which possess some likeness to that to which 
it will be added; for instance, flesh to flesh, bone to bone, and number to number (Phaedo 96d1, and e2-4). 
This conception of growth, however, is ultimately upset by Socrates’ interest in natural inquiry. 
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each thing, why (διὰ τί)21 each comes to be, why it perishes, and why it is’ (Phaedo 96a8-
9).22 Natural inquiry, then, wants to answer particular questions, aiming at exhaustion of 
every possible case. It does not seek or try to offer, however, a general theory of causation. 
It only tries to answer particular questions, one at a time. Even if successful, this kind of 
inquiry offers no universal account. The answers from natural inquiry vary, but the method 
of investigation assumes an empirical and inductive framework. Socrates gives three 
examples of the questions he considered in his initial engagement with natural inquiry: 
a. Is it when the hot and cold admit some putrefaction that living things grow up? 
(Phaedo 96b2-3). 
b. Do persons think with their blood, air, fire, or none of these? (Phaedo 96b3-5).  
c. Is the brain what produces our sensations of hearing, sight, and smell, from which 
comes memory and opinion, and from stable memory and opinion knowledge 
comes to be? (Phaedo 96b5-9).23 
Considering these questions, Socrates ‘was often shifting positions back and forth’ 
(Phaedo 96a9-b1). Natural inquiry offered him various competing answers, which 
sometimes were in conflict with Socrates’ original views. All of them, however, assume a 
materialistic, and mechanistic framework. None of these completely satisfied Socrates. He 
was unconvinced by the idea that combination processes are responsible for growth, that 
something like thinking could be reduced to a single physical element, or that a body part 
produces knowledge. Socrates did not understood how these positions explained what they 
said they were explaining.  
In his second attempt to engage with natural inquiry Socrates finally made up his 
mind. But in a self-reflective turn of events, he had not decided which answer was the right 
one, but rather that he was blinded and incompetent for the inquiry as a whole.24 Socrates, 
                                                
21 Or more literally: ‘because of what.’ For a discussion on the translation of διὰ τί, see Ebrey (2013, 5). 
22 Cf. Phaedo 95e10-96a1. Later Socrates refers to the inquiry as the consideration of ‘what happens in 
the heaven and on earth’ (Phaedo 96b9-c1). Cf. Apology 19b4-5.  
23 These questions recall various natural inquirers. The reference to the hot, the cold, and putrefaction, 
recalls Archelaus, who according to Theophrastus was a disciple of Anaxagoras, and teacher of Socrates. 
See Theophrastus’ Phys. Op. fr. 4; Hippolytus, Ref. 1.9.2, 1.9.5. DL 2.16-17. See also Burnet (1911, 96), 
and Geddes (1863, 107-8). Rowe (1993, 230), however, thinks that the reference  need not be so specific, 
and that it fits anyone who thought of matter as composed by elements, and held a materialistic view of 
the soul. The idea that humans think with their blood reminds us of Empedocles (DK31B105). The 
reference to air recalls Anaximenes (DK13B2), but also the more recent Diogenes of Apollonia 
(DK64B4,5), and Aristophanes’ Socrates (Clouds, 230). Finally, fire reminds us of Heraclitus 
(DK22B36), and the idea that brain explains sensation of Alcmaeon of Croton (DK24A5). See Rowe 
(1993, 230-231), who also notes that the idea that knowledge can be derived from sensation was already 
ruled out in Phaedo 72e-77d. 
24 Cf. Meno’s description of his perplexity after being cross-examined in Meno 79e-80b. 








instead of learning natural science, felt he could not even accept his original views anymore, 
nor the method of investigation assumed until that moment (Phaedo 97b5-6). He made 
progress, however, in his understanding of himself,25 since he recognised he was no expert 
on the subject (see Phaedo 96e6-7).  
Socrates is unconvinced by the thought that these answers offer an adequate 
account.26 His point is not that each of the specific answers are completely false, but 
something weaker. He is not convinced by any, nor able to discover the right answer 
himself, but instead considers the problem an open question. Although the natural inquiry 
seems promising at first, Socrates found that from it two problems follow that pervade even 
the most basic of the answers to why questions.  
  With the method of natural inquiry, Socrates was unable to accept even ‘why a unit 
comes to be, nor, in a word, why anything else comes to be or perishes or is’ (Phaedo 97b3-
5). Socrates explains this in two steps. The first one goes against the idea that addition is the 
αἰτία of the generation of numbers. He does not accept that when a unit is added to another 
unit, either: (a) one of them becomes two, or (b) both of them become two because of the 
addition of one to the other. For, he thinks, he will be astonished if, first, both units are 
separated and neither is two, but later the units are put together, and their juxtaposition is the 
αἰτία of their becoming two (Phaedo 96e7-97a6).27  
The key piece in the argument is that juxtaposition cannot be accepted as the αἰτία. 
Socrates thinks that neither unit becomes two, nor do they cease to be units and become two 
just by juxtaposing them.28 This means that juxtaposing things is ineffective, and hence, 
making reference to it does not explain anything either. Empirical inquiry assumes the 
existence of numbers, and cannot give an adequate account of them. So juxtaposition of 
things is not really responsible for the coming into being of two.  
                                                
25 For self-knowledge in Plato more generally, see Annas (1985), Griswold (1986), Rappe (1995), Benson 
(2003), and Nightingale (2010). 
26 There is an ambiguity about whether these accounts are ‘insufficient’ or ‘inadequate,’ two of the 
meanings of the word ἱκανῶς (see Phaedo 96d8). What is at stake is whether what is missing adds to, and 
so fixes, the existing accounts (making them sufficient) or whether it will replace it (because the first 
account was inadequate). I think it cannot be about sufficiency since Socrates will propose a completely 
new method. This, however, might not mean that we should throw away all the answers that natural 
inquiry offers. Some of them might answer correctly some other question, for instance, the hows and 
whens of something, and the necessary conditions for things to happen.  
27 Cf. Burnet (1911, 103) who thinks that what is surprising to Socrates is that the two things (a) and (b) 
should be true at the same time. This reading, however, is not the only possibility. I think this could also 
be a dilemma, where both horns are deemed unacceptable. 
28 As Rowe (1993, 234), explains it: ‘If two “came into being,” then the ones cannot previously have been two; 
but—Socrates wonders—why not? Why should bringing them together make any difference? (Are they not 
countable even when apart?).’ 
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Socrates is not convinced either by the idea that division offers the right answer. If 
that were the case, then, two would also come to be from division, which Socrates 
understands as separation from one moment to the other, for instance, if we divide four in 
half. The same reasons to be doubtful about addition would apply for division. There is, 
however, another problem. Even assuming that from each addition and division it is 
possible to offer an αἰτία of two, it would imply that two opposites are αἰτίαι of the same 
thing. This is something, however, Socrates is not ready to accept (Phaedo 97a7-b7). The 
reason is that it makes knowledge much more difficult, and makes the explanations sound 
irrelevant (why does this happen? Because of X or not-X).  
The crucial premise of the argument is that opposites cannot offer αἰτίαι of the same 
effects (see Phaedo 97a7-8). The worry behind this is universality. If an effect can have 
opposite αἰτίαι, how to be sure which one is responsible? Moreover, if opposites can offer 
αἰτίαι of the same effects, in what are they different then? The topic is not an easy one. For 
now, suffice to say that due to Socrates’ belief in juxtaposition and opposites, he is unable 
to understand how addition or division would be the αἰτία of the coming into being of two. 
Since Socrates thinks these premises are fundamental for accepting any other αἰτία, then he 
is unable to accept the whole method assumed by popular wisdom and natural inquiry. 
Socrates, is unconvinced by popular and scientific accounts because they assume what they 
are trying to explain, and lead to contradiction. But if the job of an αἰτία was to answer a 
why question, and make us understand the causal process behind an effect, natural inquiry 
left people in the dark, not even sure about things they presupposed true at the beginning.  
4.  Nous is responsible and orders each thing in whatever way is best 
The explanatory failure of natural inquiry made Socrates develop his ‛confused 
method’ (Phaedo 97b6-7). But instead of describing it right away, Socrates resumes the 
story of his intellectual development.29 One day Socrates listened to someone30 reading 
Anaxagoras’ book. Unlike other natural philosophers, Anaxagoras gave a more compelling 
answer—in Socrates’ eyes—to the problem of responsibility and causation. This first 
impression made him take Anaxagoras’ proposal to be worth considering. The reason 
seems to be that Anaxagoras proposed a single answer to any ‘why?’ question, which 
would eliminate the worries about the same effect with opposite αἰτίαι.  
                                                
29 See πότε at Phaedo 97b8. 
30 Archelaus perhaps. See note 23. 








Socrates anticipated a whole account, and a programme of inquiry that gave him great 
hope. He thought that Anaxagoras’ books would teach him why each thing is generated, is 
destroyed, and exists. When he finally got his hands on Anaxagoras’ books he was 
disappointed with the content (Phaedo 98b3-6). But what Socrates first thought about 
Anaxagoras account, reveals instead some of his own views and expectations.  
Socrates first heard one single claim from Anaxagoras’ book, which is about nous 
and its connection to order, and responsibility:  
νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσµῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος (Phaedo 97c1-2).31  
This translates as ‘it is nous that orders and is responsible for each thing.’32 As it 
stands, without any further context, the report introduces the thought that nous alone has the 
active power to order things, and that it can be blamed for this. This closes responsibility 
under nous (only nous is held responsible for the things in the world), and thus, could be 
understood as some sort of closure principle. But depending on how the sentence is read, it 
could mean very different things. Is the claim referring to a concrete nous (a cosmic nous), 
or the universal concept (in which case it includes any human and divine nous)? It leads to 
different claims in terms of quantification:  
If the claim is about a concrete nous: 
1. ∃y, ∀x (Ny ⋀ Oyx ⋀ Ryx) 
There is a y, such that for any x, y is a nous, and y orders x, and y is responsible for x.  
If the claim is about the universal concept: 
2. ∀x, ∃y (Ny ⋀ Oyx ⋀ Ryx)  
For any x, there is a y, such that y is a nous, and y orders x, and y is responsible for x. 
If Socrates takes the claim as referring to a cosmic nous, as it has often been 
understood,33 that would raise a lot of questions regarding the cosmic nous’s relationship 
with each and every human nous in terms of action, and responsibility. Under this reading, 
if the cosmic nous is responsible for each thing, what would it be the causal role of human 
nous? If responsibility is closed under a cosmic nous, so to speak, does that mean that 
                                                
31 See Phaedo 97c3-4: ‘nous is the αἴτιον of each thing.’ Cf. Anaxagoras’ fragments DK59B 11-14, and 
Cratylus 413c6-7. See also Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1.3, 984b8-22, where Aristotle mentions that 
Hermotimus of Clazomenae proposed this view even before Anaxagoras. See also Philebus 28c, 30c4-7, 
and 30d6-8. Cf. Laws 10.888e. Again, the distance between Socrates’ report and Anaxagoras’ fragment 
reminds us that the story is told from Socrates’ perspective and limitations.  
32 That πάντων refers to every concrete thing, is reinforced by τὰ πράγµατα in 98c1. This does not imply 
that nous orders everything at once. Against this view see Sedley (2007, 88).  
33 See, for instance, Bostock (1986, 143), and Sedley (2007, 88).  
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humans cannot be held responsible for anything? Would Socrates still be able to claim that 
humans have nous? Socrates did not ask any of these questions, nor seemed worried about 
the multiple problems an over-controlling cosmic nous raises. Scholars reading the text in 
this way are forced to say that Socrates’ explanation of his nous as the being responsible for 
his staying in jail is an analogy. But the text does not present it as an analogy at all (I shall 
return to this point later). If Anaxagoras’ claim introduces a cosmic nous, then Socrates was 
tremendously enthusiastic about a deus ex machina strategy that tries to solve a puzzle with 
even more obscure assumptions.  
These arguments, however, do not rule out completely the cosmic nous reading. 
There are ways in which it would be compatible with human nous and human 
responsibility. But for that to work, some assumptions about causation and responsibility 
are needed, for example, that they are a transitive relation—an idea developed in the 
Republic, but absent in Phaedo (see Ch. 2). However, if Socrates is taking nous as a 
universal that encompasses any nous (either divine, or human),34 there is no need to supply 
premises or extra assumptions from other dialogues. Divine nous would be accountable for 
natural phenomena, whereas human nous would be responsible for people’s actions, and 
creations. This picture fits with the text, with traditional Greek religion, and avoids the 
problems that the cosmic nous generates. The difference between Gods and humans is not 
their type of nous, but the fact that gods are more resourceful, for instance, in terms of time, 
memory, information, strength, and physical objects they can direct, and order.  
There is also a question about order (διακοσµέω), and its relation to responsibility. 
Is the ordering exclusively intrinsic (x is ordered; i.e. x’s parts are ordered), extrinsic (x is 
fitted in a wider order), or both? Moreover, one may wonder what exactly (if any) is the link 
between order and responsibility. Is the thought that order explains responsibility? The 
reason to think that is that later Socrates just makes reference to the ordering activity of 
nous, and assumes that this means it is responsible for what he does. If this is true, Socrates 
understood the claim as saying something stronger:  
3. ∀x, ∃y [Ny ⋀ Oyx ⋀ (Oyx ⊃ Ryx)]  
For any x, there is a y, such that y is a nous, and y orders x, and if y orders x, then y is 
responsible for x. 
Note that from claim (3), it is possible to infer (2). Socrates’ positive reaction to 
Anaxagoras’ claim, however, was the result not only of this, but also of his addition of the 
                                                
34 Cf. Sophist 265e: the making art is of two kinds, human and divine. 








idea that if nous directs and arranges each thing it does so in whatever way is best (since 
that is what a nous does):35  
For I never supposed he [Anaxagoras], having said they [i.e. each thing] were 
ordered by nous, would offer any other sort of αἰτία of them other than that it is 
best for them to be exactly the way they are (Phaedo 98a7-9).  
Socrates idea is that: for any x, there is a y, such that y is a nous, and y orders x in 
whatever way is best.36 Adding the reference to responsibility, we have the following claim:  
4. ∀x, ∃y [Ny ⋀ BOyx ⋀ (Oyx ⊃ Ryx)] 
For any x, there is a y, such that y is a nous, and y orders x in whatever way is best, and if 
y orders x in whatever way is best, then y is responsible for x.37 
This is Socrates’ Nous Closure Principle, even if inspired by Anaxagoras. The claim, 
however, does not necessarily imply that a nous is aware of what it is doing, or that it has 
purposes or intentions. Nous is a principle of order that only has one function. Whatever is 
at the disposition of a nous, gets ordered in whatever way is best:  
nous(x) = x is ordered in whatever way is best. 
This leaves open, however, the question about what the best is. The text gives no 
indication about for whom it is best, or if it is the best order simpliciter. It is difficult to see, 
however, the claim as meaning that any nous orders in whatever way is best simpliciter, 
since if that were true all actions would be successful and all agents would be infallible. It 
seems, in turn, that each nous orders in whatever way is best to the best of its ability and 
resources. The outcome seems to depend, however, on whether there was enough time, 
knowledge, and so on.  
Also missing from the passage is an explicit indication as to what makes a specific 
order better than the other. The passage has been traditionally read as a teleological account, 
and the discussion has focussed on whether Socrates ends up discarding it or not.38 But 
there are many ways to understand teleology.39 In this passage the good is achieved through 
                                                
35 The explanation of ‘what is best’ is revisited in Timaeus (29-34, 44d-46a, 48a2-5, 68e-71a). In other 
texts, Plato’s Socrates says that people always aim at the good. See Phaedo 69a-c, Protagoras 358b-c, 
Gorgias 466b-468e, Meno 77b-78b. Here the claim is stronger. Humans could aim at the good not only 
with their nous but also with their desires, and appetites. The thought here is, perhaps, that the nous aims 
at the best of the options. Sedley (2007, 75-92) argues that this thesis is an innovation of the historical 
Socrates, but a similar idea is also found in Diogenes of Apollonia (64B3), Socrates’ contemporary. 
36 See Phaedo 97c4-6, and 98a6-b1. See also Republic 379b-c. 
37 This would imply the weak version of the claim, which following (2) would be ∀x, ∃y (Ny ⋀ BOyx ⋀ Ryx): 
‘For any x, there is a y, such that y is a nous, and y orders x in whatever way is best, and y is responsible for x.’  
38 See, for instance, Bedu-Addo (1979), Wiggins (1986), Vlastos (1969), MacKenzie (1988), McCabe 
(2000, 165, 187), and Sharma (2009). 
39 See McCabe (2000, 187-189). 
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an ordering activity. The idea seems to be that order is intrinsically good (why it is good, it 
is not said). The superlative—what is best—could be, then, the most ordered option 
available for each specific thing.40 This quantitative reading seems the most economical; 
the more order there is, the more goodness it has. Otherwise, the criterion to decide 
what is best would be something else, and Socrates says nothing about what that could 
be. The quantitative reading will also solve the doubt about whether Socrates had in mind 
internal, external order, or both. What is best, on this interpretation, is to be ordered in both 
ways.     
Any human not choosing what is best will imply a failure that is not due to that 
person’s nous, but a deficiency in a different area. This picture will explain at once both the 
natural and human ambits of the world without implying that human nous is a second rate 
entity, nor that it is only nous in a derivative or diluted sense. Moreover, any human using 
his nous will think that acquiring nous is the best investment of their time.  
Note that this proposal, in contrast with the inductive method of natural inquiry, 
offers a universal principle from which particular answers can be derived. Socrates saw in 
Anaxagoras’ claim, then, a promising way out from the problems he found in the previous 
accounts.41 That meant an account where opposites are not αἰτίαι of the same effects, and 
where causation is not explained by mere manipulation of physical tokens (like 
juxtaposition and separation) 
Socrates’ interpretation of Anaxagoras allows him to anticipate a programme to 
answer the questions of natural inquiry. It only gives a general direction to the inquiry and 
not a step-by-step method to get the answers, but it advises that: if a person S wishes to 
find the αἰτία of X, S has to find in what way it is best for X to exist, or else to act, or be 
acted upon in any way (see Phaedo 97c6-d1).42 
                                                
40 See Phaedo 98a7-9.  
41 Socrates reaction to Anaxagoras’ claim was enthusiastic. After feeling incompetent, blinded, and ignorant 
due to his previous experiences, now he was ‘delighted,’ (Phaedo 97c3), ‘glad’ (Phaedo 97d7; cf. Meno 84b), 
eager to know more (Phaedo 98b3), and ‘wonderfully hopeful’ (see Phaedo 98b3, and 98b7). But notice that 
hope is a dangerous business in Greek culture, if we remember Pandora’s box, for example (cf. Hesiod's 
Theogony 507-616, and Works and Days, 42-105). Socrates also made a preliminary evaluative judgement. 
Anaxagoras’ claim seemed to him ‘good’ (Phaedo 97c3), and something that was ‘in accordance with his 
nous’ (Phaedo 97d7). The use of nous here makes a pun with Anaxagoras’ nous. But it might not be a 
joke, as Burnet (1911, 104) notes, but something that will highlight an important ethical consequence of 
Anaxagoras’ claim. See Phaedo 98b8-9. The inclusion of all these emotions in the philosophical 
conversation will turn out to be important later. See Ch. 4, sec. 3.  
42 The language of acting or being acted upon (πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν in Phaedo 97d1) will be a central topic in 
the Sophist 245e-249d (Ch. 4, se. 5), and for the Stoic ontology (Ch. 5, sec. 2.2). 








This programme presupposes the Nous Closure Principle. Since a nous orders things 
in whatever way is best, therefore an αἰτία should explain in what way the explanandum 
exists, or is acted upon, in the best way, or in which way it is an αἴτιον (in which case it 
would not be the αἰτία of it, but how it is responsible for something else). Socrates’ 
suggestion is to accept the Nous Closure Principle, to have a clear path to search for αἰτίαι 
of particular things and phenomena. While the popular view and the natural scientists tried 
to answer why questions (διὰ τί in 96a8-9, and c7; δι’ ὅτι in 97b3-5) by reducing them to 
specific hows and whens (ἐπειδάν in 96b2, c9; πότερον in 96b4, ἐπεί in 97a4), this 
programme would answer them by finding in what way (ὅπῃ in 97c6) is the best for them to 
be, act, or be acted upon.  
 Socrates’ programme sets a new way to look at natural inquiry, and this requires a 
new method. A question that emerges, however, is whether the programme is supposed to 
completely overthrow everything said in the popular and scientific inquiry, build upon it, or 
ignore it.43 On the one hand, Socrates does not deny the popular and scientific accounts as 
explanations of how and when. He could agree with the temporal sequences and mechanics 
of some of them. He may agree, for instance, that at some point a small man eats and 
drinks, and at a second moment that man is bigger. What he would not accept is that eating 
and drinking is what is responsible for that growth. On the other hand, it may be that we do 
not need that kind of knowledge but only the knowledge of what is best. It is possible, 
however, that the knowledge of what is best requires the knowledge of the sciences and 
popular opinion to be able to judge what is best (see Phaedo 97d4-5). These questions are 
left unanswered.  
Socrates, however, realised that the general programme affects a person’s whole way 
of life:  
It belongs to a human to investigate, in relation to himself44 and other matters, 
nothing other than what is the finest and best (Phaedo 97d1-4).  
 
Doing this is using one’s nous. But this claim makes humans not only the inquirers but also 
the objects of investigation, which means that the programme allows self-inquiry, and self-
transformation.45 The same programme will do for all kinds of knowledge, and enterprises 
                                                
43 This is again the question about ἱκανῶς at 96d8 as ‘sufficient’ or ‘adequate.’  
44 For a different reading, see Verdenius (1958, 229). 
45 This is in two senses, independent inquiry, and inquiry into oneself. This means that if knowing 
yourself were ever possible, it would be through this programme, namely to know what is best in relation 
to oneself. Cf. Phaedrus 230a. See Rowe (1993). 
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from sciences to psychology and leading one’s life. Socrates’ extension of the programme 
means that he sees all the areas of knowledge as engaged in essentially the same business.  
The general programme also imposes limits and termination criteria for the 
investigation. For any inquiry, one would only need to investigate what is the finest and best 
for each thing. Socrates clarifies, however, that it also needs to include knowing what is 
worse, since it is part of the same knowledge (Phaedo 97d4-5). Once one knows what is 
best for something, then there is no need to keep looking; that would give a satisfactory and 
sufficient answer to the why-question (Phaedo 98a1-2), subject to review only if more 
information arises. Of course, there is a question here about how on earth we get access to 
that knowledge. In this sense, the failure of Anaxagoras will be instructive.  
Socrates also expands the programme in another direction. Until now it sounds as if it 
was only for finding αἰτίαι of effects already familiar to us. But when Socrates explains the 
kind of account he was hoping to learn from Anaxagoras, he indicates that it could also help 
to solve matters of fact (Phaedo 97d8-e3, and 98a2-7). Put in general terms, Socrates was 
ready to learn whether x was Y or Z (for instance, whether the earth was flat or not, and 
whether the sun had this or that relative speed); and then, to receive an explanation of its 
causation and necessity. This explanation would consist in saying which option was better, 
and how it was best for each thing to act or be acted upon.  
The method serves then to predict events, to describe matters of fact, or point out in 
which direction to look for what is wrong (certainly not nous, which has a stable function, 
but somewhere else). This could also be applied to analyse human action. To answer the 
question why S did X (Why did Socrates stay in prison? Why did Ajax the Lesser rape 
Cassandra?), it is necessary to explain how by doing X, S necessarily does the best thing she 
could have done; again, with the knowledge, time, resources available at the specific 
moment.  
Socrates was also hoping to get the αἰτία common to each thing (that is, an answer to 
how in general nous orders each thing); and, finally, an explanation of the common good 
for each thing (see Phaedo 98a9-b3). That and no less is what would have fulfilled 
Socrates’ desire for knowledge. Human beings, then, just need to find the best order to 
understand why things generate, perish, and exist. At this point, this only constitutes a 
general programme but lacks a clear method to succeed. This is what Socrates was hoping 
to learn from Anaxagoras.   








5. Accounts that do not hold together  
5.1 Real αἰτία, and real αἴτιον 
Socrates expresses his objections to Anaxagoras’ account at Phaedo 98b7-99d3. His 
description reveals a deep feeling of disapproval46 and disappointment. After reading his 
books, Socrates found out that Anaxagoras’ actual philosophy was far from his 
expectations.47 The books offered an account Socrates did not even consider a viable 
option.48  
First, Socrates explains why his hopes for Anaxagoras’ philosophy vanished away.49 
The main failure—he thinks—is that Anaxagoras does not use his nous, nor does he ascribe 
to it any responsibility in the ordering of things, offering instead αἰτίαι that made no 
reference to nous, but to other αἴτια.50 This implies three thoughts: an inconsistency 
between two claims, a disconnection between two parts of the theory, and an 
overdetermination of αἴτια. Anaxagoras seems to be claiming that nous is the αἴτιον of each 
thing, and yet alleges there are others, which seems contradictory.51 Even ignoring this 
problem, Anaxagoras’ account explains nothing about how nous is responsible for 
everything.  
This latter point is the main topic Socrates was hoping to learn from Anaxagoras. 
Without a clear account of how nous is related to everything else, the proposal remains just 
as a fairy tale. Finally, since Anaxagoras is proposing countless αἴτια, and his αἰτίαι make 
no reference to nous, it seems uneconomical to also propose nous as an αἴτιον. But without 
nous, Anaxagoras’ account is no different from that of the other natural philosophers, which 
means that it will also suffer from the same limitations.  
To illustrate the seriousness of the matter, Socrates puts forward two cases.52 One 
case refers to why Socrates is sitting in jail, and the other about why he is having a 
conversation with his friends. In both cases, an Anaxagorean answer would allege that the 
                                                
46 Socrates refers to Anaxagoras not by name but with a derogatory ‘ἄνδρα’ (the man). See Burnet (1911, 
105). 
47 See Phaedrus 269e-270a on Anaxagoras as teacher of Pericles, nous and lack of nous. 
48 See Phaedo 98a7.  
49 Socrates’ ‘wonderful hopes’ ‘vanished away’. With the expression ᾠχόµην φερόµενος at Phaedo 98b7-
8, Socrates ‘speaks as if he had been cast down from Olympus like another Hephaestus’ Burnet (1911, 
98). Cf. Euthyphro 15e5. 
50 See Phaedo 98b7-c2, and Phaedo 98c1-2: ‘holds as the thing responsible (αἰτιώµενον) air, aether, water, 
and many other absurd things.’ 
51 There are more charitable readings of Anaxagoras. It could be that the proposal was to offer two types 
of αἴτιον, or that they are related in some way Socrates missed.  
52 There is no reason to think these cases are hyperbolic, as Ledbetter (1999, 263) wants. See the 
superlative ‘ὁµοιότατον’ (‘in exactly the same position’) at 98c3. 
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things responsible are material things (bones and sinews, air and sounds), and would offer 
mechanistic αἰτίαι, just as the natural inquirers did before (Phaedo 98c2-e1). The first case, 
for instance, is expressed in the following way: 
He [Anaxagoras] seemed to me to be53 in exactly the same position as if 
someone said that all Socrates’ actions were accomplished by his nous, and then, 
in attempting to express the αἰτία of each of my actions, were to say, first, that 
the reason [διὰ ταῦτα] that I am now sitting here,54 is that my body is composed 
from bone and sinews, and the bones are hard and are separated from each 
other by joints, whereas the sinews, which can stretch and relax, surround the 
bones along with the flesh and skin which hold them together; then, with the 
bones hanging on their joints, the sinews by relaxing and contracting, somehow 
make me able to bend my limbs now, and this is the αἰτία of my sitting here bent 
down  (Phaedo 98c2-d6).55  
The Anaxagorean proposes a general principle: (1) all Socrates’ actions are 
accomplished by his nous; and then, that (2) Socrates is sitting in jail because his bones and 
sinews make him able to bend his limbs. Socrates’ nous is blamed for all his actions, which 
means that it is their αἴτιον. But then, when the Anaxagorean actually attempts to express 
the αἰτία of each of Socrates’ actions, he offers a physiological account that only explains 
how human bodily motions are possible in general.  
It is true that Socrates’ bones and sinews make him able to bend his limbs, but that is 
not why he is sitting in jail, nor does this account mention Socrates’ nous. The physiological 
account does not advance our understanding of Socrates’ decision to stay in jail. Moreover, 
someone who accepted it would think that the αἴτιον of Socrates’ action is not nous but his 
bones and sinews. This is made clear when Socrates offers the second case:  
And further, with respect to our conversation he would speak of other αἰτίαι such 
as this I just mentioned,56 alleging as the αἴτιον (αἰτιώµενος) sounds, airs, 
hearing, and countless other things such as these, … (Phaedo 98d6-8).  
Socrates thinks that the Anaxagorean would offer another physiological account, just 
like the one given to explain the movement of Socrates’ limbs. But in this case, instead of 
bones and sinews, the αἴτιον would be sounds, airs, and other things. This presents an 
additional problem. Socrates thinks that Anaxagoras’ philosophy posits a set of different 
αἴτια for each of Socrates’ actions. It seems, then, that in order to explain a day in Socrates’ 
life he would need countless αἴτια. The Anaxagorean in these two cases—Socrates thinks—
                                                
53 Plato uses the perfect infinitive πεπονθέναι, but Williamson (1904, 198) notes that this is a common 
euphemism for ἁµαρτανεῖν. The sense of the sentence is to show how these cases fail or miss the mark 
exactly in the same way as Anaxagoras’ account. 
54 Cf. Phaedo 60b. 
55 Cf. Metaphysics 1.4, 985a where Aristotle makes the same complaints about Anaxagoras. 
56 Here τοιαύτας refers to αἰτία in 98d5, and not to what follows. Sedley (1998, 115) points to this 
passage (and 101c4-5) to suggest that the distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτία is not entirely clear in the 
Phaedo, but if I am right in the reference of τοιαύτας, the distinction is clear. 








would neglect to say the real αἰτία57 of why he is sitting in jail, which is his decision about 
what was best under his circumstances (Phaedo 98e1-99a5). Socrates spells out his decision 
in two steps; first he explains the context of his decision, and then the evaluation he gave to 
his action:  
…he would neglect to say the real αἰτία, that, since the Athenians thought it was 
better to condemn me,58 because of this (διὰ ταῦτα) I in turn also thought better 
to sit here, i.e.,59 more just to stay to suffer whatever penalty60 they ordered 
(Phaedo 98e1-5).  
This is the real αἰτία. This is Socrates’ judgement in jail the day he is set to die. The 
inference the reader is invited to make is that this should be the kind of αἰτία one gets from 
Socrates’ method. Even if Socrates’ method is a little bit confused or imprecise, it is good 
enough to offer a sketchy but authentic αἰτία, instead of an inadequate one. In this sense, the 
difference perhaps would be that a real αἰτία points at the right αἴτιον. Socrates’ real αἰτία 
can be read as the following argument:  
A. Since the Athenians thought it was better to condemn him, Socrates thought it was 
more just to stay to suffer whatever penalty the Athenians ordered.  
B. Since Socrates thought it was more just to stay to suffer whatever penalty the 
Athenians ordered, he thought it was better to sit in jail (rather than run away).  
C. The Athenians thought it was better to condemn him. 
D. Therefore, Socrates thought it was better to sit in jail.  
This αἰτία assumes that Socrates acts according to what he thinks is best in his 
circumstance, and that explaining why he thought this or that specific action was best is 
explanatory in a way the answers from natural inquiry were not. This fits with the claim that 
all his actions are accomplished by his nous, and with the Nous Closure Principle. The 
αἴτιον is Socrates’ nous, the αἰτία his choosing of what was more just. The job of an αἰτία, 
then, is to explain a specific action given the above framework. In this case, the αἰτία needs 
to explain why Socrates thought sitting in jail was better than any other action available to 
him. Notice that Socrates does not give the general answer that Socrates’ nous always 
chooses what is best. The real αἰτία tells us why Socrates chose what he chose in this 
particular case. This does not require, however, a commitment to the thought that in fact 
                                                
57 Cf. Phaedo 99b3-4. 
58 See Phaedo 116c-d. 
59 Taking καί as epexegetic. 
60 There is a pun with δικαιότερον … τὴν δίκην that gets lost in translation. 
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sitting in jail was the best thing to do. It may turn out that after further reflection one finds 
out that there was a better action available.  
Socrates’ αἰτία shows that his action is linked to a wider context. It is a response to 
the activity of other people’s decisions (which they took by using their nous). The 
Athenians and Socrates, however, follow the same pattern, they did what they think was 
best. This shows that nous aims for the best action in its specific context and options 
available. A nous will always order things in the best way between the possible options.61 
But the αἰτία clearly states that Socrates’ decision to stay was prompted by the action of the 
Athenians. For instance, without sentence or in case of an unlawful detention, Socrates 
might have decided a different thing.  
The general structure of the αἰτία seems to be the following: for any agent S, and any 
action Y, an αἰτία of Y offers a) the previous action(s) that demand S’ action, b) S’ rationale 
in the light of (a), and c) how Y is a consequence of (b). According to this, (a) demarcates S’ 
scope of action, (b) makes explicit S’ action criteria, and (c) shows how the action criteria 
lead to Y. Due to the Athenians’ decision, Socrates was in jail, but he could have escaped, 
so the decision to stay was in his hands (i.e., in his nous’s power). However, his criterion for 
action was to consider which option was more just, and thus, he decided to sit and stay in 
jail (assuming a conception of justice where being just implies to comply with the law). In 
doing so, Socrates reveals that for him, it is better to act according to justice than any other 
criteria for action. However, someone else might have acted according to a different 
principle, for example, self-preservation, and then the best course of action would have 
been different.  
Socrates explains that the problem with his predecessors’ accounts is that they 
confuse the real αἴτιον with the necessary conditions for its action (and thus they are unable 
to give a real αἰτία):  
Since—by the dog!—I believe these sinews and bones could long ago have been 
in Megara or Boeotia taken by my belief as to the best, if I had not thought more 
just and fairer to suffer whatever penalty the city ordered, rather than escape and 
run away. But to call such things [i.e. these sinews and bones] the αἴτια is out of 
place (Phaedo 98e5-99a5).62   
Although Socrates’ scope of action may be determined by the Athenians’ actions 
(they put him in that position), they do not determine his decision. He could have escaped if 
                                                
61 We could rephrase the function as nous(x) = best order for x (that that specific nous can think of under the 
circumstances).  
62 Cf. Timaeus 46c7, where these types of things are called συναίτιον, and distinguished from the αἴτια. 
The Stoics also use the word συναίτιον, but not in the same sense (see Ch. 5, sec. 6.5).  








he had thought it was the best. But Socrates considers that it is a mistake to think that the 
bones and sinews are the αἴτια of his action, instead of his nous’s activity. Socrates, 
however, is not rejecting the physical reality. He recognises that having bones and sinews is 
a necessary condition for nous’s activity: 
If someone said that without having such things, as bones and sinews and many 
other things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be speaking the 
truth. But to say that because of these things I do what I do, even doing them 
with my nous, rather than my choice of what is best, it would be a profoundly 
lazy way of talking (Phaedo 99a5-b2).   
Nous’s activity depends on some necessary physical conditions, but this passage puts 
emphasis on decision and choice. The necessary conditions could be established by 
reflecting on all the things whose absence would make impossible the action of nous. For 
example, without legs, Socrates cannot sit, even if his nous commands it. The activity of 
nous, then, presupposes the existence of the material part of the world, and depending on 
the action, a specific set of complex realities. Otherwise, a nous would have nothing to 
order or direct. The necessary conditions, however, fail to answer the why question. 
Socrates continues:  
For not being able to distinguish that the real αἴτιον is one thing, and that without 
which the αἴτιον would not be able to be a αἴτιον, another (Phaedo 99b2-4).  
 Mentioning the necessary conditions as αἴτια calls for counter-examples. The reason 
Socrates is in jail cannot be that his bones and legs put him there, because his legs could 
have also been in Megara or Boeotia. Therefore, although these things are necessary, they 
are not why Socrates is sitting in jail. Moreover, even if nous is mentioned as the αἴτιον, if it 
does not make reference to its function, namely choosing what is best, the account would be 
lacking. Socrates’ contribution to the discussion is the thought that nous orders things in 
whatever way is best. Notice how the real αἰτία of why he is sitting in jail makes no 
reference to Socrates’ bones and sinews, even when he recognises that they are necessary 
conditions of Socrates’ action.  
Socrates, then, groups Anaxagoras, natural inquirers, and ordinary people, to make a 
comparison:  
It is precisely what the many seem to me to do, groping about like in darkness, 
using a name that belongs to something else, and thus calling it as if it itself were 
an αἴτιον (Phaedo 99b4-6).63   
 The problem is one of misidentification. Everyone is blaming the wrong things as  
responsible for all that happens in heaven and on earth. This is a bold claim Socrates has 
                                                
63 Cf. Ch. 2, sec. 4.  
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been waiting to reveal. He thinks that everybody else is in the dark. He is the exception, 
however, since he is able to see which is the real αἴτιον, and what is the problem with 
everybody else. If people continue to mistake necessary conditions for αἴτια, they will never 
find the real αἰτίαι of things. Socrates is arguing here that people need to stop thinking about 
causation in the way they have been thinking because it leads nowhere. It does not matter if 
this goes against common sense, or the original intuitions, the point is that it is a mistaken 
way of thinking about the whole topic.  
5.2 The Titanomachia  
The result of such a mistake is to propose theories that do not hold together. Socrates 
offers two cases: one is a person who argues that a vortex surrounds the earth to keep the 
heavens in place,64 another is someone who makes the air support the heavens like a wide 
lid (see Phaedo 99b6-c1).65 Socrates presents these accounts merely as competing 
descriptions, unable to explain why things are in the way they say. For Socrates, people 
who do that do not inquire into the capacity that things have to be located in the best 
possible way, nor do they think this capacity has divine power, nor do they think that what 
is good and binding really binds things together. They think, in turn, that at some point they 
will find a firmer αἴτιον to hold everything together (see Phaedo 99a5-c6).  
Socrates thinks, in contrast, that things do have the capacity to be disposed in the best 
way possible. This implies that to know the αἰτία of generation and destruction, one needs 
to inquiry into this capacity. Socrates also believes this capacity bears certain divine 
strength (cf. the Stoic view, see Ch. 5, sec. 2.2). Socrates also complains that people do not 
believe ‘what is good and binding really binds.’ According to what has been said in this 
passage, this seems a reference to nous; nous—by ordering—is what really binds things, 
instead of bones, sinews, airs, and vortices; nous is the capacity with divine power to really 
bind things together (this idea will later be defended in the Sophist, see Ch. 4, sec. 7).  
It seems that some of the natural inquirers think, in contrast, that in case they haven’t 
found the ultimate αἴτιον of why things hold together, they will find it at some point using 
their mechanistic method. They think they will ‘find at some point a more powerful and 
more everlasting Atlas’ (Phaedo 99c3-4). Plato uses ἰσχυρότερος (more powerful) here, 
referring back to the divine ἰσχύς (power) of nous (in 99c3). These people are looking for 
‘an Atlas’ with a divine power, stronger than the divine power of nous. Socrates, however, 
                                                
64 Perhaps Empedocles. See Aristotle DC 300b2-3, cf. 295a166-ss. See the discussion in Rowe (1993, 
237), and Burnet (1911, 107). 
65 Rowe (1993, 238) suggests the reference may be Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. See 
Aristotle DC 294b13-17; cf. Clouds 379. 








never talks about whether these people have reasons for their failure to believe in nous. 
They might be materialists who wish to avoid certain metaphysical commitments, but if so, 
in a sense, they are populating their ontology with countless material αἴτια. They might not 
want to believe in a different type of αἴτιον, nous. But if nous is used in the universal sense, 
in insisting on their materialism these folks are erasing not only divine nous, but also human 
nous from their ontology. This seems too much of a cost for Socrates. Materialism will be 
further discussed later in the Sophist (see Ch. 4, sec. 6-7).  
The comparison between the divine power of nous, and the strength of Atlas, also 
implies some differences. The reference to Atlas, a titan from the pre-Olympic era, makes 
an allusion to the Titanomachia.66 Atlas, the god of astronomy, defied Zeus in the Titans’ 
revolt, and after the Olympic gods won, he was condemned to hold up the sky for all 
eternity. By comparing the missing αἴτιον of the natural inquiry with Atlas, Socrates is also 
implying that those who look for it are joining forces with the loser’s side, since at the end it 
was Zeus who commanded Atlas to hold up the heavens, and in the same way the inquirers 
into nature will find out that nous is behind even the strongest of their alleged αἴτια. Atlas 
was also known as a dull, witless giant, somewhat stupid.67 He represents in this way the 
contrary of nous: nous is an Olympic, heavenly, divine force, whereas the power of Atlas is 
that of a son of the goddess Earth.  
5.3 The Second Voyage 
Socrates, in the end, remains open to becoming a student of anyone able to put such a 
theory together (a theory with a stronger Atlas than the one they have), but since he was 
deprived from any good candidate from the beginning, however, was unable to discover it 
by himself, nor learn it from another, he decided to begin a second attempt in search of the 
αἰτία (Phaedo 99c6-d3).68  
Phaedo 99a5-c6 raises the following exegetical questions: 1) what exactly is 
Anaxagoras’ mistake, and what implications does it have? 2) Why it is a mistake? 3) What 
exactly is Socrates’ decision about it, and is it justified? There has been much discussion 
about (1)69 and (3).70 It has been thought that the outcome of this section is Socrates’ 
                                                
66 This links with the Sophist passage I analyse in Ch. 4 (see esp. sec. 1, and 3). There, there is a second 
Titanomachia, known as the gigantomachia, where the Giants, sons of the Goddess Earth, rebel against 
the Olympic gods.  
67 See Homer Odyssey 1.51-4; Hesiod Theogony 507-20, 744-50; Pindar Pythian 4.289-90; Aeschylus 
Prometheus 347-20, 425-30. 
68 See Politicus 300c. 
69 See, for example, Vlastos (1971, 138); Annas (1983, 314); Sedley (1990, 7), (1995), and (1998); and 
Hankinson (1998, 84-87). Ledbetter (1999, 260) adds that Socrates also objects Anaxagoras’ inclusion of 
bodies as causes. 
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complete abandonment of the search for a teleological answer. In contrast, some have seen 
a hint of a full teleological account that gets expanded in Republic 6, with the form of the 
good as the cause, but that it is put on hold here.71 Everybody agrees there is a change of 
αἰτία. I think, however, that even after rejecting Anaxagoras’ αἰτίαι, Socrates still considers 
nous as the αἴτιον of each thing. The passage criticises Anaxagoras not for proposing nous 
as the αἴτιον, but for being unable to deliver αἰτίαι that connected nous with its effects.72  
As other dialogues use mathematical or medical methodologies to extend their use 
to other areas,73 so Socrates extends here a legal framework and applies it to 
everything.74 Anaxagoras charged nous as being responsible for each thing, but his own 
                                                                                                                                          
70 This is the famous discussion about the meaning of ‘δεύτερος πλοῦς.’ See, for instance, Murphy 
(1933), Rose (1966), Shipton (1979), Ross (1982), Gonzalez (1998), and Sharma (2009). 
71 See Bedu-Addo (1979); McCabe (1998), (2000, 165). 
72 The standard interpretation comes from Vlastos’ (1969, 297-8, n. 15) reading of Phaedo 99c6-d2. According 
to him: ‘what Socrates has failed to discover by his own labours or from those of others and is prepared to do 
without for the present is the teleological aitia itself. This leaves no room for understanding him to mean (as 
has been done over and over again in the literature) that his “second-best journey” is (a) an alternative method 
of searching for teleological aitiai rather than (b) an alternative method of searching for aitiai. The text offers 
no direct support for (a), since nothing is said of different methods of looking for teleological aitiai (the natural 
philosophers were condemned for failing to look for such aitia, not for looking for them by the wrong 
method).’ Bostock (1986) for example, follows this line of thought. But this reading has led not only to an 
unsatisfactory answer as to why Socrates stayed in prison but also to a complete misreading of Socrates’ 
account of causation and responsibility in the Phaedo. The main problem with this interpretation is that it 
construes Socrates second voyage as a weak, and weird proposal, subject to many counterexamples. More 
importantly, it is unable to explain the real αἰτία and real αἴτιον (see this chapter’s sec. 5.1). Bostock (1986, 
155) accuses Plato of carelessness, and says that his ‘line of thought has led to an obviously absurd result.’  
Sedley (1998, 123-124), however, has shown that Bostock’s approach is inadequate ‘to object on the ground 
that Plato’s causal theory cannot account for all the relations which we consider causal.’ The problem with 
Bostock’s counterexamples is that they take our intuitions about causation as evidence against Plato. But this is 
to misunderstand the whole point of the passage. Plato wants us to change our intuitions about what is and what 
is not an αἰτία, not to give a theory to explain them. Plato himself makes this clear when he recognises that 
previous philosophers and ordinary people have a radically different understanding of what is an αἰτία.  
The problems, then, can be avoided by correcting Vlastos’ mistake. Let me first quote the relevant passage 
from the Phaedo 99c6-d2: ‘ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει µαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ’ ἂν 
γενοίµην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ’ αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου µαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόµην, τὸν 
δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγµάτευµαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωµαι, ὦ Κέβης;’ 
This translates to: ‘So I would gladly become student of anyone who possess [the knowledge] of such αἰτία. 
But since I was deprived of it and have not been able either to find it myself or to learn it from someone else, 
would you like me to give you a demonstration, Cebes, of how I pursued my second voyage in search of the 
αἰτία?’  
Vlastos’ (1969, 297) rejects the teleological αἰτία on the basis that: ‘the reference of ταύτης in C8 (the object of 
ἐστερήθην and also, with the implied change of case, of the infinitives εὑρεῖν, µαθεῖν) is to τοιαύτης αἰτίας in 
C7.’ Vlastos reads the text as saying that Socrates was deprived of the teleological explanation (i.e., ‘τοιαύτης 
αἰτίας’). I agree with his reading of the Greek, but I do not think that τοιαύτης αἰτίας should be identified with 
the teleological αἰτία (an Aristotelian distinction Vlastos imposes on the text), but with the Atlas sought by 
natural inquiry. Socrates abandons his confidence in the naturalistic explanation that promises to answer the 
‘why?’ question. But that does not mean he rejects the search for the αἰτία of the divine force referred as ‘the 
truly good and binding’ (ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον, Phaedo 99c5), and the capacity of natural things to be in 
the best place they could possibly be put. 
73 For an example with medicine see Phaedrus 270c1-d7, discussed in Ch. 4, sec. 5.  
74 Legal analogies have already been suggested, see Sedley (1998). I think, however, that Plato is not 
making analogies but extrapolating a legal framework and applying it to the whole of reality. That the 
Phaedo is framed as Socrates’ second legal defence is stated in 63b. 








allegations failed to prove nous’s blame. His mistake was to end up accusing75 other 
suspects, without making clear their connection with nous. Socrates, who also suspects 
nous, is disappointed by Anaxagoras’ lazy performance as prosecutor.76 Socrates criticises 
Anaxagoras’ legal strategy, but not in order to drop the case but to promote himself as the 
leading prosecutor. He still thinks the case could be won. The legal framework also explains 
Socrates’ insistence on the thesis that opposites cannot be responsible for the same effects, 
and that a single effect cannot have an opposite αἰτία. If any of those things were possible, 
they would lead to two opposite αἴτια with two opposite allegations for the same deed. 
Notice, however, that the problem is not that Socrates is assuming there must be only one 
nous per effect (the democratic decision to condemn him to death penalty makes this clear). 
The difficulty is that the two alleged αἴτια would be opposite to each other.  
At Phaedo 98c4-5, Socrates makes clear that each of his actions needed an αἰτία, 
even if his nous is the αἴτιον of all of them. Each of his deeds requires a new trial. This 
means that there are as many αἰτίαι as things in the world, even if there is only one kind of 
αἴτιον. If nous, then, is the thing responsible for everything, with one counterexample, with 
one αἰτία of something that successfully proves that the αἴτιον is something other than nous, 
the whole proposal falls apart.  
Socrates is also concerned that Anaxagoras is not giving nous any responsibility for 
the ordering of things,77 but alleging that the culprits are a multitude of other things. 
Socrates calls these things ἄτοπα,78 which is normally translated as ‘absurd,’ but its literal 
meaning is ‘out of place.’ Anaxagoras’ error is to misplace other αἴτια instead of nous, 
proving he is not using his own nous to order things in the best way possible. What is 
absurd is to put things out of their place. For instance, people unable to distinguish between 
αἴτιον and necessary conditions use names in a disordered fashion, since they use the name 
‘αἴτιον’ referring to certain things when in reality it belongs to something else. Even if they 
say true things while describing the necessary conditions, since they talk about them as if 
they were the αἴτια, they have failed to answer why each thing is or should be where it is. In 
addition, when Socrates explains what he considers the real αἰτία of why he is sitting in jail, 
he says that his decision to stay there is to suffer the Athenians’ orders (κελεύω in 98e5), 
                                                
75 See Phaedo 98b9. Plato uses the participle ἐπαιτιώµενον, literally ‘bringing a charge against, accusing.’ 
This vocabulary was normally used to bring legal charges against someone.  
76 See ἀµελέω, ‘have no care for,’ in Phaedo 98e1, and πολλὴ ἂν καὶ µακρὰ ῥᾳθυµία εἴη τοῦ λόγου (‘it 
would be to speak extreme laziness’), in Phaedo 99b1-2. 
77 Phaedo 98c1: τὸ διακοσµεῖν τὰ πράγµατα. Here it is clear that nous orders each specific thing. Note 
that διακοσµέω is the same word the Stoics use to refer to the re-establishing of the world’s order after the 
conflagration.  
78 See Phaedo 98c1-2, and 99a5. 
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and whatever penalty the city has imposed (τάσσω in 99a4). The decisions of both, the 
Athenians and Socrates, are about putting things and persons in the right order.  
6.  The solar eclipse and why previous methods are unsafe and careless 
Socrates begins the exposition of his own method and the type of αἰτία he champions, 
after his deep disappointment with the previous inquiry. This is the first lesson he took from 
all these:   
Well then, after these things,79 he said, since I had failed in my inquiry into 
things, I thought it was necessary to be cautious not to suffer the same as what 
happens to those who observe and examine the sun during an eclipse. For I 
suppose some80 ruin their eyes unless they examine its reflection (εἰκών) in water 
or something such as this. I just had in mind something such as this, and I feared 
my soul would be completely blinded by looking at things with my eyes and 
attempting to grasp them with each of my senses. I thought I must flee and take 
refuge in arguments, and examine in them the truth about things (Phaedo 99d4-
e6).  
Socrates recommends a change of attitude, which leads to a change of method to save 
him from the risks of inquiry. First, he wants to be more careful than everybody else. Note 
that it is through thinking that he decides to change his attitudes towards inquiry. Before, 
Socrates was, perhaps, overly enthusiastic, but was not especially concerned with being 
careful. But his assessment of Anaxagoras led him to evaluate everybody else as lazy, and 
careless (see Phaedo 99b1-2). That lack of care, it seems, is one of the reasons their theories 
do not hold together. Socrates suggests a relation between the attitudes towards inquiry, the 
risks, and the harm that can result from it. He thinks that an inquiry badly conducted could 
make people permanently resilient to his method, the real αἰτία, and αἴτιον.  
To explain this, he draws two analogies with the different ways people look at solar 
eclipses. These analogies compare two different methods of observation of the sun, with 
two methods of inquiry of the αἰτίαι of things:  
1. Looking directly : Solar eclipse :: Using the senses : searching for the αἰτία of 
things. 
2. Looking at reflections : Solar eclipse :: Examining arguments : searching for the 
αἰτία of things.81  
                                                
79 See Phaedo 99c6-d3. 
80 The word is ἔνιοι, and seems to refer back to Anaxagoras and everyone else making the same type of 
mistake. Anaxagoras may have seen the real αἴτιον of things, but by being careless with his method, he 
ended up blinding himself. 
81 This allows a more general analogy: method of observation: phenomenon :: method of inquiry: subject of 
inquiry. 








In the first analogy, just as some people ruin their eyes by looking directly at the 
eclipse, some people ruin their souls by attempting to grasp everything exclusively with 
their senses (Or with their senses while being careless with the arguments). In the second 
analogy, Socrates thinks that looking at the eclipse’s reflection in the water is safer, just as 
examining the αἰτία of things with arguments. There are two main things to take into 
consideration, the methods, and the possible outcomes.  
In the first analogy the method of observation is unsafe, and careless, while in the 
second one it is safe, and careful. The reason for these differences seems to be the directness 
or indirectness of the method. Socrates, however, is going to reject this line of thought in 
Phaedo 99e6-100a1. Βut if it is not a problem of directness, then it seems that the difference 
is about using all the resources at hand to inquire into nature. In the case of watching an 
eclipse, people should consider, for instance, the testimony of previous observers, and be 
aware of the dangers of eye damage. They should use their reason to find out a way to study 
solar eclipses without risking their sight. In the case of the soul, Socrates thinks he should 
avoid the exclusively empirical observation of nature, and undergo instead a careful 
examination and reflection of the arguments, theoretical frameworks, and concepts used. 
The examination of the arguments is the safest method to observe and study nature.  
The possible outcomes of (1) are blindness, and (metaphorical) ‘blindness’ of the 
soul. Both imply a damage that could be temporary, or permanent. Socrates has already 
talked about his own temporary blindness of the soul after his inquiry into nature (see 
Phaedo 96c6). Now his worry is that the damage may become permanent. If the analogy 
holds, the suggestion is that the damage to the soul is directly proportional to the time spent 
using the senses as the method of inquiry. But what exactly would the blindness of the soul 
consist in? Real blindness is the loss of sight. In that case, the eyes stop seeing light, and 
colour. Staring at a solar eclipse, however, involves the corruption of the organ of visual 
perception due to a misuse (in contrast with an accident or the loss of sight that comes with 
age). The blindness of the soul in this passage seems to be a loss of the capacity to see what 
is best. Notice that what is best is out there in the world. It is something to be ‘seen’ with 
one’s nous. It implies a realist conception of the good. Therefore, the soul’s blindness is, 
more specifically, a corruption of a person’s nous, which implies an impediment to 
understanding reality thereafter.  
Socrates’ claim is, then, that what his predecessors have done has a degenerative 
consequence for someone’s nous. Socrates thinks that an extended use of the empirical 
method may lead to a permanent blindness of the soul, and therefore, a permanent inability 
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to grasp the αἰτίαι of things. This would imply not only a scientific bad practice, but a moral 
one, since Socrates includes in the inquiry into αἰτίαι, and certainly in the task of one’s 
nous, questions of justice and goodness (this explains the reference to people who do not 
believe in ‘what is good and binding’ in Phaedo 99b6-c1). Socrates thinks that an incorrect 
method can cause axiological blindness. But it may not only include Anaxagoras and 
famous natural philosophers, but everyone who is not doing philosophy in the right way, 
that is, Socrates’ way.  
There is a scale of the degrees of damage a nous has suffered by failing to inquire into 
the αἰτίαι of things. Remember, for instance, that Socrates has also compared the inquirers 
into nature with people groping about in darkness (see Phaedo 99b4-6). The comparison 
with the eclipse, however, warns against their method and attitude not because it leads to a 
misidentification of the real αἴτιον, but because it can produce a permanent damage to the 
soul. It seems, then, that there are at least three different kinds of blindness of the soul:  
a) Brief temporary blindness: like Socrates’ inquiry into nature. People switching 
positions, puzzled.  
b) Prolonged (but hopefully still temporary) blindness: some of the scientists who are 
groping about in the dark, like Anaxagoras, or the Athenians. People holding 
inconsistent accounts of reality, and/or misidentifying the αἴτιον of things.  
c) Permanent blindness: scientists that do not even believe in what is good and 
binding, and think they will find a stronger Atlas.  
According to this picture, a brief temporary blindness might even be therapeutic and 
helpful in certain circumstances. It would count as a healthy amount of puzzlement. The 
problem is when the blindness persists, and people stop realising their arguments do not 
hold together (like Anaxagoras), or worst, when someone starts thinking that darkness is all 
there is. The risk of being careless with the inquiry into things is that one may ruin one’s 
nous, and cause oneself’s axiological blindness. This would also imply the loss of one’s 
agency, since that was nous’s job-description. Blindness of the soul leads to the loss of 
agency, and, therefore, to the loss of full credit of one’s actions. The threat involved in 
failing to examine arguments is to become by one’s own actions a slave, or worse, a 
mindless zombie. It is a loss of the capacity to do good (order things in the best way), but 
that does not imply people in that situation lose their capacity to move things around. The 
danger is to lose sight of what is good and just, while keeping the instrumental use of 








reason.82 The threat of complete axiological blindness is that it means an irreversible 
damage to one’s soul.83 Does the permanent damage to the soul mean that arguments are 
useless against this type of blindness?  
The possible outcomes of the second analogy seem more promising. People who 
watch a solar eclipse in reflections do not ruin their eyes, and are able to study the eclipse in 
a safer way. Accordingly, Socrates suggests that by examining arguments he can avoid 
blindness of the soul, and study the αἰτίαι of things without the risks. But, unlike the case of 
watching eclipses through their reflection, Socrates presents himself as the discoverer and 
only practitioner of the right way to examine arguments to get to the αἰτίαι of things. As in 
the eclipse’s observation, Socrates’ method may not be straightforward, absolutely accurate, 
or certain, but it is at least safer for the soul, and is able to consider a wider scope of reality. 
It considers the whole picture, since it includes the good and the capacity of things to be in 
the best way, and (allegedly) it also offers an account that will hold together.  
Socrates’ method, however, does not reject the phenomena. After all, arguments are 
about the generation, destruction, and existence of things, and some observation is needed. 
Moreover, in the eclipse analogy the use of reflections in the water implies a causal 
connection between the eclipse and its reflection. A reflection is there only if there is 
something that is reflecting in the water. In the same way, first order arguments are 
‘reflections’ of things, and are caused by them, while second order arguments are 
reflections of first order arguments. If the arguments are about how the αἴτιον is linked with 
the physical reality, it is necessary that those arguments include the empirical observation.  
Socrates’ retreat to arguments is not an absolute abandonment of the information of 
the senses, it is, however, a change of priority. Socrates may think that an empirical 
expedition without a proper theoretical framework would end up in disaster. Instead of 
trying to observe nature for a longer time and being obsessed about developing the art of 
empirical observation while being careless with the argumentation, then, he suggests that 
first we need some conceptual clarity. Socrates makes clear, however, that he did not 
develop his method with the empirical detail covered by his predecessors, and he claims to 
know nothing or very little about the necessary conditions, and the ‘how’ of things. But this 
does not mean it is impossible, or that it is undesirable to have that knowledge.84 
                                                
82 Similar complaints are done by Adorno and Horkheimer (1944) in Dialectic of Enlightment. 
83 This also shows that philosophy can be a dangerous business if done carelessly. 
84 Against this reading see Bostock (1986, 147). 
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Socrates points out, however, an important dissimilarity between the solar eclipses 
and the investigation of αἰτίαι (see Phaedo 99e6-100a1). He explains it in the following 
way:  
For I do not actually agree that someone who examines things with arguments 
examines them with reflections85 more than one who examines facts (Phaedo 
100a1-3). 
The eclipse analogies sound as if inquiry through sense perception were better and more 
direct than examining things through arguments. Socrates thinks, however, that both are 
reflections, and both are, at least, equally close to reality. In the eclipse case, staring directly 
with the naked eyes has a claim of authenticity and accuracy that empirical inquiry lacks in 
the examination of the αἰτίαι of things. Socrates thinks, then, that empirical inquiry of αἰτίαι 
is not staring at reality in a purer way than by argument, but it is a harmful one. With this 
clarification, Socrates undercuts one of the advantages that empirical inquiry had to offer. 
Another problem with empirical inquiry is that it may lead people to misidentify reflections 
with the originals. Socrates’ stepping back to arguments, and all his previous journey that 
led him to that point, implies that he is now able to see reflections as reflections, which 
means he knows there are originals, even if he cannot see them directly, or clearly.86  
7.  A new hope  
7.1 The method of hypothesis. 
Once Socrates clarifies the dissimilarity between solar eclipses and the inquiry into 
αἰτίαι, he offers a first general description of his own method of inquiry. This is the method 
he developed as a δεύτερος πλοῦς after he failed to learn a reliable method from someone 
else or by his own first attempts. He describes it by saying:  
I started in this way: hypothesising in each occasion the argument which I 
decided would be the most powerful; I established, on the one hand, as being 
true that which seemed to me in harmony with it [i.e., the argument], about αἰτίαι 
and about everything else; on the other hand, I established as not true whatever 
seemed to me not in harmony with it (Phaedo 100a3-7).87  
The method assumes a certain familiarity with the competing arguments and an 
evaluation of which is the most powerful. It does not start from scratch, but from an implicit 
first survey of the possible arguments to answer a problem, and the realisation that none of 
                                                
85 The word εἰκών is normally translated as image or likeness. That, however, dilutes the causal relation 
between the original and its reflection, since likenesses could be accidental. For the use of εἰκών in other 
dialogues see Phaedrus 250b3, 4; Republic 520c4-6; Timaeus 48e-49a. 
86 The distinction between reality and fiction is a theme the Stoics will also use in their discussion of 
forms (see Ch. 5, sec. 5.1).  
87 Cf. Phaedo 97c6-61. 








them work. This is important because it stresses the fact that the previous inquiry was not a 
waste of time, and the new method is not an abandonment of the phenomena, and also 
because it means that the method does not try to wipe everything at once. In the case of the 
αἰτία of generation and destruction, Socrates’ method presupposes his previous knowledge 
of the accounts of natural inquiry. This means that his second method subsumes the 
experiences from the first one. Socrates’ method, then, consists in the following steps:  
If in puzzlement about X: 
1. Decide which would be the most powerful argument. 
2. Hypothesise the most powerful argument as true.  
3. Stipulate as true everything that seems in harmony with the most powerful 
argument.  
4. Stipulate as not true whatever is not in harmony with the most powerful 
argument. 
This is a method to order one’s own ideas. Getting out of puzzlement is crucial 
because otherwise one’s nous cannot decide which order is best. The key to the method is 
harmony (συµφωνεῖν). Socrates use of this word seems to make a point about compatibility 
and complementarily.88 If this were the case, the method would be able to accept arguments 
as true even if they do not follow from the hypothesis, as far as they are compatible with it. 
If the main concern is compatibility, it would certainly include whatever it can be logically 
deduced from the hypothesis, but it would not be limited to that. This also means that the 
hypothesis does not need to be the foundational axiom of the account.89 Moreover, it gives 
the impression that from a single hypothesis one can build different harmonies, accepting as 
true things that are more specific, more general, and also in other areas of knowledge. 
Socrates, in any case, seems aware of the tentative nature of his method. As such, it does 
not guarantee in any way the truth about the answer it can offer, but only the consistency of 
one’s account.  
                                                
88 This is often considered as a deductive method. See Burnet (1911, 109). Socrates idea would be, then, to set 
an axiomatic account of reality. In such case, an argument is selected as the axiom, and everything that 
logically follows from it would be accepted as true, and anything inconsistent with it would be dropped and 
considered false. There is, however, no reason to think this is about deduction. For a detailed discussion on 
συµφωνεῖν see Bailey (2005) who discusses various alternatives. I agree with him that συµφωνεῖν is not  
‘to be consistent with,’ or ‘entail.’ I also agree that Gentzler’s (1991) view that is an interim between 
these other options is also problematic. Bailey’s own view, that συµφωνεῖν stands for ‘mutual explanatory 
support,’ in a generalising and particularising kind of explanation, where they form an unity, seems, 
however, an over-translation. I think, instead, that συµφωνεῖν is about complementarity in a looser sense that 
may include explanatory support but also mere compatibility.  
89 Contrast with Republic 437a5-8.  
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The first step of the method, however, seems to generate a problem. The decision it 
requires seems to presuppose a criterion or some way to tell which argument is the most 
powerful, but it does not say how one is supposed to make this decision. The best option I 
can think of is that its basis is how well the person in puzzlement understands the different 
arguments.90 In that case, the decision of which is the strongest argument would be based 
on which argument the inquirer understands best. This of course would not guarantee the 
truth of the argument, and that is why there is need to hypothesise it as true, but it will at 
least give to the inquirer a firm ground to start looking. Of course, the inquiry could prevent 
understanding the selected hypothesis or it could cause us to unlearn it, which is what 
happened with Socrates’ initial intuitions about growth.  
7.2 Safest answers and the method of hypothesis 
7.2.1 Using the method of hypothesis.  
Socrates thinks his first attempt at explaining his method needs some clarification 
since Cebes seems not to understand it (see Phaedo 100a7-8). What follows is not an 
elaboration on the details of the general method but an explanation about how Socrates 
applies this method to their specific problem:  
But this is what I say: nothing new, but what I never stop arguing both elsewhere 
and in the previous part of our conversation.91 For I am going to try to show you 
the kind of αἰτία with which I busy myself; and I am back to those well known 
things, and I begin from them. I assume there is a beautiful itself by itself, and a 
good, and a great, and all the rest (Phaedo 100b1-7).  
Socrates makes three points in this passage. First, that his task is to show the kind of 
αἰτία he proposes. (Note that he is not proposing a new αἴτιον). Then, he says that the 
arguments from where he is going to start are nothing new: he argued them in previous 
occasions, and in a previous part of the conversation. This seems to be the arguments he has 
                                                
90 There are various options. One could be to think it needs to be just an educated guess, or a bet, since 
otherwise there would be no real puzzlement about the topic under discussion. But still, someone could ask, if a 
person is in genuine puzzlement, on what grounds could she decide which is the most powerful argument? 
Plato’s word for ‘most powerful’, ‘ἐρρωµενέστατον,’ could also mean most influential, in which case, the 
person would go with the argument that has the best reputation among others. Socrates, however, makes a case 
for his own argument (that forms exist).  A solution to this problem could be to think that the decision just rests 
on what appears to be an individual in each case, relying on subjective taste. There is, however, no hint of that 
in the text. A better option is to read the passage as saying that the argument used as the hypothesis is not about 
the topic being discussed (since one is completely at a loss about it), but a strong argument at a more general 
level. The idea would be to take that strongest argument from there, and try to see if by examining arguments 
compatible with it, one can discover which arguments in the area of puzzlement would be compatible with the 
hypothesis. There is one problem with this solution. If the most powerful argument is from a different topic, 
why would we need to posit it as a hypothesis? Why would we not just consider it true?  
91 See Phaedo 65d-ss. Cf. Republic 6.507a7-b10 (see Ch. 2, sec. 3).  








decided are the most powerful. Then, he assumes them as true, and reveals that he means 
the arguments about forms, which if true, imply that some forms exist.  
Socrates, hope is that if he can show the kind of αἰτία he proposes holds together, he 
will be able to show that the soul is immortal.92 Note that the promise is not that his kind of 
αἰτία will be logically deduced from the arguments about forms, but it presupposes their 
existence. Thus, they may be just an extension of the theory of forms, something 
compatible with it, or co-supportive, not necessarily a logical consequence. Following the 
method described above, Socrates says:  
Consider, he said, whether you also agree with me as to the following; for it 
seems to me that if something else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it is 
beautiful by no other reason than that each of these things participates in that 
beautiful, and I say so in everything.   
—Do you agree with an αἰτία such as this? 
—I agree.  
—Well then, he said, I no longer understand nor I am able to recognise those 
other ingenious αἰτίαι. But if anyone tells me why something is beautiful either 
because it has a bright colour, or shape, or anything else such as these, I dismiss 
these other things. For I am confused with all these other things. But I simply, 
artlessly, and perhaps simple-mindedly, admit this to myself: that nothing 
different makes something beautiful than the beautiful itself, whether by its 
presence or by communion, in whatever way or manner happens (Phaedo 
100c3-d6). 
Once the existence of forms is accepted, Socrates asks to accept a further claim about their 
causal relationship with the rest of the things in the world. The claim can be expressed as 
follows:  
If X is F, and X ≢ the F-itself, then X is F because and only because X participates in 
the F-itself. 
 The claim is composed by three elements: the particular objects, their properties, and 
the forms. The claim’s explanandum is a particular object X with a specific property F. The 
explicans is the participation of X in the F-itself. The grounds to accept this claim are that it 
is in harmony with the existence of forms, and, thus, it is an application of the third step of 
Socrates’ method and should be considered as true. The claim offers a general framework 
of αἰτίαι. If someone asks why X is F, the answer would be that it is because X participates 
in the F-itself.  
Socrates, however, does not explain what is meant by participation (µετέχει in 
100c5), and later will make clear that his argument will not explain it; perhaps because he 
does not need to for the purposes of proving the immortality of the soul. What he needs is 
                                                
92 See Phaedo 100b7-9. 
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that an explanatory relationship between the forms and its participants is accepted. There 
are, however, some things that can be said about this participation. First, it is an asymmetric 
relation: the F-itself will never participate in X; and second, participation has an explanatory 
power for the qualities that things have.  
Does that mean that Socrates is proposing that forms can be the αἴτιον of generation, 
destruction, and existence? Accepting this idea, however, would raise a question about how 
forms, which are only intelligible, can cause something in the physical part of the world. 
This is a well-known objection against forms.93 If they are intelligible, it seems they are 
passive, and even if they offer a formal explanation, that certainly does not make them the 
entities responsible for the generation, destruction, and existence of things, which is what 
Socrates is looking for. The agency is missing here.  
A more charitable reading is to see in Socrates’ proposal an implicit reference to 
nous. This means nous is the missing link between forms and particulars. If someone asks 
not why X is F, but, accepting that it is because it participates in the F-itself, now asks why 
X participates in the F-itself, the answer is that it partakes in it because a nous acted upon X 
to that effect, that it was best for X to be F. A nous’s job—ordering in the best way—could 
be done using the forms as instruments.  
In fact, if the Forms were αἴτια, then there will be an over-determination of culprits 
for each thing (the culprit of action X is Socrates, and the form of the good, and the form of 
justice, etc.). But the agent of an effect should be the only one accountable for her actions 
(even if other things are necessary for the causal explanation). If Anaxagoras was unable to 
explain the connection between nous and its effects, here Socrates is trying to connect nous 
with its effects through forms. This also explains, then, how a nous orders things: through 
forms. Even if the grasp of them is defective, whenever a nous creates something beautiful, 
it is through the form of the beautiful. This means that the claim about forms can be 
understood as saying:  
If X is F, and X ≢ the F-itself, then X is F because and only because X participates in 
the F-itself (through the activity of a nous).  
Socrates applies the last step of his method to all other alleged αἰτίαι, and since they 
are not in harmony with the hypothesis of the existence of forms, he is unable to understand 
them and recognise them as genuine αἰτίαι. On these grounds, the stipulation is that the 
claim ‘X is F because of Y,’ where Y is not the F-itself, nor participates in the F-itself, must 
                                                
93 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 991b3-991b8, and De anima 430a10-25.  








be rejected qua αἰτία (even if it is a true description). The reason, Socrates says, is that he 
would be confused. These αἰτίαι would not be in harmony with the existence of forms. 
Socrates seems worried with universality again. In his example of beauty, the αἰτίαι he 
rejects are that something is beautiful because it has a bright colour, or certain shape. But, 
even if a specific object is beautiful and has a bright colour that does not guarantee that all 
bright-coloured things are beautiful. In fact, accepting the existence of forms implies there 
is at least one beautiful thing, the beautiful itself, which has neither bright colour, nor any 
kind of shape. There is no need, however, to go that far. Surely there are beautiful things 
that fail the test, or things that are not beautiful and have a bright colour or certain shape that 
in another context would belong to something considered beautiful.  
7.2.2 The safest answer 
Socrates assesses the merits of his own account at this point. Other alleged αἰτίαι, 
while ingenious, confuse him. They are not in harmony with the hypothesis of the existence 
of forms. Puzzlement and confusion are evidence that something is out of place. But 
Socrates explains that his answer’s requirements are low:   
But I simply, artlessly, and perhaps simple-mindedly admit this to myself: that 
nothing different makes something beautiful than the beautiful itself, whether by 
its presence or by communion, in whatever way or manner happens (Phaedo 
100d3-6).  
Socrates thinks that even a fool without skills would accept his αἰτία (at least, if one is 
ready to accept the hypothesis that there are forms). He is going to repeat the safest answer 
in various occasions, using the example of the beautiful itself, with other forms, and finally 
in a general formulation at Phaedo 101c2-9. But these repetitions are not gratuitous. 
Socrates speaks each time as if someone were leading a cross-examination of the person 
who is following the method of hypothesis, like someone trying to catch her or make her 
fall into a ‘disharmony’ (διαφωνία) by accepting other αἰτίαι to explain beauty or other 
attributes. The repetitions of the safest answer, then, show an increase in the intensity in the 
way the claim is stated. First, it is introduced as a consideration (100c3), then, as a simple-
minded admission (100d4). Next, it seems to become a more confident statement: ‘For I no 
longer affirm this94 with confidence,95 but only that it is through the beautiful that all 
beautiful things are96 beautiful’ (100d6-8). Some lines later, Socrates says that anyone 
following him through the method would solemnly testify the safest answer (101a1). At the 
                                                
94 In d6, τοῦτο refers back to the ‘ingenious αἰτίαι’ of Phaedo 100c9-10. 
95 Note that Plato uses διισχυρίζοµαι (affirm confidently) in d7, which is the same word the ES uses in the 
Sophist (246a9-10) to describe in negative terms the materialists (see Ch. 4, sec. 4).  
96 Following MS B which omits γίγνεται here and in e3. See Burnet (1911, 112). 
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end, he says that things would reach the point of loud shouts (101c2). The point of all this is 
that Socrates wants to test how secure and stable his safest answer is, in contrast with the 
changing his opinion was after his first attempts at natural inquiry.  
Socrates’ relation with the ingenious αἰτίαι shows an inverse transformation. 
There is a decrease of intensity, and a distancing from them. First, Socrates stopped 
understanding and recognising them (Phaedo 100c9-10), which led to confusion 
(100d3), and prevented his affirming them (100d6). Next, anyone in agreement with 
him would not accept it if someone else proposes other αἰτίαι (100e8). Finally, there 
would be firm rejection of any other αἰτίαι apart from those derived from the safest 
answer (101c2). Socrates thinks that the safest answer provides him with the most secure 
route to answer the ‘why?’ questions:  
For I think this is the safest97 thing to answer to myself and to others; and I 
believe holding to this I shall never be ruined; but this is the safe thing to answer 
for me and for anyone else, that it is through the beautiful that beautiful things 
are beautiful. Or do you not think so too? 
—I think so (Phaedo 100d8-e4).  
Safety makes reference to the dangers of inquiring in the wrong way criticised before, 
when using the solar eclipse analogies (see Phaedo 99d4-e6). Using the causal claim to 
answer why questions is, allegedly, not only safer, but the safest of all routes. This safest 
answer may have some limitations, but it promises to keep people’s souls unharmed. So it is 
not only about avoiding errors, or inconsistencies, but to protect the inquirers’ integrity, and 
capacities.98  
This answer is safe because it is in harmony with the hypothesis of the forms, and 
because it tries to grasp what things are with arguments rather than with the senses (see 
Phaedo 99e4-6). The αἰτίαι they offer are not devoid of empirical data, but they explain 
empirical evidence through forms, which are not sensible. This means that empirical data is 
the explananda, whereas the forms are the explicantia. In the empiricist model—the unsafe 




                                                
97 Cf. Phaedo 101a5-6. 
98 This means that πεσεῖν, which I translated as ‘be ruined,’ should not be translated as ‘fall into error.’ It is true 
that it means ‘to fall down’ or ‘to cast oneself down’ from somewhere. In this context, however, it has the sense 
of failure, but not a narrow logical mistake but a more comprehensive failure. 








Difference between Explananda and Explicantia 
 Explananda Explicantia 
Empirical answer: A beautiful flower Bright colours, shape, 
etc. 
Safest answer: A beautiful flower The beautiful itself 
 
When Socrates says he fled and took refuge in arguments he means that he tried to 
explain empirical phenomena not with more phenomena but with objects that can only be 
grasped by thought. A question that arises now is where does the safest answer stand in 
relation to ‘the real αἰτία’ (at Phaedo 98e1-5). They seem quite different. But if the real 
αἰτία is the end point of Socrates’ method, the safest answer is somewhere in the middle. 
The safest answer does not answer the question ‘why?’ for specific things or events. Taking 
the flower example, to say that it is through the beautiful itself, explains why beautiful 
flowers in general are beautiful, but it does not explain why this flower is beautiful. But, 
why are there things that partake in the beautiful itself, and others that do not? So if 
someone asks why Alcibiades is beautiful, the safest answer would be to say that it is 
because he partakes in the beautiful. One may complain, however, that that is no answer to 
why specifically Alcibiades, among all other Athenians, is beautiful. Why him, and not, for 
instance, Socrates? If this is the level of specificity required to answer questions like why 
Socrates stayed in prison, the safest answer seems insufficient. 
In all cases of X being Y, the safest answer would apply, and the explanation would 
invariably be by partaking in a Y-itself. From this, it follows that Socrates and anyone 
following his method would reject any other αἰτία:  
You would not accept if someone says that one person is bigger than another by 
a head,99 and that the smaller is smaller by the same thing, but you would 
solemnly testify100 that, on the one side, you mean nothing else than that 
everything bigger is bigger than something else by nothing but bigness, and 
because of this is bigger, [i.e.] by the bigness. On the other hand the smaller is 
smaller by nothing else than the smallness, and because of this is small, [i.e.] by 
the smallness (Phaedo 100e8-101a5).  
The passage looks back to the first αἰτίαι Socrates considered when he was young. The 
rejection of any supporter of these other αἰτίαι follows from the application of the method 
of hypothesis. This means that any αἰτίαι other than those complying with the safest answer 
                                                
99 Cf. Phaedo 96d9-e1. 
100 The word διαµαρτύροµαι, means protest solemnly, call to witness, testify, asseverate. For its use in 
Plato see Philebus 59b11, 66d4; Phaedrus 260e4. It seems as if Socrates was preparing Cebes to give a 
testimony in a court of justice.  
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are not in harmony with Socrates’ account, but not because they are inconsistent with the 
existence of forms, but because they go against the causal claim. So even when the causal 
claim is not the main hypothesis, once accepted everything else should be in harmony with 
it.  
For this to work in that way, it is essential to understand why the ‘additive’ αἰτίαι are 
incompatible with Socrates’ safest answer. This is clear, however, if we analyse both. The 
‘additive’ αἰτίαι can be put in the following way:  
1. X is bigger than Y by a head.  
2. R is smaller than Q by a head.  
Socrates’ answer, however, is that:  
1. For any X, Y, if X is bigger than Y it is by and only by participation in the bigness-
itself.   
2. For any X, Y, if X is smaller than Y it is by and only by participation in the 
smallness-itself. 
The latter cases are both universal explanations, in contrast with the particularity of 
the ‘additive’ αἰτίαι, since not every object will have a head of difference in size. In 
addition, the ‘head’ examples assume that a head can be the cause of opposite effects. This 
as we know is something Socrates is not prepared to accept. His answer, in contrast, is able 
to avoid the problem since it offers opposite causal explanations for the bigness or 
smallness of things. Another difference is that the head examples assume a process of 
addition or division (the full statement would be that X is bigger than Y by the addition of a 
head), whereas Socrates means here the relation of participation. Participation – whatever it 
turns out to be – must be different from addition and division, at least because participation 
is a relation between intelligible and sensible things, and addition and division are relations 
between sensible things. Someone could complain here that Socrates is not explaining how 
participation is possible, but, as I have argued, the text could be assuming that sensible 
objects are able to partake in intelligible forms by the action of a nous. Then the pressing 
issue is to explain how nous does what it does. This is something that will be discussed later 
in the Republic (see Ch. 2, sec. 5), Parmenides (Ch. 3, sec. 6), and Sophist (see Ch. 4, sec. 
6).  








To reject the ‘additive’ αἰτίαι, Socrates also offers an abbreviated form of the 
argument in 96e7-97b7. It also has the form of a reductio ad absurdum:101 
I think you will be afraid that some opposing argument would confront you if 
you say that someone is bigger or smaller by a head. First, on the one hand, since 
the bigger is bigger and the smaller smaller by the same thing, then since the 
bigger is bigger now by a head which is small, and this is a monstrosity,102 
namely that someone is big by something small. Would you not be afraid of this?  
—I would, said Cebes, laughing (Phaedo 101a5-b3).  
The problem with the ‘additive’ αἰτίαι, and the fact that they propose an αἴτιον which 
produces opposite effects is that, used in a legal context to find the thing to blame for 
something, it turns out that these αἰτίαι undercut themselves. If a person were trying to find 
culprits, she would have too many valid accusations, pointing to opposite things. They will 
show that they were only necessary conditions for the effect in question but also for the 
opposite. Socrates makes this argument with an exaggerated tone (this is clear by his use of 
τέρας instead of ἄτοπος). This is why Cebes laughs. He assents to the argument but 
recognises that it is so obvious, so absurd, that at this point none in their right mind would 
accept it. The ‘additive’ αἰτίαι sounds ridiculous and utterly absurd at this point of the 
conversation. Socrates has been successful in convincing Cebes.  
The reductio works, but only assuming the principle that like causes like. This 
principle, however, seems to be a central piece of the safest answer. It is what guarantees 
the safety, and makes it possible for Socrates to flee from the fieldwork of the empirical 
enterprise. The ‘like causes like’ principle tries to track the legal and moral context. 
Socrates point is to advance the thesis that the principle applies not only to cases like heat 
and cold, but also to other cases of causation even if this goes against our original intuitions. 
Next, Socrates makes the same point but with numbers, and units of measure:  
Then, he said, would you not be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two, 
and that this is the αἰτία of the excess, but not bigness and because of bigness?103 
Or that two cubits are bigger than a cubit by half, rather than by bigness? For I 
suppose it is the same fear.  
—By all means, he said.104  
What then? Would you not be beware to say that when one is added to one the 
addition is the αἰτία of the coming into being of two, or when one is divided the 
division? (Phaedo 101b4-c2). 
These four examples give further support to Socrates’ thesis. He has no problem with the 
addition 8+2=10, but with saying that the addition of two is the αἰτία of the coming-into-
                                                
101 See Rowe (1993, 244). 
102 For the use of τέρας, cf. Meno 91d5, Parmenides 129b2, Theaetetus 163d6, and Philebus 14e3. 
103 Cf. Phaedo 96e1-3. 
104 Cf. Phaedo 96e3-4. 
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being of ten (where two is the αἴτιον). For anyone assuming the hypothesis of forms and the 
safest answer, they will be afraid to accept: 10 > 8 because of the addition of 2, and not 
because of participation in bigness-itself; 2c > 1c because of the addition of 1c, and not 
because of participation in bigness-itself; 2 because of the addition of 1 to 1; and 1 because 
of the subtraction of 1 from 2.  
The addition of one is not the αἰτία of the coming into being of two, since it would 
have the same problem as the ‘additive’ αἰτία. It will make opposite cause opposites. 
Socrates shows that fear leads to being careful. It is not a negative thing to have fear if one 
has fear of the right things, like being careless. Socrates insists that anyone following the 
method would be by now desperate, and will insist shouting the same thing:  
And you would loudly shout that you do not know how else each thing comes to 
be other than by partaking in the distinct being of each thing in which it partakes, 
and in these [cases]105 you do not admit of any other αἰτία of the coming into 
being of two except by participation in the two, and things that are going to be 
two must partake in this, and whatever is going to be one must [partake] in the 
unit, and you would dismiss these divisions and additions and other such 
refinements, leaving them for those wiser than yourself to answer (Phaedo 
101c2-9).  
Socrates is saying that the person following the method will be able to make two claims 
regarding knowledge, one positive and one negative: she would know a way in which 
things come to be, and she would not know how else things could come to be.  
Note that Socrates does not dismiss the wisdom of adding and subtracting, but he 
considers it a refinement that belongs to wiser people than him. But we can infer that that 
other knowledge is not about αἰτίαι, or αἴτιον, since it answers different questions. It is a 
knowledge that needs experience that Glaucon lacks at the moment: ‘But you, afraid, as the 
saying goes, of your own shadow and inexperience, holding to the safety of that hypothesis, 
would answer in this way’ (Phaedo 101d1-3). The method prefers a safe route, even if it 
cannot answer all the questions. It accepts its limitations, and prefers a narrow scope rather 
than trying to cover too much, and fail. 
7.2.3 Recursiveness of the method of hypothesis.  
Socrates then explains a second part of his method. What follows is a description of 
the steps to follow when the hypothesis itself—that is the argument selected as the 
strongest—becomes the topic of discussion (Phaedo 101d3-102a3):  
But if someone were to hold on the hypothesis itself, you would dismiss him, 
and would not answer until you had examined whether the things that came from 
                                                
105 Phaedo 101b9-c2. 








it harmonise106 or are discordant with one another. But when you need to provide 
an argument for the hypothesis itself, you would give it in like manner, 
hypothesising again another hypothesis which seems the best of the higher ones, 
until you arrive at something adequate, but you would not confuse both just as 
the disputants do by discussing about the beginning and the things that came 
from it at the same time, since you want to discover the things that are. For these 
persons on the one hand, probably do not talk nor give one thought about this, 
since their wisdom enables them to throw everything together into confusion, yet 
to be pleased with themselves. But you, on the other hand, I think would do as I 
say, if you are one of the philosophers.  
—It is absolutely true what you say, answered Simmias and Cebes at the same 
time (Phaedo 101d3-102a3).  
Socrates’ recommendation can be understood as the following list of steps:  
1. If a person S holds on to a hypothesis X, then dismiss S until step (2) is complete, 
then proceed with step (3).   
2. Examine the things harmonic with X, and see whether they harmonise or are 
discordant with them.  
2.1 If they do not harmonise, dismiss what is discordant, then go to step (3);  
2.2 if they harmonise, go to step (3). 
3. Provide an argument for hypothesis X by: 
3.1 Hypothesise Φ, where Φ is the best of the hypotheses at a higher level than X.  
3.2 Repeat step (2) for Φ, then repeat step (3.1) at a higher level until arrival at 
something adequate. Then, stop.  
The recommendation is that if you were trying to answer, for instance, why p, and 
following Socrates’ method you hypothesised X, you should not try to examine X until you 
examine whether the things accepted as harmonic with X, lets say q, r, s, also harmonise 
between them, that is q with r, r with s, q with s.107  
Note that in the case being analysed by Socrates here, the original hypothesis was the 
existence of forms, and then, as something that is harmonious with it, they accepted that 
there is a safest answer of the form ‘X is X by the Xness’. This already anticipates a new 
discussion about the existence of forms, and a method to go about it. The method, then, 
does not map ontology but discovery.  
                                                
106 This does not necessarily mean logical inference. It can be the things added in harmony with the 
hypothesis. 
107 For the debate about the method of hypothesis in the Phaedo, see Archer-Hind (1894), Murphy (1936), 
Robinson (1953, 157), Bluck (1955), Taylor (1956, 107), Gulley (1962, 53-54), Sayre (1969, 40-44), 
Bedu-Addo (1979a), Rose (1996), and Newton Byrd (2007).   
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The method establishes, first, that Socrates needs to examine whether other things 
that “came” from the hypothesis that forms exist harmonise with the safest answer. Once 
this is done, the argument for the existence of forms can be called into question. Socrates, 
however, does not say what that hypothesis is. He also fails to explain what something 
adequate will be, and how to recognise it. The recursive aspect of the method of hypothesis, 
however, seems to set up both, the proposal of the good itself as the unhypothetical first 
principle in the Republic (510b6), and the examination of whether the forms really exist in 
the Parmenides (see Ch. 2, and 3). But for now, it seems that Socrates is only interested in 
whether what is derived from the hypothesis harmonises. Socrates, however, makes clear 
that his method and its answers hang on the assumption that at a higher level there will be 
something adequate to harmonise the discovery of the safest answers he is making.  
8. Opposites, and the safe and subtle answers  
8.1 Echecrates’ interruption 
After the explanation of Socrates’ method, Echecrates interrupts Phaedo’s narration, 
and expresses his reaction to Simmias’ and Cebes’ approval of the method (Phaedo 102a4-
b3). He says that Simmias and Cebes reaction is very natural since Socrates explained his 
method with marvellous clarity, even to people with little intelligence (σµικρὸν νοῦν, 
102a4). Phaedo agrees and says that it seemed that way to everyone present at Socrates’ last 
day. Echecrates speaks for everyone else in that moment and says that they also agree. Plato 
presents Socrates’ method as able to reach agreement even through Phaedo.  
But notice that persuasion has required all and every detail of Phaedo’s narration. It is 
through presenting the whole conversation (with objections, and autobiography), and by 
making us aware of the context that Plato portrays everyone as being persuaded. Consensus 
at the different levels marks off Socrates’ method as an important contribution. Agreement 
with the method also works as a kind of entry to the philosophical community. It seems that 
as long as Simmias and Cebes agree with Socrates on this, it does not matter whether they 
have doubts or disagree with Socrates in the details of the present argument. They have now 
a way to evaluate and review their arguments. But the text does not prescribe the reader’s 
reaction to this. It is up to the reader to decide the meaning of this widespread consensus. It 
could just mean that everybody is biased. Does the method really have the philosophical 
calibre shown in the text? The structure of how the dialogue is constructed could well be an 
invitation and a provocation to assess it. The philosophical relevance of the dialogue form, 








and these multi-layered set ups will become more clear later (see Ch. 3, sec. 2, and Ch. 4, 
sec. 3).    
8.2 Opposites   
Phaedo continues his narration by explaining how Socrates and company examined 
whether the things accepted before were harmonic or not with their hypothesis (Phaedo 
102b3-d4). Phaedo explains that once everyone conceded the method, and agreed that in the 
present case the strongest argument was that ‘each of the forms is something’ (εἶναί τι 
ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν, at Phaedo 102b1), and that ‘other things acquired their name by 
partaking in them’ (Phaedo 102b1-2), then they considered whether Simmias is bigger than 
Socrates but smaller than Phaedo, and therefore that Simmias possesses bigness and 
smallness (Phaedo 102b3-7). Socrates accepts this (as harmonic with the hypothesis) but 
makes it more precise.   
He explains that when they say that the claim ‘Simmias surpasses Socrates’ does not 
express the truth of the matter. Since ‘it is not the nature of Simmias, by being Simmias (τῷ 
Σιµµίαν εἶναι), to surpass Socrates, but by the bigness he happens to have’ (Phaedo 102c1-
2); nor Simmias ‘surpasses Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has 
smallness in relation to Simmias bigness.’ (Phaedo 102c3-4) Then, nor does Phaedo 
surpass Simmias ‘because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has bigness in relation to 
Simmias’ smallness.’ (Phaedo 102c6-7). From these points Socrates concludes that 
Simmias is called both small and big, being between the two: his smallness is surpassed by 
the bigness of one, his bigness surpasses the smallness of the other. 
Socrates gives a further argument that uses the bigness and smallness but then he 
applies it to all the opposites. It has the following general form (Phaedo 102d5-103a3):  
In a case where X and Y are a pair of opposites:  
1. The X-itself is never able to be X and Y at the same time.  
2. The X-in-a will never admit the Y but whenever Y approaches, X flees from a, or 
X-in-a is destroyed.  
3. The X-in-a is not able to endure and admit Y and be other than it was.  
4. But a admits and endures Y and still remains a, and a is Y.  
5. X being X, cannot be Y.  
6. The Y-in-us is unable to become or to be X ever.   
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The argument implies that we can talk about opposites in two ways, in themselves, 
and in other things. Socrates, however, argues that X-ness (in both cases X-itself, and X-in-
a) never admits its opposite Y. The difference between X-itself and X-in-a is that only the 
second one flees or is destroyed. But what happens to a is that it can admit both X and Y 
without destruction. The presence of X-in-a, or the Y-in-a is what makes a be X and/or Y. 
But, what is the ontology behind this? Is it that there are intermediaries between forms and 
us and between forms and particular things?108 Are these intermediaries qualities? They 
seem different from forms themselves, in which case: X-itself ≠ X-in-a. We are not told why 
would we need this intermediate step. The focus of the argument is that in any of these 
cases, X, being X, can never be Y. This argument does not argue for the existence of ‘forms 
in us,’ it just includes them and argues that whatever the case, X cannot be Y. This feature of 
the opposites is not really dependent on the hypothesis that forms exist, it is consistent with 
that, but is logically independent of it.  
8.3 A doubt about opposites, and the law of opposites  
Someone whose name is not mentioned, voices a doubt which connects the previous 
argument with what Socrates discussed at Phaedo 70d-71a. The worry is about harmony 
between what was said before about opposites and this new argument (see Phaedo 103a4-
c9). The concern is that if Socrates has agreed to something opposite before, he cannot 
change his mind now without compromising the whole demonstration of the soul’s 
immortality. The problem has two levels. On the one hand, it is problematic to agree to 
opposite things, regardless of the content of what is being said. But, on the other hand, the 
topic of the conversation is about the opposites, and the first agreement was that opposites 
are generated from each other. If this is naively applied to the conversation itself the 
problem is that the discussion could have generated the opposite of what was said at the 
beginning. The question is completely relevant, even if based on a misunderstanding (that’s 
why Socrates praises the person’s manly attitude in a sexist remark at Phaedo 103b1). It is 
important to make sure that everybody has followed the argumentation, and that it holds 
together. 
The doubt is that if it was agreed that the bigger comes from the smaller and vice 
versa, and this was how opposites come to be from opposites, how is it that now they are 
saying that this would never happen. Socrates answers that the speaker does not understand 
(οὐ ἐννοεῖς, 103b1)109 the difference between what was said then and what is being said 
                                                
108 Forms in us; see Denyer (2007, 91-93). This will be discussed later in the Parmenides (see Ch. 3, sec. 4).  
109 This vocabulary is further evidence that the method is about how to use one’s nous. 








now. The blame is on the person who asks, since he is not using his nous to put together or 
order the thoughts that have been discussed, not Socrates. Before, Socrates explains, they 
were talking about things that receive their name due to the opposite they have, whereas 
now they are talking about those very opposites that give their name to those things. The 
confusion is caused by the use of names. In the first case, we have an object a, which is X, 
receives for that reason the name ‘X’ (like when we say ‘that’s hot’ referring to a hot pot of 
tea). But in the second case we are not talking about objects that are X, but about the Xness 
(both in itself, and in a).110 The discussion of this doubt ends with the so-called law of 
opposites: ‘An opposite will never be an opposite to itself’ (Phaedo 103c7-8).  
8.4 Opposite bearers  
Once the doubt has been clarified, Socrates asks whether Cebes will agree with a new 
idea (see Phaedo 103c10-104c10). The general claim could be put as follows:  
There are some a, which are not the X-itself, but always have X whenever they exist, so that 
any a is X. 
I will refer to these objects as ‘opposite bearers.’ Socrates explains them with two 
examples. The first one is with snow and fire: 
1. There is something called hot and cold.  
2. The hot is different from fire, and the cold is different from cold.  
3. Snow will not admit the hot, and be both snow and hot, but it will retreat or be 
destroyed.  
4. Fire will not admit cold, and be both fire and cold, but it will retreat or be destroyed.  
Socrates concludes, then, that (C1): ‘Not only the form itself deserves its own name for 
ever, but there is also something else which is not that [i.e., the form] but has its character 
always, whenever it exists’ (Phaedo 103e2-5). Universality again seems to be the worry. 
Notice that the argument is based on an observation. Premise (3) is observable, and 
falsifiable. The nature of snow and fire is open to further investigation, and we may argue 
about the true nature of fire and snow. The conclusion that Socrates is trying to obtain is, 
nevertheless, that there are some opposite bearers. Socrates then, gives a second example: 
1. The odd [itself] is always odd.  
                                                
110 Cebes seems not worried about all this, but tells Socrates that other things disturb him. He, however, 
does not say anything else, and Socrates ignores him completely and continues his argument. This is 
similar to the way Socrates dismisses Glaucon’s worries in the Republic (see Ch. 2, sec. 7).  
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2. There are other things that are always called odd, as well as by its own name, since 
it is in their nature never to be separated from the odd. Each of them is (always) by 
their nature odd, but not the odd itself.  
3. Even numbers are always even but not the even itself.  
The conclusion Socrates takes from this is that (C2): ‘opposite bearers are not opposite to 
each other, yet always contain the opposites, and do not admit the form which is opposite to 
that which is in them, since if it approaches them, they perish or give way’ (Phaedo 104b7-
c1). Opposite bearers, then, are particulars which cannot receive an opposite to what is in 
their nature. From this it also follows that (C3): ‘then, it is not only opposite forms that do 
not bear the approach of each other, but also some other things that do not bear their 
opposites’ (Phaedo 104c7-9).  
Once the existence of opposite bearers is accepted, Socrates tries to ‘define what sort’ 
(ὁρισώµεθα ὁποῖα, Phaedo 104c11) of things they are. They agree that opposite bearers 
compel whatever they occupy to contain their character111 but also that of an opposite. This 
can be expressed in the following way: a is an opposite bearer of X, if a compels any b it 
occupies to contain not only the character of a but also of X (Phaedo 104d1-3). From this it 
follows that an opposite bearer of X will bring along Xness and will not admit the opposite 
of X.  But as is clear with the examples, even things that are opposite to something else can 
be opposite bearers of something else. Like the double, itself and opposite of something 
else, yet not admitting the form of odd.  
8.5 A safe and subtle answer  
Finally, Socrates uses the opposite bearers to formulate a new way to answer ‘why?’ 
questions, more sophisticated than the safe answer he offered before:   
Then, tell me again, from the beginning—Socrates said. And do not answer with 
what I asked, but imitating me. I say, then, that beyond that first answer we 
spoke of, the safe one, I see—from what we have discussed now—another safe 
answer. Since if you ask me what will exist in a body that becomes hot, my 
answer will not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but a more 
sophisticated answer, from what we discussed now, that it is fire. And if you ask 
me what will exist in a body that becomes sick, I will not say sickness, but fever. 
And if you ask what will exist in a number that becomes odd, I would not say 
oddness but oneness, and in this way with other things. But see whether you 
adequately understand what I want.  
Quite adequately—he said. (Phaedo 105b5-c7) 
                                                
111 Socrates uses the word ἰδέα at 104d2, but does not seem to refer to forms but to the character of things. 








The new answer is said to also be safe, although not ignorant as the first one, but 
sophisticated. The main difference between the safest and this new answer is more 
empirical and mathematical knowledge. This new answer shows that the person knows, for 
example, that fire is an opposite bearer of heat (cf. Ch. 5, sec 6). The difference between the 
safe but ignorant, and the safe and sophisticated answer can be seen in the following table: 
Opposite bearers’ types of answers  
Type of answer 
Example 1: what 
will exist in a body 
that becomes hot? 
Example 2: what 
will exist in a body 
that becomes sick? 
Example 3: what 
will exist in a 
number that 
becomes odd? 
Safe and ignorant 
answer Heat Sickness Oddness 
Safe and 
sophisticated answer Fire Fever Oneness 
 
If we go back to the question about why Socrates stayed in jail, we could wonder 
whether Socrates’ ‘real αἰτία’ (Phaedo 98e1-5) is compatible with these sophisticated 
answers. According to the real αἰτία, Socrates stayed in jail because he decided that it was 
more just to stay. This could be analysed as Socrates being just. If someone asks him why 
justice exists in Socrates, we could answer that it is because he possesses justice. But that 
will be the safe and ignorant answer. If we were to know more about opposite bearers of 
justice, then we will be able to say something more sophisticated. For example, if we know 
that suffering an injustice is always more just than committing one, and that is what 
Socrates did, then we can call that a more sophisticated answer, if that kind of action is a 
true bearer of justice. Socrates only puts forward the outline of how to do it; it is a 
programme of investigation, a framework to investigate the world.  But again, note that 
both answers presuppose Socrates’ agency. He, or to be more precise his nous, is the αἴτιον 
of those actions, the entity responsible for them.  
9. Progress and remaining puzzles 
 Phaedo 95e8-105c7 discusses different conceptions of causation and 
responsibility: the appropriate addition, the various accounts offered by natural inquiry, 
Anaxagoras’ account, and Socrates’ own tentative proposals. All of them offer different 
choices to answer ‘why?’ questions, either in a specific domain or in general. These 
conceptions could be grouped now in three groups: (1) those where two opposites are 
used to explain the same effect (sec. 3), (2) those which confuse necessary conditions 
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with αἴτιον (sec. 4-5), and (3) those which hold together, are explanatory, and safe (sec. 
7). 
 The first part of Socrates’ intellectual autobiography highlights some puzzles that 
arise from reflecting on the properties in group (1). As a result of these puzzles Socrates 
unlearned what he thought he knew, making him unable to understand even the simplest 
things. Socrates uses this lack of understanding as evidence that his initial intuitions, 
and the answers from natural inquiry, were flawed. Later Socrates rejects accounts in 
group (2), arguing that their main problem is an inadequate method of inquiry. This 
implies there is a proper way to inquire and answer why questions. But the 
repercussions of inquiring in the wrong way, according to Socrates, are worse than 
simply not finding the answers; it has a harmful effect in our souls.  
 For Socrates, the only clear thing is that opposites cannot be opposites of 
themselves. This means that when certain alleged αἰτίαι imply two opposites producing 
the same effect, Socrates is unable to understand how that would explain anything. Then 
he explains the confused but safe method he developed to answer why questions.  
 I have argued that Socrates’ proposal is one in which for each thing there is a nous 
that ordered it in the best way possible and it is therefore responsible for it. I have also 
argued that the two types of answers Socrates developed connect each effect with the 
ordering of a nous, in an ignorant and in a more subtle way, using forms as instruments. 
The main reason to think that this is the most plausible way to read the passage is 
Socrates’ proposal of real αἰτίαι, the use of cognitive vocabulary through the safe and 
sophisticated answer, and the fact that there is no clear indication that Socrates 
abandoned nous as the αἴτιον of each thing.  
 Socrates explains the different conceptions with a framework and vocabulary that 
he extrapolates from the legal context in which relations of causation and responsibility 
are identified (‘x causes y’ is the same to ‘x is responsible for y’). But Socrates sees this 
process as having four elements: one or more αἴτιον; something that is generated, 
destroyed or exists; an αἰτία, which explains the connection between the previous two 
elements; and finally the necessary conditions. The αἴτιον refers to the thing or event 
that bears the responsibility, and gets the blame. The things that are generated, 
destroyed, or exist constitute a wide spectrum of things, from concrete particulars to 
events, and the criterion is simply whether it is possible to ask of them why.  An αἰτία is 
understood as the answer to the ‘why?’ question. It explains who or what is the αἴτιον, 
and which of its actions produced a specific effect. In modern terminology we could say 








that this general framework understands relations of causation and responsibility as 
processes with two relata (one or more αἴτιον, and one or more effect), background 
conditions without which the relation is not possible, and an explanation of the relation 
between them (αἰτία).   
 The text, however, leaves some remaining puzzles and themes that set the 
scenario for the passages discussed in the following chapters. First, the text is not clear 
about what happens in bad actions, and why that happens. If nous always orders in the 
best way possible, then there is something else that affects the range of options available 
to it. We may think that what makes a difference is the knowledge of forms, and the 
ability to get out of puzzlement, but there seem to be other factors that could affect 
nous’s decision at a specific moment. The sun analogy in Republic 6, will offer a way to 
explain this problem (see Ch. 2, esp. sec. 8), and the Stoics will offer their own account 
of this too (see Ch. 5, sec. 7). A second theme is the relationship between divine and 
human nous. This is also explored in the sun analogy (see Ch. 2, esp. sec. 4), 
problematized in the Parmenides (see Ch. 3, sec. 5-7), and discussed more directly in 
the Sophist (see Ch. 4, sec. 6), and by the Stoics (see Ch. 5, sec. 2.2-3). The distinction 
between necessary conditions and αἴτια is also prominent in the Republic 6, which tries 
to explain their connection with the good itself (see Ch. 2, sec. 6), and plays an 
important role in the Stoic conception of causality (see Ch. 5, sec. 6.5). Finally, the 
question of how nous could, if at all, be the link between forms and particulars is the 
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CHAPTER 2. Causality, and responsibility in the Sun 
analogy (Republic 6.506d7-509c4) 
 
 In this chapter I analyse and evaluate Republic 6, 506d7-509c4. The main purpose 
is to show how this text continues the discussion on some of the remaining puzzles in 
the Phaedo, exploring new models and aspects of causality and responsibility by 
examining an analogy between the good itself and the sun. This analogy focuses on the 
relation between background conditions and αἴτια, and explores the connection between 
forms and nous. I argue that the passage offers an inference from analogy, but it also 
sets up a puzzle between two options: in one of them the good itself is an active and 
productive God, whereas in the other it is a structure that explains reality. There are 
methodological reasons to think that the first one is correct, but there are also good 
reasons to reject it. Both alternatives present problems that will remain open.  
 The chapter is divided into eight sections. In the first one I present the place of the 
passage within the Republic and its relation with Phaedo; then, in a second section, I 
give a reconstruction of the general dialectical and argumentative structure of the text. I 
dedicate sections 3 to 7 to an in-depth analysis of the text. Finally, the last section 
evaluates the contributions of the passage to the discussion on causation and 
responsibility, highlights the progress made, and the new puzzles introduced by the text.  
 
1. Context, and relation with Phaedo 
In the Republic, philosophers are described as lovers of all wisdom and especially of 
the sight of truth.112 They are the only ones who can distinguish forms from their 
particulars, and have the skills necessary to be rulers. But these philosophers need a proper 
education. The most fundamental field of study in the philosopher ruler’s curriculum, even 
superior to justice, is the form of the good (Republic 505a). Socrates complains, however, 
that his own knowledge of the good is inadequate. Yet, having this knowledge seems of 
outmost importance to be able to grasp anything worthwhile. Socrates rejects the idea that 
the good could be either pleasure or knowledge, and complains that the rulers of the city 
cannot be in the dark about this topic. But then, Glaucon demands Socrates views on the 
matter (Republic 506b).  
                                                
112 For recent studies about the structure of the Republic, see Rowe (2006), and Barney (2010). 








It is at this point that the passage which I analyse in this chapter begins. The passage 
shows a tension between the significance of the topic and Socrates’ poor understanding of 
it. He warns his interlocutors that he possesses no knowledge about the good, and implies 
his opinions about it are defective, blind, and deformed. This makes him feel afraid that to 
speak his mind would make him look ridiculous (Republic 506d). At the end he agrees to 
talk, not about the good itself, but about its child, the sun, since according to him its account 
can illustrate some features of its father. The comparison is multifaceted, but one of the 
things it reveals is a causal and explanatory connection between the form of the good and 
everything else. It is necessary, however, to remember that the passage is further explained 
by the analogy of the Line and the Cave (Republic 509d-520a).  
The sun analogy’s passage is strongly connected with the Phaedo. Their relationship 
has been widely discussed, so I will only mention some important aspects of it.113 The 
structure of the passages is similar in various ways, for example, in both, Socrates uses 
previous agreements about the forms to advance in the discussion, and his method of 
inquiry, if not the same, has a strong family resemblance.114 The passages also use 
analogies with blindness, and talk about the lack of knowledge as a state where people 
change their mind from one view to the other.115 In addition, both texts are interested in the 
distinction between αἴτια and background conditions.116 But perhaps the most important 
aspect is that the Republic can be seen as continuing the discussion about nous.  
There are some differences too. For a start, Socrates in the Phaedo is talking with 
his closest friends, whereas in the Republic his interlocutors are a heterogeneous mix 
between friends and hostile acquaintances. This might have an impact on the 
willingness of Socrates to speak, and how afraid of ridicule he is. In addition, although 
both passages talk about forms, they are described somewhat differently. It has even 
been suggested that one account might be designed to reject the other.117 But the most 
important difference for the discussion about causality and responsibility is something 
else. If in the Phaedo there is an interest in discussing the role of nous in the generation, 
destruction or existence of things, the Republic passage is interested, I suggest, in the 
                                                
113 See Silverman (2002, ch. 3), and Ferejohn (2006) for recent discussion on the relation between Phaedo 
and Republic. 
114 Compare Phaedo 100a3-7, and 100a7-b9, with Republic 509d-511e, and 533c9-d1. For a discussion 
on the relation between the method of hypothesis and dialectic see Benson (2006), and Newton Byrd 
(2011).  
115 Compare Republic 508d5-8 with Phaedo 96a9-b1, and 99d4-e6. 
116 Compare Phaedo 98e5-99b6 with Republic 509b1-9. 
117 See, for instance, White (1978), and Politis (2010). 
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possibility conditions of causality, and in arguing that the relation between nous, forms, and 
visible things is natural, even if the explanation of how it works remains a puzzle. 
Taking all this into consideration, how are we supposed to read the passages? Are 
we supposed to read them separately, or are we allowed to supply premises or ideas 
from one to the other? Is the relation between them one of explanation, extension, 
mutual support, replacement? Is it possible that, even if the arguments are independent, 
they share a single conception of cause and responsibility? The answer to these 
questions is affected by decisions about the order of composition, reading order of the 
dialogues, and one’s own exegetical principles.118  
Although the discussion on these areas is far from being settled, the widespread 
assumption is that, although the composition of both dialogues is close, the Republic is 
a later work that expands, explains, or modifies Phaedo's arguments.119 Consequently, 
the normal practice is to read the Phaedo first, even when its dramatic dating is later.120 
These assumptions, however, do not really answer what is the relation between the two 
passages, and the arguments are insufficient to justify an inference to the further 
assumption that we are supposed to read the arguments as a single proposal. My 
analysis, therefore, would not depend on these assumptions. The safest strategy, 
perhaps, is to read both passages in isolation, as self-standing conversations.121 The 
analysis, however, does not need to stop there. Once the independent examination of the 
texts is done, we cannot be blind to the fact that both passages touch on the same topic, 
and have intertextual references, even if we are not sure in which direction they go.122 It 
is still possible to ask whether the same conceptions are at play, whether the arguments 
have shared assumptions, and whether one premise in one is the conclusion in the 
other.123 
2. Argumentation, analogies, and puzzles   
The Republic passage has five sections. It starts with an introduction where Socrates 
trades the account of the good itself for that of its offspring, the sun. This is followed by a 
preliminary agreement and reminder of the existence of forms and its relation with 
                                                
118 For this discussion see Howland (1991), Brandwood (1992), and Young (1994). 
119 See, for example, García Gual (1986, 10). 
120 Ordering the dialogues by their dramatic dating is complicated. Even if we were able to know the 
chronological order, why should we assume that is the correct reading order? For the discussion of this 
topic, see Festugière (1969), Nails (1998; 2002, 307-330), Zuckert (2009, 8-9), and Altman (2010, 44).  
121 See Rowe (1993, 12). 
122 For this worry see McCabe (2002).  
123 See Apology 26d1-e4. 








particulars. Then, Socrates explains how sight needs not only the objects of sight but also 
light, which is a link caused by a God identified with the sun. Once this is established 
Socrates offers the analogy of the sun. Finally, Glaucon reacts to this by mocking Socrates, 
while Socrates complains he warned his interlocutors of the risks of sharing his beliefs 
about the good.  
The dialectical and argumentative structure of the passage includes various 
arguments, agreements and disagreements, and different reports of epistemic attitudes 
towards Socrates’ analogy. First, Socrates claims he has no knowledge of the good, but only 
opinions (Republic 506c). He seems, however, more confident about his account of the sun, 
and the arguments about forms and particulars. Glaucon, on the other hand, agrees on the 
account of the sun and the previous arguments, but regards Socrates’ opinions of the good 
as inconceivable (ἀµήχανον, Republic 509a6) and ridiculous (γελοίως, Republic 509c1-2). 
Socrates, in turn, overlooks Glaucon’s worries about conceivability (Republic 509a9-10), 
but seems to concede that his opinions sound ridiculous (Republic 506d, 509c2-4; see sec. 
6, below). The general dialectical structure of the passage could be understood as follows:   
1. Socrates says that he has no knowledge of the good but mere opinions.   
2. Socrates and Glaucon make some agreements (on what they should do next, and on 
the right account of sight, light, and the sun). The characters reach these agreements 
through two arguments:  
A. A practical argument to explain why they should consider the child of 
the good (the God sun) instead of the good itself;  
B. A descriptive account of the sun’s relation to sight;  
3. Socrates claims that the good produced the God sun as its analogue, and explains 
how the analogy maps onto the visible and intelligible parts of the world. This is 
done in two steps:  
C. Explaining the analogy between the sun and the good in relation to sight 
and nous.   
D. Extending the descriptive account of the child and the analogy.  
4. Glaucon responds to Socrates with two complaints: 
E. If Socrates’ opinions in C were right, then the good would be 
inconceivably beautiful.   
F. Socrates’ extension of the analogy in D is ridiculous.   
5. Socrates, in turn, dismisses E, but seems to concede F, at least in the present context.  
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At the end, there are some agreements even though some disagreements remain. 
Glaucon’s main concerns are not discussed, and Socrates continues his explanation of the 
sun analogy by offering the analogy of the line. In the present passage Socrates only shares 
a small part of his ‘ridiculous’ opinions about the good.  
The main argument of the passage is an inference from analogy:  
1. There is no direct access to the good.124 
2. However, the sun is to the visible part of the world as the good is to the intelligible 
part of the world, where: 
a) the sun’s relation to sight maps the good’s relation to nous, and  
b) the sun’s relation to the coming-to-be, growth, and nourishment of visible things 
maps the good’s relation to being and existence of the intelligible things.  
3. Therefore, by examining the sun’s relation with the visible part of the world, we can 
infer the relations the good has with the intelligible part of the world.  
The sun analogy is supposed to tell us something about the good; more precisely, about 
the good’s relation to forms. The idea of an analogy is to state the identical structure two 
different systems share (the identity of relation).125 The source system in this case is the 
visible part of the world, and the target system the intelligible part of the world. The sun’s 
relation to the visible things is supposed to map and help us know something about the 
good’s relation to forms. Methodologically, then, the passage invites us to take the things 
Socrates says about the sun as indicative of what we are supposed to think about the good. 
There is a puzzle, though.  
The passage emphasises the agency of the sun as the producer of all the necessary 
conditions for sight, and later as the being responsible for the coming-to-be, growth, and 
nourishment of all visible things. Socrates goes on as to say that the sun is a benevolent 
God. Prima facie, then, it seems that the purpose of the sun analogy is to argue that the 
good is a benevolent God (it is ‘most generous’ πολυτελεστάτη, lit. ‘the most lavish,’ 
Republic 6.507c7). The analogy could be spelled out as ‘the sun is a benevolent God in the 
visible part of the world, as the good itself is a benevolent God in the intelligible part.’ The 
                                                
124 This is only because Socrates is unwilling to tell his views about it, and not because it is impossible in 
general.  
125 An analogy states the structure shared by two systems (target T and source S). An analogy of the form 
‘A is to B as C is to D’ means that there is a single relation R such that R(A, B) in T, and R(C, D) in S. The 
identity of relation means that R in T ≡ R in S. See Steinhardt (2001, 82).  








identity of relation here is ‘is a benevolent God in.’ This can be expressed in the following 
way:  
Is a most generous God in  ≡ Is a most generous God in 
The sun: the visible part of the world :: The good: the intelligible part of the world 
This interpretation of the text has had its champions,126 but it has also met fierce 
opposition.127 It could be said that scholarship on the sun analogy has traditionally lined up 
into either a theological, or a formal reading. The latter rejects the identification of the good 
with an active God, and defends an abstract conception of the good, where the good is 
understood as a structure, and its relation with forms an explanatory one. Recent scholarship 
lines up unanimously, as far as I am aware, with the latter, formal readings,128 and I believe 
it is because there are good reasons to reject the theological reading. I will briefly mention 
three of them.  
In the first place, the theological reading seems to be incompatible with the general 
account of forms, which describes them as unchanging.129 The thought is that since forms 
are unchanging, they cannot literally receive anything from the good, and the good, since it 
is a form, it cannot literally give anything to the forms. Therefore, we are supposed to read 
all the references that identify the good with God as metaphorical.130 The second reason to 
reject the theological reading is based on the idea that the good cannot be a complex entity 
like a nous, since it is beyond being,131 and it is what makes it possible.132 Finally, it has 
been also noted that even if the theological reading were not inconsistent with the 
                                                
126 According to Benitez (1995, 114 n. 8) the idea that the good is God can be traced as far as Thrasyllus. 
It was common in antiquity, see Sextus Empiricus M 2.70. See McPherran (2006, 95, 100 n. 35). Scholars 
who support the claim that Plato identifies the good with God include: Zeller (1888, 282), Jowett (1892, 
xcviii), Adam (1902, 58 apud 508a), (1908, 442), Wilamowitz (1920, I, 589), Friedländer (1928, I, 72), 
Lodge (1928, 171, 466-ff), Ritter (1933, 130, 375), Festugière (1936, 264-266), Hardie (1936, 156), 
Robin (1938, 259-f), Pacheco (1942, 70-83), Jaeger (1943, 285-f, 415 n. 39), Frank (1945, 92-96), and 
Doherty (1956, 459), (1961).  
127 Against the identification are Shorey (1895, 239),(1934, 230), Bovet (1902), Raeder (1905, 381), 
Steward (1909, 53, 59), Burnet (1928, 337), More (1921, 312-314), Grube (1935, 152), Taylor (1929, 
232), Cornford (1935, 245-ff.), (1937, 34-35) Demos (1939, 10, 64, 123), Solmsen (1942, 72, 92), Gilson 
(1940, 437-438), (1941, 25-ff.), Rutenber (1946, 34-f.), Ross (1951, 43), and Cherniss (1944, 603-610).  
128 See, for example, Cooper (1977, 154), Santas (1980), (1999), (1985), (2001, 58-193); Hitchcock 
(1985); Fine (1990); and Annas (1999, 96-116). 
129 The theological reading, however, would explain the odd passage about the form of bed in Republic 10 
(596a-598c).  
130 See Ketchum (1994, 1). See also Wheeler (1997, 172-173), who substitutes the verb ‘produce’ with ‘logical 
unfolding.’ 
131 See Republic 509b8-11, but see my discussion of this sentence in this chapter’s sec. 6.  
132 See McPherran’s (2006, 95-96) description of this argument. He further explains that “since it would seem 
that for Plato a necessary condition for something’s being a God is that it be a mind/soul possessing 
intelligence, the good cannot be a God.” Plato, he continues, “is willing to talk as though the good might be a 
God that we could call Great Commander Zeus (e.g., at 596a-598c), but without working out the problems of 
ascribing mental states to a being beyond being.”  
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description of forms, Socrates still fails to explain how the good’s agency works, how could 
it be an efficient cause, to put it in Aristotelian terminology.133 But if we accept these 
objections against the theological reading, how should we understand the analogy? What 
are its structural and methodological consequences?  
If the references to divine agency are metaphorical, they seem to ruin the whole point of 
the analogy, since the identity of relation would no longer hold, and the analogy would lose 
its explanatory power: 
Is a most generous God in ≢ “Is a most generous God in” (metaphor) 
The sun : the visible part of the world :: The good itself : the intelligible part of the world 
According to this, Socrates would be offering an analogy with an embedded and undercover 
metaphor. But we do not get any clue as to what it is a metaphor of. All guesses would be 
speculations,134 and the method intricate to say the least.  Perhaps, however, the identity of 
relation is something less pretentious. The analogy might be explained by an identity of 
relation like ‘explains’ or ‘is explanatory of.’ In this case, the analogy would look like this:  
      Explains                ≡         Explains  
          The sun : the visible part of the world :: The good: the intelligible part of the world 
The problem with this idea is that it seems to make irrelevant the references to divine 
agency. Worst, it makes them look as extra information that obscures the passage. If the 
identity of relation is only an explanatory one, why does the passage waste so many words 
in obscuring this relation by talking about the sun in those terms? This reading makes 
Socrates garrulous.  
I am not interested in defending the theological reading, but in pointing out that the text 
does not rule it out. Assuming Plato is a careful writer, the references to divine agency are 
there for a reason. The sun analogy offers a puzzle for us to worry about. Moreover, it 
explores the relationship between divine and human agency that was envisaged in the 
Phaedo (see Ch. 1, sec. 4-7).   
3. You shall know the father through his son 
At Republic 506d7-a5 we read: 
But, my dear friends, we should leave the question about what the good itself is 
for the time being; for it seems to me it is beyond the present project to reach my 
                                                
133 See McPherran (2006, 96). 
134 See, for example, Wheeler (1997, 172-173), who substitutes the verb ‘produce’ with ‘logical unfolding.’ 








own views now. I am willing to say, however, what seems both a child (ἔκγονος) 
of the good and most like it; if it is also pleasant to you, but if not, we leave it.  
Well, tell me—he said. You will pay for the story of the father later.  
I could wish, I said, both for me to be able to pay, and for you to be able to 
receive it, and not like now only with the interest (τόκος). But at this point 
receive at least this, both the interest (τόκος) and the child (ἔκγονος) of the good 
itself. Be cautious, however, that I do not deceive you involuntarily in some way, 
by giving you a fraudulent account of the offspring (τόκος).  
We will be cautious—he said. But only tell us. 
Socrates is not willing to talk about what the good itself is.135 He thinks it is ‘too 
much for the present impulse’ (Republic 506d8-e1). This could be understood in various 
ways, though. It might be that too much time is needed when the topic is not the main point 
of the discussion, or perhaps, since it is a difficult enterprise, it requires too much energy. 
Socrates seems to think that it is a shared responsibility, and wishes he will be able to 
express his views later, and that Glaucon will be fit to receive them.136 It does not need to 
be the topic’s fault, but that of Socrates and his interlocutors. Socrates might think that 
explaining his views to these specific interlocutors and in the present circumstances would 
need too much effort from everyone involved. It seems a pragmatic problem. The context 
for talking about the good is not ideal, so Socrates excuses himself. He makes clear, 
however, that he does have views about what the good itself is, and he is purposely not 
telling his interlocutors. Socrates is worried about how convincing he will be under the 
circumstances, a worry that will prove to be important later (see Parmenides 133a11-c1; 
Ch. 3, sec. 3).    
In trade for his opinions about the good itself, Socrates offers to talk about something 
that has two relevant characteristics. It is what seems (φαίνεται at e2) both a child of the 
good itself, and most like it (Republic 506e2). The first question that arises from this claim 
is how to take the verb φαίνεται. It could be that Socrates is creating an image that will 
explain some point but imply no causal connection in the real world. However, it might 
point out a real relationship in the world, but emphasise that it is just Socrates’ opinion. The 
ambiguity of this sentence begins to set the tensions and puzzles of the passage.  
A further question is about the relation between the two characteristics attributed to 
the child of the good. The text expresses it as a conjunction (X is the child of the good, and 
X is most like it), but one may think that the conjunction of both characteristics is not 
                                                
135 His unwillingness recalls Meno 86c4-e1. The difference, however, is that in the Meno, Socrates is the one 
willing to examine what virtue is, and is Meno who insists on answering a different question. The Socrates of 
the Meno, thinks the proper order of investigation is from the definition to the characteristics of a thing, but in 
the Republic Socrates insists on a reverse order. 
136 This seems to make reference to the advice not to return lent arms to a mad friend in Republic 1. 
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accidental, but a result of an implication (since X is a child of the good itself, then X is most 
like it). It could be that all things are in a sense offspring of the good, in which case we will 
need an additional reason to explain why this specific offspring is the most similar to his 
father. Socrates will offer not such explanation, but perhaps this is because it is just an 
opinion and not knowledge. On the other hand, if this offspring is most like the good 
because it is his offspring, later when Socrates talks about other products of the good, he 
will be committed to distinguishing between both relationships. It could be that the good 
produces things like truth and knowledge, but has offspring like the sun, on the other hand. 
Both products, however, are said to resemble the good, although the thought might be that 
fatherhood is a stronger relationship. A reason to think this is that the child of good has 
agency and directive powers, whereas truth and knowledge do not. None of these options 
closes the possibility that the good has another offspring. But let me now analyse the first of 
these characteristics.   
In general, a parenthood relationship, of the type X is father of Y, and Y is a child of X, 
suggests many features. To begin with, they normally suggest a natural correlation that 
results from the father’s activity—normally the intercourse with another parent—to beget 
the child (correlations are discussed later in Ch. 3, sec. 4). It often transfers likeness from 
parents to children, who were born smaller and weaker than their parents. If there is another 
parent here, Socrates does not talk about it, but we should not discard this possibility since 
in the Timaeus that role seems assigned to a receptacle, or necessity.137 In terms of their 
formal properties, it can be said that both relations are irreflexive, asymmetrical, and 
intransitive.138 
If the good has a parenthood relation to something else, even without knowing what 
the child is we can infer that the good is something with a specific causal power, the power 
to beget children like him. This power transfers the good’s main characteristic(s) to some 
degree, and makes the discussion about the child worthwhile. If the relationship is not only 
a story or an image but literally true, then it will also explain many more things, since we 
would be able to assume that the good is some sort of living being. Maybe because of some 
of these reasons, Glaucon accedes to Socrates’ suggestion, and allows him to avoid the 
topic under the condition that it remains a debt to talk about later. Glaucon concedes only if 
Socrates promises to pay him later. This establishes a creditor/debtor relationship between 
                                                
137 See Timaeus 49a-ff. 
138 That is just to say that no one is his own father (irreflexive); that it implies that if X is the father of Y, then Y 
is not the father of X (asymmetrical); and that if X is the father of Y, and Y of W, then it is not true that X is the 
father of W (intransitive); the same properties are true for the ‘child of’ relation. See note 3.  








Socrates and his interlocutors, which means that Socrates is not free from the 
commitment,139 and remains with certain responsibilities towards his interlocutors. This 
relationship makes an analogy with the father/child description, where the debt begets its 
interest in the same way a father begets its children. Plato plays with the double meaning of 
the τόκος (‘offspring,’ ‘interest’), word which comes from τίκτω, ‘to produce, generate, 
cause.’ In this sense a debt begets its interest:  
Debt: Socrates’ views about the good.    Father: The good  
   ↓      ↓ 
Interest: Socrates’ account of the child of the good.   Children: the sun 
Note that the debt is to blame for the existence of the interest. It is not the creditor’s 
fault, but the debt’s existence. That is what a debt produces in normal circumstances. Even 
if the child’s account is not part of the ‘capital’ of the debt, interest is usually an increase of 
the same sort of thing as is owed. If Socrates owes 10 drachmas, a 10% interest rate will be 
1 drachma. In this case, the difference between the capital and the interest is only of 
quantity. The creditor/debtor relation also establishes the terms in which the conversation 
will develop. It is a transaction. The interlocutors should not just believe what Socrates has 
to say, but they should be cautious not to be deceived, specifically about the account of the 
child (Republic 507a4-5). A mistake there will lead to a mistake in our conception of the 
good. Socrates’ aim is to avoid giving a fraudulent account of the child.  
The audience, then, is told to be as active, wary, and careful, as they are when 
someone is paying them a debt. For even when Socrates may have no intention to deceive 
their creditors, he may still pay with a spurious coin inadvertently. That Socrates says he 
has no intention to deceive is important in a topic where only opinions are being told, 
although a person trying to deceive would probably say the same thing.141 Perhaps for this 
reason, Socrates does not want their interlocutors just to trust his word. He is not seeking 
mere persuasion, but a critical engagement and scrutiny of what he has to say. But why does 
Socrates only ask for care with respect to the account of the sun, and not for all he has to 
say?  
One reason may be because he has no way to justify his other opinions, but it might 
also be because being careful about the account of the child is something their interlocutors 
can actually do since they are much more familiar with it. Since the child will turn out to be 
                                                
139 This recalls Socrates’ debt to Asclepius at the end of the Phaedo. For the discussion of Socrates’ last 
words see McPherran (2003), and Peterson (2003).  
141 Cf. the description of the sophist as a magician in Sophist 234e-235b. 
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an object of sensation, claims about it are empirically verifiable (like the subtle answer in 
the Phaedo; see Ch. 1, sec. 8.6).142 For this reason the account of the sun is the source 
system of the inference from analogy. But Socrates will not share his account of the child 
unless some preconditions are met. He asks his interlocutors both to recall and to agree 
something that has been mentioned before in their conversation and elsewhere (see 
Republic 507a7-9).143 Socrates summarises it in three main points: 
We affirm—I said—there are many beautiful things, and many good things, and 
so on in each case, and we also distinguish them in argument.144  
—We say so.  
Also, then, we say there are and we distinguish in argument the beautiful itself, 
and the good itself, and so on about everything which we formerly established as 
many; in turn, we establish145 many things as having one being, because of146 
one form147 for each, and we call it the  ‘what is’148 of each.   
—That is true.  
And we say the many things in fact are visible, but not perceived by nous 
(νοεῖσθαι), while in turn forms are perceived by nous (νοεῖσθαι) but not visible.  
—Absolutely (Republic 507b1-10).  
These three agreements are packed with information. The first one establishes two claims: 
(a) the existence of qualified things; and (b) the fact that they have distinguished them by 
argument. In the second point, Socrates adds five further claims: (c) there are forms; (d) 
they have distinguished those forms by argument; (e) each form corresponds to a quality 
distinguished in (a); (f) that they established many things as one being in accordance with 
one form for each; and (g) that they call this being the ‘what is’ of each group of things. 
Finally, the third point includes two more claims: (h) they say that the many qualified things 
                                                
142 Comparing the two passages, the first impression might be to wonder why empirical inquiry is not 
puzzling in the Republic. On the contrary, the agreements on the account of the child will reveal 
something about the good. The key to the strategy, however, depends on the strength of the resemblance 
between the good and its child. But Socrates will not elaborate on it, nor will his interlocutors protest, at 
least at this point. Would it be possible that Socrates is presupposing the framework of Phaedo’s subtle 
answer? Everybody seems to accept the relationship very easily. Glaucon’s silence here, however, might 
be explained by the fact that he wants to listen to the whole account before mocking Socrates about it. 
143 In the Republic it could be a reference to 5.476a, 475e. Elsewhere, it may refer to Phaedo 75b, 66d-ff, 
74a-79a, 99e-100d, and Symp. 210e-212a. Perhaps also Euthydemus 300e-301a, and Cratylus 430a-b. For 
similar restatements of the arguments about forms see Republic 596a-ff, Phaedo 108b-ff. Compare 
Socrates’ request with Phaedo 100b1-3 (Ch. 1, sec. 7.2.1). 
144 This recalls Phaedo 99e4-6, and the statues of Daedalus in Meno 97d-98a. 
145 But see Rowe (2007, 240), who translates: ‘positing [sc. beautiful itself, good itself, and so on] in 
accordance with one form [..] belonging to each, as being, each, one form [kind], we address each of them 
as ‘what is.’’ I do not see, however, how this fits with πάλιν αὖ in b6. 
146 Here κατ᾽ ἰδέαν is normally translated as ‘in accordance with one form,’ but that point was already 
made by the first part of the sentence. For that reason, I take it as causal or instrumental, and explanatory.  
147 Cf. Rep. 597a2, Cratylus 389b5-6. For locutions about forms, see Sedley (2007, 72-73). 
148 Cf. Phaedo 75b, d, 78d, Parmenides 129b, Symposium 211c, Rep. 490b, 532a, 597a. For a recent 
discussion of the meaning of this locution see Politis (2012).    








distinguished in (a) are visible but not perceived by nous; and (i) forms are perceived by 
nous but are invisible.  
Socrates emphasises not only that they agree on the ontology and epistemology of all 
this but also on the fact that they did it by argument, something that was also emphasised in 
Phaedo, when Socrates retreats to arguments (see 99d4-e6, Ch. 1, sec. 6).  But what exactly 
is this ontology and epistemology he wants his interlocutors to take for granted? Even if he 
wants to recall something that has been said before he may only require part of it. From 
what he says in this passage we can infer a basic picture. First, there are qualified visible 
things, which imply a pluralism where there are things, visible characteristics, and the idea 
that the same characteristic could be shared by more than one thing. We also learn that these 
qualified visible things are not perceived by nous but by sight. Socrates and his interlocutors 
also agree that there are characteristics themselves, but that they are not perceived by sight 
but by nous. Finally, the characteristics themselves and the visible things have the following 
relations: for every characteristic itself there is a corresponding visible characteristic; and 
many qualified visible things share the same characteristic (i.e., being) by virtue of one 
characteristic itself (i.e., form), which we call the ‘what is’ of each.  
With these agreements it seems that Socrates and his interlocutors can then establish 
that for many cases of visible things with a shared characteristic, there is a characteristic 
itself in virtue of which the sharing of the visible characteristic is possible. These claims, 
and the agreement that they have established them through argument are the preconditions 
set by Socrates to proceed with his account of the child of the good.  
4. The child of the good in relation to sight 
Socrates offers an account of the child of the good in relation to sight, although he 
expands his account later. This needs to be the non-fraudulent account that Socrates 
promised. For it, he first examines with Glaucon how sight works, and identifies as one of 
its characteristics that it is deficient, and that it needs light to be able to see (Republic 
507c1-e4). The agreements are as follow:  
4. If X is one of person S’s senses, then X has the power to perceive a corresponding 
sensible quality x in a perceptible thing Y. 
5. Sight is a sense that person S has to see visible things.  
6. Many senses and sensible qualities do not need a third kind of thing without which 
they will not perceive and be perceived, respectively.  
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7. In a case where a person S is in front of a sensible thing Y, it might happen that: (a) 
S’s sight is fine, (b) S is attempting to use her sight to see Y, (c) Y’s colours are in 
front of S’s eyes,149 (d) but if the situation is not supported by a third thing W, then, 
(C) S’s sight will not see Y, and Y’s colours will be invisible to S.  
8. The third kind of thing W, which S needs to see Y and that Y needs to be seen by S, 
is specific to the circumstance by its nature, and it is called light.  
9. The craftsman150 of our senses was most generous when he crafted the power of 
seeing and also to be seen [since he also provided us with the light needed to see 
and be seen].   
These claims offer a brief description of vision which distinguishes the following 
elements: subjects who possess the faculty of sight, visible things which possess colours, 
eyes as the organs of vision, light, the actual event of seeing151 and be seen, and a craftsman 
both of the senses and of the power of seeing and to be seen. Socrates does not explain all 
the relations between these elements nor all the details of how vision is supposed to work. 
He does not explain, for instance, why sight needs a third element unlike all the other 
senses. Moreover, someone might complain that this is not true. Is it a problem of directness 
versus indirectness? Is it because sight requires no contact with the object perceived, and 
thus needs an intermediary? If so, Socrates does not make it explicit. He only establishes 
that an instance of successful seeing requires that:  
A person S sees Y, iff S possesses eyes with sight, Y is a visible object, Y is in front of 
S, and there is light. 
The introduction of a provident craftsman of the senses and of the power of seeing 
and to be seen could sound odd to modern readers, but Socrates introduces it as smoothly as 
                                                
149 Adam complains that in 507d11 ἐν αὐτοῖς (‘in these’) should make reference to the sensible things, but 
grammatically seems to refer to τοῖς ὄµµασιν (the eyes), and there is no relevant variant in the MSS. But 
if ἐν αὐτοῖς refers to τοῖς ὄµµασιν, the colour would be in the eyes even without light, which might seem 
self-defeating if what Socrates wants to say is that light is a necessary condition for sight. Adam ends 
saying that it is better to retain the Ms reading and ‘understand αὐτοῖς perforce as τοῖς ὁρωµένοις.’ 
(Adam, 1902, 83, app. VIII). It can be argue, however, that keeping the text as it has been transmitted is 
not necessarily self-defeating even if ἐν αὐτοῖς refers to τοῖς ὄµµασιν. The phrase ‘in the eyes’ could 
mean ‘in front of the eyes’. If colours exist even if a person is not perceiving them, then the colours may 
be at reach from one’s eyes, but invisible without external light. Compare this theory of vision with Lysis 
217c-e, Meno 74c-77a, Phaedrus 110b-e, Critias 116a-b, Theaetetus 156d-e, Philebus 12e, and Timaeus 
45a-46c, 67c-68d. 
150 This craftsman of our senses, of course, reminds us of the craftsman in Timaeus 47a, Philebus 27b, 
and Republic 10.596b-598c but also the titan Prometheus, who brought light and reason to humankind. 
Thus, it recalls also Protagoras’ long speech in Protagoras 320c ff. 
151 One thing is the faculty of sight (ὄψις) that someone could possess even if it is not able to see at a 
given moment due to lack of light, and another is the actual seeing (ὁρᾶν). Contrast Theaetetus 184c, 
where Socrates distinguishes between ὀφθαλµοῖς and δι’ ὀφθαλµῶν. See Denyer (2007, 91). 








any of the other claims. The role of the craftsman seems to be that he is responsible for the 
whole setting needed to see, from the existence of sense organs, faculties, but also light, and 
colours. The craftsman is an agent not only able to create structured and ordered things, but 
to be generous to humankind. He is a benefactor in a literal sense, he does good through his 
craft, and humans are the recipients of his generosity. In the same way, Socrates makes 
clear that sight depends on the craftsman’s good will.  
Socrates’ account of vision simply assumes there is such a craftsman, and then asks 
whether he is the most generous (Republic 507c7). But notice that the craftsman only 
provides the possibility conditions for successful seeing, but for that to happen the person 
needs also to have good sight in her eyes, and attempt to use it to see something visible. It is 
not the craftsman who makes a person see, it is that person’s responsibility, even when the 
craftsman provides the conditions for this to happen. This illustrates the interconnection 
between necessary conditions and causality and responsibility—one of the questions left 
unexplained by the Phaedo (see Ch. 1, sec. 6). The text here makes clear that the effects of 
an αἴτιον could be the necessary condition for the activity of another αἴτιον. Note, however, 
under this model, effects are not necessarily αἴτια. Let us look at the specific case of sight 
and light again. Due to its role as a necessary condition of vision, both Socrates and 
Glaucon praise light:  
If indeed light is not without value, then it is not an unimportant kind of link that 
joins (ἐζύγησαν) the sense of seeing and the power to be seen—more valuable 
than other links there are.  
—But surely it is far from being without value (Republic 507e5-508a3). 
Light has an instrumental value. It is relevant so far as it enables seeing and to be 
seen, both assumed as valuable. Light links the sense devoted to seeing and the power 
visible things have to be seen to allow instances of successful seeing. Plato uses the word 
ἐζύγησαν, the aorist passive of ζεύγνυµι, which can also mean join ‘in wedlock.’ If the 
word is intentionally used to suggest marriage, then we may wonder whether the instances 
of successful seeing are the children of the union.152 Note that light is a real thing in the 
world, independent of perceivers, but its natural role is to bind ontology and perception 
together (cf. the binding capacity of nous highlighted in Phaedo and Sophist; see Ch. 1, sec. 
5, and Ch. 4, sec. 7).    
Socrates’ next question is to identify the source of light, which was already presented 
as a craftsman (see Republic 507c6-8). He phrases it as follows:  
                                                
152 The reflection about links is going to become a prominent aspect later (see Ch. 3, and Ch. 4, sec. 6-7).  
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Then, which of the gods in heaven would you hold responsible (αἰτιάσασθαι)153 and 
author of this, whose light makes both our sight to see in the best way and the 
visible things to be seen?  
The same also you and others would say—he replied—since it is evident that 
you asked about the sun (Republic 508a4-8).154  
This is the non-fraudulent account of the child. It reminds us of Republic 2, 379a, 
when Socrates demands that gods must be always represented as they are. Here in Republic 
6, Socrates and his interlocutors think that the account of the sun is accurate. Everyone 
assumes a divine design of the visible part of the world, and that fact is never questioned. 
The sun, then, is the heavenly god responsible for light because it has the power and 
authority to produce it. The sun is provident since without his light, humankind will be in 
the dark. Humans and any animal capable of vision need the light of the sun to lighten up 
the place, since otherwise they see nothing, and things remain invisible. Human effort, and 
the possession of good sight is not enough to see visible things and their colours.  
The sun’s light produces two things at once: sight in the perceiver, and the power to 
be seen in the visible things. Put more generally, it enables something to act, and another to 
be acted upon. This intermediary role can be understood as follows: X is an intermediary, if 
X makes Y act and allows Z to be acted upon.155 Note that in the case of seeing and being 
seen, the activity does not imply a real change for the thing observed but for the viewer, 
who acquires a perception of the object. 
If Socrates is right in his account of light, then light is the natural link between sight 
and the visible (Republic 507d12). But now Socrates will ask whether that means that the 
relation between sight and the sun is according to nature. The reasoning seems to be that if 
sight and light have a natural relation, and the sun is the responsible for light, then there 
should be a natural relation between sight and the sun. The conclusion is true only if natural 
relations are transitive, or sight and the sun are naturally related anyway by a different 
reason. But the text seems to use light as a link not only between sight and the visible things 
but also between sight and the sun (Republic 508a9-10), and also between the visible things 
and the sun. To explain this, Socrates first step is to emphasise the distinction between sight, 
the sun, and the eye:  
                                                
153 For αἰτιάσασθαι in 508a4 see Republic 1.329b4: τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι. (‘Accuse as the responsible 
αἴτιον’). The whole passage in 1, 329b1-6 talks about confusing a necessary condition with the real 
αἴτιον. Here in book 6 this is also an intertextual reference with the Phaedo (Ch. 1, sec. 5).  
154 Cf. Cratylus 397c4-d7; Laws 7.821b5-6, 899b3-10, 950d2-5; and Apology 26d1-e4. See also 
Aristophanes Peace 406 ff., Herodotus iv. 188, and Epinomis 985b, 988b. 
155 The capacity to act and be acted upon will be considered a mark of being in the Sophist 247d8-e4 (see 
Ch. 4, sec. 5). Cf. also the Stoic corporeal relation between God and all other bodies (see Ch. 5, sec. 2.2).  








Sight is not the sun neither itself nor that in which it comes to be, which we call 
the eye.  
—Certainly not.  
But, I think it (i.e., the eye) is the most sunlike of the organs of sensation.  
—Very much so (Republic 508a11-b5). 
But what does it add to say that the relation between the sun and sight is a natural 
one? Knowing that a relation is natural tells us, first of all, that it is possible, genuine, and it 
is not a human invention, even if we are unable to pin down how exactly it works. Socrates 
seems also to imply there is a non-arbitrary resemblance between things related by nature. 
This makes clear that sight refers to the faculty in the eyes, but it is not identical with them, 
since one can have blind eyes. Sight, then, is not the source of light since if it were, it would 
not need the benevolent God’s aid to see.156 However, Socrates adds, the eye is sunlike. 
This establishes a resemblance relation not between the sun and sight, which were the 
elements he was trying to explain are naturally related, but with the organ of vision. This 
makes a chain of resemblance from the form of the good:157  





The sun is the most good-like of the visible things, and now the eye is the most 
sunlike of the organs of sensations. But in what respect do these things resemble each 
other? Could it be authority, responsibility, and causal capacity? But if so, what exactly do 
the eyes produce? Socrates says that sight comes to be in the eye, so it might be that the 
eyes are not only a passive place where sight happens to come to be, but that the eyes (if all 
the necessary conditions present) produce sight. Socrates’ idea, perhaps, is that, for 
instance, the eye’s iris controls the diameter and size of the pupils, which adjust the amount 
of light needed to produce sight. In this way, sight is a faculty that depends on certain 
background conditions but also on the proper function of the eyes. So, the eyes are the 
creators of sight, as much as the sun is the craftsman of light, the senses, and the power to 
                                                
156 Cf. Timaeus’ account of vision at 45b-47e. 
157 This recalls the magnets in Ion 533d-e. In the same way the bits of iron depend on the magnet, the 
eye’s and the sun’s productive power depend on the activity of the good itself. 
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see and be seen. If this is so, sight is an active faculty. Socrates further explains the relation 
of sight with the sun with a comparison:  
Surely then, sight158 also acquires from him (i.e., the sun) the power it has, just 
like an abundant (ἐπίρρυτον)159 treasurer.  
— Certainly, in fact (Republic 508b6-8).  
An abundant manager or treasurer administers the wealth of her employer or master. 
She can decide, up to a point, how to use the employer’s wealth, but has no wealth of her 
own, and depends on her employer to have a job. The treasurer’s power comes from the 
employer’s deposit of her goods. As a treasurer, a person does not generate wealth, just 
administrates it, and the job consists in looking after the interests of the employer. The 
treasurer uses his power to exercise the employer’s will. 
Just like a treasurer, then, sight has the power for seeing thanks to the light given by 
the sun. The comparison emphasises that sight has a limited active capacity. Just as the 
treasurer did not own the money and his power is not to make more, but to administer it, 
sight has no power to make light but to see thanks to it. Sight sees the things that the sun 
allows us to see, so much that it takes away his light during night. The benevolence of the 
sun, then, is not that he gives humans a gift, but that he gives them a job. There is an 
employer/employee relation with the sun, just as a treasurer has a relation with the owner of 
the money. But in the case of sight and the sun, the relation is said to be natural. So it seems 
that sight has a limited authority, it is dependent on the God’s will, and that is the natural 
order of things.160  
Socrates adds that the sun is not sight but is responsible for it (Republic 508b9-10). 
Before, he said that the craftsman was responsible for the senses and the power to see, but 
now he adds that he is also responsible for sight, something that does not follow from the 
previous claims.161 But, since eyes are said to be producers of sight, what Socrates claims 
seems to be that the sun holds an indirect responsibility. If this is so, responsibility is a 
transitive relation (if X is responsible for Y, and Y for Z, then X is responsible for Z). This is 
an innovation with respect to the discussion in the Phaedo where responsibility is not 
transitive (see Ch. 1, sec. 4). In the Republic, however, this is what allows a connection 
between necessary conditions and causality and responsibility. This, however, seems to 
contrast with a passage from the myth of Er in Republic 10 (617e4-5), where Lachesis, 
                                                
158 Since ἣν refers to sight at Republic 508a11.  
159 Adam translates ‘flowing over’ and refers to Timaeus 80d. 
160 This relation will come under attack later with an example about the master and the slave relationship. 
Cf. Parmenides 133d6-134a2 (see Ch. 3, sec. 5). See also Xenophon’s Memorabilia I 1.11-15.  
161 Otherwise Socrates would mistake necessary conditions for αἴτια. See Ch. 1, sec. 5. 








the maiden daughter of Necessity, informs the souls that when they choose a new life 
for the next cycle of reincarnation, the responsibility of their action lies with them, 
while God remains innocent. Responsibility there seems again intransitive. Although 
this passage is part of a myth, it would still seem problematic if the myth were to 
misrepresent the relation between gods and humans.  
Is there a way to explain these hesitations? Republic 2.379b1-c7 might be the 
answer. There, Socrates says that God is good, and that he is the αἴτιον of no evil, but 
only of good. A suggestion, then, could be that the Republic conceives responsibility as 
transitive when it is about good actions, and effects, but intransitive when it comes to 
evil ones. In this way, God would be indirectly responsible for every good action and 
effect in the world, but not of any evil. The responsibility of bad actions would stop 
with the wrongdoer. If Socrates performs a good action, then, he but also God would be 
responsible for it, whereas in the case of rape, murder, or condemning the innocent the 
responsibility would be exclusively in the hands of the criminals who committed those 
crimes. This fits well with the comparison with the abundant treasurer. Whenever 
someone is doing good, it is doing the job God gave her, and therefore God is also 
responsible for its outcomes. This would not he the case, however, when a person does 
something wrong.  
Looking back again to Republic 508b9-10, Socrates also says that the sun is seen by 
sight. It seems that the sun, in its benevolence, has not only revealed the visible things but it 
has also revealed itself. Note that the way the sun reveals itself fits with the natural faculty 
humans have. Human sight is naturally able to see the sun, even if the eyes can only hold 
the sight for a moment, and it is a bit painful, or dangerous if done without care, as we 
learnt from Phaedo 99d4-e6 (see Ch. 1, sec. 6). Notice this is also a hint about sight being 
something that could be done properly. If we want to study the sun we will need to see 
its reflection in the water to avoid being blinded by it, just as Socrates is making us 
study the form of the good by an inference from analogy. This seems to suggest that this 
is the proper way to study the form of the good, and that Socrates is not planning to pay 
his debt after all. All these characteristics will map the relationship between nous and 
the good.  
5. The set up of the analogy  
Let me now analyse in more detail the way Socrates expresses the analogy: 
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Therefore, I continued, say162 that this is what I call the child of the good, which 
the good begot analogous to himself; for what the good itself is in the intelligible 
part of the world163 in relation to both nous and the intelligible things, this is the 
sun in the visible part in relation to both sight and the visible things (Republic 
508b12-c2). 
The passage states the sun analogy, but it also reminds us of the parenthood relation, and 
tells us that the good begot the sun as analogous to him. So we have three claims:  
1. The good is the father of the sun. 
2. The good begot the sun analogous to himself.  
3. The sun is to the visible part of the world what the good is to the intelligible part.  
The analogy states an identity of relation between the two parts of the world, but the 
other two claims establish a causal link between the intelligible and the visible part of the 
world. The good stands in a relation both to the forms and to its child. This picture, 
however, is vulnerable to the same objections I presented above regarding the good’s 
relation to forms. If the good is a form just like the others, namely unchangeable, it is 
difficult to imagine how it can literally beget the sun, even if the sun was begot by 
something. The tensions generated by these ambiguities, however, could have been one of 
the motivations to introduce a distinction between a craftsman and the forms in the 
Timaeus. It could also explain why in the Sophist, the Eleatic stranger revises whether the 
intelligible realm should include some change (I shall come back to the latter in Ch. 4, sec. 
6-7).  
This general analogy is elaborated by Socrates in more detail by making explicit the 
different relations the sun and the good have with different things in their corresponding 
part of the world. Socrates first adds two relations in each part, nous and intelligible things, 
and sight and visible things on the other. But shortly after he gives a fuller picture of the 
epistemology in both parts. In the case of the sun, it is also in relation with the eyes, seeing, 
the power to be seen, and light. The good, in turn, is also in relation to understanding and 
knowledge, and truth and being. How exactly are these pieces supposed to fit in the 
analogy? Is every bit analogous to another element in the other part of the world? If so, then 
there is not only one analogy but many derived analogies, which make one part of the world 
a mirror of the other (which reminds us of Phaedo 100a1-3; Ch. 1, sec. 6). If so, Socrates 
does not stop to say exactly which element corresponds to which, but the following table 
                                                
162 See φάναι in Republic 473a8. 
163 Translating τόπος as ‘part [of the world],’ There is no reason to think the intelligible and the visible are 
two different worlds. 








offers what seems to be a fuller picture of the resemblance between one part of the world 
and the other:  
Plato’s visible and intelligible parts of the world 
Visible part  Intelligible part 
The sun The good itself 
Sight Nous 
Visible things Intelligible things (forms) 
Light  Truth 
Eyes Soul (?) 
Seeing Understanding and knowledge 
To be seen To be understood and known 
Colours Being (?) 
According to this, each pair implies an identity of relation, and to find it, it is 
necessary to remember what was said about each element in the visible part of the world. 
Sight and nous, for instance, are both deficient faculties that require a third thing to 
successfully operate. In the first case, this third thing that naturally fulfils this need is light, 
whereas in the case of nous it is truth, which connects the faculty with the intelligible 
things. Truth, as light, has instrumental value. It is a link that ‘joins in wedlock’ nous and 
the intelligible things. Socrates also says that sight comes to be in the eye, and, as I 
suggested, it is a product of the eyes’ activity. In the same way, it seems, nous is a faculty 
that exists or comes to be in an organ of intellection, and it is a product of its exercise. 
Socrates does not talk about an organ of intellection, but he normally talks about nous as a 
faculty of the soul.164 Therefore, it seems that nous is a faculty product of the soul’s activity 
(interestingly, both the eyes and the soul, may allow for voluntary and involuntary activity).  
Socrates does not say what is the analogue of colour in the intelligible part, but it 
must be something that intelligible objects have, and is perceived by nous. This makes 
plausible the idea that being is the analogue to colour. So knowing or understanding an 
intelligible thing would include comprehending its being (perhaps that it exists, and ‘what it 
is;’ see Republic 507b1-10, in sec. 3 of this chapter). Now, just as in the visible part having 
sight, attempting to see and even having the colours of an object in front of one’s eyes may 
not be enough to actually see, so in the intelligible part of the world something analogous 
                                                
164 For a similar claim see Phaedo 70b1-4, where Plato uses φρόνησις, not nous. 
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would happen. A person may have nous, attempt to use it to comprehend or know 
something, and that something may exist and being in front of the person’s nous, but 
without truth linking the intelligible things and the person’s nous there will be no successful 
knowledge or understanding. The analogy between sight and nous also reinforces the idea 
that both are faculties that can be developed, adapted, and that effort can make some 
difference, and that we may become better at exercising them. In addition, the sun and the 
good itself will be both objects of their corresponding faculties, that is, as we have seen, that 
the sun is seen by sight, but also that the good is known by nous, all this within the natural 
capacities of each faculty, even if in both cases it could be a difficult and dangerous thing to 
do. Done with the appropriate provisions, it is perfectly possible to have a sight of the sun, 
and to grasp the good itself. This is one of the promises of the analogy.   
That the sun and the good itself provide a link between their corresponding faculties 
and their objects does not mean they are the only sources or that there is no other thing that 
can serve as a link in each case. Socrates explains this when he says:  
You know, I said, that when we turn our eyes to things upon which colours are 
no longer illuminated by the light of day, but by night-light, they have a weak 
sight and seem nearly blind, as if they lacked clear sight.  
Of course—he said.   
But I suspect that when the sun shines165 upon things they [i.e., the eyes] see 
clearly, and it seems that [clear sight]166 exists in those very same eyes.  
—Indeed. 
Thus, now understand (νόει) the soul also as follows. When, on the one hand, it 
fixes on something that ‘shines’167 by both truth and being (τὸ ὄν), it both 
understands (ἐνόησέν) and knows (ἔγνω), and it seems to have nous. On the 
other hand, when it fixes on what is mixed with darkness, on what comes to be 
and passes away, it opines (δοξάζει) and it has weak ‘sight,’ changes its opinions 
‘upwards’ and ‘downwards,’ and in turn seems to lack nous.168  
—Yes, it looks like it (Republic 508c3-d9). 
The passage establishes two cases for each part of the world, an optimal and a 
deficient one. This makes it possible to compare the differences between the two cases in 
each side, and also the similarities and differences across the visible and intelligible part of 
the world. Socrates, however, leaves some of these relations unspoken. In the following 
                                                
165 I think καταλάµπει should be translated as ‘shines’ and not ‘lightened’ as Grove and Reeve do, since X 
shines by virtue of X having colour(s) and receiving light from a source Y.  
166 And not only ‘clarity’ (claridad), as Eggers Lan (1988, 333), or ‘vision’ as Grube and Reeve (in 
Cooper & Hutchinson 1997, 1129). See Adam’s note ad locum. 
167 Socrates exports some vocabulary from the visible part to the intelligible, like καταλάµπει, σκότος, 
ἀµβλυώσσω, ἄνω and κάτω. Since their use in the intelligible part of the world is either metaphorical or 
an extension of its meaning, I have added quotation marks to those words in my translation. 
168 This last sentence, as noted at the beginning of the chapter, is a clear reference to Phaedo 96a9-b1, and 
99d4-e6. See Ch. 1, sec. 3, and 5.  








table I summarise the information he provides plus the necessary inferences to complete the 
picture:   
Plato’s visible and intelligible parts of the world and their inferences 
Visible part Intelligible part 
Optimal case: when a visible object X shines 
thanks to both sunlight and its colours, and S’ 
eyes fix on X, S’ eyes then: 
A) see X clearly, and 
B) clear sight seems to exist in S’ eyes. 
Optimal case: when an intelligible object Y 
‘shines’ thanks to both truth and being, and 
S’ soul fixes on Y, S’ soul then:  
A) understands, and knows Y, and 
B) S’ soul seems to have a [functional] 
nous.  
Deficient case: when a visible object X is not 
illuminated by sunlight but by moonlight, 
and S’ eyes turn to X, S’ eyes then:  
C) [guess?], 
D) have weak sight,  
E) seem nearly blind,  
F) are just like if they lacked clear sight 
(have permanent visual impairment). 
Deficient case: when an intelligible object Y 
is not ‘illuminated’ by truth but by what is 
mixed with what comes to be and passes 
away, and S’ soul fixes on Y, S’ soul then: 
C) opines,  
D) has a weak ‘sight’ [i.e., nous] 
E) changes its opinions (nearly 
lacking all understanding and 
knowledge). 
F) seems to lack nous (permanent 
below average intelligence).  
Note that there are four links, with four different sources. In the visible part of the 
world, there are two different types of light that come from two different sources, that is 
sunlight and moonlight, which come from the sun and the moon. In the intelligible world, in 
turn, there are also two types of links between intelligible objects and nous that come from 
two different sources, that is truth, on one side, and what is mixed with coming to be and 
passing away, in the other. Although moonlight and what is mixed with coming to be and 
passing away can in some way link the corresponding faculties with their objects, they do a 
very poor job. Moonlight is dimmer than sunlight, and what is mixed with coming to be and 
passing away is always changing, and thus unreliable.  
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Socrates makes an interesting clarification of the analogy between sight and nous. 
Given the more complex picture, he compares not mere sight but clear sight with nous. The 
deficient case is called in both sides ‘weak sight,’ which in the intelligible part would mean 
‘weak nous’ (or perhaps small nous, like in Phaedo 102a4; see Ch. 1, sec. 4). Socrates, 
however, seems to leave the use of the word nous to refer exclusively to the use of the 
faculty in optimal conditions, as if he were unwilling to use the word when the faculty is 
used in the deficient case.169  
It is important to notice, however, that in the deficient case of the intelligible part, the 
idea is not that nous is trying to perceive colours or any other perceptual quality. Nous used 
in optimal or deficient conditions is a faculty whose objects are intelligible things, like 
justice and virtue. But when nous tries to understand their being by fixing its attention on 
particulars, like, for instance, trying to understand justice or virtue by exclusively looking at 
specific cases, local laws, and cultural traditions, even the best nous will only reach shifting 
opinions—just like when Socrates’ nous studied nature in Phaedo’s autobiographical 
passage (see Ch. 1, sec. 3). To reach real understanding and stable knowledge about those 
things, then, nous needs to be aided by truth.  
The sun and light relation is clear, but the relation between the good and truth is 
puzzling. It could be that the good itself has a veridical aspect, or that truth has an ethical 
component, or both. According to the account of the child, the sun in his benevolence gives 
us light as the third thing necessary to see. The good, then, provides us with truth as the 
third thing that naturally fits with our nous and the objects of thought, to make us ‘see’ the 
qualities of the objects. Truth, however, does not need to be the only or most important 
characteristic of the good. After all, the sun in the visible part also gives us, for instance, 
warmth. It is simply that truth is the gift we need to successfully use our nous. The 
difference between truth and what is mixed lies in its stability, but also its universality. 
Moreover, the passage seems to imply that without the presence of the good, there is no 
truth, so whatever a discerner thinks she is ‘seeing,’ if there is no good in it, it has no truth.  
The existence of four links in the world, two better than the other, implies that nous 
and sight have a normative component. If you are not ‘seeing’ things through the ‘light’ of 
the form of the good, then you are almost without nous, you are not doing things in the right 
way. There is also a reference to strength. To be able to see properly gives you power, 
                                                
169 There are other similar cases of this peculiarity in Plato, like οὐσία and γένεσις in the Sophist’s 
gigantomachia. Moreover, this use explains why the ES is able to say that in materialism and certain 
types of idealism, nous disappears (see Ch. 4, sec. 6).  








and strength. Blindness here also conveys being crippled, disabled, and weak. No one 
wants to be voluntarily weak and disabled. Notice, however, that there is no reference to 
complete blindness. Even without good illumination, the eyes work, and do their job, if 
somehow poorly. A person’s nous also works even when little truth is present. 
In what follows, Socrates drags the epistemological conclusions of the analogy, 
together with the distinction between the good, knowledge, and truth, and an evaluative 
claim that puts the possession of the good above the others: 
Then, you could say that this is the form of the good, what produces truth in the 
things discerned170 and what gives the power to discern to the discerner. But 
being responsible for (αἰτίαν) knowledge and truth, you could on the one hand 
think it [i.e., the good itself] as an object of discernment; on the other hand, as 
they are both beautiful beings, seeking to know and truth, judging that it [i.e., the 
good itself] is other and more beautiful than they, you will judge (ἡγεῖσθαι) 
correctly. But knowledge and truth, just as in the visible part both light and sight 
are correctly considered as sunlike, but it is not correct to judge they are the sun, 
in the same way also here they are both correctly considered as goodlike, but to 
judge that either of them are the good is not correct, since the possession of the 
good is yet more valued (Republic 508d10-509a5).  
This passage offers some substantive content about the form of the good. But this is 
striking, and the reader should be surprised since Socrates said he was not going to talk 
about the good, and here he seems to offer if not a definition, various important features of 
it. The fact that Socrates insists on giving this analogy might be intended to clarify the 
causal connection between the good and the rest of the world, and in this way to 
reemphasise its centrality and relevance.  
The information in this passage can be broken down into two main parts, one about 
the form of the good and the other about knowledge and truth:  
A. The form of the good is:  
 With respect to its causal capacity (in epistemology):  
  1. What produces truth in the things discerned.  
  2. What gives the power to discern to the discerner.  
With respect to its explanatory role:  
  3. It is responsible for knowledge and truth.  
 With respect to its relation with knowledge and truth:  
  4. It is an object of discernment.  
                                                
170 See Adam’s note and his Appendix IX for the discussion about correcting γιγνωσκοµένης to 
γιγνωσκοµένην in e3. I think, however, it can be translated with the genitive. See Slings (2005, 111-112). 
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  5. It is different from knowledge and truth.  
  6. It is more beautiful and valued than knowledge and truth.  
 
B. Knowledge and truth:  
 With respect to its relationship with the form of the good:  
  1. They are goodlike.  
  2. Since (6), they are not the good.  
The form of the good is described as active. It produces something in both sides of 
the knowledge relation: truth in the ‘things discerned,’ and the capacity to discern in 
knowers. Notice that those two things are only necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient. 
But it seems that by being the source of these two things, the good explains why knowledge 
and truth are possible. According to the analogy, it also seems to follow that the form of the 
good gives their soul to the discerners (as the craftsman of the senses gives us eyes).  
The good, however, is itself discernable, and it is different from knowledge and truth, 
since apart from being its αἴτιον, it is more beautiful and valuable than them. This means 
that the object of discernment is different from the act of knowledge, and what is needed to 
actualise knowledge, namely truth. Socrates conceives the good as whatever is the most 
valuable, and beautiful possession. This raises the question of what exactly it is to possess 
something in general, and specifically, what is to possess the knowledge of the good (this 
will be discussed again in relation to the Parmenides, see Ch. 3, sec. 6). When Socrates says 
that knowledge and truth are goodlike, what exactly is the similarity? It does not seem to be 
the same similarity the sun has with the good (regardless of whether we read it in the 
theological or in the formal way).  
6. Extending the analogy 
I shall leave Glaucon’s remark at Republic 508a6-8 aside for a moment, since Socrates 
ignores it and continues with his exposition (perhaps hoping that he will convince Glaucon 
with what he is about to say). This new part has the same structure as the previous passage 
(Republic 508d10-509a5). Socrates begins by asking Glaucon to ‘examine, however, its 








image (εἰκών)171 more fully in this way’ (Republic 509a9-10). Socrates expands the scope 
of the analogy, and to do it he also expands his account of the sun: 
You will say, I think, that the sun produces not only the power to be seen in the 
visible things, but also their coming to be, and growth, and nourishment, but it is 
not itself coming to be. 
—How could it be?  
And, therefore, you could say that not only do the things discerned owe their 
being discerned to the good, but also they take from it [i.e., the good] both their 
existence and being, although the good is not being, but goes beyond being [by] 
excelling it in dignity and power (Republic 509b1-9). 
The passage, then, goes back to the description of the sun to finish the examination 
about how it maps the form of the good. But what he says about each part is not exactly 
symmetrical as is shown below:  
The sun and the form of the good 
The sun The form of the good 
1. The sun produces (in the visible 
things): 
a) the power to be seen, 
b) coming-to-be, 
c) growth, and  
d) nourishment. 
 
2. The sun is not coming-to-be.  
1. The good produces (in the things discerned): 
a) the possibility to be known. 
2. Things discerned take from the good:     
a) existence (τὸ εἶναι), and 
b) being (οὐσία).     
 
3. The good is not being (οὐσία), but what 
excels being in power and dignity.  
The passage moves from claims about epistemology to claims about ontology. I will 
start with the extension of the account of the sun. Socrates claims that the sun also produces 
the generation, growth, and nourishment of the visible things. How is the sun the source of 
so many things? The idea seems to be that the sun produces all things with its light, and 
heat.172 But this does not explain the variety of things in the world. Is something else 
required? Someone might complain that the sun only takes part in the production of these 
things, and is not the only responsible, nor always a direct participant. Glaucon makes none 
of these questions, though. He pacifically accepts this as a clear addition to the account of 
                                                
171 This does not mean that the whole passage is Socrates’ invention. The εἰκών is between the sun and 
the good, because the sun mirrors features of the good.  
172 Cf. Phaedo 105b5-c7; see Ch. 1, sec. 8. 
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the sun. The new information about the sun also raises a question about how the sun’s 
products are connected to each other. There is at least a temporal order: coming-to-be, 
nourishment, growth, although the power to be seen seems to be present all along. There is 
also an ontological priority implied, where coming-to-be is the most basic, since without it 
the others cannot take place. This reference to natural order as a product of the sun, reminds 
us of how nous is related to ordering in the Phaedo (see Ch. 1, sec. 4).  
Consider now the good itself. Socrates says it produces the possibility conditions for 
the intelligible objects to be known, and these objects take from the good its existence and 
being. We are not told how this is possible. But notice how the good is not said to produce 
the existence or being of intelligible objects, but that they take from the good its existence 
and being. The purpose of this change in the formulation is to account for the fact that 
intelligible things are not generated or destroyed. Without the good, however, there is no 
other form. The good is metaphysically prior to the forms.  
This implies that intelligible things are not self-sufficient. If the good is the αἴτιον of 
these things, it seems it is some kind of sustaining cause (to borrow from Stoic terminology, 
see Ch. 5, sec. 6), an αἴτιον that needs to be present all along for its effects to exist. The 
good, in contrast, does not appear to need anything else. That the good is metaphysically 
prior and responsible for the existence of other intelligible things, is enough to consider it 
more powerful and with more dignity. Notice, however, that this does not answer why the 
good itself seems to have two productive roles. Even if it does not literally produce forms 
(and the text never says so), the good itself still is said to beget the sun, and indirectly 
everything else in the visible part of the world. The good itself, then, has a double function: 
as metaphysically prior and explanatory of forms, and as producer of the sensible things and 
their connections with the intelligible things. This seems to break responsibility into two 
different versions, one that has to do with agency, and the other with metaphysical priority. 
The text, nevertheless, only presents this as a puzzling suggestion.   
 The last claim about the form of the good (3) and the last claim about the sun (2), 
which are analogous, could be read in various ways. The relevant part of the text says: ‘the 
sun […] is not itself coming-to-be […] the good is not being, but moreover, farther than that 
it is what excels being in dignity and power.’ The first thing to note is the additional 
explanation about how the good excels being. If the analogy is complete, then we are bound 








to understand that the sun excels coming-to-be in dignity and power too. This could be 
construed, however, in at least three different ways: 173  
1. Just as the sun is not a case of coming-to-be at all, the good is not a case of οὐσία at 
all. 
2. Just as the sun is not the particular coming-to-be that it produces, the good is not the 
particular οὐσία of the other intelligible things.  
3. Just as the sun is not coming-to-be taken universally, the good is not οὐσία taken 
universally. 
The main problem with option (1) is that it is uneconomical. It requires a new 
ontological category to accommodate the good, and it is not clear what that would be, or 
what difference it would make (after all, as I have shown, the good is still intelligible). 
Besides, if the sun is not a case of coming-to-be, how could it be the child of the good? The 
fatherhood relation implies generation, and if the relation between the sun and the good 
cannot be taken literally, what is it? Even if ‘produces’ and ‘takes’ are metaphorical in 
relation to the good and the forms, the good is still the sun’s father. If this is ignored we risk 
ending up with a two-world reality where there is no causal connection between the 
intelligible and the sensible things. According to option (2), the claim differentiates the 
entity responsible from its effect, and is neutral as to whether the form of the good is a case 
of οὐσία or not. But since there is no good reason to think it is not a case of οὐσία, it could 
be taken as saying both things. The difficulty with this reading is that it would have been 
easy for Socrates to have specified that in the text. Instead, he chose this ambiguous 
formulation, which allows a third option still. This last version (3) is a conceptual 
differentiation that perhaps stresses again the metaphysical priority of the good. The text 
cannot be said to rule out any of these options. So we remain in puzzlement.  
7. All this is either inconceivable or ridiculous 
Glaucon’s remarks, after Republic 508d10-509a5, and after 509b1-9, are criticisms, if 
not explicit objections. Glaucon reaction is first of mockery and then of laughter. He is not 
only unimpressed, but considers what Socrates says utterly ridiculous. But what he 
considers ridiculous is not the account of the sun, which goes by without complain, but that 
it is analogous to the good. The first problem is epistemological. In Glaucon’s words:  
                                                
173 My three readings follow closely and benefited from distinctions originally found in the manuscript 
version of the minutes of the Yale-KCL Republic 6, seminar held in 2012. The leader of the session was 
Brad Inwood.  
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You say something inconceivably beautiful, he said, if on the one hand it 
produces knowledge and truth, and on the other it is above them in beauty. For I 
presume you do not call it pleasure174 (Republic 509a6-8).  
Glaucon’s first criticism could be put as an objection. His remark would go against the 
idea that the good is an object of knowledge but is more beautiful and valuable than 
knowledge and truth, which are nonetheless goodlike. Glaucon, then, may be implying 
something like the following argument:  
1. If the form of the good is an object of knowledge but is more beautiful and valuable 
than knowledge and truth, which are nonetheless goodlike, then the good is 
inconceivably beautiful. 
2. It is not the case that the good is inconceivably beautiful.  
3. Therefore, it is false that the form of the good is an object of knowledge but is more 
beautiful and valuable than knowledge and truth, which are nonetheless goodlike. 
Why does Glaucon think it would be inconceivable? It could be that he is just disagreeing 
with the claim that it is possible to discern the source of knowledge and truth. But that is 
supposed to be explained by the case of looking at the sun, which is the source of sight. 
Glaucon might think that the analogy does not work in this case, or that having a glance at 
the sun does not really count as a successful sight of it.  
The analogy might be used on Glaucon’s behalf. It may be that just as no one can 
have a proper sight of the sun, no one can have a proper grasp of the good. And Socrates’ 
own remarks about not knowing what the good is will be evidence of this, and the reason 
why Socrates reacts by silencing Glaucon. Socrates, nonetheless, has an answer to this 
problem. An answer that has to do with the method to ‘look’ at the sun, and to think about 
the good. This could also explain why the Line image, which is supposed to explain the 
analogy of the sun, emphasises method. Glaucon, however, after the extension of the 
analogy of the sun, ends with a different criticism:  
And Glaucon laughing aloud,175 said, “by Apollo, superiority belonging to a daimon!”  
You are responsible, I replied, since you forced me to tell my opinions about it 
(Republic 509c1-c4). 
 Glaucon laughs because Socrates seems to be introducing either a new God or a 
conception of the good that is completely abstract, options that sound ridiculous to him. If it 
                                                
174 The reference to pleasure goes back to the beginning of the discussion about the good, where 
knowledge and pleasure were the two options considered.  
175 The phrase µάλα γελοίως, literally, ‘very comically’, could be inside Glaucon’s comment, in which 
case it would be translated as ‘by Apollo, a very comical superiority…’ This point was made in the Yale-
KCL Republic 6 seminar, 2012. 








is taken to be introducing a new God, this connects with Socrates’ accusations, and reminds 
the reader that other people will find that introducing new gods is more threatening than 
funny. Socrates seems to agree that it sounds crazy, or that laughter was what he was 
expected from the situation (see Republic 506d). But Glaucon’s concerns are not properly 
addressed here. The inconceivability objection, we shall see in the next chapter, reappears in 
the Parmenides.  
Glaucon’s mocking attacks Socrates’ idea that the good produces not only the power 
to be known but also forms take from it existence and being, but it is not itself being, but 
what excels being in dignity and power. Glaucon seems to imply that:  
1. If (a) the good produces the power to be known, (b) forms take from it their 
existence and being, (c) it is not itself being, but (d) what excels being in dignity and 
power, then the good’s superiority is daemonic. 
2. If the good’s superiority is daemonic, then the good’s superiority is ridiculous.  
3. The good’s superiority is not ridiculous.  
4. Therefore, (a-d) are false.  
Socrates, however, does not deny the charge that this is daemonic, nor does he correct 
what Glaucon has understood; he only laments that it sounds comical to Glaucon, and puts 
the responsibility on him. The theme of force recalls various stages of the Republic that 
begin in book 1. It seems that forcing people to tell their opinion without the right 
conditions and “impulse” leads to their appearing ridiculous, and to their being the object of 
laughter (in the best case scenario).  
8. Continuity and innovation in the Sun analogy 
In this chapter I have highlighted how the analogy of the sun in Republic 6, reflects 
about causality and responsibility, making references to the discussion in the Phaedo, and 
highlighting the interrelation between the epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and 
ethics, but exploring new aspects and puzzles. I have shown that although the 
argumentative structure of the passage is an inference from analogy, the passage insists on 
fostering discussion as to whether the good is a divine agent or an unchangeable structure. 
On setting the analogy, the text continues the discussion about how necessary background 
conditions relate to the causal/responsibility process. Moreover, it suggests that the relation 
of causality and responsibility is transitive when it is a good action, and intransitive when it 
is an evil one. This could be expressed in the following way:  
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If X is responsible for Y, and Y for Z, X is responsible for Z, iff Z is a good effect, elsewhere 
X is not responsible for Z. 
One question that arises from this, one that is not explored in the passage, is how transitivity 
affects the assignation of praise and blame. In the case of good deeds, it would mean that 
praise gets distributed through the whole chain of responsible agents. This would suggest 
that when we see a good action we should praise the good person who did it, but also God, 
and any relevant intermediate agent between them. In the case of bad actions, however, the 
responsibility lies with the wrongdoer alone. I will come back to this model to compare it 
with the Stoic conception of causality (see Ch. 5, sec. 7).   
The Republic passage also explores the connection between agency, and 
responsibility. One of the suggestions is that the link between intelligible things and nous, 
affects how stable and secure the connection is. Truth is stable and secure, what is mixed 
with generation and destruction is not. This creates a normative outlook for thinking. 
According to the passage, thinking is an activity that can be done better or worse, and this 
seems to track better or worse ways of acting. Thinking in the right way leads to the right 
type of actions. This of course was also a prominent topic in Phaedo. A difference between 
Republic and Phaedo, however, is that the former introduces a single nous, the sun, which 
is said to be responsible for most background conditions in the visible world; not only with 
respect to sucessful seeing, but in general to human action. But notice that if responsibility 
is transitive, this does not rule out the action of other agents.  
Plato revisits his discussions of responsibility and causality in various places. Some of 
these passages seem to agree or be closely related to things defended in the Phaedo and the 
Republic, others seem to add in similar directions, and others to modify it. Yet, other texts 
seem to criticise their main assumptions. In particular, one objection against forms, the so-
called ‘greatest difficulty’ (Parmenides 133a11-135c4) seems to pose a significant 
challenge against the agreements reached before. 
 








CHAPTER 3. The greatest difficulty in Parmenides 
133a11-135c4 
 
In this chapter, I analyse and evaluate the merits of the greatest difficulty in the 
Parmenides. My purpose is to show that its structure is more complicated than 
traditionally assumed, and for this reason it poses challenges at different levels. My 
reconstruction shows that there is a dialectical, epistemological and an ontological layer 
in the difficulty, and that all of them need to be addressed to escape the terrible 
consequences it implies. The chapter is divided into eight sections. In the first one, I 
offer the context of the present text and its connection with the previous passages. The 
following sections offer a detailed analysis of the text, and I finish with a brief 
discussion of the significance of the difficulty for the understanding of causality and 
responsibility in Plato.  
1. The last of many difficulties 
The Parmenides is a dialogue whose contents are framed by a complex prologue that 
reminds us of the beginning of the Phaedo (see Ch. 1, sec. 1). The main narrator is 
Cephalus, who at his arrival to Athens, runs into Plato’s brothers Adeimantus and Glaucon 
(two of the main interlocutors of the Republic), and asks them about Antiphon, their half-
brother, who is said to have memorised the discussion that Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides 
once had. The brothers confirm that when Antiphon was young he memorised the 
discussion to perfection, meeting many times with Pythodorus, one of Zeno’s friends who 
was present when the discussion took place, and still can recite it from memory even many 
years later. Cephalus and the two brothers ask Antiphon to recite the discussion, and 
although he hesitates at first he finally agrees to do it. Antiphon then tells them that a 
venerable Parmenides, and a mature Zeno came to the Panathenaea in Athens once. A 
young Socrates and some of his friends came to see Zeno to listen to him read his book. 
When Zeno was finishing his reading, Parmenides, his host Pythodorus, and Aristotle (who 
later became one of the thirty Tyrants) arrived, and listened to the final part of the reading.  
Once Zeno had finished, Socrates asked him to read again the first hypothesis of his 
book, and then he asked him whether he has understood the main argument. Socrates 
summarises Zeno’s proposal by saying that if things are many, then they are like and unlike, 
but this is impossible because neither can unlike things be like nor like things unlike (cf. 
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Phaedo 101a5-b3, and 103c7-8; Ch. 1, sec. 7.2.2). Zeno confirms that Socrates understood 
him, and explains that his argument opposes pluralism. Socrates then, says that Zeno and 
Parmenides defend the same view, since Parmenides’ poem argues that the all is one, 
whereas Zeno argues that the all is not many. Zeno agrees, but tells Socrates that his book is 
just defending Parmenides’ argument, claiming that the premise that there is plurality is 
itself an absurdity and also entails further absurdities than the ones the pluralists criticise in 
Parmenides. But then, Socrates puts an objection to Zeno’s view.  
Socrates asks Zeno whether he does not believe that there is a form, itself by itself, of 
likeness, and another of unlikeness; and that we and other things get a share of these forms, 
and by partaking in both, things are like and unlike themselves, which was exactly what 
Zeno argued was impossible. This is the same case, Socrates thinks, as what happens with 
the one and multiplicity, and the things that partake in both. Socrates tells Zeno that he 
would be astonished if someone were to show him that the forms or kinds have in 
themselves these opposites, but that there is nothing to be surprised about if someone 
demonstrates that particulars are one and many (cf. Phaedo 103a4-c9; Ch. 1, sec. 8.3). 
However, Socrates argues, he would be surprised if someone could distinguish the forms, 
which are grasped by reasoning, as separated entities, themselves by themselves, and then 
show they can mix together and separate.176 After Socrates’ brief account of forms, 
Parmenides takes over and questions him, putting forward various challenges against his 
conception of forms. The last one is what occupies me in this chapter. 
The connections between the Parmenides and both the Phaedo and Republic are 
multiple. Here I just want to point out two links that matter for the present research. The 
first one is the reference to the existence of forms. This, as I have shown, is a crucial 
building block of Socrates’ arguments in both previous dialogues (see Phaedo 100b1-7, Ch. 
1, sec. 7.2.1; and Republic 6.507a7-b10, Ch. 2 sec. 3), and even if there are differences 
between how forms are presented in these discussions, the formulation of the Parmenides is 
general enough to apply to both versions of forms. An important part of the greatest 
difficulty consists in challenging first the cognoscibility, but later also the existence of 
forms. The second connection is, precisely, the emphasis on how access to forms is crucial 
to explain the causal process and the assignation of responsibility. As in the previous 
passages, this turns also into a discussion about method, and the moral requirements of 
philosophical inquiry.  
                                                
176 This is what the Eleatic Stranger tries to do in Sophist 251a-257a. Socrates in the Parmenides never 
says that to show this is impossible, only that he will be astonished to see someone doing it. See Ch. 4, 
sec. 7.  








2. A multi-layered challenge  
How to understand the ‘greatest difficulty’ in the Parmenides is a contentious topic. 
Scholars have construed the objection in radically different ways, disagreeing about the 
structure and soundness of the arguments, as well as about its conclusions.177 Recent 
discussion agrees the difficulty poses an important threat to Socrates’ account of forms, and 
focuses on whether the greatest difficulty is an objection that assumes complete separation 
between particulars and forms, or whether the separation is only partial.178 The two sides of 
the debate, however, start from different assumptions about the purpose of the passage, and 
what kind of person would raise the main objection. I argue, however, that the discussion 
has played down the dialectical aspect of the discussion, and has misrepresented the 
structure of the objections in relation to their consequences.  
The passage can be divided in six sections:  
A. Presentation of the difficulty (Parmenides 133a11-c1). 
B. A first explanation of the difficulty (Parmenides 133c2-d5).  
C. The example of the master-slave relationship (Parmenides 133d6-134a2). 
D. Distinction between knowledge itself and knowledge among us (Parmenides 134a3-
c3).  
E. Discussion about the knowledge of God (Parmenides 134c3-e8). 
F. Conclusions (Parmenides 134e9-135c4).  
The main argument, however, has three objections layered one inside the other:    
1. Dialectical objection: Socrates’ account is unconvincing for people posing the 
epistemological objection.  
2. Epistemological objection: if forms are themselves by themselves, then they are 
unknowable.  
3. Ontological objection: if the epistemological objection is right, then forms may not 
even exist.  
Parmenides, however, plays a double role in the passage. He makes the dialectical 
objection, but also talks on behalf of the people who would make the other objections, 
                                                
177 Compare for instance Cornford (1939, 99), Cherniss (1962, I.284), Runciman (1962, 159), Forrester 
(1974, 233-237), Prior (1985, 75-76), Gill and Ryan (1996, 46), Allen (1998, 193), McCabe (1999, 91), 
and Duncombe (2013).  
178 For the first line of argument, the most recent publication I am aware of is Gill (2012, ch.1). 
Duncombe (2013) argues, instead, that the separation is only partial, restricted to reciprocating 
correlations between forms and participants. See also Turnbull (1998, 34).  
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people who are absent from the conversation. Notice this is a conversation about a 
possible conversation. Parmenides is asking Socrates to imagine what it would be like 
to talk with people who are absent from the scene. A similar if somewhat more complex 
situation occurs in the Sophist’s gigantomachia (see Ch. 4, sec. 2).179 Additionally, 
Parmenides evaluates the consequences that would follow from accepting these objections, 
and agrees with Socrates that they are unacceptable:  
4. The consequences that would follow from (1-3) are unacceptable.  
Finally, Parmenides concludes with Socrates that:  
5. Since (4), then something must be done.  
The conclusion opens the way for the second half of the Parmenides, which is a training to 
be able to stop the consequences of premise (4).  This means that the main argument of the 
passage is an instance of practical reasoning. Parmenides is persuading Socrates to do 
something with him to address the greatest difficulty. Let me now give a more detailed 
analysis of the difficulty.  
3.  Forms: a public relations disaster 
After previous objections against Socrates’ account of forms, Parmenides warns 
Socrates: 
Be sure then, he said, that you do not yet fully grasp how great is the difficulty if 
you are going to assign one form in each case every time you make a distinction 
among beings.  
How so? —He asked.  
There are many other difficulties, he said, but the greatest is this: if someone 
were to say that if the forms are such as we say they must be, it does not even 
belong to them to be known. If someone says this, no one would be able to show 
him that he is mistaken—unless the dissenter180 happens to be of great 
experience and not without natural talent, willing to follow the one who is giving 
the proof while treating of very many arguments and from a distant point181—
Otherwise, he who thinks that they are necessarily unknowable would be 
unconvinced (Parmenides 133a11-c1).182 
Parmenides believes that Socrates, even after listening to many other objections 
against his account, has not yet understood, in general, the dimension of the task he faces. 
Parmenides says there are still many difficulties for Socrates’ account of forms, but he only 
                                                
179 For missing people in Plato more generally, see McCabe (2004, 16).  
180 The person who denies that it belongs to forms to be known. 
181 This can be read as a reference to Republic 6.506d7-a5 when Socrates laments that he does not have 
enough impulse to talk about his views of the good, nor do his interlocutors have adequate skills to 
follow. See Ch. 2, sec. 3. 
182 See also Parmenides 135a3-5.  








tells him about the one he considers the greatest. If we look carefully at the way Parmenides 
phrases the problem, we can construe the claim as follows: if a person P says ‘If the forms 
are as Socrates says they must be, then they are necessarily unknowable,’ then no one 
would be able to show P she is mistaken, and P will remain unconvinced, unless P happens 
to be experienced, talented and willing to follow a long proof.  
Note that what I have called the epistemological objection is not the main problem 
here. Even if the epistemological objection is flawed, it might still pose a threat for the 
convincingness of Socrates’ account, if its flaws are very difficult to show, for instance. 
This difficulty, then, is most generally a public relations problem. It is a dialectical 
objection that Socrates’ account faces while dealing with people making an especially 
difficult objection. The dialectical layer of the difficulty has nothing to do with whether 
Socrates is right about forms, but with the complexity and length of the proofs and 
arguments it requires, and the experience, willingness, and talent needed from the people 
involved.  
The epistemological objection is a conditional: if a form is itself by itself, then it must 
be unknowable. This objection, although difficult to refute, is not by itself the greatest 
difficulty. In fact, Parmenides thinks that the epistemological objection is wrong, and the 
people who propose it are mistaken.183 The real problem is that it is impossible to disprove 
a person who holds to that objection, unless a very difficult and rare set of requirements is 
met. Given how difficult it is to meet these requirements, there is a catastrophic problem 
for the persuasiveness of Socrates’ account. It is an argument that asks for almost 
impossible conditions.184 This is what Socrates has not fully grasped. He is about to 
embark, inadvertently, on a tragic enterprise. Parmenides wants at least to warn Socrates of 
the risks he is about to take. Moreover, we might consider this objection in relation to the 
arguments in the Phaedo: there the existence of forms was considered the strongest 
argument (see Phaedo 100a3-7, Ch. 1, sec. 7.1), but here, and after the greatest difficulty, 
that argument looks far from sound.  
The dialectical problem will always be there since it does not only depend on what 
Socrates and Parmenides can do, but also on the people dissenting. Here, like at the 
beginning of the sun analogy, and in the Phaedo, the responsibility for the conversation is a 
shared business. Even if Socrates is able to become an experienced and skilled dialectician, 
                                                
183 When Parmenides says ‘no one would be able to show him that he [i.e., the dissenter] is mistaken’ 
(Parmenides 133b6-7), he is taking sides with Socrates, and conceding that he is right. 
184 It also recalls Socrates’ reluctance to talk about the good itself with Glaucon and company in the Republic 
6.506d, because the conditions then, were not ideal; see Ch. 2, sec. 1.  
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some people will always remain unconvinced (like Simmias at Phaedo 107a8-b10; see Ch. 
1, sec. 1). The existence of this set of people is in itself a difficulty. Since there are three 
different requirements the interlocutor has to meet, namely, great experience, natural talent, 
and willingness to follow a long proof, the variety of people who could dissent is extensive, 
and some of them will have great influence and intellectual stature. The following table 
shows the different alternatives:185  
Type of dissenters in Parmenides 133a-134e 
Type of person Great experience Natural talent Willingness 
Ideal dissenter  Yes Yes  Yes 
Dissenter who has 
none  
No No No 
Dissenters who 
have one 
Yes No No 
No Yes No 
No No Yes 
Dissenters who 
have two 
Yes Yes No 
Yes No Yes 
No Yes Yes 
 
According to Parmenides only what I have labelled ‘the ideal dissenter’ could 
understand her mistake and be persuaded of Socrates account of the forms (provided that 
the person offering the proof does a good job too). All other people represent a nightmare 
for the account’s popularity and persuasiveness. Notice that the problematic dissenters 
could include very talented, experienced, or willing people. Socrates could be rejected by 
some of the smartest, some of the most experienced, and even some of the people who are 
willing to give him a chance to make his case (and some combination of those). Moreover, 
assuming there are not many people who satisfy the ideal dissenter’s characteristics, the 
people who will remain unconvinced seem to be not only a simple majority but also a 
majority in each of the three groups of people, that is, the majority of talented, experienced, 
and willing people. But this means that the ratio of dissenters that Socrates will be able to 
                                                
185 More specific alternatives have been suggested. Seligman (1974) proposes the atomists, McCabe 
(2004, 16), thinks they are Zeno and Parmenides, and De Waal (2009, 64), identifies them with the sight-
lovers from Republic 476a11, who are also compatible, she suggests, with the materialists of the Sophist 
gigantomachia at 246a4-6 (see Ch. 4, sec. 4). I think the text in the Parmenides does not refer to any of 
these groups specifically, but to a wider set of people, which may include all the previous options.  








persuade will always be very small. At this moment one might ask what kind of person 
could make the epistemological objection.  
It seems that the person making the epistemological objection (τις at 133b4), is 
someone who would have at least listened to Socrates’ basic description of forms. It is not 
someone who simply rejects all immaterial entities more generally; she does not need to be 
a materialist, but someone unconvinced of the description Socrates gives of the forms. Even 
if wrong, it is not a stupid objection. In fact, he makes a very good point, since it demands 
consistency from Socrates’ account by asking how forms could be intelligible objects if 
from their description it seems to follow that they are unknowable.186 The epistemological 
objection consists just in one claim, but the argument implied behind it can be understood 
as a modus tollens:   
1. If the forms are themselves by themselves, then forms cannot be known.  
2. But forms can be known.  
3. Therefore, it is false that forms are themselves by themselves (MT 1, 2).  
Socrates is in trouble because he is committed to the antecedent of premise (1), 
namely that forms are themselves by themselves (Parmenides 128e-129a), and to premise 
(2). If Socrates were to accept the dissenter’s conditional premise (1), Socrates will 
contradict himself both by accepting and denying that forms are themselves by themselves, 
and accepting and denying that forms can be known. If Socrates wants to avoid 
contradicting himself he should either retract one of his claims, or reject premise (1).187 
Socrates is unwilling to retract his claims, so Parmenides, seeing that Socrates asks for 
elaboration, explains why there are some good grounds to accept premise (1).  
Additionally, there is a question about what exactly it means to say that it does not 
even belong to forms to be known, and that they are necessarily unknowable. The dissenter 
is worried about Socrates’ description of forms, not directly about whether they exist or 
not.188 The dissenter advances his objection from the assumption that forms exist, and can 
be known. The objection is mainly a worry about the consistency of what Socrates is 
proposing. The objection against Socrates is independent of whether or not one admits 
unknowable objects into one’s ontology.   
                                                
186 Cf. Ch. 1, sec. 8.3.  
187 Cf. Ch. 1, sec. 4. 
188 Although later we will see Parmenides suggesting that there is a small step from unknowability to denying 
the existence of forms; see sec. 8 below. 
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4.  Correlative forms and particulars 
Socrates asks for some elaboration, and Parmenides answers by explaining the scope 
and grounds for the epistemological objection: 
How, Parmenides?—asked Socrates.  
Because I think not only you, Socrates, but also any other who posits that there 
is for each case some being itself by itself, would agree in the first place that 
none of them are in us.  
How could it possibly still be itself by itself?—asked Socrates.  
You are right—he answered.  
And then, all of the ideas189 that are what they are in relation to one another 
have their own being itself in relation to themselves, but not in relation to the 
things among us—whether one assigns them as likenesses or in some other 
way—from which we, by partaking of them,190 are named. These things among 
us, which have the same name as those being by themselves, are, on the 
contrary, themselves in relation to themselves,191 but not in relation to the 
forms, and [have their own being in relation] to themselves but not in relation 
to those who in turn are called in this way (Parmenides 133c2-d5). 
The first thing Parmenides highlights is that the epistemological objection affects not 
only Socrates’ account of forms but also any account which proposes there is some being 
itself by itself. This is explained as follows:  
(A) For each case of X where there is some X itself by itself, the X itself by itself is 
not in us.192 
Socrates accepts this description, and also agrees with Parmenides’ claim that forms 
are not in us, since otherwise, he thinks, it would not be possible for them to be themselves 
by themselves. This implies that: 
(B) For any X, X is itself by itself if X is not in any particular.  
This implies a problem about the participation of particulars in forms.193 Although 
this does not mean there is no relation between them (since they may still share, for 
instance, the same name) it may block causal relations if these depend on participation. 
Parmenides, however, worries about something more specific. He explains that if Socrates 
agrees with his claim that forms are not in us, then some consequences will follow both for 
a specific group of forms and particulars, namely any pair of reciprocal forms, and any pair 
                                                
189 Gill and Ryan (1996) translate τῶν ἰδεῶν as “characters.” I translate ‘ideas’, but here ideas and forms 
are synonyms. 
190 Here ἕκαστα refers to the things among us, τὰ παρ' ἡµῖν. 
191 Meaning, ‘in relation to one another in the physical part of the world.’ 
192 Cf. Ch. 1, sec. 8.3.  
193 See Allen (1997, 195).  








of particulars in a reciprocal relation.194 We may understand what Parmenides describes as 
follows:  
Reciprocal forms: a pair of forms X, Y, is reciprocal when X is what it is in relation to 
Y, and vice versa.  
Reciprocal relations among particulars: a pair of particulars a, b is in a reciprocal 
relation when a is what it is in relation to b, and vice versa.195  
Reciprocal forms can be themselves by themselves even if what they are (their 
essence we may say), is in relation to another form. Introducing these definitions, 
Parmenides says that from (A) two further claims can be inferred:  
(C) Any reciprocal form has its being in relation to its correlative form, and not in 
relation to particulars.  
(D) Any reciprocal particular is in relation to its correlative particular, but not in 
relation to forms.  
The logical structure of the argument up to now is the following:  
1. B, then A.  
2. B.  
3. Therefore, A (MP, 1, 2).  
4. A, then C and D.  
5. Therefore, C and D (MP 3, 4).  
This argument precludes reciprocal relations across the intelligible and the visible part of 
the world. In addition to this, Parmenides also claims that:  
(E) Any reciprocal particular has the same name as its corresponding reciprocal 
forms.  
(F) Humans partake in the reciprocal particulars, and we are named after them.196  
This restricts the relation between the two parts of the world to one of mere 
synonymy one. Claim (E), however, is left unexplained. How could we explain that even if 
(C) and (D) are the case, there is still synonymy between pairs of reciprocal ideas and pairs 
of reciprocal particulars? In the case of (F) the idea behind it could be that since we are 
                                                
194 See Duncombe (2013).  
195 Cf. Republic 438a-c. 
196 See Gill (1996, 47). 
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particulars, we can be one of the relata in a reciprocal relation between particulars. But 
presumably, the fact that we are named after them makes a puzzle about why (E) should be 
true in the first place.  
5.  The master-slave dialectic 
Socrates seems baffled by Parmenides’ argument (Parmenides 136d6), and requires 
some help. Parmenides, seeing this, offers an example of a coordinated pair of reciprocal 
ideas and their corresponding reciprocal particulars, and explains how premises (C) and (D) 
will work in the example. Notice, however, that the example is not part of the grounds for 
the epistemological objection, but Parmenides’ pedagogical addition. Parmenides’ example, 
the pair master/slave, will turn out to be important later, so its introduction into the 
discussion is not innocent. The dissenters concerned by the epistemological objection, 
however, may not be aware or may not have worried about this specific example. In fact, it 
may be important that the dissenters have not noticed that their objection can be extended to 
non-epistemological cases like the master/slave case. The example starts with the pair of 
reciprocal particulars, and then with the forms:  
For example, said Parmenides, if any of us is master or slave of someone, I 
presume he is not slave of the master itself, of what master is; he is a slave of a 
specific person, but not of the slave itself, of what slave is, nor is the master a 
master [of the slave itself], but being human he is in both cases a slave or a 
master of a human being. On the contrary, mastership itself is what it is of 
slavery itself, and in the same way slavery itself is slavery of mastership itself, 
but things in us do not have power in relation to them [i.e., forms], nor do they 
[i.e., forms of relatives] have their power in relation to us; yet, like I say, they are 
by themselves of themselves and in relation to themselves, and those among 
us, in the same way, are in relation to themselves. Or do you not understand what 
I say?  
Certainly, Socrates said, I understand (Parmenides 133d6-134a2). 
The first part of this quote gives a case to exemplify claim (D), and it establishes that:  
For any pair of human beings a, b, if a is master of b, a is not a master of the slave 
itself, but of b; and if b is slave of a, b is not slave of the master itself, but of a.  
The predication remains in the human sphere. In contrast, the second part of the quote 
is the exemplification of claim (C), and establishes that:  
Mastership itself is what it is of slavery itself, and not in relation to particular slaves, 
and slavery itself is what it is of mastership itself, and not in relation to particular 
masters.  








Parmenides also indicates two more things. First, he explains that X itself = what X is 
(see Ch. 2, sec. 3, esp. n. 148). This identifies forms with the essences of things. Second, 
Parmenides introduces a reference to δύναµις. When Parmenides describes reciprocal 
beings he claims that they are in relation to each other, but now he adds that it is not only 
their being but that they have their power in relation to each other. Notice that Parmenides 
presupposes that both, forms and humans, have power.197 The problem, then, is that each 
group of reciprocal pairs has their power only in relation to things inside their own group, 
and there is no cross-group relation. Reciprocal forms have their power exclusively in 
relation to their correlative form, and people in a reciprocal relation have their power 
exclusively in relation to the person who bears the correlative of that relation.198 These two 
points, then, can be expressed as follows:  
(G) Any reciprocal particular has its power in relation to its correlative particular, but 
not in relation to ideas.  
(H) Any reciprocal idea has its power in relation to its correlative idea, and not in 
relation to particulars.  
The case of reciprocal particulars is clear. For example, Achilles, if Briseis is his 
slave, can master her, and order her to do as he wishes. In the case of forms, however, this 
sounds odd. The master itself has power in relation to the slave itself. What exactly does 
that mean if forms are unchangeable? What kind of power could a form have? Notice that 
claim (H) only applies to reciprocal forms, so there is no need to assume that all forms have 
δύναµις over others. Parmenides’ point is that in case reciprocal forms have power, they 
will not have any power among us. This recalls the sun analogy in Republic 6. There, the 
good itself and the sun hold a reciprocal relation, that of father and child. In the analogy, 
however, the good does not only have relations to other forms, but to the sun, which is part 
of the visible part of the world. But if Parmenides is right about reciprocal relations, it puts a 
challenge to the causal connection between the two parts of the world, since it implies that 
the good itself cannot have any reciprocal relation with a particular (see Ch. 2, sec. 2-3). 
Notice how these arguments also challenge the Phaedo’s connection between nous and 
forms (see Ch. 1, sec. 5). But before talking about the consequences all this has for 
Socrates’ account, Parmenides moves to another example: knowledge.   
                                                
197 Cf. Ch. 4, sec. 5, and 6.  
198 For a detailed discussion, see Duncombe (2013). 
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6.  Knowledge itself vs. knowledge among us  
Parmenides’ second example of correlative terms is the pair knowledge and truth. 
This is the case that really concerns the dissenters:  
Surely then, also knowledge itself, he said, what knowledge is, would be 
knowledge of that of what truth itself is?  
—By all means.  
On the contrary, every case of knowledge, what it is, would be knowledge of 
each being, what each thing is. Or is not so?  
—Yes.  
Would not knowledge among us be of the truth among us, and, in turn, would 
it follow that every case of knowledge among us is knowledge of a particular 
being among us?  
—Necessarily (Parmenides 134a3-b2).  
The case of knowledge is more complex than the master and slave example. The way 
in which Parmenides explains the example has two peculiarities. First, it is odd that the 
correlative of knowledge is truth, since in other dialogues, knowledge is accompanied by a 
different correlative.199 In fact, even here truth itself does not seem to be the direct 
correlative of knowledge, but a side reference to the actual object of knowledge itself, 
which is each different form.200 Notice, in addition, that for the example to work, 
knowledge has to be episodic. In the case of knowledge among us, it is knowledge of 
particulars truths, or more precisely of particular things. The passage establishes that:  
For any case k, and any particular truth y, k is a case of a particular knowledge, if k is 
knowledge of y.   
In the case of forms the example is the following: 
Knowledge itself is knowledge of forms, namely that of what truth itself is. 
Next, Parmenides explains, step-by-step and reminding Socrates of what has been 
agreed, how from this it follows that we cannot know the forms. The conclusion reveals that 
the epistemological objection cannot say, as one might have understood at the beginning, 
that forms are necessarily unknowable in general. According to Parmenides’ argumentation, 
it is just that they are unknowable to us, human beings, here in the sensible part of the 
world. Parmenides explains it as follows:  
                                                
199 See Charmides 168b2-3, and Republic 438c7-8.  
200 Like truth in Republic 6 (508d3-509a5, see Ch. 2, sec. 5), which is a link between nous and intelligible 
things. For a different interpretation see De Waal (2009, 61), who suggests it is knowledge of different 
branches of knowledge, and quotes Republic 438c8-e9.  








But we neither have the forms themselves, as you agreed, nor can they be among 
us.  
—No, they cannot.  
The kinds themselves, what each one is, are, I suppose, known with (ὑπ’)201 the 
form of knowledge itself?   
—Yes.  
A thing which we, at least, do not have.  
—No, we do not.  
Then, we know none of the forms, because we do not partake of knowledge 
itself.  
 —It does not seem so.   
Then, also it is unknowable to us what the beautiful itself is, and the good, and 
everything else we take as being ideas themselves.   
—Probably (Parmenides 134b3-c3).  
Parmenides agrees with Socrates on two claims about the relation between particulars 
and forms that are implied in what Socrates already accepted in claim (B): humans do not 
have the forms themselves, nor are the forms in any other particular. Notice that Socrates’ 
claim (B), from Parmenides 133c3-6, was made before restricting the conversation to 
reciprocal relations, so it covers all the forms. Neither humans nor particular things, then, 
have any of the forms in them.202 Socrates agrees that this is what follows from the way he 
has presented his account. Perhaps someone may think that even if we do not partake in any 
of the forms (since they are not in us), we can still know them. But here is where the 
previous agreements about reciprocal relations pay off. To be able to know the forms, 
Parmenides explains, we would need to partake in knowledge itself, something that 
Parmenides and Socrates agreed is impossible for humans. But according to this, what 
humans don’t know and never will is what forms are, not that they exist. Humans cannot 
have knowledge of what the kinds themselves are, what each one is. Parmenides argument 
can be understood as follows:  
1. Forms are known by partaking in the form of knowledge itself.  
2. If humans do not partake in the form of knowledge itself, nor can knowledge itself 
be among us, then humans cannot know the forms.  
                                                
201 The contracted preposition ὑπ' is normally translated as ‘by’ but that seems to cause self-predication. 
But if taken as ‘with’ the only thing the text is saying is that to know the kinds themselves one needs to 
partake in the form of knowledge itself. And only God does that. Another option is to take ὑπ' as ‘from.’ 
202 This does not mean that particulars do not hold likeneses relations to the forms (or many other 
relations), but it means that those relations are not a result of participation. Likeness could be a result of 
the accident. Contra Duncombe (2013). 
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3. Humans do not partake in the form of knowledge itself, and knowledge itself cannot 
be among us.  
4. Therefore, humans cannot know the forms (MP 2, 3). 
5. Therefore, humans cannot know the beautiful itself, nor the good itself, … (Inst. 4).   
This argument supports the epistemological objection of the dissenters. If Socrates 
accepts premise (3), which is implied in claim (B), it follows that humans cannot know 
forms. This is the end of the epistemological objection, and it constitutes in itself a difficult 
challenge for Socrates view, and any other view with the same commitments.  
7.  The knowledge of God 
Parmenides’ concerns go beyond the epistemological objection. He points out some 
consequences ‘still more terrible’ (Parmenides 134c4), than the fact that forms are 
unknowable for humans, and that also follow from what has been accepted about reciprocal 
beings. But these consequences are bad news not only for Socrates but, since they are so 
radical, they could also be bad news for some of the dissenters. These consequences could 
also be reasons not to accept the epistemological objection. They are a warning that if 
Socrates (or anyone else) is persuaded by it, she might be accepting inadvertently claims 
that will sound ‘exceedingly surprising’ (λίαν… θαυµαστός, at Parmenides 134e7). 
Parmenides is presenting Socrates with a puzzle: his account is in great trouble, but, as he 
will also show, if we draw the consequences of the epistemological objection it turns out to 
also be highly implausible, let alone unpopular and politically dangerous, so it cannot be 
accepted either. Parmenides explains this saying:  
You would say, I suppose, that if in fact there is some kind itself of knowledge, it 
is much more genuine203 than knowledge among us, and beauty, and all other 
things in this way.  
—Yes.  
Then, if, indeed, anything else partakes of knowledge itself, surely you would 
not say that anyone more than God has the most precise knowledge?  
—Necessarily, I would not.  
Then, will God, in turn, having knowledge itself, be able to know the things 
among us?  
—Why not? 
                                                
203 Here ἀκριβέστερον cannot mean ‘more precise,’ since then it would seem as if the difference between 
the knowledge itself and the knowledge of particulars is not of different objects but of difference in 
degree. But if so, then God would be able to know us, and the particulars in a more precise way than we 
know ourselves, and the things around us. But that goes against what the epistemological objection is 
trying to prove. 








Because, Parmenides continued, it was agreed by us, Socrates, that neither do 
those forms have the power they have in relation to the things among us, nor the 
things among us in relation to them, but each group in relation to themselves.  
—It was agreed.  
Surely then, if this most precise mastership and this most precise knowledge 
belongs to God,204 his mastership cannot master us, nor could his knowledge 
know us or any other thing among us; but in the same way we do not govern 
those things with the authority among us, nor do we know anything of the divine 
through the knowledge belonging to us. They, in turn, by the same reasoning, are 
neither our masters nor being gods know human affairs.  
But I am afraid, he [i.e. Socrates] said, that the argument is too surprising, if one 
is going to deprive God from knowing (Parmenides 134c6-e8).  
The argument in this passage can be understood as follows:  
1. There is some kind of knowledge itself.  
2. Knowledge itself is much more genuine than knowledge of particulars.205  
3. If God partakes of knowledge itself, then he will not know the things among us 
(because forms have no power in relation to things among us, nor do things 
among us have power in relation to them).  
4. God partakes of knowledge itself. 
5. Therefore, God will not know the things among us.  
But if premise (2) depends on a more general claim, and can also apply to the master/slave 
example, then: 
6. If the most precise mastership and the most precise knowledge is in God, (a) his 
mastership cannot master particulars (like us), (b) nor could his knowledge know 
particulars (like us).  
But in the same way:  
7. If only particular mastership and particular knowledge is in humans, (c) they do not 
govern gods, (d) nor humans know gods.  
The crucial premise for the argument is (2). Knowledge of the forms is more 
genuinely knowledge, than knowledge of particulars. For the argument to work, Parmenides 
needs this to mean that knowledge of particulars is not genuine knowledge, otherwise it 
could be answered that God partakes of both, knowledge itself, and knowledge among us. 
There must be something wrong about knowledge of particulars that makes Parmenides 
                                                
204 Cf. Republic 6. 507c6-8, Ch. 2, sec. 4.   
205 This kind of knowledge resembles the description of opinion in other dialogues. See, for example, 
Republic 6.508c3-d9. Ch. 2, sec. 5. 
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think that God will only have the first one (later we get a hint: it has to do with mutability, 
and universality). It seems that Parmenides is assuming that God will only have the more 
genuine knowledge, and he cannot have fake knowledge. This makes the point that if 
knowledge of particulars is knowledge at all, it is not the real thing, but just a fakery. If so, 
why should we care that God does not partake of that knowledge? Someone might reply, 
that no matter how degraded particulars are in the ontological picture, humans and the 
things we care about are in that domain. The problem is that God’s power, both as a knower 
and as a master, if authentic, is then ineffective in our world of particular things. However, 
this might be giving us a hint of what is wrong about the epistemological objection, namely 
that it takes opinion of particulars as if it were knowledge. It might be true that fake 
knowledge is not connected with God’s knowledge, but that is not necessarily to say that it 
is impossible for humans to partake in knowledge itself. Socrates, however, would have the 
burden of the proof on this.  
8.  Terrifying consequences  
From what has been said so far, there are six undesired consequences: 
Dialectical conclusion   
 A. Socrates’ account of forms is utterly unconvincing for some of the most 
talented, experienced or willing to listen.   
Epistemological conclusion  
 B. Forms cannot be known by us.   
But as Parmenides’ evaluation of the epistemological objection showed, it has some more 
terrible consequences: 
Unexpected consequences of the epistemological objection 
  C. Gods are not our masters.  
 D. Gods do not know human affairs.   
 E. Humans cannot master gods.  
 F. Humans cannot know gods.   
In the final section of the passage, Parmenides goes back again to tell Socrates about 
the only possibility of solving the difficulty, which requires a lot from the dissenter and the 
one giving the proof. Parmenides summarises all this in the following lines, while adding 
new concerns:  








To be sure, Socrates, said Parmenides, the forms necessarily have these 
[difficulties] and many others in relation to them, if there are those ideas of 
beings, and someone will determine each form as something by itself. Therefore, 
the one who listens is doubtful and argues that they do not exist, and even if they 
do, that it is absolutely necessary that they are unknowable to human nature, and 
saying this he both seems to say something significant, and, as we were just 
saying, he is extraordinarily hard to convince. Only a man of a very gifted nature 
will be able to understand that for each thing there is a kind, just being itself by 
itself, but [it will take someone] more wonderful still to discover it and to be able 
to teach another who has elucidated all these things adequately.  
I agree with you Parmenides, Socrates answered. For you say very much what I 
think (Parmenides 134e9-135b4).  
Parmenides tells Socrates that some dissenters could not only argue that forms cannot 
be known but that they do not exist. This subgroup of dissenters uses the epistemological 
objection as a step to an ontological objection. It could be that if humans cannot know 
something, then it does not even exist. If this conditional is accepted, the following 
consequence follows:  
Ontological conclusion 
 G. Forms do not exist.206 
With this in mind, Parmenides could have proposed abandoning the idea that forms 
are themselves by themselves, in favour of a different description of forms. Instead, he 
insists that this is what has to be taught but that it requires a very gifted person. But 
Parmenides warns Socrates of what would happen if consequence (G) were the case:  
But on the other hand, said Parmenides, if someone in fact, on the contrary, in 
regard of all the present difficulties and others such as these, will not allow that 
there are forms of the beings, and will not distinguish a form for each one, then 
he will not have a direction in which to turn his thought, since he will not allow 
that there is a form of each of the beings, always the same, and, in this way, he 
will destroy entirely the power of conversation. But in fact you are well aware of 
such a thing.  
—You speak truth, he said (Parmenides 135b5-c4).  
The argument in the passage is the following:  
1. If forms do not exist, there is no thought.  
2. If there is no thought, conversation has no power.  
3. Forms do not exist (G).  
4. If forms do not exist, conversation has no power (HS 1, 2). 
5. Therefore, conversation has no power (by MP 3,4).  
                                                
206 Cf. Ch. 5, sec. 5.  
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The conclusion is the last of the terrible consequences of the greatest difficulty. As 
with consequences C-F, the dissenters might not be aware of it:  
Unexpected consequence of the ontological objection: 
 H. The power of conversation is entirely destroyed.  
Parmenides and Socrates have a realist conception of knowledge where the objects of 
thought are independent of nous. If there are no forms, there is no thought, and therefore no 
knowledge. This ultimately destroys the power of conversation. Parmenides, however, does 
not explain what does he means by the power of conversation. One possibility is that he 
means conversation would be impossible. This, nevertheless, cannot be so because he has 
accepted that particulars would still have names, so some sort of talk is still possible. What 
is destroyed seems, instead, to be the power to communicate universal knowledge. That 
kind of knowledge is what gives purpose to philosophical conversation, and it requires, in 
Parmenides opinion, the existence of certain beings, which are always the same and play an 
explanatory role in the existence of particulars. But without forms (or anything to substitute 
them) there is no objective universal explanation.  
Moreover, since forms include notions like justice, the good, and so on, without them, 
there seems to be no secure foundation for practical reasoning, and therefore no way to 
know whether there is moral progress or not. If that were the case, however, then dialogue 
and conversation would have no transformative power, since people would be aware that 
everyone has their own opinion, no one better than the other. This will make conversation 
trivial. In the end, if the ontological objection is right, not only is Socrates’ account of forms 
a public relations problem, but any account that tries to transform our conduct will be as 
well.  
The greatest difficulty affects the arguments about causality and responsibility in two 
ways. First, it challenges the theory of forms, which is a central assumption of the models of 
the relation advanced in Phaedo and Republic (see Ch. 1, sec. 7.1, and Ch. 2, sec. 3). 
However, it is also a more direct challenge to the possibility of universality in 
causal/responsibility relations. If left unanswered, the difficulty threatens any possibility to 
find stable and secure ways to establish who or what is responsible for what. The situation 
is a puzzling one, and the only clear thing is that something must be done. However, the 
very fact that Parmenides persuades Socrates of this is in a way a pragmatic answer to the 
last of the difficulty’s consequences: conversation does have power. Socrates accepts there 








is a puzzle to be solved. The problem is to explain how, and under which conditions 
conversation has power.  
According to my analysis, there is no flagrant flaw in Parmenides’ argumentation. 
The objections are good ones, and Socrates is in trouble at every layer of the greatest 
difficulty. There are metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical implications involved. As in 
Phaedo, and Republic, the greatest difficulty makes clear that methodological decisions are 
crucial, and always interrelated with the metaphysics and epistemology. If Socrates wants to 
retain his forms, and his models of causation and responsibility, some amendments or 
clarifications are needed on all fronts. Otherwise, the causal/responsibility relation is limited 
to particular instances where no generalisation is ever possible (which would set things back 




  111 
CHAPTER 4. Thinking again about the greatest 
difficulty in the Sophist 245e6-249d5 
 
This chapter analyses and discusses Sophist 245e6-249d5. The passage contains 
many types of interconnected arguments, all of which are indispensable for the full 
understanding of the passage, and its connections with the wider discussion on causation 
and responsibility. My aim is to show how the argumentation is an attempt to reflect again 
the possible consequences of the greatest difficulty, and to offer the groundwork for a way 
out of it. The Sophist’s gigantomachia begins in a post-greatest-difficulty scenario. At the 
heart of the discussion there is, I shall argue, an attempt to rescue the power of conversation, 
and an examination of the crucial role nous plays in causality. In particular, the necessary 
conditions for nous, its nature, and its relation with forms. In contrast with the previous 
chapters, causality here starts as something detached from responsibility, making reference 
to a wider conception of acting and being affected. The passage will show, eventually, that 
the agency of nous is needed, and with it comes knowledge and responsibility. The chapter 
is divided in seven sections. The first one explains the place of the passage within the 
dialogue, and its connection with the other dialogues discussed here. The remaining 
sections offer an analysis and evaluation of the passage.  
1. Context, and relation with Parmenides 
It is unclear whether Plato’s dialogues even offer an answer to the greatest difficulty or 
not. First, because the objection might pose no real threat, as some scholars suggest.207 
Others think that, if not the greatest difficulty alone, the objections in the Parmenides as a 
whole pose an unsolvable challenge that lead to Plato’s abandonment of the theory of 
forms.208 Recent scholarship has argued that answers to the Parmenides’ objections can be 
found in the second half of that dialogue, the Sophist, the Philebus, the Statesman, and 
sometimes the Timaeus.209 There is, however, huge disagreement about how to interpret 
these answers. In this chapter, I analyse one of these options, the one found in the second 
half of the Sophist, and proposed by Plato’s Eleatic Stranger. The main passage is known as 
the gigantomachia (245e-249d).  
                                                
207 See Cornford (1939, 95-98), Forrester (1974), Lewis (1979), Mueller (1983). 
208 See Ryle (1966). 
209 See, for example, Prior (1985), Turnbull (1998, 36), Silverman (2002), Rickless (2006). For an 
introduction to the problem see Gill (2006). 








This passage is in the middle section of the Sophist, where the Eleatic Stranger (ES) 
and Theaetetus examine various puzzles to show that being is as difficult to elucidate as 
not-being. The last of these puzzles is concerned with the question about what sort of 
beings there are, and discusses the views of two groups of predecessors that have been 
arguing this topic for a long time: materialists, and idealists. The ES compares the 
dispute with the mythical battle between the Olympic Gods and the Giants,210 and cross-
examines them by imagining a dialogue where Theaetetus plays the role of the 
predecessors’ spokesman.  
While the greatest difficulty starts as a challenge to Socrates’ account of forms that 
threatens to destroy the power of conversation, the Sophist’s gigantomachia is set up as 
a conflict where conversation has no power, and there is only an endless dispute. From 
there, the discussion builds slowly, and through a sophisticated cross-examination, the 
agreements necessary to reconstrue the road to philosophical conversation, which 
includes a discussion of the method, ethical requirements, and metaphysics of causation.   
This passage has received significant attention in the scholarly debate. It is 
considered key to understanding Plato’s late philosophy,211 and its repercussion on 
Stoicism.212 The text has proven, however, to be an interpretative challenge that has 
given rise to radically different readings. There is no consensus about what exactly are the 
purpose, structure of the arguments, and conclusions the reader is supposed to draw from it. 
One of the reasons which explains this is the lack of a detailed analysis of the structure of 
the passage, and its argumentation, often in favour of emphasising only one aspect of the 
many interconnected themes found in the passage.213 In what follows, I try to offer a 
reading that captures all these elements by looking closely first to the structure of the 
passage.  
2. Fiction within fiction 
The gigantomachia comprises a series of conversations nested inside each other and it 
appears that this complex structure is no accident. I shall show that these conversations 
                                                
210 Compare the use of the myth in the Sophist with Republic 2, 378b-c, where Plato’s Socrates bans this 
type of stories from Kallipolis. For an antecedent of the Republic’s concerns see Xenophanes Fr. B1.21. 
The giants should not be confused, then, with the Titans, the name used for the sons of Uranus and Earth, 
some of which ruled the world before the Olympian Gods (cf. Theogony 617ff.). Since late antiquity, 
people have mixed or confused both stories, and more recently Brown (1998, 181), and Vogt (2009, 142) 
refer to the Sons of the Earth as Titans. But in fact, as I have suggested, the decision to use Giants here 
might be a deliberate reference to the Titan Atlas in the Phaedo 99c3-4 (see Ch. 1, sec. 5).  
211 See Moravcsik (1962), Owen (1966), Keyt (1969), and Brown (1998). 
212 See Brunschwig (1988), Vogt (2009), and Sellars (2010). 
213 Some recent examples are Silverman (2002, 153-6), Miller (2004), Von Wolfgang (2004), Politis 
(2006), Leigh (2010), Crivelli (2011, 86-95), and Strawser (2012). More sensitive approaches to this 
aspect, although still too general, are those of Brown (1998), Notomi (1999), and McCabe (2000, 73-92).  
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constitute different levels of argumentation. Each level is a reflection on the next one, which 
adds, redirects, and modifies its understanding. In this way, the passage is simultaneously 
concerned with first order arguments about metaphysics and epistemology, and with second 
order arguments that reflect how and why people argue in the way they do, and reflecting 
on reflecting on argumentation. 
I think the various levels of reflection do not make a separate point, but support the 
idea that, for Plato, a truly philosophical conversation about being should reflect on a 
wider set of elements than is normally assumed appropriate. Apart from the first order 
arguments, the reflection includes a consideration of the attitudes, qualities of the 
speakers, argumentative methods, epistemological assumptions, and metaphysical 
implications (cf. the argumentation of the passages discussed in Ch. 1-3). In their 
portrayal the ES includes, for example, a broad range of attitudes that the two groups 
have towards their own theories and those of their adversaries. This includes attitudes 
regarding their assertiveness, beliefs, desires, commitments, and emotions. They reveal 
why the different interlocutors believe, argue, and behave in the way they do. The ES 
also includes his own evaluation of the dispute, and the examination of their views. I 
shall defend the view that according to the gigantomachia, it is essential to reflect on all 
these elements in order to understand the logical progression of the discussion.  
My thesis is that the different arguments in the passage, although doing different 
jobs, fit together in a single and general argumentative strategy, which reveals an 
organic and systematic conception of philosophy.214 In it, metaphysics, epistemology, 
ethics, and argumentation, are not only continuous but also fundamentally 
interdependent, and amalgamated. This robust connection between the different parts of 
philosophy is achieved by an iterated reflection that comprises the first and second order 
arguments. Moreover, this conception of philosophy leads to establishing a list of 
necessary conditions required for a proper philosophical account of being, and any other 
topic. These conditions include: a non-dogmatic approach, comprehensiveness, internal 
consistency, and explanatory power. The goal of the passage is, then, to propose a 
tentative answer to the question of what sorts of being there are by reflecting on the 
necessary conditions any philosophical account should meet, and how they impact the 
discussion about being. 
                                                
214 This anticipates the Stoic conception of philosophy (see Ch. 5, sec. 8), which is known for explicitly 
comparing the relation between philosophy and its parts with a living being (LS26B; DL7.39-41), and 
arguing that these parts are inseparable (LS26D; Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 7.19; 
Posidonius fr. 88), and that they teach them together (again LS26B; DL7.39-41). 








The gigantomachia has different parts, presents different dialogues, and involves 
various characters with different roles. The passage has three main parts, one in which (i) 
the dispute between the materialists and idealists is presented, another (ii) with the 
examination of each view, and a final section where (iii) some conclusions are reached. 
Each part is divided into subsections as can be seen below:  
(i) Presentation of the dispute (Sophist 245e6-246c4) 
 (i.1) Introduction of the question (245e6-a3) 
 (i.2) Comparison with the gigantomachia  (246a4-5) 
 (i.3) Description of the materialists (246a6-b5) 
 (i.4) Description of the idealists (246b6-c2) 
 (i.5) Portrayal of the conflict (246c2-4) 
(ii) Examination of each side of the conflict (246c5-249b4)  
 (ii.1) General diagnostic (246c5-d1) 
 (ii.2) Examination of the materialists (246d1-248a3) 
  (ii.2.1) Hypothetical improvement of the materialists (246d1-e4) 
  (ii.2.2) Cross-examination of the improved materialists (246e5-247d7) 
(ii.2.3) The ES’s proposal to solve the puzzles and the agreement with the improved 
materialists (247d7-248a3) 
 (ii.3) Examination of the idealists (248a4-249b4) 
 (ii.3.1) Attempted agreement with the idealists on the grounds of (ii.2.3) 
(248a4-c9) 
  (ii.3.2) The idealist’s conception of knowledge (248c10-e5) 
  (ii.3.3) The ES’s objection to (ii.3.2) (248e6-249b4) 
  (ii.3.4) Rejection of theories that make nous disappear (249b5-c9)   
(iii) Conclusions (249c10-d4) 
The passage also establishes four main dialogues: (a) an indirect dialogue between 
Plato and the reader, (b) the conversation between ES and Theaetetus, (c) the dispute 
between materialists and idealists, and (d) the cross-examination of both sides of the dispute 
by the ES and Theaetetus. Each dialogue has different characteristics in term of how it is 
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presented, in what tone it is set, and how it relates to the other dialogues. Plato, of course, 
speaks to the reader entirely through the other dialogues, but just as he creates the whole 
dialogue, the ES and Theaetetus, inside their conversation, set out dialogues (c) and (d). 
This creates one dialogue nested inside another, like a set of matryoshka dolls. The passage, 
then, goes from dialogue (b) to (c) and (d), and ends back in (b).  
 There is an elaborate relation between the characters’ presence or absence, their 
participation as speakers or as silent audience, and whether they talk in propria persona 
or represent someone else. Plato is present in dialogue (a), but absent in the other 
dialogues (like in the rest of his writings, but he could, after all, have included himself 
as speaker or in the audience of his fiction). The ES is present throughout all dialogue 
(b), leading the conversation, and almost always speaking in propria persona. 
Theaetetus is also present in all of dialogue (b), and is also active during the passage, 
mainly answering the ES’s questions. He not only talks for himself but also as the 
materialists’ and idealists’ spokesperson, one at a time. In addition, Socrates, 
Theodorus, and Young Socrates are also present in the conversation (b), but only as 
silent witnesses. The materialists and idealists are not present with the ES, and 
Theaetetus in (b), but they are the leading characters in their own dispute (c), where 
they stand alone, fighting.215 At least in a sense, however, the ES’s thought experiment 
gives them some voice during dialogue (d). Finally, the reader of the dialogue is 
present, and silent witness throughout (a). As I shall argue below, her presence in the 
passage is alluded to in the text, and not merely a consequence of the fact that the 
Sophist is a written text. The reader, of course, remains absent from the rest of the 
dialogues.  
The structure and elements of the passage raise two main questions. The first one is 
about its complexity and number of elements. Why does the gigantomachia have the 
structure it has? Why not something simpler and straightforward, with less elements? The 
second question is about the function and relation of its dialogues, and characters. What 
purpose does each dialogue and section of the passage fulfil? In which way is each 
dialogue, character, and element related to the others?  
Many dialogues and other parts of the Sophist approach difficult philosophical 
puzzles without so much complication. Even in the immediately previous section of the 
Sophist, where monists and pluralists are examined, the structure is simpler, since these 
                                                
215 Note that both the ES and Theaetetus, despite considering the materialists and idealists as their 
predecessors, have met members of these groups. See Sophist 246b4-5, and 248b6-8. 








groups of predecessors are not discussing with each other (Sophist 243d-245e). Here, in 
contrast, the ES describes a dispute in which he and Theaetetus will act not only as 
examiner and spokesman, but also as improvers, and mediators.216 If the purpose of the 
passage were only to reject two mistaken ontologies, or even to fix some problems with the 
theory of forms, why does Plato seem to take the longest route to the answer?  
There are three different ways we might explain this, none of which persuades me. 
One is to say that the complex structure and elements of the passage are only part of Plato’s 
rhetorical style that aims to persuade the reader into philosophizing, and so dispensable for 
understanding the philosophical content. Secondly, we could interpret these elements 
merely as pedagogical devices on how to be better philosophers. A final option would be to 
say that these elements make insightful philosophical points, which, nevertheless, are 
unrelated to the main arguments of the passage. If any of these options, separately or 
together, gives an exhaustive explanation of the structure and elements of the passage, 
recent scholars would be justified in ignoring them for the purposes of getting the main 
philosophical content of the passage right. I think, however, that throughout the passage 
there is clear textual evidence to show that, independently of whether some of these 
explanations have some truth, each element fits all the others and contributes arguments to 
the main philosophical discussion. I deal with the evidence in the following sections of this 
chapter, but on top of that, there are some reasons to reject the alternatives mentioned above 
as exhaustive answers to the structural complexity of the passage.  
My worry with the rhetorical reading is that the complexity of the passage does not 
seem to work in favour of persuasion. On the contrary, the text is so full of different features 
that the reader might end up more confused than persuaded. And if a first time reader is 
persuaded of something, it is more about avoiding unnecessary paraphernalia in a 
philosophical text than anything else. The pedagogical reading has a stronger case since it 
has some textual support (see Sophist 242c4-243d8). The examination of the predecessors 
takes the form of imaginary dialogues because otherwise it is difficult to follow their train 
of thought. Other elements, like the comparison with a myth and the colourful portrayal of 
the dispute might also be read as didactic resources to engage, highlight, reinforce the 
reader’s memory, and to invite her to think for herself instead of just giving the right 
                                                
216 For the comparison between the two sections see Notomi (1999, 213-214). There are various places 
where Plato complicates the structure of the passage in terms of nesting one conversation in another. See, 
for example, Crito 50a-52d, Meno 82a-85c, Republic 358c-361e, and Parmenides 133a-135c (see Ch. 4, 
sec. 2). But there is no other place, as far as I am aware, where the main interlocutor talks about a 
discussion of absentees, proposes modifying their views, and imagine they are present to be able to 
discuss, and negotiate with both parts.  
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answer. All this may be right, but I suspect it might just be a side effect, and not the central 
reason for introducing those elements into the text.  
Plato teaches philosophy by presenting us with philosophical conversations, not by 
patronising and treating the readers as children (which is the complaint the ES has against 
the predecessors in Sophist 242c8-243b1). Finally, although it is plausible that the dialogue 
addresses different philosophical topics at the same time, if they are completely unrelated 
that might compromise the unity, cohesion, and intelligibility of the passage. This would 
see the dialogue as an artificial blending of topics thrown at the reader.217 In sum, I think 
that the rhetorical, and the unrelated philosophical explanations are wrong, and that the 
pedagogical explanation, although plausible, gives no full answer to the question. Even if 
this latter option is defensible, I think we can do better.  
The Sophist, as I have said, is an attempt to imagine a scenario where conversation 
has no power, and leads to an endless dispute, but also one that presents the ES as a talented 
dialectician who will try to teach the necessary conditions for a philosophical conversation, 
and in doing so, he will engage in the topics and puzzles discussed in the greatest difficulty 
of the Parmenides (see Ch. 4, sec. 8). This leads to the question about the function and 
relation of dialogues and elements in the passage. It seems that each dialogue has a different 
function, and that each nested dialogue tries to contribute to the topic discussed on the 
dialogue in which it is nested. The following sections of the chapter will make this clear 
with dialogues (b) to (d), and their interrelation. But first I will say a few things about the 
dialogue between Plato and the reader (a), and its relation with the conversation between the 
ES and Theaetetus (b).  
Since dialogue (a) is the widest, the reader’s exegetical decisions have a determinant 
role and a direct impact on the understanding of the entire passage. Although this is no easy 
task due to Plato’s indirectness, the gigantomachia makes some allusions exclusively 
directed to the reader, which shows that Plato is conscious about the reader’s presence. That 
is the case of some inter-textual and historical references, as well as the invitation to reflect 
on argumentation and the philosophical method. Some phrases, for example, strongly recall 
passages in Phaedo, Republic, and Parmenides, although none of those dialogues feature 
the ES or Theaetetus.218 The reader, however, might wonder if she is supposed to supply 
information from those dialogues, or to assume Plato is talking about the same things, or, as 
                                                
217 Owen (1966, 337-338), and Brown (1998, 195-197), for instance, do not find unity in the passage. 
218 Compare, for instance, Sophist 247a with Phaedo 100c-e, Sophist 249a with Republic 5, 477a, and 
Sophist 249a-d with Parmenides 133b4-133c1. Cf. also Sophist 247d8-e4 with Phaedrus 270c1-d7.  








I take it, to critically continue discussions and offer alternative routes to answer 
philosophical problems.219  
Although I am not going to elaborate on all these topics since many of them are 
common to all of Plato’s dialogues, I want to highlight, however, one of the most 
fascinating aspects of the gigantomachia. This is the fact that the ES and Theaetetus mirror 
some aspects of what Plato does as author of the Sophist. In both cases, Plato, and the ES, 
are modelling fictional dialogues with philosophical purposes, and are imagining how a 
cross-examination of their predecessors would look. Plato might be reflecting here on his 
own practice, and the rationale behind it. If this suspicion is right, the gigantomachia is one 
of the few places where Plato reveals his own motivations and purposes in writing in 
dialogue form. Before jumping to any conclusion, however, let me analyse what exactly is 
the ES’s motivation for what he is doing. This is given some pages before the 
gigantomachia, when he and Theaetetus first decide to analyse their predecessors’ views:  
ES. —It seems to me that Parmenides, and everybody else who ever rushed into 
a judgement to determine how many and what sorts of beings there are, spoke to 
us carelessly.  
Th. —How?  
ES. —Each of them appears to me to describe some tale, as if we were children. 
[…] It is difficult to say if any one of them spoke the truth in all these things or 
not, and it is wrongful to censure such famous and ancient men. But this can be 
declared without reproach.  
Th. —What?  
ES. —That they have overlooked and esteemed very little the many of us. For 
they argue without considering whether we follow them or are left behind, each 
of them drawing their own conclusion (Sophist 242c4-b1).220 
                                                
219 Similarly, the characterisation of the people in the dialogue invites us to reflect if they correspond or 
not, and to what extent, to historical figures or Plato’s contemporaries. The answer has been widely 
discussed. I do not think that anyone is a source for Plato. Rather, I believe he is conducting a conscious 
reflection on some aspects of his predecessors’ and contemporaries’ accounts, methods, and attitudes. The 
set up of the dialogue invites us, for instance, to reflect about the role of fiction, indirectness, and whether 
it is possible or pertinent to identify Plato’s own views. In any case, determining the references, and what 
exactly are the arguments at this level are tasks that Plato leaves open to the reader’s decision, as the 
indeterminacy of these cross-references confirms. Scholars propose different candidates to fit the 
descriptions. For the materialists, Protagoras, Aristippus, Antisthenes and Democritus, or some of his 
extremist followers, have been proposed. Although some scholars agree that the passage depicts some of 
the views held by Democritus, various fragments prove that there are significant differences between the 
materialists and the atomists. The materialists of the Sophist say something similar to what Democritus 
states in his Frag. 9 (Sextus. M 7.136, 4-7). But, on the other side, what they say is incompatible with 
Democritus’s views in Frags. 11, 125, DK 67A6 (Aristotle’s Met. 1.4, 985b4), and Aristotle: Met. 4.4, 
1009b7. Some believe there is no allusion to a specific thinker, like Cornford (1935, 231-2), Friedländer 
(1969, 159; 489, n.28), and McCabe (2000, 76-7). Boys-Stones (2010, 36-39) thinks the materialists 
represent a family of views where Heraclitus and Empedocles are included. The idealists are normally 
identified with earlier Platonic views—see Brown (1998, 194, n. 2)—or some extremist understanding of 
them, see Leigh (2010, 72). Some have identified them instead with Parmenides (Proclus, In Parm. II 
149.), and the Pythagoreans (like Campbell 1867). In the case of the ES’s proposal, some have suggested 
Hippocrates as the origin of the doctrine; see Diès (1963, 22-25), and Apelt (1891, 77). 
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The ES is not only criticising the metaphysics of their predecessors, but their entire 
way of doing philosophy and interacting with other people. The ancient wise men rushed 
their judgements, had a careless attitude, are condescending with their audience, and the 
truth of their tales is difficult to assess. In their accounts there might be jumps in the 
argumentation, false assumptions about the audience’s capacities and their shared 
beliefs,221 misunderstandings, and inaccuracies. People held them, however, in high 
esteem, so it would not be right to ignore what they said, both because of their influence and 
because they might be saying something true. The main problem is that their arguments go 
on without considering if their audience understands or agrees, which means that they might 
end up talking alone, being the only ones convinced of their own conclusions (this reminds 
us of the autobiographical passage and the complaints Socrates makes about natural 
inquirers in Phaedo 96a5-102a3; Ch. 1, sec. 3-6). But what kind of mistakes are they 
making? And are those mistakes connected? The answer lies in the gigantomachia. They 
are mistakes of different types, all interconnected, and unless we are able to overcome them, 
there will be no philosophical account of being properly speaking (i.e., of forms and 
particulars).  
The wise men constitute a double challenge. The ES should avoid falling into the 
same mistakes that they made, but at the same time he should take their contribution into 
account. To achieve this, the ES proposes a single solution to both problems. He declares it 
by saying to Theaetetus that “here we must make our investigation (µέθοδος) by inquiring 
as if they [i.e. the predecessors] were present” (Sophist 243d6-8). The idea of talking with 
the ancient predecessors seems a reference to Odysseus’ descent (κατάβασις) to the 
underworld, in which, following Tiresias’ advice, the hero talks with various illustrious 
dead people (Odyssey xi).222 But the ES—instead of offering a sacrifice to make dead 
people talk—attracts the predecessors by questioning their accounts, and asking Theaetetus 
to answer on their behalf. The comparison with the myth is evident, but at the same time it 
is clear that the interlocutors are conscious of the fictional character of the exercise.  
Imagining a dialogue with ancient thinkers is, then, neither a rhetorical dramatization 
nor a didactic measure, but a philosophical approach to overcome the limitations of 
                                                                                                                                          
220 Cf. Republic 7.527e-528a. 
221 McCabe (2000, 65-66) suggests that when someone tells a story and treats the audience as children, 
she assumes an attitude on the part of the audience of suspension of critical disbelief, in particular, about 
ontology. She notes, that in contrast, the arguments made by the ES in what follows are highly critical. 
222 This can also be compared with Apology 40e-41c, the beginning of the Republic, the Cave analogy 
(see especially 516d4-7), and the Myth of Er in Republic 614-621. 








previous ways of arguing.223 It is presented as a valuable and fruitful way to do philosophy, 
one that replaces the mythological and monological approach. This reveals that for the ES, 
face-to-face and imaginary conversations are the proper way to do philosophy. Philosophy, 
then, requires full attention to each step of the argumentation (as well as good disposition, 
see Sophist 217c1-d3),224 the willingness to clarify what has been said loosely, to reflect on 
your own assumptions and beliefs, and to be able to place oneself into the other’s shoes to 
try to imagine their attitudes, and the conditions in which a rational agreement could be 
reached. This not by merely agreeing with the wise men, but by picturing what they, as 
speakers with a wide range of attitudes and qualities, would answer in a cross-examination. 
This, of course, also invites the reader to take a critical stance as the audience of the 
dialogue.225  
Apart from the ‘descent method’ and all the innovations it implies, the ES’s program 
uses some philosophical strategies well-known to Plato’s readers: a question-based 
examination, production of aporia, proposing and testing of hypotheses, arguments and 
counterarguments, and the comparison with myths.226 In a couple of pages, the discussion 
will include some reflections about argumentation, ethics, metaphysics, ontology, and 
epistemology. All this reinforces the feeling that the passage is like a miniature version of a 
standard Platonic dialogue. There are, however, some differences. Most notorious is the fact 
that the ES keeps taking part in the dialogue in propria persona, while Plato never does 
that. In this aspect, Plato seems closer to Theaetetus playing the role of a spokesman. Just as 
we would not identify Theaetetus’ views with those of the predecessors, we cannot ascribe 
so easily the ES’s views to Plato.227  
Now, it is not just that Plato might be using the ES to present views he does not share, 
but that the setup of the dialogue compels the reader to consider the accounts from different 
                                                
223 It has also been said to be a history of philosophy. This would be true if we make the clarification that 
Plato is doing, to use Cohen’s & Keyt’s (1992, 195, 199-200) distinction, not a ‘retrospective 
interpretation,’ but a sophisticated mode of ‘prospective interpretation’ of some ideas and practices of his 
predecessors. 
224 Cf. Phaedrus 276e-77a. 
225 Remember that Socrates, Theodorus, and Young Socrates are also silent witnesses of the conversation. 
Unlike the reader, they, in principle, could intervene in the discussion at any time, but they decide not to 
do so. Are they agreeing with all that has been said, or are they just waiting to see what happens? 
Agreement is a recurrent topic throughout the dialogue, and recalls the first line of the Sophist at 216a1. 
226 This makes clear that his problem with the predecessors is not that they use myths per se, but the way 
they use them. What changes is the way we are asked to think about the myths, from taking them at face 
value to reflecting about specific comparisons and similarities, but clearly distinguishing their fictional 
status. This also implies, of course, that there is no reason to exclude myths from the philosophical 
account. What changes is their purpose in the account. 
227 For this exegetical assumption, sometimes called the ‘mouthpiece principle,’ and its influence in 
current scholarship on Plato, see Wolfsdorf (2008, 19-25). For scholars assuming it see, as an example, 
Kraut (2006, Ch. 1), and in the Sophist, Leigh (2010, 64), and Bailey (2014, 260).  
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perspectives. This includes perspectives about being, but also perspectives about 
perspectives. The reader, for example, gets to know the materialists’ and idealists’ 
viewpoint only through the ES’s own perspective, since these groups are absent, and the 
reader may wonder if the portrayal is fair. In addition, some of the perspectives are 
impersonations. Theaetetus, apart from talking in propria persona, pretends to be a 
materialist and an idealist for the moment, which in turn personify the giants and the 
Olympic gods.  
3. Dispute is a powerless conversation 
Let me turn now to the analysis of each part of the passage. At the beginning of the 
gigantomachia, the ES introduces the materialists and the idealists, explaining why he wants 
to include them in their inquiry, and why there is a dispute between them comparable with a 
mythological battle. The passage also informs us that the conversation between the 
materialists and idealists is a dispute “about being” (περὶ τῆς οὐσίας, at Sophist 246a5); 
meanwhile the ES and Theaetetus are discussing that “it is not easier to speak about what 
being is than of what not-being is” (τὸ ὂν τοῦ µὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτ’ 
ἔστιν, at Sophist 246a1-2).228 The conversation of the latter is not directly about being, but 
about comparing the ease of speaking about two different topics (being and not-being). But 
in what sense could speaking about something be easy or difficult? The verb Plato uses is 
εἰπεῖν, whose sense could be very broad. The difficulties of speaking, then, can include not 
only the soundness of the arguments but also the attitudes and qualities of the speakers, their 
argumentative strategies, and other actions performed by language. Note how the ES makes 
the transition from the previous examination of predecessors to the materialists and 
idealists:  
ES. –Well then, we have not gone through all those who inquire minutely 
(διακριβολογουµένους) about what is and what is not, but let this be enough 
(ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω). Moreover, we have to look at those who speak in a different 
way, to know from all sources, that it is not easier to speak about what being is 
than speaking of what not-being is.   
Th. –Well, it is necessary, to conduct a search upon them (245e6-246a3).229  
                                                
228 In the gigantomachia the verb εἶναι has an existential value, although we must have in mind that it is a 
complete but further completable verb. It can move from ‘x esti’ to ‘x esti F,’ without any change in its 
meaning. See Brown (1986, 63-64) and (1998, 185), and Burnyeat (2003, 10-13). For a more recent 
discussion of this topic see Malcolm (2006), and Leigh (2008). 
229 The change from one group to the other is surprising. If they have not yet examined all those who inquire 
minutely, why should they move on to a less meticulous group? It seems a lack of thoroughness from the ES. 
The ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω at e7 is more an unexplained decision, than something that logically follows. Is the problem 
that there is not enough time to go through all the predecessors? If this is the case, it will be an indication of the 
provisional character of the conclusions and agreements reached. It also shows that the ES prefers a variety of 








The use of διακριβολογουµένους at e6 makes an implicit judgement about the 
materialists and idealists. It excludes them from those who inquire meticulously.230 The 
word expresses an attitude with both ethical and epistemic implications. It implies that 
being careful is good, and that inquiry is necessary for knowledge. But what exactly is the 
negation of ‘inquiring minutely’? Is the problem with the topic of the inquiry, with the way 
the inquiry is done, or with both? Could it be that the new group does not inquire but just 
talk as if they already knew the truth, or is that they inquire but without proper care or 
detail, or are they both dogmatic and careless? In any case, it is also telling that the ES is 
willing to include them in the examination, since even a group with such limitation could 
contribute something to the discussion.    
If the materialists and idealists are both dogmatic and careless, at least in comparison 
with the other predecessors, that could explain why they are in a violent discussion of 
cosmic proportions: 
ES. –And it seemed that between them, like the gigantomachia, there is a dispute 
against each other about being (Sophist 246a4-5).  
And a bit later:  
There is always, Theaetetus, an immense battle going on between both of them 
about this (Sophist 246c2-3). 
What does the comparison with the gigantomachia tell us? In the Greek myth, the 
giants, encouraged by their mother Earth, challenge the hegemony of Olympian deities. The 
powerful rebels attack, throwing rocks and trees towards Olympus. One of them, 
Alcyoneus, was immortal as long as he remained in his birthplace, which is why he seemed 
invincible. Along with this problem, an oracle told the gods that they would not defeat the 
giants unless a mortal aids them. At the end, the Olympians accomplish their victory with 
the help of Heracles, a demigod who dragged Alcyoneus away from his native land and 
killed him.231  
                                                                                                                                          
sources of information rather than exhaustiveness from few sources. The reason might be that his aim is to get 
a philosophical account of being, rather than a comprehensive history of thought on this topic. 
230 They are not real philosophers; see Sophist 249c10-d4, and this chapter’s sec. 9. Cf. Ch. 1, sec. 8.1.    
231 References to the giants in Greek mythology have two stages. In Homer, giants are a savage and 
autochthonous race that is expelled or destroyed by the gods as a result of their insolence (Odyssey vii 58-
60, 206; x 120). Hesiod considers them divine beings, sons of Uranus and Earth (Theogony 182-7, 675-
715). Neither Homer nor Hesiod talks about a battle between the gods and the giants. In later accounts, 
the battle is presented as an imitation of the rebellion of the Titans, and it is said that Earth, unhappy with 
the fate of her former children, gave birth to the giants (Apoll. 1.6.1-3). They made an attack upon 
heaven, being armed with huge rocks and the trunks of trees (Ov. Met. 1.151ff). The reference to 
Alcyoneus, his immortality, the oracle, and the participation of Heracles can be found in Schol. Ad Pind. 
Nem. 1.100; Eratosth. Catast. 11; Pindar Pyth. 8.19. See also Euripides Ion 205-18, Heracles 177-80; 
Pindar Nemean 1.67-9. For a summary of the evidence and a brief comparison with similar myths, see 
March (1999, 169-70). For Plato’s use of Hesiod see Boys-Stones & Haubold (2010). 
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  In the Sophist, the ES uses this myth to compare the idealists with the gods and the 
materialists with the giants. The comparison runs throughout the description of both 
materialists and idealists (i.3-4, see below). The conflict is presented as a ‘boundless battle’ 
(ἄπλετος... µάχη, at Sophist 246c3), as if the battle were still in need of a decisive 
intervention. Although Plato does not talk about Heracles, the ES plays his role.232 The 
description of the materialists is always more negative than that of the idealists, who are 
depicted in a friendlier way. In addition, the ES, to deal with the materialists, will need to 
drag them out of their original doctrine (in this case to improve them), as Heracles does 
with Alcyoneus to overcome him. But in contrast with the myth, the ES does not defeat the 
giants; he first, improves them, and then, reaches an agreement with them. Then he goes 
with the idealists and questions them with what was agreed with their adversaries. The ES’s 
attitude is more like the one of a skilful diplomat rather than that of a crucial aid to any of 
the sides.233 The comparison with the myth is here an argumentative strategy. It raises some 
expectations about where the discussion is going, but by not fitting perfectly it also makes 
us wonder which element of the myth is being compared and which one is not. 
When the ES describes the materialists and idealists, the comparison with the myth 
helps to build the portrayal of their attitudes, and the ways they voice their views. The ES 
describes the materialists in the following way:  
ES. –Some of them [i.e., the materialists] drag down to earth all from heaven and 
the invisible, embracing rocks and trees simply with their hands. For they, laying 
violent hands upon all, affirm confidently that only what produces contact and 
some touch exists, defining as identical body and being; and if others would say 
that <something> which has no body exists, they despise them absolutely and 
will not hear another word.  
Th. –In fact, you have spoken about terrible and clever men. I have also already 
met many of them (Sophist 246a6-b5). 
Let me focus for now not on the content of their view but on the description of their 
personal qualities, and attitudes. The materialists are like the giants in their violent 
character. They both drag down (ἕλκουσι) all, laying violent hands (ἐφαπτόµενοι) upon 
things. When the ES describes the giants again in 246c9-d1, he says that they “drag 
everything down to body by force” (εἰς σῶµα πάντα ἑλκόντων βίᾳ).234 This image suggests 
that the materialists, who deny the existence of forms, wish to challenge the established 
                                                
232 This idea is reinforced by the comparison of the ES with god, and his subsequent description as 
godlike. See the beginning of the Sophist at 216a-c. For a discussion of a ‘philosophical’ Heracles in 
Plato, see Loraux (1985), Morgan (2000, 246-7), and Jackson (1990). 
233 See also Morgan (2000, 247). 
234 Compare this with the violent reactions in Republic 1.327c and 5.473e6-474a4. 








viewpoint, which seems to be idealism, just as in the myth, the giants are rebels against the 
established order imposed by Zeus.  
The ES says that the materialists “affirm confidently” (διισχυρίζονται, Sophist 246a9-
10), “determine” (ὁριζόµενοι, Sophist 246b1), “despise” (καταφρονοῦντες, Sophist 246b2), 
and ignore (“will not hear,” οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες … ἀκούειν, Sophist 246b3). This means that 
their attitudes towards what they think are pretty strong, maybe arbitrary (they just affirm 
and determine, not suggest, or argue for), and closed to different ideas. The materialists are 
also shameless (Sophist 247c4-5), and in need of improvement (Sophist 246d4-e3). In the 
Theaetetus, Socrates had already talked about similar people with Theaetetus. He describes 
them as “those who believe that no other thing exists except what they can hold tight in 
their hands” (Th. 155e4-5), and also portrays them in negative terms: they are stiff 
(σκληρός, Th. 155e7), obstinate (ἀντίτυπος, Th. 156a1) and rude (ἄµουσος, Th. 156a2).  
In contrast, the idealists are portrayed in a better light. The ES expresses the way they 
argue and defend themselves from the materialists as follows:  
ES. –For that reason, those who disagree with them defend themselves very 
cautiously (εὐλαβῶς) from some place above and invisible, arguing vehemently 
(βιαζόµενοι) that genuine (ἀληθινὴν) being consists in some intelligible and 
incorporeal forms. And in their arguments, they break down into small pieces the 
bodies of their opponents and the truth spoken by them, calling it, instead of 
being, some moving becoming (Sophist 246b6-c2). 
The idealists are not attacking, only defending themselves. They do not throw rocks, 
they argue, and are cautious, and “gentler” (ἡµερώτεροι, Sophist 246c9). The ES addresses 
them as “the best of all men” (ὦ πάντων ἄριστοι, Sophist 248b2), and he reveals that he 
knows what they think ‘because of his acquaintance with them’ (διὰ συνήθειαν, Sophist 
248b8). But not everything is fine with them. They argue vehemently, even obstinately (see 
ἰσχυρίζηται at Sophist 249c7). This seems to lead them to dismiss their opponents too fast. 
The ES says that they break into pieces the truth spoken by the materialists, as if their 
obstinacy prevented them from seeing that their opponents have a good point. We should 
not forget that they, after all, fit the negative description of the predecessors (Sophist 242c4-
b1).  Thinking back again to the Parmenides, the gigantomachia presents a group of 
idealists that have not noticed the greatest difficulty and that do not seem as experienced 
and talented as the situation would require.  
The text is loaded with ethical language, but what, if any, is its connection with the 
discussion about being? The answer is threefold. First, the descriptions suggest there are 
some ethical requirements for philosophical inquiries. If the parties do not have the 
appropriate personal qualities and attitudes, at least in a minimum amount, the search, in 
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this case about being, gets blocked, even if the interlocutors are partially right. If someone 
defends a view obstinately, no one would be able to disabuse her. But even if she is right 
about a specific point, but does not have the correct qualities and dispositions, she might not 
get the rest of the picture right. Second, it seems that metaphysics and epistemology could 
have an effect on one’s qualities and attitudes. The dismissive attitude of the materialists 
towards those who think differently seems to be based on their beliefs about being. Finally, 
personal qualities and attitudes seem also to affect the method of inquiry and 
argumentation. If a person were not cautious and gentle, but careless, overconfident, or stiff 
that would definitely affect the quality of her method, and her arguments in different ways.  
After these ethically loaded descriptions, the ES invites Theaetetus to start the descent 
method again, and make the predecessors speak:  
ES. –Well then, on both sides, let us get from each kind an explanation of the 
being they propose.  
Th. –How we will get it? 
ES. –Easier from those who put it in the forms, for they are gentler; difficult and 
even nearly impossible from those who drag everything by force into the body 
(Sophist 246c5-d1). 
There is a worry that the method will not work with the materialists. The idealists, in 
turn, are easier to handle (which recalls Sophist 246a1-2). Given the description of the 
materialists, how to act as their spokesman? Should Theaetetus throw a rock at the ES’s 
face? Perhaps that would take the comparison with the myth too far, but it seems that, to be 
faithful to their description, Theaetetus’ job would only consist in affirming the same view 
very confidently over and over. Moreover, if the method consists in making the 
predecessors talk by asking them questions, it seems that the materialists would not listen, 
and then would not answer. Notice that the ES is reflecting on how moral character affects a 
metaphysical discussion. The reader, in turn, is also invited to reflect whether that is true or 
not, and to note that we are seeing the dispute through the lens of the ES, who is offering 
evaluative and descriptive claims.  
Let us go back to the ES and Theaetetus. To solve the difficulty of cross-examining 
the materialists, the ES proposes:  
ES. –If it were somehow possible, the best option would be to make them better 
in deed; but if this is not possible, let us make it in the discourse, assuming they 
will be now more legitimately (νοµιµώτερον) disposed to reply. For an 
agreement between better men is more valid than an agreement among the worse 
men. However, these are not who we care about, since we seek the truth. 
Th. –That is right.  








ES. –Request them, now that they have become better, to answer you, and speak 
as their interpreter (Sophist 246d4-e3).  
The problem with the materialists is their attitude. They need to be willing to speak, 
and to listen, which refers back to Sophist 246b2-3, in order for the cross-examination to 
happen.235 The ES is assigning a negative value to their attitude of despising others, and 
their voluntary deafness. But at the same time, he recognises that those qualities are an 
essential part of who the materialists are. If we go back to their portrayal in Sophist 248a4-
249b4, it seems that their despising is a consequence of their beliefs about being. The 
materialists, however, are not deaf. It is only if someone states that an incorporeal exists, 
that the materialists will despise him and will not hear another word (see Sophist 246b1-3). 
The point is that the materialists think they should stop listening to people when they start 
talking about incorporeal things.  
A metaphysical principle has here a methodological, and behavioural consequence. 
But why would ignoring the idealists be wrong? It gives the materialists a “field 
advantage,” which reminds us of the myth. As long as the materialists stay true to their 
account, they will be as irrefutable as Alcyoneus was invincible in his native land. It does 
not seem that someone would let this advantage go very easily. Moreover, the materialists 
form a bloc of people who agree with each other on theory, method, and attitudes. But the 
impact of these three aspects on each other is not only one-way. Once someone has the 
materialist attitude, it builds an impenetrable wall against external influence, which 
guarantees the stability of the doctrine. With this, they seem able to form a full and 
exclusive community of inquiry. They have what the ES labels as “an agreement amongst 
the worse men.” But even with this negative description, they are considered terrible and 
clever men (δεινός, Sophist 246b4), which is why they are so difficult or impossible to 
handle.236 
If from the beginning one knows that the materialists would not listen to certain types 
of argument, trying to argue with them with those very arguments is just a waste of time. 
This is something the idealists do not realise since otherwise they would ignore them and do 
not even try to defend themselves. But the reason to consider the materialists worse men 
cannot just be that they do not listen, because they might have good reasons to behave in the 
way they do. Just like the ES’s concluding remarks of the passage, one of which is exactly 
that philosophers should not listen at all to certain types of accounts (see Sophist 249c10-
                                                
235 Remember that one of the requisites for a successful conversation in the Parmenides is that the 
dissenters need to be willing to listen. See Ch. 3, sec. 3. 
236 This reminds us of the dissenters who advance the ontological objection, but also those who are 
talented but unwilling to listen (see Ch. 3, sec. 3, and 8).  
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d4). There is no problem, then, with ignoring certain arguments, but it is crucial to have 
considered them first, and have good grounds to stop listening.   
There are then, two possibilities. Assuming the materialists are wrong, their attitude 
would be obstructing any chance to correct their mistakes, which clearly is a disadvantage 
for their own interests, and a drawback of any account, even if it is irrefutable. But 
assuming they were right, why should they listen? The reason might be that even if we are 
right about something that does not mean we know that we know, or that we are right about 
everything else. Even if they are right in being materialists, from that it does not necessarily 
follow that we should be dismissive and aggressive with those who think otherwise; that is 
a jump the materialists are taking. But there is no real need to be rude. This is one of the 
reasons why the materialists are described as careless (see Sophist 242c4-b1), unable to 
inquire minutely (see 1.i; Sophist 246e6), and meet the general description of the 
predecessors: they are condescending and “have overlooked and esteemed very little 
ordinary people like us” (Sophist 243a6-b1).  But the fact that someone is wrong or gives a 
mistaken argument is not enough reason to treat her in this way, or to presuppose she is 
worthless. The difference between the materialists and the ES’s concluding remark is that 
the latter has already listened, and examined the others’ accounts. He decides to stop 
listening after careful consideration. The materialists, in turn, decide not to listen from the 
beginning. They believe they are too smart, but in fact they are assuming an awful lot about 
their opponents. The ES’s complaint is that intellectual arrogance is wrong (and negative 
for the inquiry), no matter if you are right or not about a specific point in the discussion (cf. 
Ch. 5, sec 8).  
The materialists might think, nevertheless, that their moral character is irrelevant for 
the discussion. They might think that the discussion is only about being right on a specific 
point. But if we consider their dispute with the idealists from the third person perspective, 
like the ES and Theaetetus, the materialists’ account of being seems far from satisfactory. In 
fact, it looks like a complete failure. The materialists are absolutely unable to settle the 
dispute. They are incapable of putting themselves in the idealists’ shoes. They do not 
understand why these people believe differently, and their attempts to persuade them are 
ineffective. So their irrefutability comes with the price of being as persuasive as a 
conspiracy theorist. Their conversation is powerless.  
From the third-person perspective, and with the full description of both sides, the 
dialogue includes in its reflection the two worldviews, the character of their exponents, and 
reasons to believe them. Only in that way is the reader in a position to understand why other 








persons think differently. But this knowledge is not an accessory. It is an essential part of 
understanding a subject matter, since it allows you to explain why one account is right and 
others are wrong, it allows you to explain, teach, and learn from others; something the 
predecessors cannot do. The passage conveys, then, that the aim of a philosophical account 
of being is not only to get the right answer about a specific topic, but also to be able to 
understand the wider picture, where there is an ethical, and methodological component 
essential to what it is to understand or have an account of something. Only in this way, 
perhaps, can someone claim that she knows, which might be, indeed, the only way to 
escape from the greatest difficulty.    
If the problem is with despising others, and that does not necessarily follow from the 
materialists’ criterion of existence, then they might still be right about it. Even if the 
materialists are drawing the wrong conclusions, and are mistaken about other essential 
elements that prevent them from having a philosophical account of being, they might have 
something true to contribute. The lesson, then, is that one needs to consider all views even if 
they come from pedantic, arrogant, obstinate people, who may not even want to talk to us, 
since despite their attitude they might still be partially right. When the ES says that the 
materialists “will be now more legitimately disposed to reply,” he means that the 
improvement of the materialists is not in their metaphysics, but in their attitude and 
argumentative method.  
The discussion still needs to examine if what produces touch and sense is the right 
and only criterion of being. The problem with the intellectual arrogance of the original 
materialists is that it creates a worldview that from the inside seems perfectly rational, with 
internal cohesion, which allows them to agree with like-minded people, and gives them 
every reason to believe that the idealists are not worthy of any attention. They are unable, 
however, to put into question their own dogmas, to explain their view to other people apart 
from those who already agree with them, and to learn from others. But this makes 
philosophy impossible, since there is no genuine philosophy with unquestionable dogmas, 
without explanatory power, and blinded by arrogance (all these characteristics remind us of 
the contrast between natural inquiry and Socrates’ method of hypothesis in the Phaedo, see 
Ch. 1, sec. 4, and 7).   
4. Materialism 
Consider now the metaphysical and epistemological claims of the materialists (see 
Sophist 246a10-b1). They make two claims: (1) that “only what produces contact and some 
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touch exists,” and (2) a definition establishing body and being as identical. From these 
claims the materialist definition of body can be inferred. The argument can be constructed 
in the following way:  
Materialism (M) 
M1. Only what produces contact and touch exists (Sophist 246a10-b1).  
M2. Body and being are identical (Sophist 246b1).  
From this follows: 
M3. Every body produces contact and some touch.  
The account is a special kind of materialism: a corporealism (M2) based on contact 
and touch (M1). It considers that reality is made out of tangible individuated bodies (in 
contrast with, for instance, a materialism based on passive matter). M1 implies two 
thoughts: (Ma) the criterion for something to exist is to show it causes touch and contact, 
and (Mb) there is no other criterion (see µόνον at 246a10). In this way, if a materialist 
wishes to test if a candidate for existence X really exists, she drags the candidate and 
examines if it offers touch and contact. If it does not, it dismisses the candidate even if other 
senses or sources of information tell her a different story. M2 establishes a formal identity, 
but reveals nothing about the content of the concepts of body and being. It is the implicit 
claim M3, which makes clear that this type of materialism bases its concept of body on 
contact and touch. 
The dialogue gives no explanation of why the materialists think what they think. A 
possible answer is that they believe the sense of touch is the only one which is infallible. 
This idea could depend on the immediate nature of this sense, in contrast, for instance, with 
the mediated nature of vision (if the ES has a similar view to the one discussed by Socrates 
in Republic 6; see Ch. 2). What is offered by other senses—they may think—is not always 
enough to know if something exists. This happens, for example, with visual illusions. This, 
however, does not mean touch needs to be the only criterion. But the materialists seem to 
apply Ockham’s razor and discard other criteria since their criterion suffices. This does not 
necessarily mean that touch is their only source of information about the world. It just 
means it is the only trustworthy source to decide whether something exists or not.237 It is an 
                                                
237 McCabe (2000, 85-89), in turn, makes materialism a problem about the recognition of other minds, as 
part of “the conditions for engaging in any kind of mental interchange.” In her interpretation, the 
materialists do not recognize other minds in their ontology and that is the main reason they can despise 
others and refuse to talk. The ES’s objection, then, could be construed as a charge of self-refutation (89). 
See also Silverman (2002, 155). As I have argued, however, the attitude of the materialists does not 








empiricist requirement that arguments should be grounded on ‘hard data,’ or otherwise they 
sound just like fairy tales. The drawback of this position is that touch and contact requires 
proximity with the objects, and that is why the materialists need to drag down everything 
and grab it with their own hands.  
In touch, the materialists may think, there is a special kind of relationship between 
subject and object. Plato uses the words προσβολή and ἐπαφή (Sophist 246a10), which 
involve an active and a passive role of the object and the perceiver. There is a mutual 
resistance in the act of touching, where the touched object also touches the subject. These 
words could be understood as “what we can affect” and “what can affect us,” and the 
materialists’ claims could be construed as a causal theory of perception.238 In addition, the 
materialists could see touch and contact as a guarantee that the object is individuated. 
Perhaps the materialists just want to insist, with common sense on their side, that they will 
not accept the existence of something that has no palpable power, and, consequently, cannot 
affect or harm us directly.   
Once the ES enhances the materialists, at least by word,239 he and Theaetetus are able 
to cross-examine their metaphysical claims (Sophist 246e5-247d7). The ES does this by 
checking the scope of beings the materialists are able to accept in their ontology. First, the 
materialists accept the existence of mortal animals (246e5), surely because they can be 
touched and offer some contact. Then, they accept that animals are ensouled bodies (e7), 
perhaps because they can move, and thus, they accept the existence of souls (e9). However, 
one may wonder why the materialists accept the existence of souls if they are imperceptible. 
But they might be applying a principle of sufficient reason; they do not accept effects 
without causes. If an effect is perceived but its cause is not evident, they can conjecture that 
the cause exists but is hidden (see τιθέντες, Sophist 246e9). From that, however, here is no 
need to think that souls are incorporeal. Materialists could think souls cannot be seen 
because they are a part inside animals, and if dissected they will be perceptible. They can 
affirm that if souls exist, they must be corporeal (see Sophist 247b8).240 
                                                                                                                                          
necessarily follow from their materialism. In section 6, in addition, I argue that the doctrine of change that 
makes nous disappear in Sophist 249b5-c5, is not the same as the one represented by the materialists of 
the first part of the passage. 
238 See McCabe (1999, 203; 2000, 74). This theory would be causal, however, in a broader sense than in the 
previous passages, since there is no indication of a Nous Closure Principle.  
239 Brunschwig (1994, 120) calls this modification of the giants a ‘verbally’ and ‘by hypothesis’ 
improvement. The ES suggests the improvement in Sophist 246d4, and in 247c3-4, he says that the giants 
have become better men (βελτίους γεγόνασιν ἇνδρες). See also Diès (1963, 18-20). 
240 Brunschwig (1994, 120) instead, thinks that this is evidence that the materialists are accepting the 
existence of the invisible and intangible, although they are bodies. But the materialists have no need to 
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Following this, the ES asks two closely connected questions. First, whether souls can 
be just or unjust, and second whether the presence or absence of justice is what makes them 
just or unjust:  
ES. –And what? Do they not say that a soul is just or unjust, and intelligent or 
foolish? 
Th.  –Yes certainly.  
ES. –And each soul becomes such241 by the possession and presence (παρουσίᾳ) 
of justice, and the opposite by the contrary? 
Th. –They say so  
ES. –But no doubt they would say that something which is able to be present or 
away from a thing exists.242  
Th. –They certainly affirm it (Sophist 247a2-10). 
 According to what they agree, justice and souls are different things, and the first one 
has a productive power over the latter, producing qualities in them.243 The materialists 
accept that souls are just or unjust because of the presence or absence of justice.244 The 
materialists, however, could give a corporeal explanation to all this. As Moravcsik (1992, 
59-60) notes, “one can use words like ‘justice’ and still have options among a variety of 
ontological interpretations.” For example, he argues, one may think that justice is like a 
“virus” or that “the various manifestations of justice are part of one mass.”245 If they accept 
souls in their ontology even without direct contact with them, but as a conjecture applying 
the principle of sufficient reason, they might do the same with virtues. Someone trying to 
defend her materialism at any cost would do this, and would say, for example, that virtues 
come to the corporeal soul through food or drink, and depend on the soul’s corporeal 
composition. So if dissecting souls were possible one would find tangible bits of virtues.  
                                                                                                                                          
accept the incorporeal realm here. From present imperceptibility does not necessarily follow an invisible 
and intangible nature. 
241 Here ‘such’ (τοιαύτην) refers to ‘just’ (δίκαιος) in 247a2. 
242 Cf. Gorgias 497e1-2. 
243 Notice that the ES asks for properties of the soul using adjectives: δίκαιος (just), ἄδικος (unjust), 
φρόνιµος (intelligent), and ἄφρων (foolish) at 247a2-3; but then, he uses nouns: δικαιοσύνη (justice) at 
247a5, and φρόνησις (intelligence) at 247b1. This use of the language, Leigh (2010, 66, 75) notes, recalls 
the distinction made by the ES in 245c1-3, between possessing a property and talking about the property 
itself. When, discussing unity the ES says: “if being is not a whole because of having that property, but it 
is a whole by itself, it follows that being lacks of itself” (245c1-3). 
244 Fiona Leigh (2010, 75)—following Sedley’s (1998) analysis of Phaedo—suggests that παρουσίᾳ at 
247a5, is a causal dative. According to my reading of the Phaedo, however, it could also be that it is an 
instrumental dative (see Ch. 1, sec. 7-8). The real question here, as in the Phaedo, is who or what is 
responsible for the presence of a form in a particular.  
245 The language of the gigantomachia here, however, strongly recollects Phaedo’s passages about forms. 
The becoming of the quality ‘just’ in the soul, by the presence of justice, can be compared with Phaedo 
100c-e (see Ch. 1, sec. 7.2.1-2). But if the ES is trying to introduce the same forms here he is missing 
some of their characteristics, since we don’t have all the elements of a complete argument for their 
existence. For example, here justice is not described as unqualified or above all other manifestations of 
justice, and without these specifications, the viral and mass interpretation of it will still be possible.  See 
Moravcsik (1992, 71-74). 








The discussion, however, does not go that way. When the ES asks, “do they say that 
any of these is visible and tangible or are they all invisible?” (Sophist 247b3-4), the 
materialists recognize that “hardly any of these things is in fact visible” (b5), but they think 
that souls possess certain kinds of bodies. They are, nevertheless, confused about virtues. 
They “are ashamed to agree that they [i.e. the virtues and vices] do not exist, or agree to 
affirm confidently that they are all bodies” (Sophist 247b9-c2). Here the attitudes play an 
important role again. The materialists now understand that to affirm something confidently 
or agree with a claim, you need good reasons to do it. The problem is that they are unsure 
about both options. The lack of convincing reasons to either side makes them feel ashamed. 
On the one hand, they are ashamed because they do not want to contradict what they have 
already said.246 On the other, it seems they have doubts about the tangibility and general 
perceptibility of virtues.  
Notice, however, that the belief that virtues cannot be bodies is not something that 
necessarily follows from the conversation.247 The examination is not directly aiming to 
refute materialism but to find if materialists believe in something that contradicts their 
account. Perhaps the idea of corporeal virtues, although defensible, might go against the 
predecessors’ common sense or intuitions. They may think that virtues are properties of 
bodies, and that means they cannot be bodies themselves. In this case, the ES’s strategy 
might consist in showing that some people are materialist until someone makes them reflect 
about things like virtues, since then, they would realise that their criterion of existence 
cannot explain things they accept exist, but would not consider bodies.  
The ES and Theaetetus are hoping that the idea of corporeal virtues will sound absurd 
to the materialists, and that they will be open to hearing other options, instead of trying to 
defend their views stubbornly. Of course, if the materialists do not share the intuition that 
virtues cannot be bodies, then the discussion will remain unsolved.  
This means that the invincibility of the materialists does not only depend on their 
unwillingness to listen to others. Even were they to listen, if they do not share any of the 
intuitions of their critics, then they will not feel any shame in disagreeing and remaining 
                                                
246 This is a good sign if compared, for example, to the way Dionysodorus and Euthydemus discuss with 
Socrates in the Euthydemus. 
247 Even if they are ashamed to agree any of the options, from a dialectical point of view, the materialists 
are not defeated. There are a variety of responses that someone in their position could give. They can 
reply, for example, that they do not know how to answer, but that is no reason to abandon their whole 
theory of reality; they can say that the issue will be solved in the future with the progress of science (for 
example with the invention of tools to enhance our perception, like microscopes or telescopes); they may 
recognize a problem in their account, but ask for time to think about it; or they might reconsider some 
detail of their account before discarding their core theses. 
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materialists (see Sophist 247c3-7).248 The structure of the passage and the dialogue form 
allow the reader to understand that the limitation of this (and perhaps any) criticism against 
materialism is that the effectiveness of many objections and counterexamples requires some 
shared beliefs or intuitions between the interlocutors. The ES may think that it is impossible 
to refute materialism once and for all, since some people could remain materialists if they 
are willing to accept all the consequences (something that also applies to the dissenters of 
the Parmenides). But it is possible to show their explanatory limitations, and to change the 
mind of those willing to listen, sharing certain beliefs, and open to the possibility of being 
mistaken. This is something a full-hearted follower of the materialist criterion will not do 
since even if they find themselves believing something different from what the criterion 
dictates, they will dismiss that belief. The ES, however, hopes that some materialists will 
allow some of these beliefs to override their criterion of existence, or at least that that they 
will stop thinking that it is the only trustworthy criterion.  
If tangibility and perceptibility cannot always be a criterion for existence, the 
materialists may be open to change their criterion (Ma) or allow more (Mb), but not to 
withdraw their identification between bodies and being (M2). They could, for example, 
change their materialism to include all the senses as criteria. Alternatively, they could think 
that virtues are completely imperceptible to naked senses, but still bodies. Perhaps because 
of the tiny size of their particles we cannot feel them, but they offer contact, and thus have 
the same nature as every other body. The materialists could deny that imperceptibility 
implies incorporeality.  Perhaps for this reason, the ES insists:  
Well, let us question them again; for if they would accept that something, even 
small, is incorporeal, it will be enough (Sophist 247c9-d1).  
This time, however, instead of waiting for the materialists’ agreement that there is 
something incorporeal, the ES continues his reasoning, as if they responded and agreed that, 
in fact, there are some bodiless beings (see Sophist 247d2-4). One may think that the ES is 
just avoiding the repetition of a question he has previously asked, but if so, why would the 
materialists answer differently this second time? In Sophist 247b9-c2, they are ‘ashamed to 
agree’ either that virtues exist or that they are bodies. It is a suspension of judgment; the 
materialists are in aporia. The ES gives no new argument to change their views here; he 
just pretends that they accept the existence of incorporeal beings.  
The ES’s proposal that virtues are incorporeal, then, is a tentative hypothesis (hence εἰ 
in Sophist 247e9). The introduction of the incorporeal realm is not by proof but by 
                                                
248 This is a new requisite for philosophical conversation not considered in the Parmenides passage. 








suggesting that it is a tentative solution to the nature of virtues. The materialists, if they go 
along with this, have no strong commitment to the proposal. They will only carry the 
burden of proof if it gives a better explanation of virtues than materialism. That is, of 
course, no proof of the existence of incorporeal beings. In the best case, it is presented just 
as a better account of virtues than touch-based materialism.249  
Assuming that incorporeal entities might exist, the criterion of existence must be 
modified to be open to this option. The ES asks the materialists for an answer:  
They must tell us now this: what is connatural to both these things [i.e. the 
incorporeal] and those which have body, that looking into them, they can say 
that both are. Then, perhaps, they will be at a loss for an answer (ἀπορεῖν). If 
something like this happens, look if they would also agree with our suggestion 
that being is as follows (Sophist 247d2-6). 
The ES assumes the materialists will be in aporia again (ἀπορεῖν, Sophist 247d4), 
this time about the request for a criterion open to the existence of the incorporeal. The ES, 
then, takes this opportunity to give his own suggestion to solve the problem.250 This new 
proposal, to be successful, must offer something “connatural” (συµφυές, in 247d3, 
reinforced by πεφυκός, in 247e1) to both the incorporeal (if it exists) and the corporeal. 
Touch failed to meet this requirement, at least for the ES’s and the improved materialists’ 
taste. The request, however, presupposes that every existing thing possesses a nature,251 and 
that nature has an explanatory role that reveals what something really is, not in a specific 
time or condition but in all cases. It is what underlies change. If the criterion of existence 
can mark off a common natural note of each being this will guarantee in all cases that if 
something exists, it possesses the criterion, and vice versa.  
5. The power of being  
The ES proposes a criterion that incorporates the concerns of the materialists, and meets 
the requirement announced above. His attitude is of someone who has listened to the 
materialists and is seeking an agreement, rather than one who is trying to refute his 
adversaries. The ES recognises that the materialists have a point in their complaints against 
the idealists, but that it needs to be reformulated to account for things like virtues. The ES, 
                                                
249 Compare this with the method of hypothesis as described in the Phaedo 101d3-102a3 (see Ch. 1, sec. 
7.2.3).  
250 That the ES is expressing his own ideas is clear by the use of ἡµῶν in 247d5 and λέγω in 247d8. See 
Leigh (2010).  
251 This does not mean that each thing’s nature has no relation with other things. For many Platonic 
characters, the cosmos is an organic whole, which is more than a sum of its parts. See Harte (2002, 273) 
who remarks that in wholes “parts get their identity only in the context of the whole they compose.” 
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then, redefines the criterion only in terms of power, avoiding the reference to the senses, 
bodies, and incorporeal beings:252  
ES.–I suggest that that which possesses [any] power (δύναµις) of any kind, either 
to produce (τὸ ποιεῖν) anything of any nature or to be affected (τὸ παθεῖν) even 
in the least degree by the slightest thing, even if only once, all this really is. For I 
set up as a mark of [to determine] being, that it is nothing else but power (Sophist 
247d8-e4; see also 248c4-5).253 
Theaetetus, as the materialists’ spokesman, agrees with the proposal: “since they do 
not have in the present circumstances something better to say, they accept that” (Sophist 
247e5-6). This means that the materialists, who were silent through the last part of the 
conversation, reappear to agree with the ES. The proposal, however, is held as a provisional 
agreement, open to the discovery of a better answer (Sophist 247e7-8a2). The ES does not 
offer any explanation about why this power to produce or be affected is something shared 
by all beings. In the Republic, however, this power was linked to the sun’s light, and truth 
(see Republic 508a4-8, Ch. 2, sec. 4). 
The ES’s proposal means no commitment to the existence of the incorporeal. It just 
establishes a criterion open to the possibility of any sort of entities. Whether some body or 
some incorporeal exists will be decided by whether it possesses some power or not. People 
who are only certain about the existence of bodies, then, can accept the proposal. The 
materialists take the decision to agree with the ES’s proposal because it suits their concerns 
best, and it implies no commitment with the existence of the incorporeal, only a 
commitment to the possibility of its existence.254 The materialists and the ES could 
disagree about the existence of the incorporeal, and nevertheless agree that any existing 
being has a power to produce or to be affected. The advantage of the proposal is that it can 
include virtues in the ontology, even if no one has yet a definitive argument whether they 
are incorporeal or not.  
In accordance with the request at Sophist 247d3, the proposal assumes that every 
existing thing possesses nature (see 247d3), what possesses nature has some power, and that 
                                                
252 This proposal seems to have had an enormous impact on later Academics and Hellenistic philosophers; 
compare, for instance, Cicero’s Academica I 19-23, Lucretius I.419-44 (LS 5B), and DL 7.134 (SVF 
2.299; LS44B). See Ch. 5, sec. 2.  
253 The last sentence is ambiguous (τίθεµαι γὰρ ὅρον [ὁρίζειν] τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν 
δύναµις). Is not clear if the subject of ἔστιν is ὅρον or τὰ ὄντα. The construction of the sentence is 
discussed in Cornford (1935, 234), Brown (1986, 192-3), and Robinson (1999, 150). 
254 I think the materialists accept power as the criterion of existence not because it follows as the 
conclusion of an argument, but more as a decision in the dialectic motivated by the advantages of the 
proposal to avoid the problems of the former criterion.  Even if it were reconstructed as an inference, the 
only conclusion possible would be that if virtues are incorporeal, then the definition to determine being is 
power. The materialists are only compelled to accept that if there is no other form to explain virtues, then 
the ES is right. 








nature is manifest through its powers.255 These three claims are ontological,256 but the last 
one is also epistemological (the only way to know about nature is by looking at the powers 
of things).257 The ES gives no further explanation of the connection between δύναµις and 
φύσις here, but this recalls Phaedrus 270c1-d7:  
Socrates. –Now, do you think that it is possible to understand any estimable 
account of souls without the account of the nature of the whole man?  
Phaedrus. –If, at any rate Hippocrates the Asclepiad must be trusted, without this 
method it is not possible even about bodies.  
S. –That is right, my friend; however, in addition to Hippocrates’ view, we need 
to examine closely if our reason agrees.  
Ph. –I say so too.  
S. –Therefore, consider what Hippocrates and true reason about nature can say. 
Thus, is it not necessary, about the nature of anything, to have in mind: first, 
whether it is simple or multiform with respect to what we want to be skilful at 
and make others skilful too, and then, if it is simple, inquire about its power, 
                                                
255 See Souilhé (1919, 36), and Cornford (1935, 235). 
256 Not only linguistic or formal as Moravcsik and Owen thought. Moravcsik (1962, 37), advocates a 
reading in which the criterion is extremely broad: “anything which can be a subject or a predicate in a 
genuine assertion exists.” Owen (1966, 337) has a similar interpretation. He says about the proposal that 
“The requirement to be met if X is to be said to do something to Y, or to have something done to it by Y, 
seems to come to no more than this: there should be statements in which the name of X stands as subject 
to some active or passive verb, and the name of Y stands accordingly as object or the instrumental case; 
and that these statements should be at some time (but not timelessly) true.” These readings were 
challenged by Brown (1998, 191), who gives a counterexample to this kind of interpretations: “Not-being 
is pondered by Theaetetus.” The statement, thinks Brown, satisfies Moravcsik’s and Owen’s readings of 
the proposal, but, if it does, then even the not-being would be accepted as an existent. But, of course, this 
would collapse the proposal as a criterion of existence. Brown’s counterexample fails, though. The 
subject is either senseless or an ellipsis for “the topic of not-being.” If the first one is the case, the 
sentence will not count as a true statement, and if is an ellipsis, then it will be a true statement but with an 
existing subject. Indeed, the topic of not-being is real (I thank MM McCabe for showing me this point). It 
is right, I think, that all true statements satisfy the ES’s proposal, but that is trivial. The formal readings 
assume that truth-values are known for all these statements, and that is exactly what is in dispute between 
materialists and idealists since the beginning. The truth of the sentence depends on the concept of nature. 
If something has no nature it cannot be used as a genuine subject or predicate. What is important about 
the ES’s proposal is the ontological relation with the concept of nature. Without nature, meaning and truth 
would be impossible. Moreover, although all true statements satisfy the ES’s proposal, that does not mean 
that the syntactical structure of the sentence always informs us which part is affected and which one is 
acting. Besides, there are some verbs that imply a two-way relationship between the subject and the 
predicate. For example, in ‘Hector fights Achilles’, the verb implies not only that Hector is acting but also 
Achilles. Other examples are the verbs ‘to discuss,’ or ‘to dance.’ In other verbs, it is not clear who is 
acting and who is receiving the action. For example: ‘to contemplate,’ ‘to see,’ or ‘to know.’ In section 6, 
I suggest that ‘to know’ implies a complex relationship, where the object being known acts on the subject, 
and the subject not only is affected but also acts in himself, and other things. 
257 This does not imply that power is identical with being. the ES’s proposal does not state that power is 
the only common natural feature of all things, or that power is identical with existence, like the giants do 
with contact and touch in Sophist 246a7-b5. If the ES had meant that, the search for being would finish 
here. Nevertheless—as Cornford (1935, 239) remarks—, in 249d-ff. this question is put by the ES as still 
unanswered. For these reasons, I agree with Cornford’s translation of ὅρον as ‘mark’ in 247d3. Power is 
not an exhaustive definition of being, but just a criterion of inclusion. To emphasize this point, Cornford 
(1935, 238, n.3) stresses the difference between λόγος and ὅρον. He says that the first one is an “explicit 
statement of a complex content or meaning,” whereas the other means definition only in an extensional 
sense, it is “to draw a boundary-line marking off something from other things” (cf. Gorgias 470b9-10). 
See, however, Leigh (2010, 81-83). This is, in any case, not enough reason to think that the ES simply 
discards the proposal at the end of the passage.  
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what natural ability (πέφυκεν) to be active (τὸ δρᾶν) it has, or to be acted upon 
by something and by what, and if it has many forms, count them, and then see in 
each case, as we did in the case of the unity, what it produces and how it acts, 
and how it is affected and by what?   
In this passage Socrates offers some new ways of thinking about ideas already present 
in ancient medicine:258 a holistic approach to understanding reality,259 and a naturalistic 
account of causation.260 The difference is that Socrates proposes this method not to find the 
explanation of a physical disease, or to understand only the body, but to give an account of 
what things are as a whole. The medical approach is tested by true reason (ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος, 
Phaedr. 270c10), and used in a wider context; in Phaedrus to give an account of men as a 
composite of soul and body, and in the Sophist to give an account of what marks off 
being.261 In the Phaedrus the method presents δύναµις as the key to understanding nature. 
From the simplest reality to the most complex, this method can be used to give an account 
of them. It can be expressed in the following way: 
Holistic-analytic method (HA) 
To understand x:  
                                                
258 The author of the Hippocratic treatise The Sacred Disease (18.6-7), for example, states: “each 
[disease] has its own nature and power (φύσιν δὲ ἔχειν ἕκαστον καὶ δύναµιν ἐφ᾽ἑωυτοῦ), and none is 
impossible to discover or beyond therapy.” The author attributes a nature and power to all diseases, and 
launches a research agenda based on the assumption that the nature of diseases can be discovered (see 
also The Sacred Disease 1.1-5, 18.1-4, and 18.16-20). Alcmaeon of Croton (DK24 B4, and A5) might 
have influenced this treatise but that depends on the dating of this author; see Huffman (2008). Diès 
(1963, 22-25), following Apelt (1891, 77), believes that power is a definition of being that can be 
attributed to Hippocrates. This attribution is, however, extremely problematic. There is no text to attribute 
to Hippocratic medicine the general version of power as a criterion of all what exists. Besides, of course, 
there is the problem that none of the treatises of the Corpus Hippocraticum are securely ascribable to 
Hippocrates himself, and the ideas contained in the treatises have disagreements with each other. For the 
‘Hippocratic question’ see Lloyd (1975), and Smith (1979). What can be said is that Plato is reflecting on 
some ideas that can be found in some medical treatises and even in the very beginning of medicine as a 
rational enterprise, but using them for different aims and with a wider scope. Plato seems to be 
consciously elaborating this previous material, even with a little sarcasm. It is well known that some 
medics took what was believed to be Hippocrates’ words as unquestionable dogmas, which explains why 
Socrates insists on examining his opinions carefully and rationally, instead of taking them as an authority. 
I already suggested that Plato extrapolates other disciplines’ frameworks for philosophical profit. See Ch. 
1, sec. 6. 
259 See, for example, Epidemiae I, 3.10, 1-16, which makes clear that to make a judgment about any 
disease, doctors should attend to all the elements involved, and their respective nature: “with regard to 
disease, the circumstances from which we form a diagnosis of them are, by studying the common nature 
of all, and the specific nature of each thing: from the disease, the patient, and the applications.” 
260 Medicine emerges as the result of scepticism about religious causal/responsibility accounts of disease. 
See Hankinson (1998, 52). Regardless of whether the diseases have a divine origin or not, their causal 
explanations can be analysed in a naturalistic way. They do not appear by chance or by a capricious 
decision of gods. Plato’s portraits of doctors and medicine always include this naturalism, which is 
clearly recognized in Gorgias 465a3-5. In other words, doctors understand the causes and explanation of 
disease, because they study nature. In Laws 4, 720d3, the Athenian explains that the freeborn doctors 
“inquire from the origin and according to nature.” See also Laws 4, 720b2-6; In Laws 9, 857d3-4, doctors 
inquire into “the whole nature of bodies.” 
261 Moreover, the Hippocratic treatises built no theoretical system with these notions beyond medical 
therapy. The term δύναµις occurs only sporadically and without any general pretension through the 
medical literature. See Plamböck (1964, 65). 








a) Consider x as a whole.262 
b) Identify if its nature is [1] simple, or [2] composite.  
c) If [1], then [1.1] inquire about its power [i] to produce/to be active, or [ii] to be 
affected. 
d) If [2], then [2.1] count the parts, and then [2.2] follow step (b) and (c) for each case.  
The inquiry is an exhaustive analysis that ends in the scrutiny of each power that a 
thing has. Phaedrus and Socrates postulate this method as a way to find an estimable 
account for either perceptible (bodies) or imperceptible (souls) entities. It also makes a 
distinction between simple and composite beings, but all have in common the possession of 
a power. As in the Sophist, the Phaedrus presents dunamis as a disjunction. This is a central 
aspect of the proposal in both dialogues. It establishes two basic options for beings: what 
produces-acts (τὸ ποιεῖν, in the Sophist, and πέφυκεν, τὸ δρᾶν in Phaedrus) and what is 
affected (τὸ παθεῖν).  
The specific feature of the Sophist is that these two options for beings are used to 
characterize all that exists. Read as an inclusive disjunction this can be analysed as follows.  
The ES’s proposal (P) 
P1. Something possesses power if and only if it either acts or is affected (247d8-e3).   
P2. Every being has power (247d8e3-4).  
This implies:  
P3. There is no being that does not act nor is affected (Equiv. 1). 
P4. Every being acts or is affected (Equiv. P3; 247d8-e3). 
In order to exist, a thing must be able to interact in some causal process, as an agent, a 
patient, or both. This does not mean that there are in fact beings in each of the three 
categories. The proposal only says that there could exist entities in any of these categories, 
regardless of their having body or not. What is highlighted, though, is the impossibility of 
beings that are both inactive and unaffected (P3).  
The ES also gives a list of qualifications to the central claim of the proposal. A thing 
will exist regardless of three main factors: Pa) the intensity of the power, Pb) the scope of 
                                                
262 Cf. Charmides 156b4-c6, and Laws 10, 903c5-d1. The medical account of wholes is not only a sum of 
parts, but involves also a structural relation between them. See Phaedrus 270d6-7, where Socrates 
remarks that the analysis includes not only counting the different parts, but also studying “what it 
produces and how it acts, and how it is affected and by what?” For an analysis of whole and parts in 
Plato, although without direct reference to these passages, see Harte (2002). 
  139 
application, and Pc) the number of times it happens. This means that, although we can 
distinguish many degrees of power, anything within these qualifications will equally count 
as an existent. Something with an intense power, with a wide scope and with the capacity to 
interact all the time will not be more existent than something with a weak power, a narrow 
application and that only interacts once. The proposal is just a criterion of inclusion and 
establishes no hierarchy of importance or intensity; it is what I call an egalitarian ontology, 
where all beings are equal and there are no degrees of existence.   
6. With friends (of the forms) like these, who needs enemies? 
Consider now the metaphysical and epistemological claims of the idealists. From 
Sophist 246b6-c2 we know that they think that “genuine being consists in some intelligible 
and incorporeal forms,” and they call bodies, “instead of being, some moving becoming.” 
After the discussion with the materialists, the ES gets more details about the idealists’ 
account:  
ES. –I suppose, you distinguish between becoming and being and speak of 
them as separate, right?  
Th. [as spokesman of the idealists] –Yes.  
ES. –And you say that we share (κοινωνεῖν) by the body through sensation 
with becoming, and by soul, through reasoning, with the real being, which 
always stays the same in the same manner, while becoming is different at 
different times.263 
Th.  –In fact we say so (Sophist 248a7-b1).  
The idealists think that there are two completely different and separated sorts of 
entities: forms, and becoming. These two sorts are degrees of being.264 Forms are in a 
higher rank, and they are called genuine (246b8), real (248a11), and absolute being (248e7-
8), but sometimes simply being (τὸ ὄν or οὐσία).265 To avoid confusion I shall call this 
degree always “genuine being” [GB]. Becoming, on the other hand, is a qualified, lower, 
and derivative degree, which is never simply called being, but always becoming. Each 
degree possesses characteristics that distinguish it from the other. Forms are intelligible, 
                                                
263 Cf. Th. 184c6-9. 
264 The traditional reading equates γένεσις with not-being. See, for instance, Keyt (1969). But the idealists 
never say so. The ES only reports that the idealists call bodies, instead of being, some moving becoming 
(γένεσιν ἀντ’ οὐσίας φεροµένην τινὰ, 246c1-2). The word φεροµένην implies motion, but also that 
something is carried. I think that becoming is not being in an absolute sense, but derives from or partakes 
in it. In this way, becoming is a derivative or lower degree, but it is also being. 
265 Making in this last case a metaphor from the genus to the species (to call a species not by its proper 
name but by the name of its genus; see Aristotle’s Poetics 1457b9-11). If the genus is ‘being’ and the two 
degrees (species) are ‘forms’ and ‘becoming,’ what happens in the passage is that the idealists call the 
‘forms’ with the name of the genus, i.e., ‘being.’ The reason they use such a metaphor could be to 
emphasize that forms are the higher degree of being, and, perhaps, to make clear that the final explanation 
of becoming lies in the forms. 








incorporeal, and stay the same, whereas becoming is sensible, corporeal, and changes over 
time. The idealists’ metaphysics, then, is formed by the following claims:  
Idealism (I) 
I1. If something is a GB it is a form, otherwise it is becoming.  
I2. Forms are intelligible and incorporeal. 
I3. GB and becoming are separate.  
I4. Human beings share with both becoming, and with GB.  
I5. Every GB stays always the same in the same manner.  
I6. Becoming is different at different times.   
The account shows a tension between separation and sharing: GB and becoming are 
separate yet human beings share with both. Notice how separation here seems to imply like 
in the Parmenides, that forms are not in us (see Ch. 3, sec. 4; cf. Ch. 1, sec. 8.2). If I1 and I3 
are the case, I4 seems inconsistent. The ES’s cross-examination will start exactly with this 
point, asking for an explanation of the notion of sharing: “But, best of all men, what then 
shall we say you mean by this sharing in both?” (248b2-3).266 He then asks if it can be 
explained by what has been said about power; if sharing is “an affection or a product of 
some power generated from intercourse between each other” (248b5-6).267 A positive 
answer would mean that sharing is either some kind of power, or the outcome of some 
interaction. This is a crucial question at the end of the passage since this is going to be one 
of the implicit metaphysical conclusions. But at this point, the ES explains that the idealists 
reject the proposal. They accept the existence of powers, but “they say that becoming shares 
in the power of producing and being affected, but the power of neither of these fits with 
being [i.e. GB].” (248c7-9). It follows, then, that no incorporeal or intelligible being shares 
with power. Therefore, power cannot explain how humans share in GB, and consequently 
cannot solve the tension in their account nor count as the criterion of existence. This thesis 
differentiates the idealists from the theory of forms as argued in the Republic, where 
knowledge is clearly described as a kind of power (see Republic 477c1-d9). It also 
contrasts with the section of the sun analogy that stresses the good’s agency (see Ch. 2, 
sec. 6), and with the active capacity of nous in the Phaedo (see Ch. 1, sec. 7.2).  
                                                
266 There is a discussion about the connection of κοινωνεῖν with the combination of forms in Sophist 
251e-ff. See Cornford (1935, 239, n.1), and McCabe (2000, 85, n.89). See also Phaedo 100d6, Republic 
5.476a7, Parmenides 152a2, and Gorgias 507e-508a. 
267 This is something that would establish a reciprocal relation between forms and their participants, see 
Ch. 3, sec. 4.   
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The idealists hold the contradictory position to the ES’s proposal. They affirm: 
I7. Some being does not act nor is affected (cf. P3-4).  
Even if humans manage to share268 in the two realms of being because of their 
composite nature, the idealists would have to explain how humans constitute a unified 
organism. Moreover, even if they think that humans are their souls, and GB has the 
description above (I1), it is not clear what kind of sharing souls would have of it. The only 
thing they declared was that souls are in connection with GB “through reasoning” (διὰ 
λογισµοῦ, Sophist 248a11; cf. Ch. 1, and 3, sec. 6). The ES will press that point and ask the 
idealists whether knowing (τὸ γιγνώσκειν) and being known (τὸ γιγνωσκόµενον) are an 
action, an affection, or both (ποίηµα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀµφότερον, Sophist 248d4-5). The question 
allows many responses,269 but the idealists accept none of them. In support of their view, 
they argue: 
If knowing is to produce something, being known is necessarily in turn to be 
affected. Being, under this account, since it is known by reason, as far as it is 
known, changes because it is affected, which we say cannot happen to what is at 
rest [i.e. being] (Sophist 248d10-e4).270 
This answer rejects the claim that knowing is an action. To answer the ES’s question 
it takes for granted two ideas. First, it takes it as absurd to think that knowing is an affection, 
since the idealists completely ignore this possibility. They might think knowledge is not 
something that happens without the active intervention of the subject. If knowing were 
passive, acquiring knowledge will be easy, without effort, and will not depend on us. But 
this is counterfactual—they may think—at least for intellectual knowledge. Second, they 
assume that explaining knowledge as power implies that there is a causal relationship 
between knowing and being known: if one of them is an action, the other necessarily is an 
affection (see Sophist 248d10-e1). The argument can be understood in the following 
way:271 
Idealism on knowledge (IK) 
IK1. Every GB stays always the same in the same manner. (=I5; see Sophist 
248e4, 248a11-12).  
                                                
268 If, as seems to be accepted in Sophist 247a2-8, when X shares in Y, then X has the character of Y. 
269 This allows up to nine options: (a) both are productive actions; (b) knowing (K) is a productive action, 
being known (BK) an affection; (c) K is a productive action, BK is both an action and an affection;  (d) 
BK is a productive action, K is an affection; (e) both are affections;  (f) K is an affection, BK is both; (g) 
BK is a productive action, K is both; (h) BK is an affection, K is both; (i) both are productive actions and 
affections. Cf. Brown’s (1998, 196) list of five alternatives. 
270 Not everybody agrees this passage belongs to the idealists. See Mackenzie (1986, 142-4). 
271 Cf. Brown (1998, 197), Mackenzie (1986, 143-4), Keyt (1969, 2), and von Wolfgang (2004, 311). 








IK2. If knowing is a productive action, then being known is to be affected 
(248d10-e1).  
IK3. GB is known (246b7-8, 248e2).  
IK4. To be affected is to be changed (248e3-4).   
IK5. Knowing is an action (Supp.; 248d10-e1).   
IK6. Being known is to be affected (2, 5 MPP).  
IK7. GB is affected (3, 6 HS).  
IK8. GB is changed (4, 7 HS).  
IK9. But IK1 and IK8 cannot be both true.  
IK10. Therefore, it is not the case that IK5. 
The idealists accept premises (IK1-4), and suppose (IK5) to show that from its 
acceptance can be deduced its negation (IK10). It is important to stress, however, that the 
idealists give no positive explanation of what knowledge is, nor a full justification for their 
thesis that GB does not fit with the ES’s proposal (which was stated in 248c7-9). The 
question asked at Sophist 248b2-3, about the communication between humans and GB, 
remains unanswered. The challenge, we may think, is that this version of idealism does not 
hold together, like Anaxagoras’ proposal in the Phaedo (see Ch. 1, sec. 5). Moreover, the 
ES sees in IK a remedy that is worse than the problem it tries to solve. He interrupts the 
descent method and asks Theaetetus not as spokesperson of the idealists but in his own 
mind:   
ES.—What, by Zeus? Shall we be so easily persuaded (πεισθησόµεθα) that 
change, life, soul, and intelligence (φρόνησις) are truly not present in absolute 
being, and that it neither lives nor thinks, but solemn and pure, has no nous, is 
changeless and stands still? 
Th.—We would assent indeed to a terrible account, Stranger (Sophist 248e6-
249a3).  
This opens again the tensions found in Phaedo and Republic between the 
description of forms as changeless, and the puzzle about nous’s agency. The reason to 
reject IK is—the ES warns—that it will concede that nous is not present in GB, here called 
absolute being (τὸ παντελῶς ὄν).272 The ES points out an implication chain between change 
and the other elements: ChangeàLifeàSoulàIntelligenceà Nous. 
                                                
272 That τὸ παντελῶς ὄν is the same as GB is clear because it is described twice as changeless and at a 
standstill (249a2, and 10), which is the main characteristic of GB. See Politis (2006, 150). 
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According to this, without change, life is impossible, and without it, there is no nous. 
This can be understood as follows: 
The ES’s counterargument (CA) 
CA1. If IK1, then there is no life, soul, intelligence, or nous in GB (Sophist 248e6-
249a3). 
CA2. But there is change, life, soul, intelligence, and nous in GB (Sophist 249a4-
b4).  
CA3. Therefore, ¬IK1 (MTT 1, 2).273 
The argument goes against one of the fundamental claims of idealism (I5=IK1). The 
strength of the argument lies in premise CA2. The ES and Theaetetus agree that denying it 
seems “irrational” (249b1). Taking this for granted, the ES determines that it must be 
conceded that change and what implies change is present in GB (see Sophist 249a4-b4). If 
this is true, changelessness is not a mark of all GBs, and cannot be a criterion of distinction 
between them and becoming. The argument, however, is not collapsing the distinction. It 
just implies that the realm of GB is composed not only of changeless forms, but also of 
nous (which implies intelligence, soul, and thus, change), and perhaps some forms that have 
some type of change. For instance, later in the Sophist, it is said that the form of change 
seems to necessarily be changing (see Sophist 250a8-250b6). What is clear is that this 
argument never implies that all forms change. 
If CA is right, then the conclusion IK10 does not follow. IK was an argument 
designed to explain the idealists’ rejection of power as an explanation of how the soul 
shares with GB (see Sophist 248d4-5). Since IK is ineffective, that leaves open the door to 
explain the human soul’s sharing in GB as some kind of power. But if the soul has a power 
relation with the other GBs that means forms have some power either to act on or to be 
affected by the soul (which goes against I6). This would give support to the improved 
materialists and the ES in claiming that power is a criterion of existence,274 since power 
will be connatural to both GB and becoming. Moreover, it means that GB and becoming are 
connected through souls, and that in this way it is possible for one side to have power over 
the other. This means that, although the distinction between GB and becoming survives, it 
                                                
273 See also Sophist 249c11-d1. Against this reading see Diès (1963, 39-88). Cf. von Wolfgang (2004, 
312). 
274 Although the ES will not talk again about power in the gigantomachia, the concept is used afterwards 
in Sophist 251e7-9, which supports the idea that it was accepted by both the materialists and the idealists. 
See Leigh (2009).  








is modified from a question of degrees of being to one of sorts of being which can 
participate in causal processes. Instead of degrees where one is more being than the other, 
there are two sorts equal in terms of being although different in other respects. This can be 
read as the Sophist’s solution to the epistemological objection of the greatest difficulty.  
The text, however, gives no explicit answer to what are the specifics of the power 
relation between the soul and the forms. Is it implied that knowing is a productive action? If 
so, it follows that forms are changed by being known. Some scholars have thought so,275 
but that conclusion does not follow from any of the agreed premises nor it is stated 
anywhere in the text (see IK9). Moreover, it seems to be rejected at Sophist 249b8-10. 
Another option is, in contrast, to think that forms are unchangeable, and knowing is to be 
affected by forms.276 A completely passive description of knowing, however, is 
problematic. As I have mentioned, it will make knowing something acquired accidentally, 
without effort, and involving no action from the subject. But there is no reason to think that 
the ES has that conception of knowledge. When the idealists offer IK, they ignore this 
option, and the ES seems tacitly to concur.277  
There is, however, one plausible way out. It is possible that when the soul knows it is 
both affected by the forms, and performs an action, but not an action that affects the forms 
at all. Instead, the soul’s action may affect something different, for example, the person’s 
attitudes, actions, and words. This leaves open the possibility that forms can be both active 
and not be affected, nor changed by anything. This is not only compatible with what has 
                                                
275 Moravcsik (1962, 38-40) and Owen (1966, 290-292), who following their formal interpretation of the 
passage, think that all forms are affected in being known, since forms can be predicates of ‘knowledge’-
attributing sentences (X knows Y). They think the gigantomachia concludes that in a sense everything 
changes, and in another, nothing. The argumentation in Sophist 248e6-249b4, however, only concludes 
that some GB change and not necessarily all of them. Moreover, the grammar of the sentence is not going 
to solve the problem of which thing is acting and which one is being affected. In cases of perception or 
knowledge a sentence like ‘X sees Y,’ could be an ellipsis of ‘Y imprints an image in X.’ McCabe (1999, 
144, 260), and Reeve (1985, 61), suggest that the way in which the forms change is only a ‘Cambridge 
change.’ But if the argument does not conclude that all forms change, there is no motivation for this 
interpretation. Sure all things change in a Cambridge sense, but I do not see any textual evidence to think 
that Plato is referring to change in that sense. If some GB change, and they change in a non-Cambridge 
sense, in what sense could it be? There is no explicit answer in the gigantomachia either. One possibility, 
however, is to think that some GB are immaterial self-movers (like nous or souls). For souls as self-
movers see Silverman (2002, 296). See also Ch. 1, sec. 4.  
276 See Brown (1998, 199).  
277 Leigh (2010, 67-72) also rejects Brown’s reading but for very different reasons. She argues that the 
criticism against the idealists is designed to “undermine the equivalence, assumed by the friends, between 
relations of actions and affection and relations of changing and being changed, and so to further clarify 
the proposal about being.” The problem with this reading is that it is false that the friends assume the 
equivalence between production/affection and change/changed. The text only establishes a one-way 
relation. Something changes because it is affected (see κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν at 248e3-4, IK4). 
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been agreed, but it is the only option that has not been directly or tacitly rejected.278 
According to this picture, knowledge would be a complex phenomenon that involves at 
least two productive relations: from forms to souls, and from souls to other things. The 
activity of the soul could include actions before and after the action of forms on it. To be 
affected by the forms the soul, perhaps, needs to turn her attention to the right place (similar 
to what is said in Republic 7.515c-d, and Parmenides 135b8; see Ch. 3, sec. 8), ask the right 
questions, and examine false opinions, among other things. But after being affected by 
them, knowing may also imply acting in accordance with the forms, for instance, behaving 
justly in the case of knowing the form of justice.279  
Specifically, if the passage implies the complex conception of knowledge I am 
suggesting, then it goes against the idealists’ separation of GB and becoming (I2). There 
would be at least one active connection between forms and becoming: knowledge done by 
souls which can become and change, and which are affected by what they know. Note, 
however, that the connection between souls and forms belongs to GB, so the real 
connection with becoming does not come until a soul, affected by a form, acts and produces 
an effect in the realm of becoming; there is no direct link here between forms and 
becoming, other than via the souls that are affected by knowing them.  
 Human beings, then, are the gatekeepers and link between the two sorts of beings. 
This is possible, it seems, because human nous has a double nature. It is incorporeal like the 
forms, but it is affected and changes like bodies.280 This is supported by a discussion a 
couple of pages after the gigantomachia, where the ES and Theaetetus agree that there are 
things that function like bonds which communicate things that cannot communicate 
directly, like vowels that link consonants to form words: ‘the vowels spread differently 
through all the other [letters] like a bond, so [that] without one of them it is also 
impossible for the others to fit together one with another’ (Sophist 252e9-253a2). In the 
same way, the soul is a bond between the intelligible and the visible part of the world. This, 
in addition, answers the Phaedo’s question about how nous was able to connect forms and 
particulars (see Ch. 1, sec. 9).  
                                                
278 Consider the nine options of note 269 to answer Sophist 248d4-5. As I have explained, the idealist and 
the ES seem to take for granted that knowing is not completely passive, and if one of the options is active, 
the other has to be passive, and vice versa. This excludes, on the one hand, options (d), and (f), and on the 
other hand, options (a), and (e). From the five remaining options there are four in which being known will 
be in some way affected (b, c, h, and i). Nevertheless, choosing either of them will entail that all GB, and 
with this all forms, are affected, and change, which goes against Sophist 249b8-10. The only option left is 
(g), which considers being known as a productive action, and knowing as both, an action and an affection.  
279 Note that in all of these actions, the soul can become better over time.  
280 This, again, recalls the myth, and Heracles as a demigod who shares in both the earth and the heavens, 
and is responsible for deciding the battle. 








There is a last argument against the idealists. There might be some of them that 
accept the ES’s argumentation, and embrace power as the criterion of existence. After all, 
they are more civilised and used to argumentation than the original materialists. But there 
might be others that remain stubborn even if their arguments have been rejected. Remember 
that they defend their views vehemently. But if they remain unconvinced because they are 
stubborn, there is not much the ES can do for them. Nevertheless, it still seems necessary to 
argue against their account, because they may be, for instance, misleading other people. For 
that reason, the ES addresses his last argument not to the idealists but to Theaetetus. It 
explains why people should reject not only these stubborn idealists but more generally, any 
account that makes nous disappear:  
ES. — In fact, it turns out that (1) if <all>281 beings are changeless, there is no 
nous for anybody anywhere.  
Th. —Exactly.  
ES. —And, on the other hand, if we agree that everything is moving and 
changing, by this argument, the very same thing [i.e., nous] will be also removed 
from the beings.   
Th. —How? 
ES. —Do you think that, without rest, something at some time could become 
constant with respect to the same thing and towards the same thing?  
Th. —Never.  
ES. —And what? Do you think that without these a nous could be or take place 
(ὄντα ἤ γενόµενον) anywhere? 
Th. —Not at all. 
ES. —Well then, at any rate, with any argument, we must fight against him who, 
while removing knowledge, thought or nous, maintains strongly any claim about 
anything (Sophist 249b5-249c8). 
The argument gives an account of the conditions of existence of nous. The ES seems 
to talk about nous in the two different realms: in relation to the immaterial and in relation to 
becoming (that will explain the distinction between ὄντα ἤ γενόµενον in Sophist 249c3). A 
nous can be or take place anywhere. But the conditions for its existence are the existence of 
rest, constancy, and change. Without these three things, nous is impossible. But nous 
cannot disappear because it is the link between forms and particulars. The problem with 
an account that makes nous impossible is that it is self-defeating. If someone expels nous 
from her ontology she performs a contradiction, since her account implies that giving and 
understanding an account—which is something only nous can do—is impossible (this also 
                                                
281 For Badham’s addition of πάντων to line 249b5 see Robinson (1999, 153), and Cornford (1935, 241, 
n.1). 
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works, I believe, as a refutation of the dissenters from the greatest difficulty who make the 
ontological objection).282  
7. The children’s wish 
The ES ends the gigantomachia with this concluding remark: 
As it seems, indeed, for the philosopher and for someone who most values these 
things, it is absolutely necessary for these reasons to reject those who say that the 
whole is at rest whether as one or even as the many forms, and on the other hand, 
nor must he listen at all to those who say that being is changing everywhere, but 
like the children’s prayer, he must say that being and the whole is both, that 
which is unchanging and that which is changed (Sophist 249c10-d4).     
The passage seems to establish a treaty between those who have accepted power as 
the criterion of existence (see Sophist 249c10; and Ch. 5, sec. 2, to see how the Stoics fit 
into this group). The ES’s Herculean intervention in the dispute between materialists and 
idealists does not achieve absolute peace. The ES makes alliances with the moderates from 
both sides, and now rejects any party who remains an extremist—including not only the 
materialists but also the monists. Note how, again, a metaphysical and epistemological 
outcome has led to specific attitudes and actions. The ES draws a practical conclusion 
(reject and fight certain people) from a theoretical discussion.  
In relation with the dialectical objection of the greatest difficulty, this concedes that a 
philosophical account might never reach unanimous approval, but tries only to reject the 
extreme views. The moderates, however, may disagree in many things but they all accept in 
their ontology the existence of bodies, virtues, nous, and the appropriate attitudes and skills 
to have a philosophical conversation and seek the truth. The ES’s final recommendation is 
that philosophers should be as children who desire everything.283 They should desire a 
comprehensive account of being, able to include change and rest, and an account able to 
explain how this is possible without separation.  
 The specific metaphysics and epistemology agreed at the end of the passage is a 
complex work–in-progress picture. First, it seems that power stands as a valid criterion of 
                                                
282 Note that those who maintain that everything changes might not be the materialists who have been arguing 
here, since they never directly state that the world of perceptible things is a “moving becoming.” This is only 
idealists’ talk. The materialists can complain this is no accurate representation of their view since, for them, 
bodies might already imply individuation, and permanence. They might think, for instance, that even if bodies 
are always moving, some of them are eternal, like the sun and the stars. This means that this last argument only 
rejects stubborn idealists, and the idealists’ understanding of materialists, which reduces materialism to the 
thesis that everything changes. Cf. Plato’s understanding of Heraclitus in Cratylus 402a. See also 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics 4.5, 1010a10-15 (DK 22B91). But since the idealists are misidentifying the 
materialists, the idealists accidentally bring to the discussion another account of being. The ES seems aware of 
this, since he said the idealists “break down into small pieces the bodies of their opponents and the truth spoken 
by them” (Sophist 246b9-c2). However, the ES includes this new account among the doctrines to be rejected.  
283 This looks back to Sophist 242c8-243b1. 








existence, which allows three possible sorts of being: what can only act, what can only be 
affected, and what can do both. In addition, it rules out the existence of anything that has no 
power at all. As subsets of these, there are, on the one hand, bodies, all of which have the 
power to act and be affected. Here are included ensouled bodies, and perhaps souls (since 
there is no agreement about soul’s nature). All bodies seem able to change, but since the 
possibility of eternal bodies is not ruled out, it is not necessary to think that all of them 
come to be. Therefore, it seems that becoming and bodies are only two sets, although these 
share an intersection. On the other hand, there are what the idealists called GBs. Although 
they are no longer a “higher degree” of being, they still form a different set from that of 
bodies, so they all are incorporeal. Here are included changeless forms, but also other 
elements that can change, including some changing forms, and life, soul, intelligence, and 
nous. In the case of life, soul, intelligence, and nous, it may be that they can both self-move 
and be affected by something else.  
Human beings have nous, and mortal bodies. It is unclear whether human nous comes 
to be or not, but it has access to the forms, and is part of GB, but can also produce change in 
particular things. This means that GB and becoming are communicated by the actions of the 
knower, who is the thing responsible for whatever is done. The concept of sharing, then, is 
an active one. Sharing is, as the ES suggests at Sophist 248b5-6, an affection or a product of 
some power. If a nous shares in a form, that means it is affected by it (cf. Ch. 1, sec. 7.2, 
and 8.6).284  
The gigantomachia offers, however, no definitive account of being or about what 
sorts of beings there are. As I have tried to show, if the analysis takes into consideration the 
structure of the passage and includes all the parts of the text, it becomes clear that its aim is 
more ambitious. It is a wide-ranging reflection on what counts as a philosophical account of 
being, what aspects should be included for a full understanding of it and why, and which 
mistakes a philosopher should avoid to escape giving a reductive or mistaken account.  
Many of these considerations have a general application. The text shows that the 
practice of philosophy is not about being right or irrefutable on a specific topic, but about 
seeking and understanding the truth in a holistic way, since otherwise the explanatory 
power would be partial, and the consistency with other beliefs and decisions self-defeating. 
The passage shows that a discussion of a topic is accompanied not only with arguments, but 
also with metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, argumentative strategies, and a 
heavy ethical component. It also shows that these aspects are all interdependent, and thus, 
                                                
284 This reveals much more of what Aristotle is willing to accept in Metaphysics 2.6, 987b10-ff. 
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inseparable.285 And if that is the case, then, the suggestion is that philosophy must include a 
reflection of all of them. This means that according to the gigantomachia, any philosophical 
discussion should include a careful examination of the following five aspects and their 
interrelations:  
• Ethical aspect: attitudes, personal qualities, behaviour, etc.     
• Argumentative strategy: method, valid and invalid moves, types of arguments, use 
of myths, etc.  
• Epistemological assumptions: about the conception of knowledge, knowledge 
acquisition, justification, etc.  
• Metaphysical assumptions: about ontological status, nature, cause, etc.  
• Main topic of discussion: arguments, examples, counterexamples, evidence, etc.   
Since any account or speech includes all these interconnected aspects, even if people 
ignore one or more of them, that does not change the fact that they still affect the discussion. 
The gigantomachia tries to make this point clear. It is firmly against the idea that we can do 
metaphysics (or seek the truth in any other subject) by only considering the first-order 
arguments. Reflecting on all the aspects is no easy task, but Plato, by writing in dialogue 
form and designing the nesting of different dialogues into each other, is able to include and 
distinguish all of them in his argumentation. It is through the dialogue form that Plato 
shows how attitudes, strategies, and assumptions impact the first order arguments, and vice 
versa. In this way, Plato invites the reader to consider the first order arguments about being, 
but also to take a step back and reflect about the other aspects that guide the discussion.  
It is only by considering all these aspects and their connections that it is possible to 
understand how a conception of being affects and is affected by the way people conceive 
reality, knowledge, argumentation, their actions, and attitudes, among other things. 
Understanding and testing if they are consistent with each other is essential to articulating a 
philosophical account of being. Then, to the metaphysical-epistemological picture, the 
agreements and decisions made in the other aspects should also be added.  
A philosophical account of being, then, should include change and changeless beings, 
and how they are connected. It should be an account that makes knowledge and nous 
possible; that is not dogmatic, but open to mistakes, reformulations, and new information; 
an account that is able to explain the fundamental nature of all the pieces of reality we 
accept, including virtues, and intelligible entities. It should be an account that knows why 
                                                
285 One of the mistakes of the predecessors is to ignore many of these aspects. This would not be a 
problem if it were not for the fact that they affect each other. 








other arguments and theories fail, with what level of confidence the different theses are 
affirmed, and under what conditions that confidence is modified. It should be, most of all, 
an account under constant and careful scrutiny of all its aspects.   
This is also a way out of the dialectical puzzle of the greatest difficulty (see Ch. 3, 
sec. 2, and 8). Socrates’ account was unable to address a dialectical difficulty that involved 
two objections, an epistemological one and an ontological one based on the first one. 
Parmenides explained to Socrates how the objections had terrible consequences that should 
be rejected, but it is until we read the discussion in the Sophist that we get an explanation of 
how nous has to have a bonding nature able to link the intelligible with the sensible. But 
more importantly, Plato’s way to deal with the dialectical objection is to reflect and discuss 
the requirements, context, and different aspects interrelated in a discussion about being. It 
might not be possible to persuade everyone, but we can advance in the understanding of 
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CHAPTER 5. The Stoic solution to Plato’s Greatest 
Difficulty 
This chapter analyses Stoic philosophy through the light of Plato’s discussion about 
causality and responsibility. The aim is to show that Plato’s dialogues and arguments were 
carefully interpreted and discussed by the Stoics, and that this Platonic background explains 
the interconnections and starting points of some of the most important aspects of early Stoic 
philosophy. Moreover, through an analysis of the evidence as both building a coherent 
system, and responding to Plato’s dialogues, I show that it is necessary to rethink the nature 
of the relation between Plato and the Stoics. Clarifying this point leads, moreover, to 
rediscovering the Stoics as more engaged with and more charitable to Plato’s dialogues.  
The chapter is divided into eight sections. First I discuss the evidence to decide what 
type of access the Stoics had to Plato, especially to the Sophist.  In sections 2-3, I discuss 
Stoic corporealism, and the inclusion of incorporeals in their ontology. In section 4, I 
evaluate the Stoic notion of the highest genus, and in section 5, their rejection of forms, and 
their notion of concepts. In sections 6-7 I discuss the Stoic conception of causality and 
responsibility. Finally, in the last section I discuss the Stoic proposal to explain the power of 
conversation.  
1.  The Stoics’ relation with Plato 
1.1 The Stoics reading Plato 
Most scholars are careful in recognise that Stoicism is in debt to Plato’s philosophy. The 
nature and extent of this impact, however, has been portrayed in different ways.286 Besides, 
their reception of Plato was undeniably informed by the philosophical production of 
Plato’s predecessors, contemporaries, and two generations of successors and 
critics.287Given the lack of detailed evidence, it is a common practice to point out passages 
in the Platonic corpus as antecedents to the Stoic account, without elaborating too much on 
                                                
286 See Hahm (1977), and Gourinat (2009), and Sellars (2010). 
287 The Stoics had, apart from Plato and the Academics, a wide interest in their predecessors, and 
contemporaries, especially Heraclitus, the Cynics, and the Megarian school. They, above all, saw 
themselves as heirs of the philosophical tradition initiated by Socrates. See Philodemus, De Stoicis XIII 3, 
and Sedley’s (2003, 11) remarks about it. For the impact of Heraclitus on the Stoics, see Long (1975-6); 
the case of the Stoic engagement with Aristotle is complicated. For the discussion see Hahm (1977), and 
Sandbach (1985). Modern scholars tend to favour Sandbach’s thesis that the Stoics had no or very limited 
access to Aristotle’s works. 








how to understand the connection.288 Some works devoted to exploring the relationship 
between the Stoics and the Platonists have made a huge progress in our understanding of 
the topic. These works, however, have focused mainly in analysis of the ontology, and 
cosmology, often assuming a dogmatic and unitarian reading of Plato’s dialogues.289  
The debate about Stoic causes and responsibility has centred, in turn, around showing 
how it fits with the Stoic system, and how it helps to understand other areas of it.290 Only a 
handful of papers devote their attention to the Stoic reception of Plato’s account of 
causation and responsibility.291 This research has helped to reconsider some passages 
previously neglected, and to advance our understanding of the close relationship between 
the first Stoics and the Old Academy. These studies, however, privilege the Timaeus as the 
main connection with the Stoics, and tend to understand the Sophist mainly as an 
ontological discussion. This presents the Stoic reception of Plato as mostly engaged with 
Plato’s late constructive passages. But this leaves out the possibility of a more complex 
picture, assuming that the Stoics were superficial readers of Plato, or that their access to his 
work was very limited.  
There are good reasons to think the early Stoa had direct access to Plato’s dialogues. 
It seems that Zeno, the founder of the school, was interested in Plato’s philosophy since he 
was a young man. Even before migrating to Athens, Zeno was an avid reader of Socratic 
dialogues, probably including some of Plato’s works. According to Themistius, for 
example, the reading of an Apology of Socrates triggered Zeno’s voyage from Citium to 
Athens.292 In his Republic—an early work probably written during his time with the Cynic 
Crates—Zeno proposed a political project which examined numerous topics also discussed 
                                                
288 For the Stoics alluding to the Phaedo see, for instance, Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.138, 14-139, 8 (SVF 1.89; 
2.336; LS55A; FDS 762; BS 14.10); Clement, Stromata, 8.9.25.1.1-27.5.3; 31.1-33.9 (SVF 1.488; 2.344-
351; LS 55C-D, I; FDS 763-764; BS 14.11); DL 7.135-7 (SVF 1.102 and 2.580; LS46B; BS 15.3); DL 
7.87-89 (BS 23.1); Eusebius PE 15.20.1-7 (SVF 1.128; 141;519; LS53W; FDS 423); Gellius 7.1.1-13 
(SVF 2.1169-70; LS54Q); DL 7.135-6 (SVF 1.102; LS46B); Sextus Empiricus AM 9.98. For connections 
with Plato’s Republic see Plutarch CN 1034E (LS31L); Aetius 1.7.33 (SVF 2.1027; LS46A); Stobaeus 
Eclogae 1.213, 15-21 (SVF1.120; LS46D); Stobaeus Eclogae 1.25, 4-27, 4 (SVF 1.537; LS54I); Pseudo-
Galen, De Historia Philosophica 35, 24-29 (BS13.5); Tertullian, De anima, 5, 2-6 (SVF 1.518; 2.773; 
FDS 426; BS 13.8). For Parmenides see Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.136, 21-137,6 (SVF 1.65; LS30A; FDS 
316; BS4.1); Aetius 1.10.3-5 (SVF 1.65 and 2.360; FDS 317); Syrianus, in metaph. 105, 19-30 and 106, 
5-8 (SVF 2.364 & 3 Arch. 13; LS30H; FDS 318A). For the Sophist see Seneca, Ep. 58.11-15 (SVF 2.332; 
LS27A; BS2.1); Cicero, Acad. 1.39 (SVF 1.90; LS45A; BS 2.10). Most scholars agree that the Stoic 
doctrines remind us and often have their origin in debates initiated by Plato and their successors. See, for 
example, the seminal remarks in Long & Sedley (1987, 158-437), and Brunschwig (1988); more recently 
Sedley (2002), Gourinat (2009), and Vogt (2009). 
289 Thus, touching on causality and explanation only incidentally. See, for example, Reydams-Schils 
(1999). 
290 See Duhot (1989), Bobzien (1999), Hankinson (2000), Meyer (2009), and Totschnig (2013). 
291 See Frede (1987), Sedley (2002), Bénatouïl (2009), and Salles (2013). 
292 Themistius, Orat. 23.295d (SVF 1.9). See also Sandbach (1975, 20). 
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in Plato’s Republic.293 After studying with Crates, and Stilpo, he then studied in Polemo’s 
Academy,294 where he surely studied Plato’s works in more detail.295  
Zeno interest in Plato’s works did not diminish when he started teaching his own 
philosophy at the Stoa. According to Plutarch, Zeno “continued to write against Plato’s 
Republic, solving sophisms, and urging his students to undertake dialectic since it is able to 
do this.”296 But the first Stoics were interested in other dialogues too. Persaeus, one of 
Zeno’s and Cleanthes’ closest associates, for example, followed his advice by writing a 
reply to Plato’s Laws in seven books.297 It seems that the dialogue form profoundly 
impressed Persaeus, since he even wrote dialogues featuring himself and Zeno.298 One 
of Persaeus’s students, Hermagoras of Amphipolis, is said to have also written 
dialogues.299  Herillus of Chalcedon, another Stoic from the first generation, was even 
criticised for agreeing more with Plato than with Zeno.300  
There is also linguistic evidence that Zeno read other dialogues. Apart from parallels 
with the Timaeus,301 in Stobaeus’ report, for example, Zeno’s (and also Chrysippus’) 
definition of τὸ αἴτιον as ‘that because of which’ (δι’ ὅ)302 echoes Cratylus 413a3-4: ‘for 
that because of which something comes to be is the αἴτιον.’ In the same report, Zeno’s 
examples of how an αἴτιον acts echo the formulation of Socrates’ safe answer at Phaedo 
100c-d. Compare Zeno’s ‘because of prudence “being prudent” takes place,’ with 
statements like ‘it is by the beautiful that beautiful things are beautiful’ at Phaedo 100e2-
3.303 Zeno and other Stoics also have in mind Plato’s texts when they use the word µετέχειν 
                                                
293 For the agreements and disagreements between Zeno’s and Plato’s Republic, see DL 7.32-34 (SVF 
1.226; LS67B; BS30.12); Plutarch, De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 329a-b (SVF 1.262; LS67A; 
BS30.7); DL 7.121-125, 130-131 (SVF 3.355; 3.642; 3.697; 3.757; 3 Apollodorus 17; LS66H; 67P; 
BS30.20); Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 561c (SVF 1.263; LS67D; BS30.33); Plutarch, De Stoicorum 
Repugnantiis 8, 1034F (SVF 1.260). See also Schofield (1999, 756-760), Erskine (1990, ch. 1), Schofield 
(1991, ch. 1), Dawson (1992, ch. 4). 
294 See DL 7.2; Cicero, Academica post., 1.35 (SVF 1.13). 
295 Arcesilaus’ disagreements with Zeno started, it seems, as a difference on how to interpret Plato. See 
Numenius apud Eusebius, Preparatio Evangelica 14.6.9 732B (SVF 1.12). See also Brittain (2006, xiii), 
Alesse (2000, 115), and Long (2006, ch. 5).    
296 Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1034E9-F1 (SVF 1.50; 1.78; 1.260; LS31L; BS 5.10). 
297 DL 7.36.  
298 See Athenaeus 162e-d (SVF 1.452). 
299 See Suda, s.v. (SVF 1.462). 
300 Cicero, Academica Pr. 2.129 (SVF 1.413). 
301 The Stoic relation with Plato’s Timaeus has been discussed widely. See Sedley (2002), D. Frede 
(2005), and Reydams-Schils (1999). 
302 Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae 1.138, 14-139, 8 (SVF 1.89; 2.336; LS 55A; FDS  762; BS 
14.10). 
303 See also Sextus Empiricus AM 9.98. 








(‘to partake’), when they say that while ideas are unreal, we partake on concepts (I will 
come back to this later).304  
It seems that subsequent generations of Stoics continued studying Plato, and the 
history of philosophy more generally. Cleanthes, for example, wrote four books on 
interpretations of Heraclitus, one against Democritus, and some of his works like his 
Statesman possibly engaged with Plato’s dialogue of the same name. There are also reports 
where Chrysippus discusses Plato’s philosophy. Proclus, for example, states that 
Chrysippus compared mathematical theorems with forms.305 He thought that one of Plato’s 
motivations for the introduction of forms was a reflection over linguistic conventions, as 
Syrianus’ criticism attests: ‘the forms were not introduced by these divine men [Plato, the 
Parmenideans, and Pythagorics] for the use of linguistic convention, as Chrysippus, 
Archedemus, and many of the later Stoics thought.’306 Chrysippus also discussed the 
ontological status of forms, a context in which he offered his famous ‘not-someone’ 
argument.307  
1.2 The scholarly debate about the Stoics’ relation with the Sophist 
All this evidence makes very plausible that the Stoics have also read and discussed 
Plato’s Sophist. Moreover, thanks to Jacques Brunschwig’s seminal paper, ‘La Théorie 
Stoïcienne Du Genre Supreme et L’ontologie Platonicienne,’ most scholars nowadays agree 
that the Stoic doctrine of the highest genus emerged from a critical reading of the Sophist.308 
Brunschwig considers especially relevant the gigantomachia passage, and Sophist 237d, 
although he was careful not to claim the Stoics engaged directly with Plato’s text (1988, 
118). He is right, however, in noting various echoes of the language used and the themes 
discussed in the Sophist. There is, for example, a linguistic parallel between the Stoic use of 
τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον309 and Plato’s discussion of δύναµις in terms of τὸ ποιεῖν and τὸ 
παθεῖν at Sophist 247d8-e4 (see Ch. 4, sec. 5). Another parallel is Zeno’s choice of 
‘prudence’ and later ‘being alive’ when he uses the safe answer formulation (see Stobaeus’ 
report above), which could be a reference to how the safe answer formula is used in the 
Sophist’s gigantomachia, when the ES uses the same examples in his cross-examination of 
the materialists (see Sophist 247a2-247b4; see Ch. 4, sec. 4-5). 
                                                
304 Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae et Ethycae, 1.136, 21-137, 6 (SVF 1.65; LS 30A; FDS 316; BS 4.1). 
305 Proclus, In primum Euclidis  Elementorum Librum Comentarii 395, 13-18 (SVF 2.365). 
306 Syrianus, in Metaph. 105, 21-23 (SVF 2.364; LS 30H; FDS 318A; BS 4.5). 
307 Simplicius, in Cat. 105, 7-21 (SVF 2.278; LS30E; FDS 1247; BS 4.4). 
308 See also Brunschwig (2003); Reesor (1989, 13); Sedley (1985); and Aubenque (1991). 
309 DL 7.134. 
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Brunschwig’s suggestion was so eloquent that some scholars were more enthusiastic 
about the outcome of his paper than Brunschwig himself.  To give an example of how his 
paper was received, consider how Caston (1999, 179, n.73), a decade later, describes the 
situation. He claims that Brunschwig ‘conclusively demonstrates how the Stoic distinction 
between bodies and incorporeals rests on a very precise response to the arguments in the 
battle between the Giants and the Friends of the Forms’ (my emphasis).310 Again, a decade 
after Caston’s paper was published, Cooper (2009, 96) linked the Sophist to the Stoic 
doctrine of the two principles by writing ‘It is well-known, I hope, by now that Zeno 
developed this theory of principles through a very close, critical reading of the Eleatic 
Visitor’s discussion, with Theaetetus in Plato’s Sophist, of a so-called battle between some 
philosophical “gods” and some unphilosophical “giants.”’  
Following a similar line, Katja Vogt (2009) argued that the Stoics are ‘sophisticated 
Sons of the Earth’ who developed a complex notion of corporeals from their philosophical 
reading of the Sophist. Behind the agreement that the Stoics critically engaged with Plato’s 
Sophist, however, there is a debate regarding the nature and extent of the Stoic engagement 
with the dialogue. Vogt (2009, 143), for example, disagrees with Brunschwig, and argues 
that the Stoics were not interested in Plato’s ES’s question about what being is, but instead, 
were concerned with the question about what nature is, understood in corporealistic terms. 
She thinks this is the reason why they rearticulated the materialist position of the giants in 
the first place. But if Vogt is right, the Stoic engagement with the Sophist was more 
superficial than initially assumed, since in her reading, the Stoic use of Plato’s dialogue is 
instrumental, partial, and piecemeal, rather than a careful engagement with the detailed 
philosophical debate Plato was fostering. But even before deciding which type of 
engagement the Stoics could have had with Plato’s Sophist, a little bit of caution might be 
necessary.  
It may be that scholars have overstated the Stoic connection with the Sophist, so let 
me consider a possible objection. One may think that although there are linguistic echoes 
and thematic parallels, it is far from clear that the Stoics had a direct access to the dialogue, 
let alone a more sophisticated philosophical engagement. John Sellars (2010, 198-199), for 
example, argues that there is no direct evidence to prove that Zeno or later Stoics read the 
Sophist (or the Parmenides). Therefore, he thinks, there is no need to assume the Sophist is 
the direct source of Stoic materialism and ontology, and that suggestions of a connection 
with the Sophist cannot be demonstrated conclusively (contra Caston). The Stoics, in this 
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‘deflationary’ view, could have developed their philosophy by discussing not directly 
Plato’s dialogues but the contributions of the Old Academy, especially those of Zeno’s 
teacher Polemo.   
This objection makes two good points. It is true that there is no surviving evidence 
saying that any of the Stoics read or discussed the Sophist. It is also important to highlight 
that late fourth-century Academic philosophy must have had a great impact on the 
development of Stoicism. Although the evidence from this period of the Academy is scarce, 
studies like those of Sedley (2002), and Gourinat (2009), have shown that there are some 
Stoic doctrines which had Polemo’s philosophy as its most immediate inspiration, even if 
the Timaeus was the background of these developments. But it will surely be wrong to 
jump, like Sellars does (2010, 201), from there to the conclusion that we should suspend 
judgement about whether the Stoics read the Sophist.  
Demanding from the evidence either the certainty of a conclusive demonstration, or 
else the suspension of judgement, is a false dilemma. There are plenty of other options and 
attitudes towards evidence, including judgements of plausibility, feasibility, and reasonable 
conjectures. Provided that one makes explicit the degree of certainty of a judgement, avoids 
unnecessary assumptions, and offers sound arguments to support one’s decisions, it is far 
more explanatory to try to reconstrue, and make sense of the evidence, than just to advocate 
a suspension of judgement. The problem with the deflationary view is that it is difficult to 
see how it can explain the linguistic and thematic parallels that do appear in the Stoic 
evidence. But ‘deflationary’ views like Sellars’ do not only have less explanatory power, 
but for the sake of economy they may end up trading some assumptions for other less 
charitable ones.  
Consider the prima facie evidence I just offered about the Stoics’ access to other 
Platonic dialogues. Why would it be more plausible to doubt they knew the Sophist rather 
than to assume they did, unless proven otherwise? Even if there is no explicit evidence to 
prove they read this specific dialogue, we do have evidence that they read other dialogues, 
that they showed a sustained interest on Plato’s philosophy, and that there are linguistic 
pieces of evidence and thematic parallels between the Sophist and the Stoic ontology. 
Concerning the Stoic relation with Polemo and the Old Academy, on the other hand, why 
should we have to assume that in this case the Stoics’ engagement with them trumps or was 
more basic than the one they had with Plato?  
Apart from the testimonies that Zeno studied with Polemo, there is no evidence to 
show the Stoics had a direct and sustained interest in him or other Academics as they had 
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with Plato’s dialogues (and not only with Platonism more vaguely). The fact that these 
Academics were more proximate in time than Plato is not in itself enough to guarantee they 
had a more significant impact on Stoicism. Many of my views, for example, are certainly 
more a result of my direct reading and analysis of Aristotle’s and Plato’s works than a 
consequence of my temporal and institutional proximity with MM McCabe, Peter 
Adamson, or Raphael Woolf, even if I have learnt a lot from them. It would be a mistake to 
think the history of philosophy is a linear process of teachers and students where students 
have no direct access, and exegetical autonomy to engage with the works of distant 
generations (unless, of course, there is evidence that the texts were not available, or that 
they are uncritically following someone’s interpretation). It is uncharitable to assume that a 
student’s understanding of a predecessor has to be exclusively through the lenses and 
interpretations of her teachers. This, in any case, is what would need to be proved by the 
evidence, and not the other way around.  
The charitable assumption is to conceive the Stoics as independent thinkers able to 
articulate their own views about their predecessors, unless there is evidence to show 
otherwise. Again, this is not to deny the importance of other philosophers in the formation 
of Stoicism. The Stoic interpretation of Plato and the development of their philosophy is 
undeniably informed by the philosophical production of Plato’s predecessors, 
contemporaries, two generations of successors and critics, as well as their own 
contemporaries.311 There is, however, no other surviving text like the Sophist that can offer 
the context for the emergence of various connections in the Stoic ontology which appear 
otherwise disparate points. Under these circumstances the most sensible approach to the 
evidence we have is to suppose that the Stoics had direct access, and genuine interest in the 
Sophist, and its philosophical contribution.    
For that reason, in this chapter I will take as my working hypothesis that the Stoics 
did read the Sophist. But this hypothesis, which is at least prima facie plausible, does not 
only explain the Stoic doctrines of the highest genus, and the development of their 
corporealism. I shall show that it also explains the Stoic assessment of forms and concepts; 
and more importantly, it explains why these topics are so complexly interconnected for the 
Stoics. This last point means that the complexity of the argumentation in the Sophist 
constitutes evidence to explain the complexity of the Stoic ontology, showing continuity in 
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the philosophical debate initiated by Plato. Therefore, in addition to the linguistic echoes 
and thematic parallels, there is an argument from complexity that links the Sophist with the 
Stoic philosophy.312  
Contrary to what is often assumed, I argue that the Stoics do not take the giants’ 
banner because they are corporealists, but that they became corporealists by engaging in 
solving the philosophical puzzles present in the Sophist, which means that their engagement 
with Plato explains their corporealism. Let me now link this thought to the scholarly debate.  
I think we can be more confident than Brunschwig about the connection with the 
Sophist. But, while accepting Sellars’ point that it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate 
it, as Caston imagines, or to take it for granted, as Cooper does, it is also not necessary to 
fall back to a ‘deflationary’ view. Instead, by taking it as a hypothesis, it is possible to 
explain the development of the complexity and cohesion of the Stoic ontology. From 
looking closely to the texts, however, it will emerge that the nature of the relationship 
between the Stoics and the Sophist is not that of a reactionary response as often assumed, 
nor just a partial engagement as Vogt defends. But this will become clear at the end of this 
chapter. Before that, I will first analyse and compare three main topics in the Stoics that are 
also present in the Sophist: corporealism, the highest genus, and the debate concerning 
forms and concepts. By putting all these pieces together, the Stoic conception of causation 
and responsibility will emerge as their answer to and continuation of the philosophical 
debate initiated by Plato.  
2. The complexity of the Stoic corporealism 
2.1 Defining Stoic bodies  
The Stoic ontology is committed to a set of claims that sound inconsistent. They think 
that only bodies exist. They also argue that souls and virtues are bodies, and that there are 
no forms.313 However, the Stoics do not reduce everything to bodies, since they accept in 
their ontology that there are certain incorporeals. They also think that incorporeals have no 
causal capacity but that they can be thought, and more importantly, that they are essential 
for explanation, and knowledge. But how could incorporeals be part of Stoic ontology when 
they explicitly say that only bodies exist? How can they be called corporealists if they 
include these incorporeals as essential for their ontology and their account of knowledge? 
During antiquity, critics of Stoicism like the Academics, Neoplatonists, and Christian 
                                                
312 I thank MM McCabe for helpful discussion on this aspect.  
313 See, for example, Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, 16, 12-16 (SVF 2.773; FDS 420; BS 13.17). 
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apologists, enjoyed pointing out these and many other alleged contradictions and 
inconsistencies of Stoic philosophy. 
 In reality, however, the Stoics defend a sophisticated and systematic corporealism, 
which although peculiar, is a consistent account carefully put together, refined and 
improved through various generations. The complexity of their corporealism, which gives 
to this view an explanatory power never seen before in a corporealist position, has also been 
a source of astonishment in the sense that it is not entirely obvious how and why the Stoics 
developed this type of corporealism in the first place. It seems that they are committed to 
too many theses that are far away from common sense, pre-theoretical intuitions (ancient 
and modern), and previous philosophical accounts.  
This means that even if their corporealism is consistent it is difficult to see why 
someone would commit to a set of fundamental tenets that sound more obscure than what 
they are trying to show. The Stoics believe, among other unusual doctrines, that god is a 
body, that two different bodies can be in the same place at the same time, and that the world 
is destroyed in a conflagration only to be formed exactly in the same way over and over. 
This leads to two different questions. The first one is why Stoicism has the starting points it 
has, and why is committed to so many awkward claims, and second, why their position is so 
complicatedly intermingled. Let me first start with Stoic corporealism, and see whether 
seeing the Stoics as readers of the Sophist can help us answer these two questions.  
The Stoics describe bodies as whatever has ‘threefold extension314 together with 
resistance (τὸ τριχῇ διασταστὸν µετὰ ἀντιτυπίας),’315 and, they consider contact as crucial 
for bodies’ interaction.316 It is important that bodies present both characteristics, three-
dimensionality (length, breadth, and depth) and resistance, since on the one hand, void, 
which is not a body, is also extended,317 and, on the other hand, because three-
dimensionality seems a necessary condition for something to have contact with other 
bodies, and present resistance. However, resistance needs to be carefully differentiated from 
two similar concepts: impenetrability and limitation. For the Stoics, resistance does not 
imply impenetrability since two Stoic bodies can occupy exactly the same place while still 
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3.5, 204b20-22; and Lucretius, De rerum Natura, 4.419-44 (LS 5B). 
316 Although some distance interaction is also possible. See Sextus Empiricus AM 8.409-410 (SVF 2.85; 
LS 27E; BS 2.4). 
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claiming to be resistant,318 and, it does not imply any type of limitation to be acted upon, 
since there is at least one body (matter) that while resistant, offers no restriction whatsoever 
to what can be imposed on it.  
From other reports, we also get a description of Stoic bodies that makes no reference 
to three-dimensionality, but focuses on their causal power. According to this description, a 
body is anything able to produce something and/or be affected. In Pseudo-Galen’s report, 
for example, we get that bodies are what can ‘produce or be affected (τὸ … ποιεῖν ἢ 
πάσχειν).’319 These two Stoic descriptions of body could have been different definitions 
held by different Stoics. They could also be complementary descriptions of corporeality.320 
There is, unfortunately, no evidence of what exactly the Stoics understood by resistance. 
However, it is possible to speculate that resistance is divided into the bodies’ capacity to 
produce, or be affected. To offer resistance, then, would be to either produce a change in 
another body, or to be able to suffer a change due to the action of another body. Note that 
both to act and to be acted upon presuppose some resistance, since otherwise there is no 
agent or patient to be changed. If this conjecture is right, then the Stoic definition of body 
could be expressed in the following way:  
Body:  for any X, X is a body iff X is extended, and produces something and/or is affected.  
The types of bodies that this definition allows can be divided in the following way:  
1. Simple bodies:  
    1.1 Exclusively productive. 
   1.2 Exclusively passive. 
2. Bodies that can both produce and be affected.  
But the Stoics add another thought. According, for instance, to Plutarch’s reports, the 
Stoics ‘call “beings” (ὄντα) only bodies, since it belongs to beings to produce something 
and be affected.’321 The Stoics argue that bodies and beings have the same extension. This 
should be compared with the original materialists at Sophist 246b1, and with the dunamis 
proposal (see Ch. 4, sec. 3-5). The Stoic argument seems to be the following:  
                                                
318 Stoic bodies do not imply impenetrability. See Alexander On mixture 216,14-218,6 (LS48C; 
SVF2.473). Two or more bodies can occupy exactly the same place when they are mixed. 
319 Pseudo-Galen, De historia philosophica 23, 2-6 (BS2.11).  See also Cicero, Academica 1.39 (SVF 
1.90; LS 45A; BS 2.10), and DL 7.134 (SVF 2.300, 2.299; LS 44B; BS 14.1).  
320 See Boeri & Salles (2014, 37-38). But see Reesor (1954, 57, 77-78), and Hahm (1977, 21). For a 
detailed discussion on the Stoic definition of body see Gourinat (2009, esp. 55-58). 
321 Plutarch, De Communibus Notitiis Adversus Stoicos 1073E (SVF 2.525; BS 2.6). Pseudo-Galen, De 
historia philosophica 23, 2-6 (BS2.11). See also Cicero, Academica 1.39 (SVF 1.90; LS 45A; BS 2.10), 
and DL 7.134 (SVF 2.300, 2.299; LS 44B; BS 14.1). 
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1. For any X, X is a body iff X produces something and/or is affected.  
2. For any X, X is a being iff X produces something and/or is affected. 
3. Therefore, for any X, X is a being, iff X is a body.  
Note that premise (2) is equivalent to the ES’s dunamis proposal in the gigantomachia 
(Sophist 247d8-e3; Ch. 4, sec. 5), but that conclusion (3) is one of the premises held by the 
original materialists (see Sophist 246b1; Ch. 4, sec. 3). What is different from both views in 
the Sophist is the Stoic definition of body, which prevents them from accepting any 
incorporeal entity that can produce or be affected. This, oddly enough, is in agreement with 
the idealists’ conception of bodies, since they think that becoming shares in the power of 
producing and being affected (Sophist 248c7-9; Ch. 4, sec. 6). In addition, the Stoic 
conception of bodies, unlike the materialists of the Sophist, makes no reference to 
perception, but that does not mean, as in the case of the ES’s dunamis proposal, that they 
are open to the possibility of incorporeal beings. But if the Stoics do not completely agree 
with any of the views in the gigantomachia, how to explain their partial agreements?  
2.2 Stoic principles, and elements 
The Stoics think there is only one exclusively productive, and one exclusively passive 
body. They call these two bodies the principles of all things, and identify the active one with 
god, and the passive one with matter. The most complete account of this is found in 
Diogenes Laertius:  
(i) They think there are two principles of all things, what produces and what is 
affected.322 So, then, what is affected is the unqualified substance, matter; what 
produces is the order in it, god. For this [i.e. god] is everlasting, it produces each thing 
through all of it [i.e. matter]. (ii) Zeno of Citium establishes this doctrine in his On 
Substance, Cleanthes in his On Atoms, Chrysippus at the end of his first book of 
Physics, Archedemus323 in his book On Elements, and Posidonius in his second book of 
Physical Account. (iii) They say that principles and elements differ. For the former are 
ungenerated and indestructible, whereas the elements are destroyed by the 
conflagration.324 The principles are also bodies325 and without form, but the elements 
have a form.326 
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The leading figures of the early Stoa and two later members of the school share a 
basic account of the principles. Diogenes reports no disagreement between them as he does 
with other Stoic doctrines (e.g. the conflagration, the unity of virtue, and the division of 
philosophy). His report of the principles is the mainstream account for the early, and 
perhaps for the middle Stoa.327 There is a lot of information in this passage but for now I 
will focus on what it tells us about bodies.  
Since the principles are bodies, then, this means that, in general, the notion of body 
does not necessarily imply materiality nor an ordered arrangement. God is never affected, 
nor can matter produce anything. These two aspects are exclusive for each principle. This 
has some odd implications. The principles are non-material bodies, since god ‘is in matter, 
but there is no matter in it’ and matter ‘is matter, to be sure, but not a material body.’328 
This is why the Stoics are best described as corporealists rather than as materialists.329  But 
the same can be said about order (λόγος). God and matter are non-ordered bodies, which 
explains why they lack form. Matter receives order, but there is no intrinsic order in it, 
whereas god is order, but is not an ordered body.  
The principles, however, are inseparable, and co-dependent.330 They are permanently 
interacting in a special kind of through-and-through mixture which forms what they call 
substance (οὐσία). As Alexander puts it ‘They say that god is mixed in matter, pervading all 
of it and shaping it, and forming it, and producing it into the cosmos.’331 This type of 
mixture, the Stoics think, implies that God and matter occupy exactly the same place. The 
only thing that effectively distinguishes them is their capacity to act or to be affected. Now, 
according to the texts, it seems there is no restriction at all to what God can do to matter. 
Matter seems to offer no restriction to what God can impose on it.332 There is no physical 
                                                                                                                                          
325 σώµατα codd.: ασωµάτους Suda. See LS vol. I, pp. 273-4, and vol. II, p. 266; also Mansfeld (1978, 
162-3).  See also Cicero Academica 1.39. Against this reading see Lapidge (1973, 242-246, 248), and 
Todd (1979,139-143). 
326 DL 7.134 (LS44B only secc. i, and iii; SVF 2.300, and 2.299; BS 14.1). Section (i) also appears as the 
first part of SVF 1.85, which gives two further fragments for this doctrine: Aetius 1, 3, 25, and Achilles 
Tat. 124E. See also Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. 25, 15 (SVF 2.312). This is complemented by Sextus 
Empiricus: ‘Indeed also those of the Stoa speak of two principles, god and the unqualified matter; they 
think god produces, and matter is affected and changes.’ Sextus Empiricus M 9.11 (SVF 2.301). 
327 The central claims of the doctrine are reported in a similar way also in Seneca’s later account. See 
Letters 65.2 (LS55E). 
328 See Cooper (2009, 100). 
329 See Weil (1964, 560), and Gourinat (2009, 47). 
330 See Calcidius 292 (LS44D; SVF 1.88), and 293 (LS44E); and Sextus Empiricus AM 9.237-240 
(LS72N; BS 14.12). 
331 Alexander of Aphrodisias De mixtione 225.1-3 (LS45H; SVF 2.310). See also Alexander On mixture 
225,1-2 (LS45H; SVF2.310). 
332 See Cooper (2009, 98). 
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restraint to God’s power and matter’s passivity. That does not suggest, however, that it is 
not necessary to make an effort to impose it, nor that god is almighty in an absolute sense.  
In fact, the principles are co-dependent. If that were not the case, God would not need 
matter to create the world. But God acts on something, and there is no reason to think that 
he is able to act on himself since that would suppose he can be both the active and the 
passive object. This makes the principles two very special bodies. Although the active 
principle is extended, one part of it cannot act on another since that would make it passive, 
and the converse can be said about matter. This explains why there must be two principles 
and not only one, and why their separate existence is impossible.333  
2.3 Mixture of bodies 
The interaction between the two principles explains the production of all other bodies 
and interactions of the cosmos. The Stoic conception of mixture has a central role in this 
explanation. It is the Stoic answer to the puzzle of sharing and separation. Instead of 
arguing that nous links two unrelated parts of the world, like the Phaedo and the Sophist 
(see Ch. 1, sec. 7.2; and Ch. 3, sec. 4), or that God is indirectly responsible for the sensible 
part of the world, like in the Republic (Ch. 2, sec. 6), the Stoics think that God is mixed 
through-and-through in everything.  
There is, however, no information about how Zeno or Cleanthes thought of mixture. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias conserves Chrysippus’ theory of mixture of composite bodies 
that are already pervaded by breath (a combination of two elements). This means that 
Chrysippus’ theory does not entirely explain the mixture of the two principles and 
elements of the cosmos. Besides, it is uncertain whether this theory was a standard 
formulation that can be traced back to Zeno or whether it constitutes an innovation in 
line with Chrysippus’ changes to other parts of Stoic physics. But by analysing 
Chrysippus’ theory we can infer in what kind of mixture the Stoic principles have to be 
to create the cosmos.    
Chrysippus distinguished three kind of mixture: juxtaposition, fusion, and 
blending.334 The first case is like placing beans and grains of wheat side by side; each body 
of the mixture preserves its own substance and quality, and they can be easily separated. 
Both fusion and blending, however, are through-and-through mixtures. This means that the 
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bodies being mixed are extended in the same place, and no division will be able to separate 
them.335 Fusion occurs when the bodies being mixed are destroyed, and a new body is 
generated, with new powers. In the case of blending, the original substances and their 
qualities are preserved, and can, at least in principle, be separated.336 In both cases, the 
result of the mixture is something different from its original components, which implies that 
only bodies can be components of mixtures, since any component in a mixture must add 
something to it. Assuming each body has a different set of powers, the three different types 
of mixtures can be schematised as follow:  
Juxtaposition:  
α + β = (α, β) (α side by side with β), where α ≠ (α, β) and β ≠ (α, β), and both α, 
and β are preserved, and can be separated again by division.  
Through-and through mixtures:  
Fusion: α + β = γ, where α ≠ β,  γ ≠ β,  γ ≠ α, and both α, and β are destroyed 
after the fusion, which means that the fusion cannot be separated again into its 
original components.   
Blending: α + β = αβ, where α ≠ αβ, β ≠ αβ, both α, and β are preserved, and can 
be separated again (but not by simple division).  
The problem with the mixture of the two principles, which is a through-and-through 
mixture, is that it does not fit Chrysippus’ definition of fusion or blending. The mixture of 
God and matter is sui generis. The principles are not destroyed after the mixture, nor do 
they lose any of their qualities, as in blending. But the principles are inseparable, like 
fusions. Moreover, the mixture of the principles cannot be a blend since blends do not 
generate new bodies. The outcome of a blending, unlike the case of fusion, is not a new 
body. To understand the way principles are mixed together we need to express their 
through-and-through mixture as follows:  
Mixture of the principles: God + Matter = Substance, where God ≠ Matter,  
Substance ≠ Matter,  Substance ≠ God, but both God and Matter are preserved in 
Substance (and occupy exactly the same place), but cannot be separated ever.  
Only describing the mixture of the principles in this way can the Stoics account for 
the characteristics of the two principles, and at the same time explain the creation of a new 
                                                
335 See Alexander On mixture 3-4, and Galen On containing causes, 5.2-3. 
336 See also Stobaeus 1.155,5-11 (LS48D; SVF 2.471), and Plutarch On common conceptions 1078E 
(LS48B; SVF2.480). 
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body, substance (οὐσία). Since substance is a body that can act and be affected, it can act in 
itself, and produce from that action a new body. But since substance is the inseparable 
mixture of the two principles, it must also be preserved in the new bodies it produces, 
namely the four elements (fire, air, water, and earth). Whether the elements were 
indestructible or not was a matter of disagreement between the Stoics.337 Through a 
complex process, the Stoics explained how each thing in the world came to be.  
Fire was considered the active, and constructive element, the one containing λόγος. 
When mixed with air, fire forms a warm breath the Stoics called πνεῦµα. This breath acts as 
the cohesive force that holds things together, and directs them. Depending on the 
concentration of fire in the mix, πνεῦµα manifests as a tension which holds inanimate things 
together, as life in vegetables, and as animal soul, including the rational soul, or nous.338 It 
is through πνεῦµα that humans have the power of judgement. But notice that according to 
the Stoics, it is through being mixed with God, that humans can act, and they can act in the 
way they do (rationally) due to the high concentration of the active principles in the human 
souls.   
2.4 The four genera of bodies 
The Stoics do not normally subdivide bodies by their composition339 but into four 
different genera:340 (1) substrates, (2) qualified individuals (which can be commonly and 
peculiarly qualified), (3) individuals disposed in some way, and (4) relatively disposed 
individuals. But these are not different types of bodies but rather different descriptions or 
aspects that the same body can have. In this way, when they describe a body, they can refer 
to it as a subject of predication without adding any other quality (this or that being, and also 
the unqualified principles), to its permanent qualities, some of which it has in common with 
other bodies (human, prudent), and some which distinguish it from any other body 
(Socratesness). A body can also be disposed in some non-permanent way (sitting in jail), 
and also disposed in relation to other bodies (friend of Glaucon, master of Coriscus).    
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It has been suggested that this doctrine originates with Chrysippus, as a response to 
Academic attacks.341 There is, however, good reason to think that it has Plato’s dialogues in 
the background, even if the full doctrine does not predate Chrysippus. Take, for instance, 
the second and third genera.  With these distinctions the Stoics can explain that souls and 
virtues are bodies. A soul is a body in the sense that it is a qualified individual, a portion of 
natural breath, and virtue is also a body, since it is a soul disposed in some way. If we 
compare this with the Sophist, however, there the ES makes the materialists accept that 
virtues are something different from the qualities in the souls, and that it is by their presence 
in them that they are virtuous (see Ch. 4, sec. 4). The Stoics, in turn, do not accept that 
virtues are anything beyond the souls disposed in certain way. The reason is that otherwise 
virtues would not have causal power, or be present in an individual (they worry about the 
separation puzzle from the Parmenides).  
The Stoics explain that even if souls are not tangible but subtle entities, they are 
bodies. Consider, for example, an argument put forward by Cleanthes to prove that the soul 
is a body: 
No incorporeal interacts with a body, and no body with an incorporeal. But the soul 
interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body with the soul; at least 
when the soul is ashamed the body becomes red or pale when is frightened.342 
Therefore, the soul is a body.343  
In the case of virtues, Chrysippus even says that virtues and vices can be seen by the 
wise.344 For him, virtues are qualified bodies.345 However, not all the Stoics thought that 
virtue was a fixed feature of the soul, since Seneca describes virtue as the mind disposed in 
certain way.346 But some of the arguments to show the corporeality of virtue are based on 
their causal capacity. A passage from Seneca attests this:  
Or do you not see how much the virtue of courage may cause sturdiness in the 
eyes? How much prudence may cause attention? How much reverence may 
cause moderation and tranquility? How cheerfulness may cause serenity? How 
severity stiffness? How much leniency forgiveness? Therefore, these are 
corporeal, since they change the colours and appearance of bodies, exercising 
power in their own kingdom.347 
                                                
341 See Long and Sedley (1987, 165-6, 172-176, 177-179). 
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the Sophist 247b9-c2; Ch. 4, sec. 4. 
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The strategy is, in general terms, the same as in the case of soul. If something has 
causal power, then it is a body.  Notice, however, that bodies’ causal power is due to God’s 
physical presence in them. The Stoics use the Sophist’s dunamis proposal in exactly the 
opposite direction to the ES. They use it as a criterion of inclusion for bodies. The move 
seems to be the following: if to produce and/or to be affected is the criterion of inclusion for 
bodies, then it does not matter whether a body is directly perceptible or not; if it makes 
some difference in an interaction, their corporeality is inferred. If they perceive the effects 
of something, even if they cannot perceive the agent directly, the Stoics assume it is a body. 
In the case of souls, they can be perceived in the sense that when we see a human being we 
see the through-and-through mixture of a soul and a human body. The only thing that we 
may not see is the soul alone, unmixed, since it is a breath that could escape our notice. In 
the case of virtues, they are perceptible in the sense that we can see virtuous individuals. In 
this way, the Stoic four genera help to establish finer differences. Things are bodies in 
different senses, which allows the Stoics to include in their somatology even relations, since 
the fourth category seems to make relations exclusively corporeal.  
3. The Stoic inclusion of incorporeals 
3.1 Motivation for the inclusion of incorporeals   
Stoic corporealism is not a deflationist ontology but an inflationist somatology.348 As 
I have explained, instead of rejecting the existence of virtues or considering them 
incorporeal, they include them in their ontology as bodies. Their criterion for inclusion, 
however, is clear. For something to be an existent (that is a body) it has to have three 
dimensions, and resistance. It has to be able to interact in a causal chain making a 
difference, and so be able to produce something or to be affected. But when the Stoics are 
thinking about bodies they also worry about how to deal with some things that not even 
they can describe as bodies, while it still seems absolutely necessary for their account of 
reality. There are, for example, some things that are necessary conditions for the existence 
of bodies, like void, and others that seem to be caused by bodies while they are not bodies 
themselves, like propositions.  
The fact that they accept they need more than bodies means that if we see them as 
readers of the Sophist, what they do first when they are thinking about ontology is 
compromise between the idealist and corporealist positions of the gigantomachia. Notice 
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that the Stoics and the two groups of corporealists from the Sophist have less in common 
than one might imagine. They take the point of corporealism, and are able to rearticulate 
their position avoiding the challenges raised by the ES, and even using his dunamis 
proposal to work on behalf of corporealism. But the Stoics are also paying attention to the 
idealists, and the ES, and they are rethinking the arguments also from these points of view. 
The way the Stoics compromise materialism and idealism is different to that of the ES, who 
has an epistemological agenda the Stoics reject, but it is done in the same methodological 
terms. The Stoics critically revised the arguments of the different groups of people in the 
Sophist, but they are also interested in the ES’s project, to the point that they are walking in 
the footsteps of the ES, revaluating each of the arguments, and decisions made.  
If the Stoics accept that there are incorporeals, it is not because of the ES’s arguments 
(since he argues that incorporeals have power), but by reflecting on the idealists’ conception 
of incorporeals. Although the Stoics reject forms, they accept there are other incorporeal 
things that have some of the features the idealists saw in forms. In particular, Stoic 
incorporeals are essential to explain knowledge, and becoming. But here any reader of the 
Parmenides and the Sophist is going to wonder whether the Stoics would not be vulnerable 
to an epistemological objection similar to the one in the greatest difficulty. The Stoic 
definition of incorporeals tries to answer this worry.  
3.2 Definition of incorporeals 
The Stoics accept in their ontology some incorporeals. But since ‘an incorporeal is 
not of a nature either to produce something or to be affected’349 they do not call them 
existents, as with bodies, but subsistent (ὑφιστάµενον).350  But incorporeals are real. The 
corollary of this is that for the Stoics there are some realities that do not exist. It seems that 
when the Stoics talk about subsistence for thought,351 that is anything that can be grasped by 
the mind. Notice that this does not mean that subsistent items are mind-dependent, but that 
their reality can be grasped by the mind, if there is any.  An incorporeal is a way of being 
real that although it is not a body, it can be understood by minds. Under this account, then, 
bodies subsist also.  
What seems to distinguish incorporeals from everything else, however, is reported by 
Sextus Empiricus when he writes that incorporeals constitute ‘a πρᾶγµα that can be thought 
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350 See Plutarch, Adversus Colotem, 1116B7-C2 (FDS 721; BS 2.7); Galen De methodo medendi libri 
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351 See Proclus, On Plato’s Timaeus 271D (LS 51F). 
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by itself.’352 The translation of the word πρᾶγµα here is difficult. It can translate to ‘state 
of affairs,’ ‘event,’ or ‘fact,’ the problem is that all these words are loaded philosophical 
terms, and whatever is chosen should be used carefully. The important aspect is that 
πρᾶγµα is contrasted with corporeality. Even if incorporeals make reference to bodies, 
since they have no causal power they cannot be reduced to or incorporated as corporeal. 
In addition, a πρᾶγµα cannot mean what is actually the case, since there are more things 
that have subsistence to the mind that those which are the case (the Stoics think that 
false propositions are incorporeal and thus subsist). This suggests that—to put it in 
anachronistic language—for the Stoics all possible worlds are real, even if only one of 
them is instantiated.  
But let us now turn to the other part of Sextus’ report. While Socrates’ forms in the 
Parmenides are ‘themselves by themselves,’ Stoic incorporeals are less ontologically 
demanding. They are not said to have an autonomous existence with causal powers, 
separate from the corporeal reality. The only thing the Stoics claim is that an incorporeal 
‘can be thought by itself.’ One suggestion on how to understand this is as meaning that 
incorporeals, although unable to act or be acted upon, are mind-independent, and accessible 
to the mind without the need of any extra assumption. This means, on the one hand, that the 
mind does not give them their reality (they are not an invention of the mind); but on the 
other hand, that minds have access to them. In this way, the definition of a Stoic incorporeal 
can be stated in the following way: 
Incorporeal: X is an incorporeal iff X neither produces nor is affected, and X is a 
πρᾶγµα that can be thought without positing the existence of anything extra. 
 This could still sound vulnerable to epistemological objections like the one in the 
Parmenides. The Stoics, however, could respond that incorporeals are accessible to the 
mind not because we share in their incorporeal subsistence (as the idealists claim), but 
because incorporeals make reference to bodies’ interaction, and those bodies can make 
impressions in the soul. In other words, incorporeals are known through bodies, and not 
vice versa.  
3.3 List of incorporeals 
Despite the similarities I highlighted between the Stoics and the idealists of the Sophist 
in the previous section, there is a huge difference in terms of what each of them include as 
incorporeals. But they do not mean by becoming the same thing as the idealists mean. As 
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Clement reports, for the Stoics becoming is incorporeal.353 The Stoics mean by becoming, 
not generated, corruptible, and perceptible bodies, but their changes, and activities. With 
their characterisation of the incorporeal, the Stoics can include various things, and the 
reports offer a list of otherwise unrelated things. The Stoics’ incorporeals include, at least in 
its orthodox list, time (χρόνος), place (τόπος), sayables (λεκτά),354 and void.355  
All incorporeals but void derive from bodies and their interaction and thus depend on 
their existence.356 For the Stoics, the notions of both time and place, presuppose the 
existence of bodies. Place is what is occupied by a body,357 and time is the dimension or 
interval (διάστηµα) of motion,358 which cannot occur without bodies.359 In addition, 
sayables are effects of bodies interacting with each other.360 Void, however, is an 
incorporeal which is not produced by bodies, but is necessary condition for their existence, 
since it is described as what ‘neither has figure nor takes on figure, and neither is affected 
nor produced by anything, but is simply the sort of thing which receives body.’361  
4. The highest genus 
 At this point we may wonder how the Stoic ontological picture is supposed to 
work, since on the one hand there are bodies, which are the only entities that exist, and 
on the other hand there are incorporeals, which are items that subsist. The answer to this 
question is what the Stoics call the highest genus. They argue that body and incorporeals 
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359 Interestingly, the Stoics consider space and time as incorporeal because they have an absolute notion 
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360 See Sextus Empiricus M 9.211 (LS55B; SVF2.341). 
361 Cleomedes De motu circulari corporum caelestium 8,12-14 (LS49C, SVF2.541). This of course, 
makes clearer the similarities of this doctrine with the Timaeus. Is the void a Stoic version of the 
receptacle? 
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are the only two species of the highest genus ‘something.’362 This doctrine, however, 
caused outrage in antiquity, and puzzlement thereafter. The Stoics do not place ‘being,’ 
which is reserved only for bodies, as the highest genus; but surely everything that 
counts as something is a being? In fact, the Sophist makes this very point: 
ES.—Also this is surely manifest to us: that we also apply on each occasion the <word> 
‘something’ on a being; since it is impossible to apply it alone by itself, as if it were 
naked, and isolated from all beings; is it not?  
Th.—It is impossible (Sophist 237d1-237d5).  
 If according to the ES and Theaetetus, it is necessary that every time someone 
uses the word ‘something’ they refer to a being, and if the Stoics read the Sophist, why 
did they disagree, and on what grounds? If one looks at the way not the ES, but the 
idealists distinguish between ‘being’ (τὸ ὄν, οὐσία) and ‘becoming’ (γένεσις), (see Sophist 
246b6-c3, 248a11, 248e7-8; Ch. 4, sec. 6), it is possible to draw a parallel with the Stoic use 
of ‘being’ (or ‘existent’) and ‘subsistent.’363 Ignore for a moment the extension of these 
concepts. In both cases, there is a set of items that monopolises the term ‘being.’ But in the 
case of the idealists that is not to say that the items which belong to ‘becoming,’ are not-
beings in an absolute sense.  
 As I noted in the previous chapter, I argued that the idealists have an elitist ontology, 
where there are two degrees of being, and they reserve the name ‘being,’ or ‘genuine being’ 
for forms, which have the highest degree of existence, and refer to bodies as mere 
becoming. For the idealists, becoming shares in forms’ being, but is separated from them, 
always changing. At the end of the gigantomachia, however, the ES’s arguments lead him 
to modify this distinction from one about degrees of being to one about two different sorts 
of beings, since otherwise the existence of nous is at risk. This solution, however, assumes 
that incorporeals must have some power to exist. The ES’s ontological account at the end of 
the gigantomachia can be understood as placing being, marked off by the dunamis proposal, 
as the highest genus, where incorporeals (forms, and nous) and bodies are its species.  
 The Stoics, however, agreeing with one of the idealists’ views, reject the dunamis 
proposal as a criterion that exhausts reality. They insist that there are items that cannot 
produce nor be affected, but are, nevertheless, real. The Stoics consider bodies and 
incorporeals as two different species of things, and keep the use of ‘being’ for those entities 
which monopolise the active power. Instead of talking about two degrees of being, they 
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propose two different types of reality.364 They are two different ways of being real. It is not 
that Stoic bodies are better or more genuine than subsistent things, they are completely 
different, and complementary. The corollary of this is that for the Stoics there are items that 
are real even when they do not exist.  
5. Concepts, and ideas 
5.1 Fictions of the soul 
 The Stoics are known for rejecting forms, and for talking about concepts instead. 
Take for example the following report of Zeno’s and his associates’ views in Stobaeus:  
They say that concepts are neither something nor qualified, but are fictions of the 
soul,365 as if they were something and as if they were qualified.366 And these are 
what the ancients call ideas. For the ideas are of that which falls under the 
concepts,367 like of humans, of horses, and in general are said of all the animals 
and of many other things of which they say there are ideas. But the Stoic 
philosophers say these [i.e., ideas] are unreal, and that we, on the one hand, 
partake of the concepts, and, on the other hand, we bear what they call 
‘appellatives.’368   
 In this passage, the Stoics replace what the ‘ancients’ call ideas with concepts.369 
They are not the same thing, but for any idea in the ancients’ philosophy, there is a 
corresponding concept in Stoicism. In other words, ideas and Stoic concepts are 
extensionally equivalent, since each thing that counts as a participant of a specific idea 
in the ancients’ philosophy is a participant of an equivalent concept in the Stoic 
philosophy. This can be expressed in the following way:  
Extensional equivalence ideas/concepts: for any a, if a partakes in the F-itself 
according to the ancients’ philosophy, then it will be the case that a partakes in 
the corresponding concept of F according to the Stoic philosophy.  
 The difference between Stoic concepts and ideas is their ontological status and 
role in the causal process. The evidence on this matter, however, is compressed, and 
                                                
364 This point has not been sufficiently noted. Species do not presuppose degree. Contra Totschnig (2013, 
125). 
365 For the notion of ‘fiction of the soul,’ see DL 7.49-51 (SVF 2.52, 55, 61; LS 39A; FDS 255; BS 6.1); 
Aetius 4.12.1-5 (SVF 2.54; LS 39B; FDS 268; BS 6.2); Aetius 4.111-4 (SVF 2.83; FDS 277; BS 6.4). For 
the use of φαντάσµατα in Plato see Phaedo 81d2 ‘ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσµατα,’ (‘shadowy apparitions 
of the souls’). 
366 Cf. also DL 7.60-1 (LS 30C; FDS 621; BS 6.13). 
367 Cf. Pseudo-Plutarch, Epit. 1.10.5; Eusebius, Prep. Ev. 15.45.4, ii. 413, 8 Mras. And, according to 
Caston (1999, 149), derived from these also Pseudo-Galen, De hist. philos. 25. 
368 Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae, 1.136, 21-137, 6 (SVF 1.65; LS 30A; FDS 316; BS 4.1).  
369 A distinction here might be useful. When discussing ideas/forms in this context there is, on the one 
hand, a description of ideas according to idealists (v.g., they are themselves by themselves), but there is 
also a description of ideas according to the Stoics (i.e., they are unreal). 
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there is disagreement about how to understand it.370 Let me start with concepts. Apart 
from the evidence from Stobaeus, we have Diogenes Laertius’ report: 
But a concept is a fiction of thought, and which is not something nor a qualified 
[individual], but as it were something which is and as it were a qualified [thing], in the 
way a mental image of a horse comes to be even when none is present.371  
 Using these reports to complement each other, we can establish three 
characteristics. A Stoic concept is (1) a fiction of the rational soul, (2) not something 
nor a qualified individual, (3) as if it were something, and as if it were a qualified 
individual, as when a mental image of something arises even when nothing is present. 
But to understand all this we need some background. 
 The Stoics distinguish between impression (φαντασία), impressor (φανταστόν), 
imagination (φανταστικόν), and fiction (φάντασµα). According to Aetius’ report,372 
Chrysippus—probably clarifying Zeno’s doctrine—explains that an impression is an 
affection in the soul which reveals itself and its cause (τὸ πεποιηκός). The πεποιηκός of 
an impression is an impressor, an external body that activates the soul.373 They say that 
impressions, then, derive from what exists. Imagination, in turn, is an affection in the 
soul which arises without impressor, and thus, they call it an ‘empty attraction.’ A 
fiction is that to which imagination is attracted.  
 Imaginations, however, are not produced ex nihilo. For the Stoics, everything has a 
cause, and all causes are bodies. We can infer from there that an imagination is produced by 
the action of the soul in itself (or perhaps the body?), and not from the action of external 
bodies. But imaginations are a kind of affection of the soul that instead of revealing its real 
cause, reveals a pseudo-cause, the fiction. But fictions are not mind independent, although 
they appear to be. For that reason, sometimes having fictions in one’s soul is a symptom of 
madness or melancholy (if one takes fictions to be real). As in Diogenes Laertius, a fiction 
can be a hallucination of a horse. In Aetius’ report, the example is that of Orestes’ 
hallucinations.374 But a fiction is also that of what we see in dreams. In this same set, the 
Stoics include concepts as a type of fiction. The main difference seems to be that there are 
fictions of particulars, whereas concepts are fictions of pluralities. This, however, does not 
explain the ontological status of fictions quite yet.  
                                                
370 See Brunschwig (1988), (2003); Sedley (1985); Caston (1999); Sellars (2010), and Boeri and Salles 
(2014). 
371 DL 7.61, 1-3; DL 7.60 (LS 30C). 
372 See Aetius 4.12.1-5 (SVF 2.54; LS 39B; BS 6.2). 
373 Notice that knowledge, for the Stoics is a complex activity that requires the action of the body in the 
soul to produce an impression, but also the activity of reason to assent or not to that impression. Cf. my 
discussion in Ch. 4, sec. 6. 
374 See Aetius 4.12.1-5 (SVF 2.54; BS 6.2). 








 Things get even more complex. In one of Simplicius’ reports we learn that fictions of 
the soul are called οὔτι, sometimes translated as ‘not-something,’ or as ‘nothing,’375  and, 
according to Sextus’ report, not-somethings have no subsistence for thought,376 which was a 
necessary condition to be a Stoic incorporeal. The puzzle here is that fictions are not bodies, 
since they are not impressors, nor incorporeals, since—apart from their name—they do not 
present subsistence for thought. But if that is the case, fictions have no place in the Stoic 
ontological map since bodies and incorporeals are the only two species of something, which 
is the highest and exhaustive genus in the Stoic ontology. From the description of fictions, 
and their other ontological claims, it seems that the Stoics face a possible charge of 
inconsistency. There is, nevertheless, a way round the problem.  
 There is a corporealistic explanation of fictions without the Stoics conferring on them 
any new ontological status. It is possible that what the Stoics deny about fictions is not their 
existence or subsistence simpliciter, but their being and subsistence as such. The reason 
could be that fictions are not really unified items. When we talk about Pegasus, the Stoics 
will say that strictly speaking, Pegasus is not one thing, but the pastiche of two (a white 
horse and two wings). But the pastiche is artificial, without subsistence for thought, just for 
imagination.377 Even when someone hallucinates a horse, she sees one specific thing when 
there is none. On the other hand, in the case of concepts, strictly speaking the concept of, for 
instance, beauty, is not a thing, but an artificial abstraction of the common qualities of many 
similar things. But as with Pegasus, the Stoics would be saying that the concept of beauty is 
a creation that has no subsistence for thought, just for imagination. 
 The idea that not-somethings are so because they are not unified, could derive from a 
Stoic interpretation of Sophist 237e1-2. There, the ES says: Τὸν δὲ δὴ µὴ τὶ λέγοντα 
ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς ἔοικε, παντάπασι µηδὲν λέγειν. If one reads µηδέν literally, not as 
‘nothing,’ but as ‘not-one-thing,’ then, the claim translates as ‘Then, it is absolutely 
necessary, it seems, that someone who says not-something, says not-one-thing at all.’ 
Taken in this way, the Stoics agree with the claim, since it allows them to say that 
talking about not-somethings is possible, just that when someone refers to not-
something, she really refers not to one thing, but none or to many. A fiction, then, is an 
artificial pastiche, a mental construct which does not meet the standards to be considered a 
Stoic something in its own right, since it is a mind-dependent fabrication. But in a 
                                                
375 See Simplicius, In Cat. 105. 11. 
376 See Sextus Empiricus, AM 1.17 (SVF 2.330; LS27C; BS 2.12), quoted below. 
377 Brunschwig (1988, 99) says something similar when he explains that concepts are fictitious 
individuals and not real individuals. But Brunschwig (127) thinks that concepts are fictional individuals 
because they are universal, whereas I am arguing that they are fictitious because they are not unified. 
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corporealistic cosmos like the Stoics’, these fabrications are part of a condition of the soul 
(the part of an imagination that seems to be its cause, but it is not). What bodies and 
incorporeals have in common that distinguish them from fictions is that they are mind-
independent.  
 But fictions are not necessarily problematic. The peculiar thing about them is that 
although they are not unified, they seem to be. Remember that fictions seem as if they were 
something, and as if they were qualified individuals. But if someone is fully aware of the 
fictional character of a fiction, then there is no problem, like when we dream and we know 
we are dreaming, or we wake up and we are able to distinguish between dream and reality. 
The difficulty begins when someone takes what is fiction as real, namely as something or a 
qualified individual; a person who has hallucinations and takes them for real, or that thinks 
that concepts exist independently from their mind. This is exactly what the Stoics seem to 
think about ideas. An idea is a concept taken at its face value, as if it were a real mind-
independent thing.378  
 An idealist for the Stoics is someone who confuses fiction with reality. In the specific 
case of ideas, the idealist not only thinks they are mind-independent, but separated, 
explanatory, able to play a part in the causal process, among other things. For Zeno, things 
do not partake in ideas, but in concepts. This participation, however, is a construct, and has 
no effect in us beyond being called by a common name (cf. Parmenides 133c2-d5; see Ch. 
3, sec. 4.). Take the following example. The Stoic system claims that things like the good 
have no existence or subsistence as a form, since forms are merely unreal fictions some 
people take as real. Any good in the world is either corporeal or a state of affairs resulting 
from the interactions between bodies.  
 With all this, it is now possible to classify the different types of fictions in the 
following way:  
Fictions Taken as real Taken as fictions 
Particulars Hallucinations  Dreams, fictional characters 
taken as such (e.g. Mickey 
Mouse)379 
Universals Ideas Concepts 
 
                                                
378 Take, for example, Phaedo 102b1 when Socrates says ‘each of the forms is something’ (εἶναί τι ἕκαστον 
τῶν εἰδῶν). See Ch. 1, sec. 8.1. 
379 There is a puzzle about where to put universals of fictional characters (like Centaur). The Stoics do not 
seem worried about explaining this possibility, but they would be some kind of pseudo-concepts.   








Let me go back to the greatest difficulty. Parmenides warns Socrates about the 
challenges he or anyone else would face while trying to teach idealism. The main objections 
unconvinced people could make are that forms may not even exist, and if they exist they are 
necessarily unknowable to us. The Stoic criticism against forms reformulates these 
objections. The Stoics say (in their terms) that ideas do not exist, and, furthermore, they do 
not even subsist. The problem is not that they are unknowable but rather that they have no 
subsistence for thought. This does not mean, however, that they are inconceivable, but that 
they are mere follies of imagination.  
The problem is not that ideas are absolutely nothing and that Socrates and other 
idealists not even make any sense when they talk. They do make sense, and what they say 
could even sound as if it were true, but the Stoics think that if someone tries to teach 
through not-somethings (ideas, and even concepts included), teaching is ineffective. This is 
well expressed by the following report from Sextus:   
If one teaches something, surely it will be taught through (διὰ) not-somethings or 
through (διὰ) somethings. But it cannot be taught through (διὰ) not-somethings, since, 
according to the philosophers from the Stoa, these are not-subsistent for thought.380  
According to the Stoics, teaching through not-somethings is no teaching at all. Notice 
that this is a causal claim. Not-somethings as such cannot produce knowledge, because they 
are not bodies, so they cannot produce anything. This is not to say that they should be 
absolutely barred from philosophical discourse. In fact, the Stoics make widespread use of 
concepts. But the thought is that learning or whatever is learnt is not caused by not-
somethings. This applies to not-somethings in general regardless of whether one is aware of 
their fictional character (concepts) or not (ideas). The Stoics think that wasting time on 
these fictions surely does not make us knowers or virtuous, since for them these are specific 
dispositions of the soul and are a result of pondering impressions, and therefore have a real 
link with the world outside one’s own mind. The thought is that by only considering the 
concept or idea of virtue, a person will not become virtuous.  
The use of fictions in discourse, however, has some advantages, provided that one 
understands their ontological status. For one thing, they serve conciseness. It is also 
important, however, to notice that concepts are not the same as mental representations, 
which the Stoics call conceptions (ἔννοιαι). Following the Stoic terminology,381 
conceptions are a kind of impression in the soul. A conception, then, is corporeal in the 
                                                
380 Sextus Empiricus, AM 1.17 (SVF 2.330; LS27C; FDS 710; BS 2.12). Cf. Sextus Empiricus, AM 
10.238. Cf. Cratylus 439a1-b9.  
381 See Plutarch, De Communibus Notitiis Adversus Stoicos 1084F-1085A (SVF 2.847; LS 39F). 
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sense that it is the soul disposed in certain way by an impressor, which is a body 
‘commonly qualified.’ But to refer to a collection of commonly qualified objects, the Stoics 
use concepts. But the use of a concept should be understood as a shorthand for the formula  
‘for any x, if x is Y,’ or perhaps for a conjunction ‘a is Y, and b is Y, and c is Y…’ A concept 
is an objectification of this process, which is allowed if people using them understand that 
they are just fictions without an ontological unity as such. This is similar to what happens 
when people in their daily language attribute human characteristics to objects. The use of 
anthropomorphic language does not commit them to anthropomorphic beliefs.  
 As we have seen, the Stoics reject ideas, and think that concepts are just fictions of 
the soul with no role in the causal process of anything. But their rejection of ideas is clever. 
Since they also accept the subsistence of incorporeals, they are immune to the ES’s 
objection against the materialists and others who reject incorporeals (see Ch. 4, sec. 4). In 
the Sophist, the ES’s objection assumes that the only incorporeal entities are ideas, and 
therefore that whoever rejects them is committed to the claim that everything changes, 
which makes nous disappear (see Ch. 4, sec. 7). But since the Stoics propose their own list 
of incorporeals, they can agree with the claim that some things change, and some others are 
at rest, without accepting that ideas are real.  
5.2 A general map of the Stoic ontology 
I am now in a position to offer a general picture of the Stoic ontology, according to 
what I have defended here:  
Something (subsists for thought)  
  1. Bodies (exist, produce or are affected)  
   1.1 Substrate 
   1.2 Qualified (impressors) 
    1.2.1 Commonly qualified (soul) 
    1.2.2 Peculiarly qualified (Socratesness)  
1.3 Disposed (e.g., sitting in jail; dispositions of the soul like: virtues
  conceptions, and imaginations—defined as attractions to fictions)382   
   1.4 Relatively disposed (next to Coriscus, causes) 
  2. Incorporeals (subsist, do not produce, nor are affected) 
   2.1Void 
   Effects (that obtain): 
   2.2 Sayables 
   2.3 Place 
   2.4 Time 
   2.5 (Limits) 
 
                                                
382 Fictions would be pseudo-intentional objects, part of having an imagination, and for the subject having the 
imagination they look like real things, but in fact they are products of the imagination without ontological 
unity. For this reason they do not have a place in the diagram.  








Concepts and fictions are part of the phenomenology of having an imagination. They 
are a distinctive feature of a disposition of the soul, but they are nothing as such. The Stoics, 
as I have argued, are re-thinking the arguments of the Sophist, and compromising between 
materialisms and idealisms (both the one of the friends of the forms, and the modified 
version of the ES).  
But at this point one may wonder why the Stoics are still identified as corporealists 
(and not as some type of dualists)? The answer cannot be that they reserve the label ‘being’ 
only for bodies. As I argued, bodies and incorporeals are co-dependent, and they are not 
two degrees of being, but rather two irreducible species of the highest genus something. But 
if so, then why do we insist on saying that the Stoics are more interested in bodies? In other 
words, why are the Stoics more interested in the Sophist’s giants rather than in the friends of 
the forms?  
The answer, one may think, is causation. After all, the Stoic doctrine of causation is 
one of the fundamental features of the Stoic philosophy, and is one of the central links 
between their physics, ethics, and logic. But looking closely, one may object, both bodies 
and incorporeals are essential pieces for understanding the Stoic account of causation. 
While it is true that for the Stoics, bodies monopolise the causal power, incorporeals are 
necessary conditions for the interaction between bodies, as well as their effects, since the 
Stoics think that the result of bodies acting on one another is a state of affairs, which is 
incorporeal. Another way to put this worry is to consider the case of the idealists, which 
are commonly described as dualists even when incorporeal entities hold an especial 
place and have all the causal power in their ontology. So why would it be different with 
the Stoics, if the only thing they are doing is changing the direction of fit of the causal 
process (that is, from bodies to incorporeals, and not the other way around)?  
The reason why the Stoics are corporealists is that they place special importance on 
the items holding the causal power. They are interested in explaining who or what is 
responsible for each thing in the cosmos, and their interaction, since getting clear about that 
is explanatory. The Stoics, therefore, are engaged with the Platonic project of expanding the 
legal framework to explain the cosmos (as discussed in Ch. 1).  
5.3 Knowledge 
Since the Stoics reject forms, and argue that souls are bodies, they also offer a new 
account of knowledge. In doing so they reject Parmenides’ idea that without forms 
knowledge is impossible. The Stoics consider, instead, that sensation (αἴσθησις) plays 
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an essential role in the acquisition of knowledge, since it is from this that humans get 
their first impressions in their soul.383 Sensation, they argue, is πνεῦµα which goes like 
an octopus from the commanding-faculty of the soul to the different organs of sense-
perception, and comes back with a perceptual impression that then is considered by the 
commanding-faculty.384   
According to Diogenes Laertius’ report,385 however, the Stoics distinguish between 
sensory and non-sensory impressions. The first ones are those obtained through 
confrontation between impressors and the organs of sensation, the others are obtained 
through thought (διάνοια), not by confrontation but by processes like similarity, 
analogy, opposition, and transition. The soul is able to perform other actions, like 
transposition, combination, abstraction, diminution, and magnification, but these do not 
seem to generate impressions but fictions. 
But the Stoics say that ‘knowledge is a cognition (κατάληψις) which is safe 
(ἀσφαλής),386 firm, and unalterable by argument.’387 However, to fully understand this 
very technical definition it is necessary to briefly explain what is implied in a cognition, 
and all the qualifications the definition includes.  
A cognition, according to the Stoics, is defined as assent to a cognitive impression 
(φαντασία καταληπτική).388 The sources preserve, however, various accounts of what a 
cognitive impression is. The notion, originally from Zeno, seems to have evolved as a 
                                                
383 Sextus Empiricus AM 8.56-61 (SVF 2.88; BS6.8). 
384 DL7.52 (SVF 2.71; LS40Q; FDS 255); Aetius Placita 4.21.1-4 (SVF 2.836; LS53H; FDS 441; 
BS13.13). 
385 DL 7.49-51 (LS39A, FDS 255; BS 6.1); for the source of this passage see Mansfeld (1986, 351-73), 
and Kidd (1988, 190). See also DL 7.53 (LS39D; BS 6.3). 
386 Cf. Socrates’ ‘safe’ (ἀσφαλής) answers in Phaedo 100d8-ff. See Ch. 1, sec. 7. 
387 Sextus Empiricus AM 7.151-157 (SVF 1.67-69; 2.90; LS41C; FDS 370; BS7.8). See also Cicero Acad. 
1.40-42 (SVF1.55, 60-61; LS40B, 41B; BS7.5); Stobaeus Eclogae 2.73, 19-74, 3 (SVF 2.112; LS41H; 
FDS 385; BS7.13), text I discuss in what follows; and Ps.-Galen DM 19.350, 3-10, where, as Boeri & 
Salles (2014, 172) point out, ἐγκαταλήψεων must be a synonym of κατάληψις. 
388 Sextus Empiricus, AM 7.151-7 (SVF 1.67-9; 2.90; LS41C FDS 370; BS7.8); AM 11.182-3 (SVF1.73; 
2.97; FDS 336, 378; BS 7.12). For the impact of Plato’s Theaetetus in the development of the notion of 
cognitive impression, see Ioppolo (1990), Long (2002), and Sedley (2002b). According to Sextus’ report 
in AM 7.242-260 (SVF 2.65; LS39G, LS40E; FDS 273; BS6.5, 7.3), the Stoics distinguished various 
types and subtypes of impressions. The following table shows these distinctions and where the cognitive 
impressions are situated:  
Φαντασία  
 1. Persuasive.  
  1.1 True.  
   1.1.1 Cognitive.  
   1.1.2 Not cognitive.  
  1.2 False. 
  1.3 True and false. 
  1.4 Neither true nor false. 
 2. Not persuasive.  
 3. Simultaneously persuasive and unpersuasive.  
 4. Neither persuasive nor unpersuasive. 








response to a heated debate inside and outside the Stoa. To Zeno is attributed  a three-
part definition, although it is possible that these characteristics were proposed 
diachronically and were not supposed to be taken together as a definition.389 He said 
that a cognitive impression: (a) ‘arises from what is (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος)’ and (b) it is 
‘stamped and imprinted with that very thing which is (κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον 
ἐναπεσφραγισµένην καὶ ἐναποµεµαγµένην).’ Later, after Arcesilaus’ objections, he 
added that (c) it is ‘of a kind that could not arise from what is not (ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο 
ἀπὸ µὴ ὑπάρχοντος).’390 Later Stoics took it as a definition and built upon it. This type 
of impression is—among other characteristics—self-evident, pulls us to assent, cannot 
arise from what is not, is a condition for knowledge, and when it has no impediment, it 
is the criterion of truth.391 An impression, as I explained before, is an affection in the 
soul392 which reveals itself and its cause.  
In order for someone to have knowledge, then, two things are needed: an unimpeded 
cognitive impression, and an unalterable assent to that impression. Knowledge, then, is 
a complex activity, which, at least in that aspect, is similar to the notion of knowledge 
derived from the Sophist’s gigantomachia (cf. Ch. 4, sec. 6).  
6. Causal interaction and responsibility  
6.1 The background of the Stoic notion of αἴτιον in Zeno and Chrysippus 
 The Stoic doctrine of causality puts all the previous elements together. But it is also a 
highly peculiar doctrine. Stoic doctrine has often been understood as containing three relata: 
two bodies and a predicate.393 It has been recently suggested that the Stoic causal process 
has four relata (two causes and two effects).394 But before even discussing how many relata 
there are, we need to pay attention to how their notion of cause and causality developed.  
At a cosmic level, God is the only source of active capacity (and thus of causal 
power), and it is only through being mixed with him that other bodies have active 
capacity (cf. Ch. 3). The way the active power gets expressed in each body, however, 
                                                
389 See Sedley (2002b). 
390 Sextus Empiricus AM 7.247-260 (SVF2.65; LS40E, K; FDS 273; BS 7.3). See also DL 7.45-46 
(SVF2.53; LS40C; FDS 33; BS 7.1). For the translation of this definition I follow very closely Sedley’s 
(2002b) commentary on this passage. But note that the term ὑπάρχον could mean ‘what is’ or  ‘what is 
the case.’ For discussion see Schofield (1980, 248), Annas (1980, 89), Long & Sedley (1987, vol. 1, 250), 
M. Frede (1999, 300-311), and Boeri & Salles (2014, 133). 
391 Sextus Empiricus AM 7.253-60 (LS40K). 
392 For discussion about the debate inside the Stoa about what exactly this means, see Sextus Empiricus 
AM 7.227-236 (SVF 2.56; LS53F; FDS 259; BS7.10). 
393 See, for instance, Frede (1987, 137), Bobzien (1998, 19), Hankinson (2000, 484). 
394 See Totschnig (2013, 120-124). 
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depends on the nature of the specific body. Although Seneca calls God the cause 
(causa),395 early Stoics do not refer to him as if he where the only αἴτιον. The early 
Stoic notion of αἴτιον has a more complex story. Look for example at the Stobaeus’s 
report I was making reference at the beginning of this chapter in section 1.1:  
About Zeno. Zeno says that αἴτιον is ‘that because of which’ (δι’ ὅ); while that of which 
it is an αἴτιον is a consequence (συµβεβηκός). And he says that the αἴτιον is a body, 
while that of which it is an αἴτιον is a charge (κατηγόρηµα). It is impossible, then, for 
the αἴτιον to exist, yet that of which it is an αἴτιον not to be produced. What he says has 
this force: an αἴτιον is that because of which something takes place, for instance, 
because of prudence ‘being prudent’ takes place, because of soul ‘being alive’ takes 
place, and because of moderation ‘being moderate’ takes place.396 Since it is impossible 
for something to have moderation [and] not being moderate, or [for it to have] soul 
[and] not being alive, or [for it to have] prudence [and] not being prudent. 
About Chrysippus. Chrysippus says that the αἴτιον is ‘that because of which.’ And, on 
the one hand, he says that the αἴτιον is a being and a body, <while that of which it is an 
αἴτιον is not a being nor a body;>397 He also says that an αἴτιον is a ‘because’ (ὅτι), 
whereas that of which it is an αἴτιον is a ‘because-of-something’ (διά τι).398 An αἰτία is 
the λόγος of the αἴτιον, or the λόγος concerning the αἴτιον as αἴτιον.399   
 Zeno and Chrysippus explicitly agree in two aspects of their doctrine. Both 
describe αἴτιον in the same way, and they also agree that only bodies can be αἴτια—
something also clear from the way they define bodies. Since for the Stoics every αἴτιον 
is a body, this is a Corporeal Closure Principle:  
For any x, if x is an αἴτιον, x is a body. 
 Notice, however, that this does not hold conversely. For instance, matter—the 
passive principle—is a body, and is never a cause of anything, since it is completely 
passive. Even if matter is the only body that cannot be an αἴτιον, ever, that means that 
being an αἴτιον is not part of the definition of bodies. What we have in Stobaeus’ report, 
however, are two distinct accounts of causality that, although similar, show an 
interesting doctrinal development. But first we have to notice what is in the background, 
namely that the Stoic notion of αἴτιον recalls some Platonic passages.  
 In the first place, the way Zeno and Chrysippus describe an αἴτιον is practically 
the same we found in Cratylus 413a3-4, when Socrates says he learnt—from a doctrine 
amazingly similar to the Stoic physics—that δι’ ὃ γὰρ γίγνεται, τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον (‘for 
                                                
395 See Seneca, Ep. 65.2 (LS55E; BS14.20). 
396 Note that prudence, soul, and moderation are bodies that produce (are the αἴτια of) the incorporeals 
‘being prudent,’ ‘being alive,’ ‘being moderate,’ a predicate that takes place to another body (soul, human 
body, soul, respectively). See this chapter’s sec. 2.4.  
397 Add. Wachsmuth coll. 139. 
398 In the codd. it says διατί. LS has διὰ τί (‘why’, ‘because of which’). Here I follow BS, which follows 
Heeren with διά τι.  
399 Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae 1.138, 14-139, 8 (SVF1.89; 2.336; LS55A; FDS 762; 
BS14.10). 








that by which [something] comes to be is the αἴτιον’).400 In addition, as I advanced at 
the beginning of this chapter, the cases offered to explain Zeno’s account seem 
structurally similar to Socrates’ safe answer in Phaedo (100c-ff; Ch. 1, sec. 7), and are 
the same examples the ES used in Sophist 246d1-248a3 (see Ch. 4, sec. 4), to cross-
examine the materialists.401 Finally, Chrysippus’ distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτία, 
has often recalled Plato’s use of these terms in Phaedo.402 All this makes it very 
plausible that the background of the Stoic discussions of causality is Plato’s passages. 
The Stoics are reflecting and proposing their doctrines with Plato’s dialogues and their 
puzzles in mind. I will come back to these points of contact with Plato later, but for now 
let me first analyse in which way Zeno and Chrysippus offer two different doctrines.  
6.2 Zeno’s notion of αἴτιον 
Despite their agreements, in Zeno’s account we have a conceptual distinction not 
mentioned by Chrysippus. Zeno distinguishes between αἴτιον, and συµβεβηκός, as two 
of the relata involved in causation. For Zeno, these two relata are correlative terms: an 
αἴτιον is that thing because of which a συµβεβηκός takes place, whereas a συµβεβηκός 
is that thing of which something is an αἴτιον. This description also makes clear the 
direction of fit of the causal relation. An αἴτιον produces a συµβεβηκός, and not vice 
versa.403 Zeno adds to this that the αἴτιον is a body whereas the συµβεβηκός is a 
κατηγόρηµα (which I translated as ‘charge,’ but is often rendered as ‘predicate’).  
Zeno also proposes a thesis of causal sufficiency, which establishes that it is 
impossible for something to be an αἴτιον, without the corresponding συµβεβηκός being 
produced. This could be explained with the general formula:  
For any X, and Y, if X causes Y, then whenever X occurs, Y occurs.404 
According to the structure of two of the three examples in the fragment, it is 
possible to substitute Y for ‘being X,’ and understand that the effect occurs ‘in 
something,’ which, to be consistent with the Stoic physics, must be a body. Therefore, 
Zeno’s thesis is that:  
For any bodies X, and Z, if X is an αἴτιον of the συµβεβηκός ‘being X’, it is 
necessary that if X exists in Z, then ‘being X’ takes place in Z.  
                                                
400 For the relation between Cratylus and Stoicism see Ademollo (2011, 201-223).   
401 The examples, however, are not a direct quote but an exegesis of Zeno’s account. For that reason, they 
do not offer definitive evidence to link Zeno with the Phaedo and the Sophist. But there is, in turn, no 
conclusive evidence of the contrary.  
402 See M. Frede (1980, 222-223). 
403 See Cicero, Acad. 1.39 (SVF 190; LS 45A; BS2.10). 
404 See Hankinson (1998, 242). 
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There is no αἴτιον without συµβεβηκός. Stobaeus offers two instantiations of this 
principle. They can be spelled out as follows:  
1. Since prudence is the αἴτιον of ‘being prudent,’ it is necessary that if prudence 
exists in a soul, ‘being prudent’ takes place in that soul.405 
2. Since moderation is the αἴτιον of ‘being moderate,’ it is necessary that if 
moderation exists in a soul, ‘being moderate’ takes place in that soul.  
In these two examples there is certain synonymy preserved between the αἴτιον and 
the συµβεβηκός. Zeno’s account offers a safe answer to ‘why?’ questions just as 
Socrates’ answer in the Phaedo was safe. Zeno, however, uses a corporealistic 
framework to avoid the Parmenides’ objections. Moreover, Zeno uses the word αἴτιον, 
something Plato never uses to refer to the forms or the safe answer. In the Phaedo, as 
discussed in chapter 1, the safe answers are the αἰτίαι, not the αἴτια. If Zeno’s decision 
to use αἴτιον is intentional, he could be trying to modify Phaedo’s point. There, forms 
are the instruments of nous, and causation and responsibility are closed under nous. 
That is, only nous is an αἴτιον. But thanks to the Stoic theology, where God is mixed 
through-and-through in every thing, the Stoics can include all bodies as αἴτια.  
The example of the soul, however, is different:  
3. Since soul is the αἴτιον of ‘being alive,’ it is necessary that if soul exists in a 
body, ‘being alive’ takes place in that body.  
The difference could be explained by the fact that the example assumes that we 
know that ‘being ensouled’ always implies ‘being alive.’ This will mirror the strategy 
followed by Socrates in the Phaedo, when he talks about his sophisticated answer, but it 
also makes reference to Sophist (see Ch. 1, sec. 7.2, and Ch. 4, sec. 4). But this is not 
the only difference between the examples about virtues and the one about the soul.   
In the case of soul and body, Zeno is talking about two different bodies that can 
blend, and form a living animal, but can be separated later (see sec. 2.3 of this chapter). 
The animal’s body is alive when it is blended with a soul. But the case of virtues is 
different, since virtues are nothing else but the soul qualified or disposed in certain way, 
so there is no blend of two bodies there. If this is right, then the examples mean that the 
reason why a soul is prudent or moderate is because it is a soul disposed in a virtuous 
way. In fact, Zeno argues for the unity of virtue, which means that prudence and 
                                                
405 For Zeno’s definition of prudence, see Plutarch VM 440E-441D (SVF 1.201, 3.255; LS61B; BS26.23). 








moderation refer to the same soul disposed in the same way (virtuously) but with 
respect to different sorts of actions. Then, when Zeno claims that prudence is the αἴτιον 
of ‘being prudent’ in a soul, it means that the αἴτιον of a soul’s ‘being prudent’ is the 
soul physically disposed in a virtuously way with respect to actions in a specific 
domain. The corporeal disposition of the soul is what brings about a certain state of 
affairs. These examples establish the direction of fit of the causal process.  
If no one can be prudent or moderate if his soul has no prudence or moderation, it 
means that the source of prudence or moderation is not a person’s actions but the quality 
or disposition of her soul. It is the condition of the soul which determines the evaluation 
of the actions, and not vice versa. This, which might sound extreme, fits perfectly with 
the Stoic conception of virtue and the image of the wise. The problem for Zeno’s 
example, however, is that it does not explain how prudence and moderation exist in the 
soul in the first place. The explanation must be corporeal in nature, so it has to be about 
bodies acting in the soul. But what kind of bodies would dispose the soul in this way? 
Zeno explains this with his notion of fate, which I discuss later. But Chrysippus offers a 
different answer.  
6.3 Chrysippus’ notion of αἴτιον 
Let me look at the modifications introduced by Chrysippus. According to Stobaeus, 
his account keeps Zeno’s notion of αἴτιον, adding that it is a ὅτι (because). Instead of 
using the term συµβεβηκός, however, Chrysippus calls the other relata in the causal 
process a διά τι (because-of-something). The reason for this move might be that 
Chrysippus found problematic Zeno’s use of the terms συµβεβηκός, and κατηγόρηµα. 
Since κατηγόρηµα—which Zeno takes as the genus of συµβεβηκός—can mean ‘charge’ 
or ‘accusation,’ Chrysippus might worried that Zeno put the συµβεβηκός under the 
wrong genus, since one thing is the effect of the αἴτιον, and another the account of the 
αἴτιον as αἴτιον.406  
Chrysippus’ solution, perhaps using Plato’s Phaedo, is to highlight the distinction 
between αἴτιον, and αἰτία, saying that the latter is the λόγος of the αἴτιον, or the λόγος 
concerning the αἴτιον qua αἴτιον, which is different from the effect (διά τι). Chrysippus, 
then, talks about three elements in the causal process:  
(1) a body X (αἴτιον),  
(2) an effect y (διά τι), and  
                                                
406 Chrysippus in fact understands συµβεβηκός, and κατηγόρηµα in a very specific way. See Stobaeus 
1.106,5-23 (SVF 2.509; LS51B4). 
  185 
(3) a λόγος of X qua responsible for y (αἰτία).  
But Chrysippus’ account assumes that the effect takes place in another body, since 
only bodies can be affected. Therefore, an additional element is implied: (4) a body Y 
which receives y. The problematic element, however, is (3), since it is not completely 
clear what ontological status it has.  
Chrysippus’ distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτία has often been understood as a 
distinction between a body responsible for an effect (αἴτιον), and a causal explanation or 
some sort of propositional item (αἰτία).407 It has been pointed out, however, that there 
are good reasons to reject such interpretation.408 Let me briefly explain the thought. In a 
different passage, Stobaeus reports Chrysippus’ uses of the word αἰτία at the 
(macro)cosmic level. According to this passage, αἰτία is coextensive with λόγος. In this 
context, however, λόγος consists in πνεῦµα, the active body which pervades the 
universe and every thing in it. Αἰτία—we learn from Stobaeus—refers to the same 
substance (πνεῦµα) but from a different perspective than λόγος.409  
Although this is said at a cosmic level (the cosmic-λόγος and the cosmic-αἰτία), it 
can be applied to individual cases of causation if we have in mind that every body in the 
cosmos is mixed through-and-through with πνεῦµα. The suggestion is, then, to 
understand Chrysippus’ αἰτία as referring to the portion of πνεῦµα in a body that makes 
it the αἴτιον of a specific effect (as opposed to a portion of πνεῦµα that makes 
something else). Identifying the αἰτία of the αἴτιον, then, is indispensable to 
understanding how it was possible for the αἴτιον to produce its effect. The relation 
between cosmic-αἰτία and individual αἰτία also explains why the Stoics think that all 
causes are interconnected.  
6.4 An orthodox account of Stoic causality 
Various sources report what seems to be an orthodox account of the Stoic doctrine 
on causality, and which seems a development from Chrysippus’ version. This orthodox 
account is preserved, for example, in Sextus Empiricus: 
<The> Stoics say that every αἴτιον is a body which becomes410 the αἴτιον of something 
incorporeal for a body, for instance, a scalpel, a body, becomes the αἴτιον for the flesh, 
                                                
407 M. Frede (1980, 222), Long and Sedley (1987, vol. 1, 333), and more recently Boeri and Salles (2014, 
357-358). Frede offers a fragment of Diocles of Carystus (ap. Galen, Alim. fac. 6.455-6K; fr. 122 
Wellman) to support his claim. But as Bobzien (1999,199) points out, that is ‘insufficient to establish that 
for Chrysippus αἰτία was a propositional item or a kind of causal explanation.’ 
408 See Bobzien (1999, 198-202). 
409 Stobaeus Eclogae 1.79.5-12, quoted and discussed at Bobzien (1999, 200).  She also offers Seneca Ep. 
65.2 as evidence for this view. 
410 At some moment of time, it seems. For γίνεσθαι see Clement, Stromata 8.9.26.3-4 (LS55C), where it 
says that γίνεσθαι is an activity and hence an incorporeal. But in that passage seems to refer to what 








another body, of the incorporeal charge ‘to be cut.’ And in turn, a fire, a body, becomes 
the αἴτιον for the wood, another body, of the incorporeal charge ‘to be set on fire.’411  
 According to this report, the Stoics establish that an αἴτιον has a relation with two 
things. One is the action performed by the αἴτιον, what we may call the effect, and a 
body receiving the action. This could still be read with the legal sense: there is a culprit, 
a charge, and a victim. The Stoics mark the difference by saying that the αἴτιον is an 
αἴτιον of something (the effect) and for something (a body).412 This model sounds much 
less awkward if we notice that the Stoic use of αἴτιον tracks the legal origin of the 
terms, since the αἴτιον can be said to be the culprit (a body) of a charge (a predicate) 
against a victim (a body). Thus, the two examples in Sextus’ map out in the following 
way: 
Culprit (body) Victim (body) Charge 
(incorporeal)413 Time 
Scalpel Flesh  To be cut Today 
Fire Wood To be set on fire  Yesterday 
 
 Thus, a body becomes an αἴτιον by acting on another body and thus producing an 
effect on that body. An αἴτιον is the agent of a causal relation.414  The Stoic notion of 
αἴτιον, then, could be expressed as follows:  
Stoic αἴτιον: x is an αἴτιον, if x is a body, and x becomes at some time t1, the 
agent of an incorporeal y,415 for a body z.  
 But this also means that ‘αἴτιον’ is an appellative that bodies acquire at a specific 
moment in time. The sense in which an αἴτιον is a body, then, is the Stoic fourth genus, 
that is, an αἴτιον is a relatively disposed individual, since it is relatively disposed 
towards another body. This is made explicit in Sextus’s report when he writes: ‘Well 
then, the αἴτιον, they say, belongs to what is relative; for it is an αἴτιον of something and 
                                                                                                                                          
happens to the passive body. But then, how to take the γίνεσθαι in the second sentence of the quote? One 
option is to accept that even the active part in the relation, by being active, also is somehow affected at 
least in terms of its relative being. 
411 Sextus Empiricus, AM 9.211-212 (SVF2.341; LS55B; BS14.16). 
412 A similar version is preserved in Clement, where an αἴτιον is ‘of something’ (the effect) and ‘in 
relation with something’ (a fitting body). Note, however, that a body can act in itself. See Clement 
Stromata 8.9, 25.1.1-27, 5.3; 32.1 (SVF 2.334-351; LS55C-D, I; FDS 763-764, 766, 768-770; BS 14.11). 
For convenience, in what follows I refer to this passage just as BS 14.11.  
413 The Stoics disagreed about what exactly constituted the charge. Some of them talk about a predicate, 
others of a complete sayable, and some others about a name (the verb). 
414 In the text this is expressed in different ways terms and expressions: ἐνεργητικῶς; ἐν τῷ δρᾶν; 
ἐνεργοῦν; ποιητικόν; δραστήριον; see BS14.11. 
415 Alternatively, to use Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ terminology: ‘…x becomes at some time t1, the agent by 
which an incorporeal y is produced for a body z.’ 
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<for something>, for instance, on the one side, the scalpel is the αἴτιον of something 
like the cutting, on the other side, [it is the αἴτιον] for something like the flesh.’416   
The sources make two further annotations to the Stoic doctrine of causality. The 
first one is that not every ‘that because of which’ (δι’ ὅ) is an αἴτιον, which is made 
clear with a colourful example about Medea—preserved by Clement.417 This means that 
this doctrine either modifies Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ definition of αἴτιον, or that when 
they say that an αἴτιον is a δι’ ὅ, they never intended it to be a definition, but only as a 
classification into its genus. According to the example, there are many things that count 
as ‘that because of which’ Medea killed her sons, but only Medea is the αἴτιον of their 
death, since Medea was the agent of their death in strict sense. Only Medea is 
responsible and guilty for the death of her sons, since someone else in the same 
situation but with a different character would have acted differently. So in a strict sense 
a body is an αἴτιον of something, if the body produces the effect in an active way.418 
This distinction derives in the Stoic analysis of different types of αἴτια, but I will get 
back to that in a moment.  
The second thing to note is that the Stoics think that the passive body in the causal 
interaction needs to have certain fitness or aptitude (ἐπιτηδειότης) for the specific effect 
to take place.419 The example they give to explain this is with fire and wood. If the 
wood is wet, the fire will not burn the wood (although it could make it fit for something 
else). The wood needs to be dry for the active capacity of the fire to actually burn the 
wood. But the fact that the passive body needs to be fit, does not subtract any 
responsibility from the αἴτιον, nor make the passive body an αἴτιον in a strict sense 
(because it is not active), but becomes part of the causal explanation. So, when Clement 
reports that the scalpel is the αἴτιον to the flesh of being cut, and the flesh is the αἴτιον 
to the scalpel of cutting, the flesh is not the αἴτιον in an active strict sense, but only 
insofar as it is in a fit disposition to be cut.420  
6.5 Types of causes 
So far I have restricted the analysis to what the Stoics often call the αἴτιον in a strict 
sense. The Stoics, however, were also sensitive to many other elements involved in the 
causal process. The Stoic approach, at least from Chrysippus onwards, seems to make a 
                                                
416 Sextus Empiricus AM 9.207-208 (BS 14.15).  For the scalpel/flesh example, see also BS14.11. 
417 See BS14.11. 
418 See Boeri & Salles (2014, 350). 
419 Sextus Empiricus AM 9.237-245 (LS72N), and BS14.11. 
420 This means that Stoic causation in a strict sense is triadic and not a tetradic relation, as Totschnig 
(2013, 122-123) wants it to be. See Boeri & Salles (2014, 350-1) who point out to DL 7.63. 








compromise between the views of some natural philosopher and those of Plato’s 
Socrates. In the Phaedo, and Republic, Plato’s Socrates distinguished between αἴτιον 
and necessary conditions, criticising his predecessors for failing to do so (see Ch. 1, sec. 
5; and Ch. 2, sec. 4-5). The Stoics, follow this distinction, but introduce various types of 
αἴτια.  
According to Cicero, Chrysippus distinguished between two main groups of causes 
(causae). One group is of ‘perfect and primary’ (perfectae et principales)421 causes, 
while the other is of ‘auxiliary/accessory and proximate’ (adiuvantes et proximae) 
causes.422 The main difference explained in Cicero’s report, is that the perfect and 
primary causes are contemporary to the effect, while the others are antecedent to it.423 
The distinction is made in the context of a discussion of fate and human action to which 
I will come back later. But first let me show how this account seems to have developed 
into a more complex version found in Clement.  
According to Clement’s Stromata, the Stoics distinguished between two main senses 
of the word αἴτιον. In a legitimate or proper (κυρίως) sense, an αἴτιον is a body whose 
activity produces an incorporeal for another body. This is called in Clement’s report the 
sustaining (συνεκτικόν) αἴτιον. This type of αἴτιον is also called ‘perfect’ (αὐτοτελῆ), 
and active (ποιητικός), and is self-sufficient to produce its effect. The sustaining αἴτιον, 
then, corresponds to the sense of αἴτιον analysed in the previous section, and which 
Chrysippus calls the ‘perfect and primary’ causes. This is the sense in which only 
Medea is the αἴτιον of the killing of her children. It is the legitimate use of the term 
because it signals who or what in the causal process is responsible for the effect. This is 
important in a moral or legal context because no matter how complex the causal process 
is, it allows the Stoics to point out unambiguously who or what is to blame for each 
thing. Other elements may be part of the explanation of the causal process, and might 
play a crucial part for one’s understanding of how the αἴτιον produced its effect, but the 
legitimate αἴτιον will tell us who or what is to blame. To understand why a sustaining 
αἴτιον produced its effect, however, a better understanding of its nature will be needed. 
But first let me turn my attention to the other sense the term αἴτιον.  
                                                
421 I agree with Boeri and Salles’s (2014, 352) suggestion that with principlaes Cicero may be translating 
the Greek κυριώτατον, which refers to the αἴτιον in a strict sense. 
422 See Cicero Fat. 41-45 (SVF 2.974; LS 62C; BS14.28). See also Plutarch SR 1056C (SVF 2.937; 
BS19.10). These perfect and primary causes seem to correspond to συνεργά and προκαταρτικά. See LS 
vol. 1, 342; and M. Frede (1980, 240-1). 
423 Plutarch seems to add that the perfect αἴτιον is stronger than the others, but it is not clear in which 
sense. See Plutarch SR 1056C (SVF 2.937; BS19.10). 
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In a looser or improper sense (καταχρηστικῶς) the Stoics recognise that other 
elements could also be called αἴτιον,424 perhaps, as I suggested, because they also play a 
role in the causal process, and are needed for a full account of the causal process. In this 
sense, the Stoics include what is ‘preliminary’ (προκαταρκτικόν), ‘auxiliary/accessory’ 
(συνεργόν), ‘jointly-responsible’ (συναίτιον) for the effect, the necessary conditions, 
and even the incorporeals.425 Instead of completely discarding these elements, the Stoics 
make an effort to understand why they have a role in the causal process. Based on 
Clement’s and Pseudo-Galen’s report,426 we have information about how the Stoics 
understood these other elements as αἴτιον in an improper sense. The texts focus on three 
of these: the preliminary, the auxiliary, and the jointly-responsible.     
A preliminary αἴτιον is that which, primarily, offers the starting point for the 
generation or destruction of something else. Thus, it is antecedent to the effect, and, if 
once the effect has been produced it is eliminated, the effect remains. The preliminary 
αἴτιον, however, does not always generate its effect; it is a necessary condition, then, 
but not a sufficient one. An example is learning, where the father of the pupil is the 
preliminary αἴτιον of learning. In this case it is clearer that, ceteris paribus, the death of 
the father will not eliminate the pupil’s learning. The example also makes clear that the 
preliminary cause should not be identified with the (Aristotelian) proximate cause. The 
father is not the most proximate cause of the learning of the pupil, but is qualitatively 
the most important.  
An auxiliary αἴτιον is described as something that collaborates or aids the sustaining 
αἴτιον and makes a difference in terms of the intensity or power of the effect. By itself, 
however, it is incapable of producing the effect. The auxiliary αἴτιον, however, is 
similar to the sustaining αἴτιον in the sense that it needs to be contemporaneous with the 
effect to make a difference, and if it is eliminated, the added power or intensity 
disappears. Note, however, that in Cicero, Chrysippus is said to consider the auxiliary 
αἴτιον as antecedent to the effect.  
There seem to be two different versions of the συναίτιον (jointly-responsible). Both 
agree that this is an active αἴτιον that produces its effect in conjunction with another 
thing or things. This means that when all the jointly-responsible causes needed to 
produce the effect are present, there is no need for a sustaining cause. But in Clements’s 
version, a συναίτιον is not self-sufficient to produce its effect without its partner. In 
                                                
424 See BS 14.11. 
425 BS14.11. 
426 BS14.11; Pseudo-Galen, Introductio sive Medicus, 14.691, 13-692, 13 (BS14.14). 








Clement we learn that this type of αἴτιον is sometimes called reciprocal (ἀλλήλων),427 
and the example he gives is of a teacher and a pupil as reciprocal causes of the predicate 
‘making progress.’428 Without either the teacher or the pupil, the effect does not take 
place.   
In Pseudo-Galen, however, we have a different story. There, a Stoic συναίτιον is 
capable of producing its effect by itself, just like a sustaining αἴτιον, but there is another 
συναίτιον which is also capable of producing the same effect, and if both are present 
they are said to jointly produce the effect. Ps-Galen’s version, then, is a case of over-
determination. The example he gives is that of a stone in the bladder and inflammation 
as causes of retention of urine. These two things, he explains, can each alone cause 
retention of urine, but they can also both be present and be jointly-responsible for the 
effect. Notice that this sense of συναίτιον assumes that an effect could have two 
completely different αἴτια, something that is not assumed in the other senses of αἴτιον.  
At this point we are in a position to offer a table of the types of causes and their 
characteristics, according to the Stoics:  
Senses Type Time in relation 
with the effect 
Role with 











Preliminary Antecedent Passive 
Necessary, 






















 According to this table, a causal process involves some necessary and optional 
elements. Any causal process involves, necessarily four elements: (a) antecedent causes 
(necessary conditions, including one preliminary cause); (b) active cause(s) (either a 
sustaining self-sufficient cause, or sufficient συναίτιον); (c) an incorporeal effect; (d) a 
                                                
427 Clement also reports that ‘reciprocal cause’ has also other senses. Cf. BS14.11. 
428 See BS14.11. 
429 Here I mean the normal contemporary sense of these words. The Stoics have their own modal 
terminology, which differs form this one. See DL 7.75-76 (SVF 2.201; LS38D; BS19.22). 
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patient(s) receiving the effect. Optionally, it can also involve (e) auxiliary causes (either 
antecedent, contemporaneous with the event, or both). But we have to remember that 
only the active causes track responsibility, namely the sustaining and the συναίτιον 
(reciprocal), and in the case of a συναίτιον the responsibility is shared between the 
participants. In terms of their formal properties, these αἴτια have one difference. The 
active and preliminary αἴτια seem to be intransitive, but the necessary conditions are 
transitive. The other cases seem indeterminate.  
7. Fate and moral responsibility  
The Stoics, at least from Chrysippus onwards, also argue that there is an unalterable 
concatenation of αἴτια that includes all events and states430 in the cosmos—what they 
call fate (εἱµαρµένη). This thesis goes hand in hand with the Stoic idea that the cosmos 
is a living rational animal; for them, the cosmos is a continuous body whose parts hold 
together, and are directed by the cosmic πνεῦµα which permeates everything.431 But not 
only that, the Stoics claim that everything has a preliminary αἴτιον, and that all causal 
relations are necessary.432 These two theses amount to a strong causal determinism. The 
Stoics, however, are also compatibilists.433 They think that their determinism is 
compatible with moral responsibility. How many of these ideas are already present in 
the first generations of Stoics is difficult to know.  
According to Hippolytus, Zeno (and Chrysippus) affirmed that ‘everything is fated’ 
(καθ᾽εἱµαρµένην εἶναι πάντα), and explained this by an analogy of a dog tied to a 
cart.434 If the dog wants to follow the cart, its action coincides with necessity, but if does 
not want to follow it, the cart will compel it anyway. And the same can be said of men. 
Even when they do not want to do something, they will be compelled to do what is 
destined.435  
                                                
430 Here I agree with Salles (2005, 3-9), that for the Stoics events are reducible to states. For a different 
view see Bobzien (1998). 
431 See DL 7.142-3 (SVF 2.633, 3 Apollodorus 9; LS53X; BS12.13); Sextus Empiricus AM 9.78-80 (SVF 
2.1013; BS12.9). See also Hierocles, Elementa Ethica, 3.56-4.36. (BS13.10). 
432 For a detailed analysis see Salles (2005). 
433 For the discussion on determinism and compatibilism, see Sorabji (1980), Botros (1986); Sharples 
(1986) and (2006); Boeri (1997a), (1997b) and (2000); Bobzien (1998) and (2005); and Salles (2005) and 
(2007). 
434 Cleanthes himn has also many lines where he assumes that fate is inescapable. 
435 Hippolytus, Ref. 1.21.2 (SVF 2.975; LS62A; BS28.8). See also Cleanthes ap. Epictetus, Ench. 53 
(LS62B); Seneca Ep. 107.11. The authority of this report, however, is contested. Bobzien (1998, 345-57) 
argues that Hippolytus report has been overestimated in its value as a testimony for early Stoic 
determinism, and she argues that the analogy cannot be ascribed to Zeno or Chrysippus. See, however, 
Sharples (2005), and Boeri & Salles (2014, 703, 708). 








It has been suggested that Zeno and the first generation of Stoics probably held a 
notion of fate closer to the traditional Greek version—where fate is predicated over big 
life-changing events—than the one developed by Chrysippus. Thus, even if Zeno really 
claimed that everything is fated, he may have just meant that the external events in 
one’s life are so. In other words, the scope of πάντα may only include external events, 
but not things like one’s attitudes.436 If this is true, even if all external events are fated, 
agents have control over how to take those events, which could very well be the main 
point of the analogy of the dog and the cart.437 Zeno, then, may not be committed to 
determinism. But he certainly does not deny it either, leaving the door open for 
Chrysippus more explicit doctrine.   
Zeno was, however, committed to the idea that fate is a concatenation of all the 
causes in the cosmos—an idea not necessarily implied in a traditional conception of 
fate. According to Eusebius, Zeno explained his doctrine of the eternal return in the 
following way:   
Then, [Zeno] also affirms that the whole cosmos is subject to conflagration 
(ἐκπυροῦσθαι) according to certain fated intervals, and then is again reordered anew. 
Indeed, he says that the primary fire is exactly as a seed, which has (ἔχον) the λόγος of 
all things and the causes (τὰς αἰτίας) of what happened, what happens, and what will 
happen. And the concatenation and succession of these things is fate, knowledge, truth, 
and it is an inevitable and inescapable law of what exists. In this way everything in the 
cosmos is excellently administered, as in a well-ordered city.438 
Apart from the theses of the conflagration and eternal return,439 there are four claims 
relevant for the Stoic doctrine of causality. The first one establishes an analogy between 
the primary fire and a seed. The primary fire is to the λόγος and causes of past, present, 
and future events of the cosmos, as the seed is to the leaves and branches of a full-
grown plant. The identity of relation of the analogy is not explicit. However, it can be 
noted that it has to do with the sense in which ἔχον is used. To spell out the analogy: a 
seed has the information to generate all its leaves and branches and the causes of every 
state of development of a plant, in exactly the same way the primary fire has the λόγος 
of all things and the causes of past, present, and future events.  
There are two features that seem to be important about the use of ἔχον. First, it is an 
organic, natural way of having something; and second, it is used in two senses. A seed 
                                                
436 See Long and Sedley (1987, vol. 1, 392-4).  The analogy does not necessarily imply a deterministic 
position (if, for instance, the cart stands not for any possible event, but only for those that are completely 
beyond the control of the dog). For the traditional Greek notion of fate see Adkins (1960). 
437 For the discussion in Chrysippus’ case, see Bobzien (1998, 354), and Boeri and Salles (2014, 703). 
438 Eusebius, PE 15.14.2 (SVF 1.98; LS46G; FDS 327A; LS46G; BS19.5). Cf. Republic 508b6-8; Ch. 2, 
sec. 4). 
439 See Alexander Lycopolis 19,2-4 (LS46I; BS18.1). See also Salles (2009). 
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and the primary fire—what Zeno calls λόγος440—have in actuality the information to 
generate their outcomes (leaves and branches, and every thing, respectively). They 
literally have the genetic information of their outcomes.441 In a potential sense, 
however, they have the causes, the seed and the fire will produce the αἴτια over time 
(remember that something becomes the αἴτιον of an effect in a specific moment of 
time). We have to remember that the αἴτια are bodies. A suggestion, then, on how to 
read the analogy would be to say that: the primary fire already has the information to 
generate all things, and it has the natural capacity to produce all the αἴτιον of past, 
present, and future events; just as the seed has the information to generate all of its 
leaves and branches, and it has the the natural capacity to produce all the αἴτια of its 
events and states.  
Zeno’s second claim is that the λόγος and αἴτια are concatenated and form a 
succession that he calls fate, knowledge, and truth. He calls it fate, since it determines 
past, present, and future events. He also calls it knowledge because by understanding 
the concatenation and succession one gets universal knowledge, and by the same token 
it is the source of truth. But this is only explained by a third claim. The concatenation 
and succession of causes is considered a law of nature with an inescapable and 
inevitable force. The necessity of fate is what makes it a source of knowledge, in the 
sense of secure unalterable knowledge, and of necessary truth.  
The last claim of the passage, which affirms that everything in the cosmos is 
excellently ordered, again could make us think that Zeno is committed to a causal 
determinism. But again, it is unclear what is the scope of πάντα, and how deterministic 
this law is. It may only order the cosmos at some general level, allowing certain 
indetermination as part of the general administration of the cosmos. 
 Chrysippus, however, defends a full fleshed, and explicit causal determinism, 
which seems to build upon Zeno’s doctrine. For Chrysippus, all things—all states and 
events—come about through fate by antecedent αἴτια, which in his case are the auxiliary 
and precedent (preliminary) αἴτια.442 Following Zeno’s notion very closely, for him fate 
is ‘a certain natural everlasting organisation (σύνταξις) of the whole: some things follow 
on and destroy others, and the concatenation is unalterable.’443 Fate is, then, the 
                                                
440 It is also what contains the λόγοι σπερµατικοί. See Aetius 1.7.33 (SVF 2.1027; LS46A; BS17.3); DL 
7.135-6 (SVF 1.102, 2.580; LS46B; BS15.3). Cf. Eusebius, Prep. Ev. 15.19.1-2 (SVF 2.599; LS52D; 
BS19.8). 
441 Meaning ‘the information to generate’, which, of course, has nothing to do with genes, or 
contemporary biology. 
442 See Cicero, On fate 39-43 (SVF 2.974; LS62C; BS 14.28). 
443 Gellius 7.2.3 (SVF 2.1000). 








necessary concatenation of αἴτια, the nexus and succession of all things and the αἴτια of 
past, present and future events.444 By calling it a σύνταξις, Chrysippus seems to 
recognise that fate is not a linear concatenation of causes, but a complex arrangement or 
composition (cf. Ch. 2, sec. 4).   
According to Plutarch’s report,445 Chrysippus also says that, although the 
preliminary cause is weaker than the perfect one (because it is not sufficient to bring 
about its effect), fate is an invincible (ἀνίκητον), unhindered (ἀκώλυτον), and inflexible 
(ἄτρεπτον) αἴτιον. This means that for Chrysippus, the organisation of antecedent αἴτια 
as a whole is inescapable. This is explained by the thesis that every effect has an αἴτιον 
and every effect is necessitated by antecedent αἴτια.446 If there is a movement without 
cause, the whole cosmos would collapse,447 so nothing is causeless448 or in the positive, 
everything has an antecedent αἴτιον.449 Note, however, that this is not to say that the 
chain of antecedent αἴτια alone determines the effect simpliciter. What is determined is 
that if there is an antecedent αἴτιον there is going to be an effect (otherwise the αἴτιον 
would not be an antecedent of anything). This is something that is possible to infer from 
the fact that αἴτιον and effect are two correlative terms. If there is one of them, that, by 
definition, implies the other. But the fate as the law of nature does not tell us what the 
effect would be, it only tells us that every effect has some antecedent αἴτιον. When 
Chrysippus says that the preliminary cause is not sufficient to bring about the effect, he 
means that it is not sufficient to bring about a specific effect. The specificity of the 
effect depends on the active αἴτιον. To know what exactly the effect of a preliminary 
cause will be, we also need to know what is the active αἴτιον in play.  
Chrysippus explains this with the famous example of the cylinder and the cone:450 
these objects cannot start moving by their own, since they need an external push. But 
once this happens each object moves in virtue of its own nature: the cylinder moves in 
straight line whereas the cone moves in a circle. Therefore, Chrysippus concludes, the 
external push gives these objects the beginning of movement, their antecedent αἴτιον, 
                                                
444 See Aetius 1.28.4 (SVF 2.917; LS55J); Stobaeus Eclogae 1.79.1-12 (SVF 2.913; LS55M); Cicero On 
divination, 1.125-6 (SVF 2.921; LS55L). 
445 Plutarch, SR 1056C (SVF2.937; BS19.10). 
446 See Plutarch, SR 1049F-1050B (SVF2.937; BS19.9), 1056C (SVF 2.937; BS 19.10), 1056D-E (SVF 
2.935; BS19.11); Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.138, 14-139, 8 (SVF 1.89; 2.336; LS55A; FDS 7620); Sextus 
Empiricus AM 9.237-245 (LS72N; BS 14.12); Galen, Adv. Iul.   18.279, 12-280, 4 (SVF2.355; BS14.13).   
447 See Alexander, Fat. 191, 30-192, 14 (SVF 2.945; LS55N; BS19.14); Aristocles apud Eusebius, PE 
1.5.14.2 (SVF 1.98; LS46G). 
448 See Alexander, Fat. 191,30-192,28 (SVF 2.945; LS55N). 
449 This is based on the principle of bivalence: Simplicius, in cat. 406, 34-407, 5 (SVF 2.198; FDS 881; 
BS 19.1); Cicero Fat. 20 (SVF 2.952; LS38G; FDS 884; BS19.2). Explicitly used to argue that everything 
has a cause: Cicero, Fat. 26 (LS70G; BS19.3). 
450 Cicero, On fate 39-43 (SVF 2.974; LS62C; BS14.28).  
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but not their specific rolling capacity. The rolling capacity is the sustaining cause of the 
circular movement of the cone, and the straight movement of the cylinder. So the 
responsibility for the way they move lies in each body’s specific nature (which in turn is 
specified by its portion of πνεῦµα). With this example, Chrysippus also explains how 
humans are accountable for their actions. For Chrysippus, humans are not externally 
determined, even if one’s actions are a result of impressions, since impressions are only 
the preliminary αἴτιον of a human action. It is a person’s commanding-faculty that 
determines whether she will assent or not to the impression (and more specifically, the 
disposition of the commanding-faculty). And that, Chrysippus argues, is in the person’s 
control. This, however, does not contradict Chrysippus’ deterministic commitments.451  
According to Stoic psychology, in order to act, a person receives an impression from 
a body, which constitutes the preliminary αἴτιον of the action. But the impression 
requires an act of assent (or dissent), which is entirely up to the agent. The assent is 
what leads to an impulse that has as an outcome an action.452 The concatenation of 
preliminary αἴτια and its necessity is never broken. It just includes the internal life of the 
person, which for the Stoics is, of course, something they explain in corporeal terms. 
The Stoics, in this way, can both maintain their causal determinism and claim that 
agents are responsible for their assents or dissents, and therefore, for their actions. The 
following report by Clement puts it clearly:453  
I know that many, incessantly attacking us, say that what does not prevent is an αἴτιον. 
For they claim that the αἴτιον of the theft is the one who did not keep her guard or did 
not prevent it, like the one who did not extinguish a terrible fire from the beginning, or 
like a pilot who did not set out the sails [were the αἴτιον] of the wreck. Those 
responsible for these things are immediately punished by the law, because the αἰτία of 
what happened also applies to the one who was able to prevent it. We answer them that 
the αἴτιον is discovered (νοεῖσθαι) in what produces, namely in the acting and doing. 
Not preventing, according to this, is inactive. Besides, an αἴτιον happens in the activity, 
like the shipbuilder engaged in building a ship, and the builder engaged in building a 
house. What does not prevent, however, is separated from what is produced.  For this 
reason, then, it could act, because what is able to prevent does not act nor prevent.  
If we think about this in terms of the example of a rape the Stoic point is even more 
revealing. Many communities, shockingly, punish and blame women for not preventing 
their own rape. This makes them the causes of their own rape. They brought it on 
themselves, some people say. Perhaps these people would tell women and society that 
rape was caused by the women’s dress, alcohol consumption, lack of a clear and loud 
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(2005, 52-54; 74).  
452 See Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.88, 8-99, 13 (SVF 3.378, 389, 394; LS 65A, C, E; BS25.2). If the assent does 
not take place, like in the case of an involuntary reaction, there was no agency from the rational part of 
the soul, and therefore the person cannot be held responsible for the action.  
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no, and so on. But the Stoic answer, according to Clement’s report, would be that what 
does not prevent rape cannot be its active αἴτιον. And only active αἴτια track 
responsibility. The only αἴτιον of rape, in the strict sense, is a rapist (or a gang of 
rapists). Even if the primary αἴτιον is one of the woman’s qualities (like being around a 
rapist), that is obviously not sufficient for a rape to happen, and generates no 
responsibility in the victim. It is the active αἴτιον that is the one responsible. If we were 
to understand, however, why the rapist raped the women, we would need to be clear 
about what disposition of a person’s soul makes it possible to become a rapist (this will 
be Chrysippus’ αἰτία). 
What is, then, the Stoic response to Socrates’ death? According to Cicero’s 
report,454 Chrysippus used Socrates’ death as an example to explain the difference 
between simple and complex events, a central piece of his doctrine of co-fated events. 
For Chrysippus, ‘Socrates will die on that day’455 is a simple event, since regardless of 
what Socrates does or not, his day of dying is fixed. In contrast, he explains, a complex 
event is ‘Oedipus will be born to Laius’ since it is not possible to add ‘regardless of 
whether Laius has intercourse with a woman or not,’ since these two things are co-fated. 
The distinction has been understood in terms of unconditionally (simple) and 
conditionally (complex) fated events.456 Chrysippus’ selection of the examples, 
however, is no accident.457 But if this is true, it is not clear why Chrysippus thinks his 
Socrates’ example is a simple event.  
Someone may think that Socrates death is a complex event par excellence: if 
Socrates had not decided to stay in jail, instead of running away to Megara, then he 
would not have died the day he did (see Ch. 1, sec. 5.1). But the example here seems to 
be saying exactly the opposite: regardless of Socrates’ actions, he was destined to die 
the very day he did. So, how to understand the distinction between simple and complex 
event? One way of reading the example is by trying to find a suitable moment in which 
the example is a simple event. For instance, after Socrates drank the hemlock, his death 
was determined regardless of his actions. The oddity of the example could then be 
explained as a pedagogical resource. The example was perhaps designed to trigger 
surprise, and start a discussion.  A different take, however, is by reference to the 
disposition of Socrates’ soul. If he was a virtuous person, once he was sentenced, it was 
                                                
454 Cicero, De fato 30. (SVF 2.956; LS55S; BS 28.5). 
455 ‘Morietur illo die Socrates.’ As Bobzien (1998, 200) remarks, illo die stands for either an indexical or 
for an actual date, but either way it refers to the day of Socrates’ death. 
456 See Sedley (1993, 317). 
457 That the examples are Chrysippus’ own is argued in Barnes (1985). 
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fated he was going to die, since regardless of his (virtuous) actions, he was going to die 
because running away was out of character. This would emphasise that the example 
would not work with someone else’s case, since a vicious person could have acted 
differently. In this reading, Socrates is like the cylinder, once it has received a push, the 
way it will act is fixed.  
A different interpretation would be to take the example to mean that Socrates will 
die on a specific day, regardless of what he does or not. In this case, even if Socrates 
decided to escape, it was fated that he was going to die the same day he would have 
died whether he decided to stay, perhaps because he was going to be reprehended or he 
was going to have an accident. But two further options are possible.458 One is to 
consider simple events as an empty class, since every event is co-fated with something 
else. But this would require the disqualification of the example of Socrates’ death. Or, it 
could be that the original example was something like ‘Socrates will die’ or ‘you will 
die,’ and was later corrupted by Cicero. Simple events would be then either those where 
no action forms a necessary condition, or those for which ‘no externally induced change 
is a causally relevant necessary condition.’459 A different option is to use Eusebius PE 
6.8.35, and suggest that an event is simple in relation to a subject if and only if the event 
will happen to the subject, and the explanation of why it happens to her has nothing to 
do with the subject’s actions. But it is difficult to understand Socrates’ death in this 
way, so for this reading to work, the example should be changed to ‘Socrates will die 
some day.’460 
There is a way, however, a way to avoid assuming there was a corruption of the 
original example. First, the examples should be considered simple or complex with 
relation to what the text adds to each of them. In this way, ‘Socrates will die on that 
day’ is a simple event in relation to Socrates actions (assuming the context is after the 
Athenians have condemned him), and ‘Oedipus will be born to Laius’ is a complex 
event in relation to Laius’ intercourse with women.  
 8. The Stoics’ philosophical conversation 
I am going to finish the chapter with three points related to causality, responsibility 
and the greatest difficulty. The first one is about the Stoics’ conversation with Plato. 
The second one is about the Stoic conception of philosophy and its similarities with 
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Plato’s argumentation. Finally, I will say something about their conception of the sage 
and the power of conversation.  
At the beginning of this chapter, I argued there is enough evidence to believe that 
the Stoics had direct access to Plato’s dialogues. This makes relevant two questions 
about the Stoic reception of Plato; one is (1) how the Stoics interpreted Plato; and, the 
other is (2) how the Stoics responded to their interpretation of Plato. The answer to the 
first question determines how closely and carefully the Stoics studied and discussed the 
Platonic corpus, whereas the second one decides what kind of relation the Stoics had 
with Plato’s philosophy. Due to the fragmentary and often mediated condition of the 
Stoic evidence, it is almost impossible to answer these questions for sure (as I noted in 
the Introduction). But then, which is the most charitable way to present the existing 
evidence?  
Stoic scholarship often highlights the internal cohesion and strong explanatory 
power of Stoic philosophy, presenting it as a systematic body of doctrines. This 
downplays the fact that the Stoics were a philosophical school, primarily interested in 
discussing philosophical problems, rather than transmitting a set of beliefs.461 This 
picture is also often combined with the assumption that the Stoics interpret Plato as a 
dogmatic unitarian—a reading probably mediated via the Old Academy—, and that 
their answer to him is confrontational. The Stoics’ agreements with Plato, in this way, 
are explained as mere (unreflective) influences, shared assumptions, piecemeal 
borrowings, and appropriations where they have simplified, developed, or expanded 
doctrines discretely, to establish their own philosophical system. An example of this 
would be to say that the Stoics edited down the Timaeus’ cosmos just omitting the bits 
they didn’t like. The disagreements, in turn, are understood as straightforward rejections 
of Plato’s central doctrines, where the Stoics just try to offer an original and rival 
answer to those of Plato. For instance, if someone says that the Stoics rejected Plato’s 
theory of forms because they were materialists. 
The overall traditional portrait emphasises the Stoic originality and innovation—a 
modern fixation more than a Stoic concern. But if Plato, as many believe today, was no 
dogmatic unitarian, this interpretation presents the Stoics as poor readers of his 
dialogues. Moreover, if the Stoics were only competing with Plato in an antagonistic 
way, then the Stoics were not very good readers either, in the sense that they would 
                                                
461 The fact that there is a core set of theses and theories that all the Stoics share at a certain moment of 
time is not enough as such to claim they were transmitting them as doctrine. This is true at least of the 
first generation of Stoics. The situation may have evolved in that direction; see Sedley (1989), and 
(2003). 
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have been more interested in ideology than in having a genuine philosophical debate, 
and inquiry. This would present the Stoics as primarily interested in proving that they 
were right, rather than in understanding and discussing philosophical problems. There 
is, fortunately, no need to assume that this depiction of the Stoic reception of Plato is 
right. The only ones that fit this description are the original materialists of the 
gigantomachia. They are rude and unwilling to listen (see Ch. 4, sec. 3). But as I have 
tried to show, the Stoics do not make the same mistake. They partially agree with these 
materialists, but also with the idealists and the ES. The complexity of their analysis is a 
reason to think that they understood Plato’s dialogues as works to be analysed and 
discussed, and whose aim was to trigger philosophical debate. 
In addition, there is no evidence to indicate the Stoics were personally hostile to 
Plato.462 If, for instance, we go back to Plutarch’s report about Zeno reading Plato’s 
Republic (see sec. 1), we notice that the combative language comes from Plutarch, not 
from Zeno. Interpreters from antiquity onwards have imposed the Stoic’s hostility 
towards Plato.463 Plutarch’s report, however, makes clear that Zeno engaged in detail 
with the flawed arguments and puzzles of Plato’s Republic, and that he fostered this type 
of engagement among his students. But thinking that some of a person’s arguments are 
flawed is not a sign of hostility. The interaction seems to be one of critical evaluation. 
Zeno’s analysis was surely informed by the wider Socratic tradition, but that does not 
mean his rejection of the arguments was based on a superficial eclecticism or 
unreflective agreements with other schools, but on their rational assessment of the 
arguments.  
Zeno’s disagreements with the dialogues are primarily explained by his 
philosophical interpretation of them, and not by Zeno’s alliances with other schools.464 
But disagreement about the soundness of arguments does not imply hostility. Zeno took 
it as his task to study Plato’s works, and to decide whether the arguments were flawed 
and needed solution. The explanation of the disagreements is not that Zeno was, for 
instance, a Cynic in this or that point, but that he assessed an argument in Plato’s 
Republic, and offered a solution closer to Cynicism. I cannot stress enough how 
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impact of Cynicism in Zeno’s Republic see Sellars (2007). 








important the direction of the explanation is in this case. One case makes the Stoics 
philosophers; the other turns them into ideologists.  
From other sources we also know that Zeno was unashamed to make public his 
agreements with the Socrates of Plato’s Republic465 and other dialogues, as well as with 
other Platonic characters and distinctions. This makes the real picture more balanced 
than Plutarch allows. The Stoics, it seems, were also interested in the dialogues’ 
positive contributions, and their evaluation of the arguments was often favourable. This 
means that the Stoics were critical interpreters of Plato’s dialogues, and not only 
followers or detractors.   
Zeno’s main interest was, however, to propose a correct philosophical account, not 
to directly refute Plato. Zeno wrote his own Republic, not a work exclusively targeting 
Plato or anyone else (although by doing this, Zeno probably thought that he was 
implicitly refuting all he needed to refute from other philosophers). But Zeno’s 
treatment of his predecessors is far from agonistic. On the contrary, his intense 
conversation with the philosophical tradition is understated. The Stoic passages, more 
generally, make clear allusions to other philosophers’ works and arguments—they want 
their readers to recognise the dialectical context of their contributions—but their aim is 
to offer self-standing, coherent, and structured philosophical proposals. Later they will 
defend themselves from criticisms, but not necessarily in a dogmatic and closed-minded 
way. The way the Stoics argue with the sceptic Academy could be compared with the 
method of hypothesis outlined in the Phaedo (see esp. 101d3-102a3; Ch. 1, sec. 7.2.3), 
more than with a dispute like the one at the beginning of the Sophist’s gigantomachia 
(see Ch. 4, sec. 3).  
To sum up, there are good reasons to think that the Stoics were careful interpreters 
of Plato, and that their response to him was not reactionary but that of a more honest 
and constructive intellectual conversation. If this is so, the idea that their reception of 
Plato is that of either appropriation, if it suited them, or dismissive rejection, if they 
were influenced by other sources, has to be abandoned. The Stoic animosity against 
Plato is probably an invention that later sources introduced. This realisation opens the 
door to an entire unexplored area of research. Until now, the traditional assumptions 
have justified scholars to be content with only a thorough record of cross-references of 
                                                
465 For the agreements and disagreements between Zeno’s and Plato’s Republics see DL 7.32-34 (SVF 
1.226; LS67B; BS30.12); Plutarch, De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 329a-b (SVF 1.262; LS67A; 
BS30.7); DL 7.121-125, 130-131 (SVF 3.355; 3.642; 3.697; 3.757; 3 Appollodorus 17; LS66H; 67P; 
BS30.20); Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 561c (SVF 1.263; LS67D; BS30.33). See also Schofield (1999, 
756-760), Erskine (1990, ch. 1), Schofield (1991, ch. 1), and Dawson (1992, ch. 4). 
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the antecedents of the Stoic philosophy. But if the Stoics were evaluating their 
predecessors’ contributions, and picking up existing philosophical debates, their 
philosophy can be fruitfully construed as a continuation of those debates.  
 The Stoics are famous for their systematization of philosophy, and their different 
divisions of its parts. They are also well known for thinking that the different parts of 
philosophy are intertwined in an organic way, where there is a strong co-dependency 
between them. In Diogenes Laertius we also learn that some of the Stoics even transmit 
philosophy’s parts mixed together. The Stoics explained the relation of the parts of 
philosophy by comparing it with an animal, an egg, or a city. Each of these images 
highlights something different,466 but all of them present philosophy as a system which 
parts function in coordination as a single whole. One way to understand the 
interconnection between the parts of Stoic philosophy is to think that, for example, 
ethics assumes certain propositions from physics and logic, and that it is the same for 
the other two parts.  
 If we compare this to the way Plato argues in his dialogues the similarity is 
clear. Plato conceives philosophy as an enterprise where all the different aspects are 
strongly interconnected (as I have argued in Ch. 1-4). Moreover, Plato does philosophy 
mixing together all these parts, as some Stoics did. The difference is, however, that he 
shows no inclination to distinguish different parts of philosophy. It seems that for him, a 
philosophical conversation involves, more often than not, some methodological 
reflection, some epistemological discussions, some metaphysics, and ethics. The 
interrelation is also organic, since it maps the layout of reality.   
 The difference is that, for the most part, the Stoics teach one part of philosophy 
at a time. Zeno and Chrysippus, for example, taught first logic, then physics, and finally 
ethics. Cleanthes, in turn, divided philosophy in six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, 
politics, physics, and theology.467 This implies not only a superficial difference in 
didactics of philosophy, but in philosophical method. Although the Stoics agree with 
Plato that philosophy must include all parts, and that they are organically 
interconnected, that does not imply they should be practiced all at once.  
 At this point, we can finally answer the question about how the Stoics solved the 
greatest difficulty. If we remember, there was a dialectical, an epistemological, and an 
ontological objection clouding Socrates’ accounts (see Ch. 3, sec. 2). Even if my 
                                                
466 See Boeri and Salles (2014, 13-20).  
467 See DL 7.39-41 (SVF 1.45-46; 2.37-38 and 2.41; LS26B; FDS 1; BS 1.2); Plutarch, SR 1035A (SVF 
2.42; LS26C; FDS 24).  








reconstruction of the discussion about causality and responsibility remained 
unconvincing, it is true that the Stoic philosophy can be read as an answer to this 
difficulty, and as a development and reflection over the ideas offered in the Sophist. The 
Stoics’ corporealism avoids Socrates’ criticisms against other types of materialism, by 
incorporating incorporeals in their ontology. They, however, reject forms and propose 
that the causal capacity is exclusively in the hands of God, the active principle, who is 
mixed through-and-through with everything. Their theory of mixture gives them a way 
to explain how God could be both the cause for everything, and yet allow each body to 
be responsible for their effects in the cosmos. Thus, they offer an account with the 
advantages of the conceptions in Phaedo and Republic (universality, with explanatory 
power, and cohesion), but avoiding idealism, and the terrifying consequences of the 
greatest difficulty (see Ch. 3, sec. 8). Their corporealism also allows them to explain 
that conversation, understood as a body (a soul) acting in another (another soul) remains 
powerful. For the Stoics, the virtuous soul of the sage is causally responsible for a 
transformative conversation.  
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 Conclusions 
Let me recapitulate what has been said so far. First, I analysed two central discussions 
about responsibility in Plato’s Phaedo and Republic 6. Chapter 1 discusses various models 
of causality and responsibility, and suggests the ‘Nous Closure Principle,’ that puts 
responsibility in the exclusive hands of nous (understood as a universal). The responsibility 
of nous, Socrates thinks, arises from its capacity to choose, and order things in the best way 
it can. Socrates, however, discovered that Anaxagoras, and others have failed to 
satisfactorily explain how exactly a nous is able to connect with its alleged effects. A new 
attempt, then, is needed (the ‘second voyage’). Thanks to the section about the real αἰτία 
and αἴτιον, however, Socrates makes clear that he never abandons the Closure Principle. 
Socrates developed his own tentative method of inquiry, which led him to say, in the 
reading I defended, that forms are the instruments of nous, although an action can also fail if 
nous proceeds carelessly and lacks adequate knowledge.  
I dedicated chapter 2 to analysing the sun analogy in Republic 6. There I argued that 
the text proposes an inference from analogy to discover some features about the good, but 
that it leaves open a puzzle about whether to understand the good as an unchangeable 
structure or as an active God. In addition, I argued that the passage introduces a notion of 
causality and responsibility that is partially transitive, which is an innovation with respect to 
the Phaedo. This means that the goodness of something can be traced back to God, whereas 
evil things are traced back to specific flawed souls. These flaws, however, might be 
overcome by philosophical conversation, which has a transformative effect in the soul.  
The discussions in Phaedo and Republic are distinct and independent from each 
other. There are some shared points, and some aspects in both discussions are compatible, 
but Plato seems to be testing similar but different solutions to the puzzles about causation 
and responsibility found in previous philosophies. Each discussion has its own set of 
unresolved puzzles, some of which Plato will discuss again in later dialogues.  
In chapter 3, I analysed one of the difficulties for the arguments advanced in both the 
Phaedo and Republic 6. The puzzle, which was already hinted at by Glaucon in the 
Republic, is developed in the Parmenides and it is known as the greatest difficulty. I have 
shown that the structure of the difficulty is multi-layered, and it involves a dialectical, 
epistemological, and ontological objection. At the core of the difficulty, there is a challenge 
to the whole causal connection between the intelligible and the sensible parts of the world. 
This, if right, brings about shocking consequences. It would mean that souls (and, therefore, 








nous) have no access to the necessary intelligible instruments to function successfully, and 
if that is the case, knowledge is impossible, and philosophical conversation loses all its 
power. The difficulty, in this way, poses a challenge for the previous discussions on 
responsibility. On the one hand, if there is no access to forms, then it seems there is no 
secure criterion to judge a good action from a bad one, and then no secure way to assign 
responsibility. On the other hand, it jeopardises the transitive notion of the responsibility of 
good things, since God has no power to intervene in human affairs, and humans do not have 
knowledge of him.   
Chapter 4 focussed on the Sophist’s gigantomachia as a reflection on the greatest 
difficulty. The passage presents a fictionalised dispute between materialists and idealists, 
two possible reactions to the greatest difficulty. Importantly, it is an altercation where 
conversation has no power, and there is only room for dispute. After modifying the 
materialists, the ES acts as a link, a peace negotiator, who cross-examines both views. He 
first persuades the materialists that they have to accept that at least virtues are incorporeal, 
and thus that not only bodies but also that anything with some power exists. Then, he cross-
examines the idealists, and concludes that their views are inconsistent, and make nous 
disappear, which also make knowledge impossible. In the end, the ES’s diagnostic of the 
situation is that a philosophical account able to include and explain the connection between 
both bodies and intelligible beings is still needed. For that, the ES proposes that kinds are 
like letters. Some of them mix with each other and some others do not, but vowels act like 
bonds. We can think there are some kinds, then, perhaps nous included, that link together 
two otherwise unrelated kinds. This offers no full account of how nous or anything else is 
able to act as a link, but suggests that it is possible, and natural, and therefore not entirely 
inconceivable.   
Chapter 5 discusses whether Stoic philosophy engaged with the arguments and puzzles 
of the Sophist, and the previous dialogues included in this thesis. I showed evidence to 
suggest that the Stoics had direct access to Plato, and that they were careful readers 
interested in continuing the philosophical discussion fostered by him. The complex 
argumentation in the dialogues helps to explain, I argued, the complexity of the Stoic 
philosophy; specifically, their specific brand of corporealism, which could be understood as 
a solution to the greatest difficulty that does not have to accept the existence of forms. This 
gives rise to a theory of causality that takes into account plenty of the different aspects and 
possibilities involved in a causal relation. The main contribution here is the distinction 
between active and passive causes, and the idea that the cause in a strict sense is the active 
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one, which is the only one that tracks responsibility. The other senses of cause explain, in 
turn, how the notions of causation and responsibility began to grow apart.  
This research has also shown that there is continuity in the topics being discussed, and 
the way philosophy is conceived. It is false that the Stoics are not interested in Plato’s 
philosophical project and problems, and that they are anti-Platonic. I have argued that the 
engagement the Stoics had with Plato was not partial or instrumental but careful and 
respectful. The early Stoics were not ideologists but philosophers. They were not afraid to 
agree with Plato’s dialogues, but they were also independent thinkers able to also criticise 
arguments they considered flawed. The Stoics, I have shown, were not hostile to Plato, but 
on the contrary, they were very keen on his dialogues. Moreover, they interpreted Plato in a 
sophisticated way, reflecting the arguments from different perspectives, and evaluating each 
contribution thoroughly. The Stoics were rightful heirs of Plato in the sense that they 
conceived philosophy in an organic and interconnected way similar to Plato’s.  
This thesis, however, has been unable to signal all the possible connections between the 
texts selected, or to include all the relevant texts for an exhaustive reconstruction of the 
debate about causality and responsibility. Some of the topics, especially in the Stoics, have 
only been briefly mentioned. Almost no other philosopher was included in the analysis. No 
Aristotle, or later Academics, no Epicureans, or other Hellenistic schools. This means that 
the outcome of this research is only a partial picture. For a full understanding of the Stoics a 
more comprehensive analysis of their influences, readings, and interchanges with other 
philosophers is needed. That, however, was never the intention of this project.  
This thesis opens various lines of investigation where further work is possible. In 
general, the history of Greek philosophy might explore further the engagement between two 
different philosophers, or schools; a history not of the philosophers but of the philosophical 
debates. Methodologically, it also sets a precedent for analysing arguments in ancient 
philosophy. The idea was to respect the structure of the argumentation to see how each 
argument was linked and formed part of an interconnected whole. This, I believe, does 
more justice to the sophistication of the texts than focusing on one aspect and ignoring the 
rest. Analysing the argumentation in this way shows that what is often assumed as a 
digression in the text, is instead part of a complex network of arguments. I have shown that 
Plato, and in some cases also the Stoics, argue in a distinctive way that consistently 
incorporates, at the same time, methodological reflections, epistemology, metaphysics, and 
ethics. The moral is, then, to look for these connections and try to explain why ancient 
philosophers are interested in doing philosophy in this way. Perhaps by understanding that 








this is the way philosophy should be done, we may find that conversation has a 
transformational power after all.  
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